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In one sense, the Palestinian problem dates back to early history when the 
Canaanites, Israelites and Philistines contended for the territory and its 
resources. However, the modern Palestine problem dates only from the 
Balfour Declaration in 1917, and yet has proved to be more deadly, with six 
wars if one includes the Gulf War, and more intractable, with attempts to 
create a state of Palestine for nearly three-quarters of a century - 
A recent attempt to solve the problem was the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 
1979. If that had been the only purpose of Presidents Carter and Sadat and 
Prime Minister Begin at Camp David and of the last two in signing the Treaty 
in Washington, their efforts could only be described as futile. But more 
was a stake: the ending of a state of war and the resolution of outstanding 
territorial claims. In that regard the "Camp David process" was successful 
- indeed successful to the extent that an issue not resolved during the 
process, the question of Taba, was amicably settled by Egypt and Israel 
through arbitration. 
This thesis seeks to analyse the "Camp David process" and the terms of the 
Treaty in an attempt to answer the question of how the state of wart equelly 
important for Egypt and Israel, could be satisfactorily ended for both 
parties, how the territorial claims, equally important for both Israel and 
Egypto could be resolved, when the issue of Palestinet the source of 
virtually all the present conflicts in the Middle East and essential for 
the Egyptians as part of the Arab nation, should remain unresolved, despite 
the provisions of the Camp David Accords and the Treaty. 
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The Arab-Israeli conflict is one that has defied solution since the 
commencement of the British Mandate for Palestine in 1922. Its origin goes back 
to early history when the'Canaanites, Philistinians and the Israelites contended 
for the land and its resources. Since the termination of the Britsh Mandate 
and the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, it has precipitated six 
wars, if one includes the Gulf War. A recent attempt to solve the problem was 
the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979. 
On April 25,1979, the 31-year-old state of war between Egypt and Israel was 
formally ended when instruments of ratification of the 1979 Treaty were 
exchanged at the US surveillance post at Um-Khashiba in Sinai, thus beginning a 
new era in the relations between the two states. Certainly, the intention of 
the parties at Camp David, at least the Americans and the Egyptianso was not 
only to solve the Egyptian- Israeli coflict, but also to find a solution for the 
rest of the Arab-Israeli conflicts particularly, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. 
In one sense, the 1979 Treaty was intended as af irst step in that regard 
and a model for other peace treaties between Isreal and other Arab states. 
The Camp David Accords and the 1979 Treaty can be reduced to two elements, 
the territorial issues and the Palestinian clause. For a variety of reasons 
those parts of the Treaty dealing with the Egyptian- Israeli conflict were fully 
implemented, whereas the Palestinians clause was not. In facto forthe 
Palestinians the "Camp David process" was a failure'. For Egypt and Israel, it 
was successful - indeed successful to the extent that an issue not resolved 
xviii 
during the process, the question of Taba was amicably settled by Egypt and 
Israel through arbitration. 
This thesis seeks to analyse the "Camp David process* and the terms of the 
Treaty in an attempt to answer the question of how the state of war, equally 
important for Israel and Egypt, could be satisfactorily ended for both partiest 
how the territorial claims, more important for Israel than Egypt, could be 
resolved, when the issue of Palestine, the source of virtually all the present 
conflicts in the Middle East and essential for the Egyptians as part of the 
Arab nation, should remain unresolved, despite the provisions of the Camp David 
Acccords and the 1979 Treaty. 
The general framework of this study is as follows: 
First, a general background has been provided of the origins and the evolution 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Part I of this thesis deals with the roots of the 
Palestinian problem with an analysis of the modern Palestinian problem 
and its evolution from the Balfour Declaration in 1917 until the present time. 
Consideration is given in Part II to the manner in which the 1979 Treaty has 
dealt with the outstanding territorial issues between Egypt and Israel. Although 
this part purports to give a comprehensive acbount of the major territorial 
claims between Israel and Egypt, certain particular issues, because of their 
importance, are dealt with in much greater detail - the withdrawal of Israeli 
forces, the dispute over Taba, the Israeli settlements in the Sinai and the 
problem of the Gulf of Aqaba. These proplems are examined in Chapters Two 
and Three. 
xiX 
Part III examines the provisions relating to the Palestinian people and the 
question of East Jerusalem in two Chapters, Four and Five. 
Some general conclusions an the Camp David process and the 1979 Treaty are 
drawn at the end of this work. The conclusions evaluate the 1979 Treaty in 
the light of the expectations of its drafters, exploring to what extent the 
Camp David process and the 1979 Treaty could be a model for future negotiations 
and treaties between other Arab states and Israel. We will also propose 
solutions to the problems caused by areas not covered in the Treaty, and by 
deficiences in the wording and terminology used in the Treaty. 
By, prese nting a legal analysis of the issues covered, without favouring either 
Egypt epý Israel, it is hoped that this work will lead to a better 
understanding of the 1979 Treaty. It is also hoped that it will f ill, at any 
rate in part, the gap caused by the fact that legal literature on the subject is 
scarce in both Arabic and English. 

2 
j! A1-1RS111FR ! EARLY HISTORY 
In its broadest definition, the Middle East extends throughout all the 
countries that border the southern and eastern coasts of the 
Mediterranean Sea, from Morocco to Turkey, the Red Sea and the Gulf of 
Aqaba and the Persian Gulf. The Middle East conflict refers to that 
portion of the region comprising the area most directly involved in the 
dispute over the lands of the former mandate of Palestine-Israel and its 
neighbours Egypt, Jordan, Syrial Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the occupied 
territories encompassing the Vest Bank and Gaza Strip. ' 
The area known as Palestine is bordered by the Mediterranean Sea an the 
east, the Jordan River in the west, the Golan mountains and the Sea of 
Galilee on the north, and the Negev and Sinai Deserts on the south. 
There have been periodic crises in the Middle East since early recorded 
history, notably since the chosen 'people escaped Egyptian persecution by 
invading and/or infiltrating into the lands of the Canaanites. 1 
The Canaanites are the earliest known inhabitants of Palestine, and are 
thought to have settled there after 3000 B. C. Despite the fact that 
several peoples existed at one time or another in ancient Palestinet 
only three peoples played a leading role in that country and left a 
lasting impact on it. These peoples are the Canaanites, the Philistines# 
and the Israelites. The Palestinians are the descendants of the 
Canaanites and the Philistines. 3 
3 
The first Jewish kingdom was established in Palestine In 1030 BC, when 
the twelve Israeli tribes united under Saul who became their first king. 
After he was slain by the Philistines, his son-in-law David succeeded 
him and expanded his kingdom by conquest. Around 1000 BC, David invaded 
Jerusalem and made the City the capital of his kingdom. He ruled for a 
period of 33 years and was succeeded by his son Solomon who in turn 
ruled the kingdom for 40 years. 4 
After Solomon's death, the unified kingdom, which lasted 73 years, was 
split into two kingdoms, the Kingdom of Israel in the north and, the 
Kingdom of Juda in the south. While the Kingdom of Israel did not 
remain in existence for long, being destroyed by the Asserians in 721 
BC, the other Kingdom of Juda remained until 587 BC when it was 
destroyed by the Babylonians. The invaders burned Solomon' s Temple and 
carried the Jews into captivity. With the exile of the Jews, the Hebrew 
language disappeared from Palestine and was replaced by Aramic and 
Arabic. For several centuries Aramic was the language of Christians-6 
In 538 BC, the Persians invaded Palestine and put an end to Bablyonian 
rule. During the Persian era, which lasted two centuriest the Jews were 
allowed to return to Palestine. In 332 BC Alexander the Great invaded 
Palestine. In 166 BC another Jewish Kingdom, the Maccabian Kingdom, was 
established after the Jews revolted against the Greeks. In 134 BC, the 
Syrians besieged Jerusalem and levied a tribute upon the kingdom. 6 
In 63 BC the Romans occupied Palestine and put an end to the Maccabian 
Kingdom. During the Roman era, the Jews revolted twice against the 
Romans, in AD 66 to 70 and again in AD 132 to 135. As a result of their 
revolt, the Jews were either killed or dispersed to the four corners of 
the Roman Empire. From that time until the middle of the nineteenth 
4 
century there were practically no Jews In Jerusalem, and only a small 
number lived in Palestine. Also, during that era, one of the important 
events in the history of mankind occured in Palestine. This was the 
birth of Christ at Bethlehem. From that time, Bethlehem, where Christ 
was born, Nazareth and Galilee where he lived, and Jerusalem where he 
was crucified and buried, became Christianity's holiest places and 
Palestine itself became the Holy Land of ChristendoM. 7 
Ever since 6349 Semitic Arabs incorporated that region into the Islamic 
nation after defeating the Romans., When the Arabs drove the Romans out 
of Palestine, few Jews, following their expulsion by the Romans in AD 
70, remained in Palestine. During this era, the Arabs rescinded the 
decree of banishment and allowed the Jews to return to Palestine. Few, 
however, returned. 8 
Palestine remained under Moslem Arab rule until 1099 when it was 
invaded by the Crusaders who occupied the country and established the 
Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem which lasted 88 years. In 1187, Palestine 
was reconquered by Saladin and was restored to Moslem Arab rule. 9 
In 1517 the Ottoman Turks conquered Palestine and ruled it until the 
outbreak of World War I. The British forces in Egypt which were 
supported by an Arab army, invaded Palestine and occupied Jerusalem on 
December 9,1917. Turkish rule in Palestine came to an end shortly 
thereafter. It has been rightly observed that both the Moslem Arabs and 
the Turkish rulerst during their occupation of Palestinet did not make 
any alteration in the country's demographic structure, but only a change 
of rule and, to a large extent, a change of religion, Specifically, 
they brought no immigrants to the country. 10 
5 
THR IRAUQUIR DRCT. ARATTnl AND THR NAI[DATR 
There had been a long history of anti-Semitism in a number of European 
countries, and this became particularly intense in the 19th century. 
The Drefus affair in France is but one celebrated example-" 
From 1815 Russian Jews suffered increasing restrictions. Around 1881, 
Russia's difficulties were attributed to Jewish corruption, and Jews 
were massacred in a series of attacks. In 1914 it was estimated that 
over 2 million Jews had fled from Russia. 12 
The 1819 "Hep Hep" riot started in Wurzburg and spread through the 
German states and into Austria, Hungary, Poland and Denmark. These 
states accused Jewish financiers and bankers of being responsible for 
economic difficulties, and some central European Jews emigrated to the 
United States. 13 
In 1860 some argued that an assimilation of Jews in the countries in 
which they were living was not possible because of the fact that their 
racial characteristics were unchangeable. In other words, "a Jew could 
not, for instance, became a German through baptism and a rejection of 
heritage. "', ' Since that time, the word anti-Semitism came into general 
use, signifying that Opposition to Jews was based on grounds of race not 
of creed. Since 1880, it was estimated that over 3 million Jews, due to 
the waves of anti-Semitism in Europe, fled over three decades settling 
in Britain, Canadas Australia and South Africa; but the vast majority 
found a new home in the United States. A few of them, it is worth 
mentioning, went to Palestine which was then part of the Ottoman 
Empire-Is Aware of the problem of anti-Semitism and of the fact that the 
Jews suffered persecution in most European countriesp particularly 
Eastern Europe, Theodor Herzl wrote to Baran Rothschild that: "for 
6 
nearly 2000 years Jews had been dispersed all over the world without a 
state of their own; if only the Jews had a political centre they could 
begin to solve the problem of anti-Semitism. " 16 
With the publication of Der Judenstaat)7, most accurately translated as 
"The State Of Jews". Herzl became the ambassador of the emerging Zionist 
movement, as well as the father of political Zionism. According to his 
ideas, the Jews must be granted sovereignty over territory adequate for 
their national requirements. Herzl had two possible regions in mind: 
Argentina and Palestine. Argentina was one of the most fertile 
countries, whereas Palestine was the unforgettable historic homelandq 
and the very name would, Herzl thought, be a good rallying point. "' 
In Basel, in August 1897, Herzl, having organized the Jewish masses 
behind his ideas, convened the first Zionist Congress which formulated 
the specific intent and purposes of political Zionism concluding that 
"Zionism aims to establish a publicly and legally assured home for the 
Jewish people". The major outcome of the Basel programme was the 
emergence of the World Zionist Organization, a national flag, a national 
antheno "Hatiqva"l and the Jewish national fund. 19 It is worth 
mentioning that, at the end of the first Zionist Congress, Herzl noted 
in his diary that at Basel he f ounded the Jewish state; at that time 
such an idea was regarded with general incredulity. 20 
Several unsuccessful attempts were made in subsequent years to 
establish Jewish settlements in the Sinai Peninsula in EgYPto Cyprust 
and Uganda. However, during this period, there emerged a few Jewish 
settlements in Palestine. The seventh Zionist Congress ruled that 
settlement should be confined to Palestine. 21 Herzl died in 1904, and 
his successor was Chaim, Veizmann, a Russian immigrantt who was a 
A 
7 
practical leader rather than a theorizer. The new Jewish leader was in 
favour of the idea that "saw Palestine as being the focus of the 
renaissance of Judaism based on the positive love of Zion. 1122 While 
working to increase ihe number of Jewish settlements in Palestine from 
1904, Veizmann sought to put pressure an European governments to support 
Zionism. Settling in Britain, he attempted to win, by all means, the 
support of the British government for the Jewish cause. By April 1919 
Zionism had achieved a new status in British political thinking. For 
reasons which V411 be mentioned, some influential British officials held 
the opinion that an accomodation with the Zionists could help British 
interests in the Middle East and elsewhere. In the spring of 1916 some 
politicians had gone as far as to suggest thatt not only Britaing but 
all the Allies should jointly issue a declaration pledging to take 
Zionist aspiration 
.5 
in Palestine into account in the postwar 
settlement . 23 
Undoubtedly, the present crisis of the Middle Eastlas Quincy Wright 
observed, began with the Balfour Declaration. 24 The British 
declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspiration was communicated 
to Lord Rothschild by Arthur James Balfour, in his capacity as Foreign 
Secretary, in a letter dated November 2,1917, and made public a week 
later: "I. have much pleasure in conveying to you, an behalf of His 
Majesty's Government týe following declaration of sympathy with Jewish 
Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to and approved by the 
Cabinet. His Majesty' a, Government view with favour the establishment in 
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their 
best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being 
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the 
Aý 
8 
civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
V16 
Palestine or theý rights and political status by Jews in any other 
countries. U26 
In respect of the Declaration, Bassiouni and Fisher have pointed to two 
factors that must be carefully weighed and contrasted: first, the 
political promise clause, i. e., the establishment of a national home for 
the Jews; and secondly, the safeguard clause concerning the non-Jewish 
communities . 2r, As far as the political clause is concerned, there 
is no 
concensus of opinion as to the exact meaning of the term "national 
home" - Clearlyt the term is vague, presumably deliberately so. 
Neverthelesso two conflicting views had been forwarded. The first 
claimed that the national home would involve the establishment of a 
Jewish state in Palestine. This view was, of course, held by many 
Zionists. On the other hand, the second view denied that such was its 
intention or meaning. In the words of Sir Herbert Samuel in the House 
of Lards in 1917, "If the Balfour Declaration had intended that.... it 
would have said so... there was no promise of a Jewish state. . 027 
It may be added that the British Government declared an several 
occasions that the Declaration must not dislodge or disturb the Arab 
population of Palestine since it did not involve the creation of a 
Jewish state, nor the subordination of the Palestinians to Jewish 
immigrants. 26 As to the safeguard clause, Bassiouni, and Fisher pointed 
out: "In contrast, the safeguard clause seems clear and unequivocal. The 
words 'it being clearly understood' prove that however vague and 
ambiguous the political promise clause might be, it was subordinated to 
and condtioned upon the implementation of the safeguard clause which 
reassured the non-Jewish population of Palestine that there would be no 
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resulting injury to their rights from the political bargain struck 
between Britain and the Zionists. " 29 
There has never been a consensus of opinion as to the legality of 
the Declaration. For instance, the Declaration, according to one view 
cannot be illegal since It was in the nature of a mere promise of 
sympathy lacking any legal effect. 
inclusion in the Mandate provisions 
It follows that only after its 
I the Declaration possessed 
legal effect. On the other hand, some argued that the Declaration was 
void. An advocate of this view is Henry Cattan who wrote: *The Balfour 
Declaration is legally void, and morally wicked, and politically 
mischievous". 311 Cattan' s argument is based on the premise that the 
Declaration denied the Palestinian people their natural right of self- 
determination, and therefore was in violation of international law. 
Other reasons have been given as a basis for the nullity of the 
Declaration. It has been rightly argued that the consent of the people 
of Palestine, who were the indigenous and sovereign inhabitants was 
never asked or obtained. The British government, a foreign power in 
regard to Palestine, did not possess, nor had it ever possessed, any 
sovereignty, right of disposition or Jurisdiction over Palestine that 
enabled it to grant any rights, be they political or territorial, to an 
alien people over the territory of Palestine. Finally and most 
significantly, Turkey, as the legal sovereign over Palestine at the time 
of the issue of Balfour Declaration, did not consent to it. " 
The question of the legitimacy of the Balfour Declaration has been 
deliberately overlooked by Britain and other major powers supporting it. 
In the words of Lord Balfour, 11 ... The four great powers are committed 
to Zionism, and Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in 
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age-long tradition, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder 
import than the desire and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now 
inhabit that ancient land. 1132 
As far as the reasons for the Declaration are concernedg it is true 
that the influential pressure exerted on the British Government by the 
Jewish Zionists and their supporters in Britain had played an important 
role in obtaining that Declaration. Nevertheless, the Balfour 
Declaration had been approved by the British Cabinet for a number of 
other reasons. It had been believed by some British politicians that it 
was essential for Great Britain to establish a firm foothold in 
Palestine and that an understanding with the Zionists could help to 
strengthen Great Britain's position as a partner in the Anglo-French 
condominium envisaged by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916.31 
It was also thought that Zionist sympathies for the Allied cause could 
help the war effort. Zionists in Russia could stop that country's 
drift out of the war, while Zionists in the US, due to their influential 
position in American politics, could speed up the American contribution 
following the US declaration of war. 34 
Finally and significantly, during this period there was increasing 
concern in Britain about the many Jews fleeing persecution in Russia and 
other Eastern European countries. The British Government was also 
concerned by the problem seen as being caused by Jewish immigrants in 
Britain. There is no better quotation In this respect than what had 
been written in "The Times" on May 1,1905: 
"The immigration of Russians and Poles, nearly all of whom are said to 
be Jewss amounted to 28,511 to 30,046 in 1903, and to 46,095 in 1904. It 
is at least probable that it will reach 50,000 in the year now 
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proceeding... Apart from the seething mass of poverty and of criminality 
Whic h has thus been forced upon the attention of the public, it is well 
known to all who have inquired into the subject that the Russian and 
Polish immigrants as a rule consist of persons who are habituated to a 
lower standard of cleanliness and comfort than that which prevails among 
even the humblest of our own poor, and that they are content to work f or 
wages upon which no industrious Englishman, however much he might be 
said to be sweated by an employer, could attempt to live... EThe English 
inhabitants of the East End of London are becoming] more and more 
impatient of the presence of their unsavoury and unwelcome neighbours, 
and more and more anxious that the plague of their continual coming 
should be stayed. "36 
Turning now to what had happened in the aftermath of the Balfour 
Declaration, one must admit, at the outset, that Britain had to face the 
problem resulting from the fact that the Declaration contained 
contradictory promises. In the words of Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin 
in the House of Commons: 
"There is no denying the fact that the Mandate [which incorporated the 
Balfour Declaration] contained contradictory promises. In the first 
place it promised the Jews a national home and in the second place it 
declared that the rights and position of the Arabs must be protected. 
Therefore, it provided what was virtually an invasion of the country by 
thousands of immigrants and at' the same time said that was not to 
disturb the people in possession. 1136 
In the years 1918 and 1919, the British military administration, 
according to Jewish sources, 37 showed no sympathy with the Balfour 
Declaration. During these two years, the Declaration was not 
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officially published or referred to in Palestine. This was mainly due 
to the hostile attitude to the Jews existing in Palestine. On January 
3,1919, an agreement was reached between Amir Fisal, then the leader of 
the Arab Awakening Movement and Chaim Weizmann, President of World 
zionism. 3a The agreement recited that the "Surest means for the 
consummation of their EArabs' and Zionists'] national aspiration is 
through... closest cooperation of the Arab State and Palestine... Arab and 
Jewish duly accredited agents shall be established and maintained in 
their respective territories... The definite boundaries between the Arab 
State and Palestine shall be determined by a commission to be agreed 
upon ... The constitution and administration of Palestine shall afford the 
fullest guarantee for carrying into effect the [Balfour 
Declaration] ... All necessary measures shall be taken to... stimulate 
immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale... In taking such 
measures the Arab peasants and farmers shall be guaranteed in their 
rights. 1139 
On April 24,1920, the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference at San 
Remo resolved that the Mandate over Palestine be conferred an Britain, 
charging her with the establishment of a national home for the Jewish 
people as laid down in the Balfour Declaration. This was in fact a 
turning point of the history of Palestine . 40 In the same year, 
Sir 
Herbert Samuel, a Jew and a Zionist, was appointed High' commisioner in 
Palestine. As soon as he arrived to Palestine in June 19201 he made 
Hebrew an official language in -Palestine side by side with Arabic and 
English. He then helped to increase the number of Jewish immigrants by 
creating jobs for them in government road projects in the north. Also$ 
as a concession to the Jews who, wanted the country to be called by its 
13 
historic name, Erpzt Israel, the Hebrew initials were added in 
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Map 1. The Palestine Mandate, 1920 - 1948. 
In 1921 two important events occured. First, Prince Abdullah, a son of 
King Hussain of Mecca, seized the area known as Trans-Jordan and was 
recognized by Britain an March 27,1921, as emir with a British advisor 
and a subvention from Britain. Subsequently, Trans-Jordan was closed to 
Jewish settlement. Trans-Jordan, during this time, was part of the 
territories of the Palestine Mandate entrusted to Britain. 42 At this 
Point, it is worth observing that, according to a prevailing view, the 
territories of Trans-Jordan never formed part of historical Palestine as 
some Israelis have claimed. As one writer indicateel 11 ... The area 
lying 
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east of Jordan river... which was called Trans-Jordann. had not formed 
part of historical Palestine. In Ottoman times, it had been 
administratively part of the Province of Syria and was called the 
district of Balqa, 043 
The second event in 1921 was the outbreak of violence, in Jaffa and 
other areas, between the Arabs and the Jews, The outcome was that a 
number of victims from both sides were killed during the riots. " As a 
result, Samuel ordered a temporary halt to immigration and entered into 
negotiations with the Arab Executive Committee. The outcome of these 
negotiations was a Vhite Paper issued by Churchill an June 22,1922. It 
gave a restrictive interpretation of the Balfour Declaration, indicating 
that "it did not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be 
converted into a Jewish national home. 904S One month later the League 
of Nations Council confirmed the Palestine Mandate, citing the Balfour 
Declaration in the preamble and referring to the "historical connection 
of the Jewish people in Palestine" as a ground for reconstituting their 
national home in that country. It also provided for the recognition of 
the Zionist Organization as the Jewish Agency, to advise and cooperate 
with the administration "in such economic, social, and other matters as 
may affect the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the 
interests of the Jewish population in Palestine. 1146 
On the other hand, the Mandate referred to the rights of the Arab 
Palestinians, then constituting the vast majority of the population of 
Palestine: "it being clearly understood that nothing should be done 
which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing 
non-Jewish communities in Palestine. 6447 
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The above provisions of the Mandate require some observations. In the 
f irst place, it imposed upon the mandatory two contradictory 
obligations. It provided that the mandatory would permit the arrival in 
the country by thousands of immigrants; at the same time the mandatory 
had to safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants. 
Also, it is noteworthy that "although the Mandate speaks of Jewsithe 
Jewish people and the Jewish population of Palestine, it does not once 
mention the Palestinians or the Palestinian Arabs who... then constituted 
92 percent of the population. 049 Only the World Zionist Organization 
and its representatives were consulted about the terms'of the Mandate, 
and they also participated in drafting it. The Arab Palestinians, on 
the other hand, were neither consulted about the Mandate, nor was their 
consent obtained as to its terms. 
The arguments over the legitimacy of the Mandate, including its 
injustice under international law, its deprivation of the indigenous 
people of Palestine of their right of self-determination and its 
incompatibility with Article 22 of the Covenant, are well-known and do 
not need to be repeated here. 49 
Turning to the implementation of the Mandate, there is no doubt that 
the British policy did not achieve the basic purpose of Article 22 of 
the Covenant of the League of Nations to lead the people to full 
independence. British policy could not develop self-governing 
institutions, as stipulated by Article 2 of the Mandate. This is due 
partly to Arab opposition and partly to the fact that the Jews rejected 
any form of self-government in Palestine so long as they were a 
minority. An example is the unsuccessful attempt made in 1922 to grant 
some semblance of autonomy in the form of legislative council. Hence, 
16 
after almost three decades of the Mandate there was no sign of 
self-governing institutions. 60 
The main achievement of the Mandate was its authorization of a massive 
Jewish immigration into Palestine which resulted in the modification of 
the demographic structure in the country from a largely Palestinian Arab 
population. to a mixed Arab-Jewish population. In facts the Jewish 
population increased more than ten fold. According to a U. N. report, " 
the Jewish population increased from 56,000 in 1918 to 83,794 in the 
census of 1922, to 174,610 in the census of 1931, and to 608,230 in 1946 
out of a total population of 1,972,560. 
It may be significant here to indicate that this immigration and 
demographic change in the inhabitants of Palestine was achieved against 
the will of the indigenous population and in the face of their 
oppoSition. 62 The Palestinian opposition took the form of 
demonstrations, disturbances and an armed rebellion. An example is the 
Arab revolt that began in 1936. It started with a six-month general 
strikes guerilla activities and effective seizure of large areas of 
Palestine. This Arab resistance, however, was broken by the British and, 
by the spring of 1939, the revolt had come to an end. 63 
The main outcome of the three years of the Arab revolt was the White 
Paper of 1939, whereby the British Government announced its intention to 
limit Jewish immigration into Palestine to 10,000 a year for a period of 
five years, bringing the Jewish population to a third of the totals 
after which further immigration would depend upon Arab consent; the 
sale of land to Jews was to be severely restricted; finally, the White 
Paper provided for granting Palestine its independence within ten 
years. 64 
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The Vhite Paper of 1939 was followed by a British policy which sought 
Arab neutrality in the period 1939-1945 and which led Zionists to 
change their tactics. Instead of concentrating on the mandatory power, 
Britain, they focused on the United States. "They threatened electoral 
punishment through the Zionist vote if the American administration 
failed to support a Jewish state. " They believed that the U. S. could 
hand Palestine over to Zionists. 66 
In the meantine, the Zionists used new methods in Palestine. A policY 
of attrition was waged against the administration. From the middle of 
World War II, two Jewish terrorist organizationsthe Stern and the Irgun 
Zvdi Leumi, made a number of attacks an British forces in Palestine and 
on officials abroad (e. g., the assassination of Lord Mayne, the British 
Resident Minister in the Middle East in Cairo in 1944). sc' 
In April 1947 the British Government decided to submit the Palestine 
problem to the UN. Behind this was the fact that the Palestine problem 
had become too complicated. As one writer pointed auto "Harassed by 
the Jewish campaign of violence and terror, unable to permit any further 
Jewish immigration against the wishes Of the original inhabitants, 
subjected to pressure by American President Harry Truman to open the 
gates of Palestine to Jewish immigrants while the US Government closed 
to them its own doors, the British Government decided to refer... the 
question to the U]W. "67 
THE UK PARTIT1011 R&90LUTT_nN OF 1947 
On April 2,1947, the British Government informed the Secretary-General 
of the UN that it wished that question-of Palestine be placed on the 
agenda of the General Assembly at the next session. Britain intended to 
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ask the Assembly "to make a recommendation under Article 10 of the 
Charter concerning the future government of Falestine. "r*13 
The General Assembly held a special meeting on April 28,1947 to 
consider the Palestine question. In the debate, the Jewish 
representatives and the Palestinian representatives were invited to 
submit their views. The Jews asked for the reconstitution of the Jewish 
national home in Palestine in accordance with the Balfour Declaration, 
whereas the Palestinian representative "opposed the plan to partition 
Palestine, and emphasized that the Palestinian Arabs were entitled to 
their independence an the basis of the Charter and their natural and 
inalienable rights. 1169 The Arab states, during the same debate, 
expressed the view that the only course open to the UN was to recognize 
the termination of the Mandate and declare the independence of 
Palestine. When this Arab proposal was submitted to the vote, it failed 
to obtain the required najority. 60 
On May 15,1947, the General Assembly appointed a special committee on 
Palestine (UNSCOP) to prepare a report on Palestine. Its terms of 
reference gave the committee "the widest powers to ascertain and record 
facts, and to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the 
problem of Palestine. "c-I In its report, published on August 31,1947, 
the committee recommended unanimously that the Mandate for Palestine 
should be terminated at the earliest possible date and that independence 
should be granted in Palestine at the earliest practical date. However$ 
the committee could not agree on a unanimous opinion as regards the 
future of Palestine. It, thereforej proposed two plans, one agreed by 
the MaJority and other approved by a minority. 62 
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The seven- member majority called for the partition of Palestine into 
an Arab state, a Jewish state, and a corpus separatum for the city of 
Jerusalem, which would be subjected to a special international regime 
to be administrated by the UK. The Arab state was to comprise Western 
Gallilee, the hill country of the Vest Bank (excluding Jerusalem), and 
the coastal plain from Ashdod to the Sinai frontier; the Jewish state 
would include eastern Gallilee, the Jezreel valley, most of the coastal 
plain, and the Negev. On the other hand, the minority, consisting of 
representatives of India, Iran, and Yugoslavia, proposed the 
establishment of a bi-national federal state which would comprise an 
Arab and a Jewish state with Jerusalem as the capital of the 
federation. 63 
When the report of UNSCOP came up for discussion, Arab states 
rejected the partition proposals for two main reasons. First, the UN 
General 'Assembly was not competent, under the Charter, to recommend the 
partition of Palestine. Secondly and most significantly, they stressed 
that both the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate over Palestine were 
null and void. 64 
As a result, sub-committee 2 of the ad hoc committee on the Palestine 
question was asked to study the issues raised by the Arab states 
rejecting partition. In its report, the sub-committee recommended that 
these issues be referred to the International Court of- Justice for an 
advisory opinion. In this context, it suggested a number of important 
questions to be submitted to the Court. It seems relevant and useful to 
quote these questions : 
(a)Vhether the indigenous population of Palestine has an inherent right 
to Palestine and to determine its future constitution and government; 
'A 
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(b)Whether the pledges and assurences given by Great Britain to the 
Arabs during the First World War (including the Anglo-French Declaration 
of 1918) concerning the independence and future of Arab countries at the 
" rV 
end of the war did not include Palestine; 
(c)Vhether the Balfour Declaration, which was made without the knowledge 
or consent of the indigenous population of Palestine, was valid and 
binding on the people of Palestine, or consistent with the earlier and 
subsequent pledges given to the Arabs; 
(d)Vhether the provision. 1of the Mandate for Palestine regarding the 
establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine are in coumformity 
or consistent with the provisiony of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations (in particular Article 22), or are compatible with the provision 
of the Mandate relating to the development of self-government and the 
preservation of the rights of and position of the Arabs of Palestine; 
(e)Whether the legal basis of the Mandate for Palestine has not 
disappeared with the dissolution of the League of Nations, and whether 
it is not the duty of the Mandatory Power to hand over powers and 
administration to a goverment of Palestine representing the rightful 
people of Palestine, 
(f)Whether a plan to partition Palestine without the consent of the 
majority of its people is consistent with the objectives of the 
Covenant of the League of Rations, and with the provisions of the 
Mandate for Palestine; 
(g)Whether the United Nations is competent to recommend either of the 
two plans and recommendations of the majority or minority of the United 
Nations Special Committee on Palestinetor any other solution involving 
partition of the territory of Palestine, or permanent trusteeship over 
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any city or part of Palestine, without the consent of the majority of 
the people of Palestine , 
(h)Vhether the United Nations or any of its members is competent to 
enforce or recommend the enforcement of any proposal concerning the 
constitution and future goverment of Palestine, in particular any plan 
of partition which is contrary to the wishes, or adopted without the 
consent of the inhabitants of Palestine. 66 
Nevertheless, despite its importance, the recomm ndation to refer these 
questions to the International Court of Justice was rejected by the ad 
hoc committee on November, 24,1947 by 25 votes to 18.66 
The General Assembly adopted, on November . 29,1947, Resolution 181(ID 
for the partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state. The 
partition provided for the majority plan with slight territorial 
modifications. The Resolution was adopted by a vote of 33 to 13 with ten 
abstentions. The UK abstained. 67 
The outcome of the Partition Resolution was that the Jews, who 
constituted less than one-third of the population, who were largely 
foreigners and who owned less than 6 percent of the land, were given an 
area almost ten times greater than what they owned, namely, 57 percent 
of Palestine, while it left 43 percent of the land to the Palestinians. 
Thus, there is some reason, in the observation of Cattan that: " This is 
not a partition but a spoilation. 1'rG 
THE FOUR VARq 
Two years before the declaration of the creation of Israel, Arab 
leaders were invited by the Arab League to meet in Bludan (Syria) in 
October 1946 to consider the possibility of an Arab military action or 
22 
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intervention to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine 
and to help the Arab Palestinians to defend themselves against the 
Jewish aggression launched by the "military Jewish gangs". During this 
meeting, the Egyptian representative expressed the view that it had been 
decided previously not to engage in military operations outside Egyptian 
territories. 69 Nevertheless, despite this decision, some Egyptian 
volunteers, who belonged to Egyptian Islamic movementso were sent the 
same year to take part in the Arab struggle in Palestine where there 
had been a state of a civil war between the Jewish immigrants and the 
Arab inhabitants since 1936.70 
Vith the departure of the British High Commission on May 14,1948, the 
state of Israel was proclaimed. Reacting to that Declarationt the Arab 
League adopted a resolution calling on Arab States to intervene to 
restore peace and safeguard Arab lives in the absence of any settled 
authority. In his cablegram to the Secretary- General of the United 
Nations, the Secretary-General of the League explained the reasons for 
this intervention as being "to restore law and order and to prevent 
disturbances prevailing in Palestine from spreading into their 
territories and check further bloodshed. 91 71 
According to the military plan approved by the Arab League, it was 
decided to enter Palestine using four Arab armies. The Syrian and 
Lebanese forces were to enter northern Palestine, the Iraqis and the 
Arab Legion to attack south of Lake Galilee towards Haifa and the 
Egyptian army to be essentially diversionary, pinning down Jewish forces 
south 5>S' Tel Aviv. However, it has been said that the Arab forces were 
generally restricted to the area alloted to Palestine Arabs in the 
Partition Resolution. The Egyptian force was about 10,000 soldiers 
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organized into two brigades. The fighting lasted from May 6 to June 
11,19480 when the first cease-fire came into effect in response to a 
Security Council resolution. At this time, the Egyptian forces had 
occupied some parts of south Palestine, including Negev. Fighting 
resumed afterogyptian government refused to renew the truce. During 
this period, Israeli forces were able to defeat the Egyptian armies and 
enter some areas behind the Egyptian boundariesg namely the Rafah 
Heights. 72 The Egyptian Government invoked the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 
1936, under which Britain was obliged to assist Egypt in the event of 
attack from an outside party. 73 
On December 29, the Security Council ordered an immediate cease-f ire 
and Israeli withdrawal from Egypt. The British government declared that, 
unless Israel obeyed the Security Council resolution, Britain would 
employ its forces in accordance with the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. 
The Egyptians declared that, unless Israel withdrew from their 
territory, they would not begin armistice negotiations. Israel 
responded by withdrawing from the Rafah Heightýin the second week of 
January in order to begin peace negotiations with Egypt . 74 On January 
13,1949 the first peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel began 
under the supervision of the UN an the Island of Rhodes. Within ten 
days , the two states reached an agreement which was signed an February 
25,1949. Then followed the Armistice Agreement between Israel and 
Lebanon an March 23,1949; then the Jordanian- Israeli Agreement an 
April 3.1949; andthe Syrian-Israeli Agreement on July 20,1949 . 76 
For Israel, the main outcome of the war was its seizure of 78 percent 
of the territories of the Mandate of Palestine. Bolstered by its 
decisive victory over four Arab armies, Israel refused to implement the 
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UN Partition Resolution of 1949. The Egyptians, who realized that the 
main reason behind the defeat was the fact that their army entered the 
war without the preparation required, began to wonder about the reason 
behind the government's decisions which brought this defeat to Egypt. 
Map 3 The State of Israel, 1949-1967 
The Arab-Israeli Wý)r, 1949-49 
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The outcome for the Arab League was its total failure to face the first 
challenge to Arab security. Its fai lure resulted in t he loss Of Most Of 
Palestine. The main reason for the failure was the lack of 
coordination among the Arab armies . In fact, the League failed 
to 
appoint an overall Arab military commander because of internal Arab 
differences. While, for instance, the Jordanian army accepted a 
cease-fire, the Egyptian army, due to this lack of coordination, was 
still fighti ng. 7r- 
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One of the most notable outcomes of the 1948 war was the existence of a 
state of war between the Arab states and Israel. From 1948, the Arabs 
considered themselves at war with Israel. The resolution and procedures 
adopted by the League since 1948 have emphasized this state. The 
economic boycott initiated by the League relied partly on the state of 
war doctrine, as did the political boycott of Israel by the ArabS77. 
From 1948, Egypt announced that she still regarded herself as being in 
a state of war with Israel since that status continued despite the 
Armistice Agreements ands therefore, she reserved to herself for her own 
protection certain belligerent's rights of visit, search and seizure. 
As a result, Egypt barred the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba from 
Israeli navigation. The Israelis did not accept Egypt's argument and 
practices and questioned the legality of the existence of the state of 
war with Egypt7Q. Reasons in support of these two views need to be 
outlined. 
In support of the first view, it has been argued that, under 
international law, the rule is that an armistice agreement does not 
terminate the state of war existing between the belligerents# and that 
the rights and duties of the belligerents and of neutrals remain in 
being. 79 According to some scholars who support this view# the Arab- 
Israeli Armistice Agreements do not derogate from the general rule 
applicable to all armistices, i. e., that they provide for a complete 
cessation of all hostilities, for a specified or indeterminate period, 
but do not bring about peace in the legal sense or proscribe the 
exercise of belligerent rights, save those fcr the conduct of 
hostilities, under the law of war. " This view is supported by many 
writers and has received judical approval on a number of occasions-" 
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State practice reveals that the traditional concepts relating to the 
state of war doctrine still form a significant part of international 
law. For example, when Siam applied for admission to the UN, France's 
objections thereto were based upon the continuation of a state of war 
between the two countries resulting from Siam's aggression in Indo- 
China92. Furthermore, at one stage Greece considered itself technically 
in a state of war with Albania, a ground which was accepted by the 
International Court in the Corfu ChAnnol Case as justifying certain 
measures Albania could have taken in respect of the passage through the 
Channel 93. Some Allied Powers considered themselves in a state of war 
with Japan for a number of years after its surrender. 94 
Also, this view was held by national courts. The United Arab 
Republics Prize Court affirmed the existence of a state of war despite 
the armistice agreement as long as there existed "the need to be in a 
permanent defensive position so that the Arab states can preserve their 
existence, independence and security. 96 
On the other hand, some scholars support Israel in holding that the 
belligerency between the parties concerned was terminated by the 
conclusion of the Armistice Agreement of 1949. The following reasons 
have been advanced. 
First, the question of the nature of the Armistice Agreements and their 
effect upon the state of war between Israel and the Arab States was 
debated before the Security Council in 1951 when Israel complained to 
the Security Council against the restrictions imposed by Egypt upon the 
passage of Israeli ships in- the Suez Canal. Both Egypt and Israel 
expressed their own view on the issue. On September 1,1951 the Security 
Council adopted a resolution which provided Inter alla: 
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"that since the armistice regime, which has been in existence for nearly 
two and a half years, is of a permanent character, neither party can 
reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent or rb.. i. lresnhat to 
exercise the right of visit, search and seizure for any legitimýte 
purpose of self-defence. 1196 
Thus, by rejecting the Egyptian claim of belligerent rights, the 
resolution has been construed by some authors as an authority for the 
legal proposition that the Armistice Agreements were a de factc, 
termination of war and that belligerent rights were no longer 
available. 87 In contemporary practice, an armistice agreement may have 
the effect of terminating the legal status of war, particularly if the 
agreement was concluded for an indefinite duration. As is well-knownt 
the Armistice Agreements between the Arabs and Israel were concluded 
for an indefinite duration, thus leading to a de facta state of 
peace98. 
Moreover, it has been argued that the existence of a state of war can 
in no way be reconciled with the provisions of the Charter of the UK. 
In this respect Feinberg argued that "The provisions of Article 2j 
paragraph 4, prohibiting the use, or the threat, of forcet ares of 
course, no guarantee against developments which might$ in consequence of 
a breach of them, lead to hostilities between member states of the 
Organization, and even to military operations on a very wide scale. But 
it is impossible to maintain that, on the cessation of such hostilities 
(generally, by a cease-fire order of the Security Council), a State can 
lawfully argue that it is'at- war with the State with which it has been 
in conflict... The authors draw a distinction between a "state of war" 
accompanied by hostilities and one not so accompanied: the former, in 
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their opinion, is forbidden, the latter, permissible, under the 
Charter. 1189. Lastlyj the Tel Aviv District Court declared that the war 
between Israel and Lebanon had been terminated not later than March 
23,1949-1111. 
Another outcome of the 1948 War concerned the 1950 Arab Defence Pact. 
By 1950, the lessons learned from the Arab defeat in the 1948 war 
brought about the conclusion of the Arab Joint Defence and Economic 
Cooperation Treaty. The Treaty established an Arab system for 
collective self defence to replace the system provided by Article 6 of 
the League's Charter. 91 
The final outcome was the Arab economic boycott. In 1951, a central 
boycott officet with headquarters in Damascus, was established to 
implement the League's policy and the boycott programme. The boycott 
principles and detailed regulations, which were drafted by the 
directors of regional offices and members of the central boycott office, 
were approved by the League's Council. It was called "the unified law" 
and was subsequently approved by the legislative authorities in each 
Arab State. The boycott legislation provided a number of principles: 
all natural and legal persons were prevented from entering into 
transactions with any persons or firms resident in Israel, or of Israeli 
nationality, or acting on behalf of or in the interest of Israel, if the 
object of these transactions was commercial, financial or any other kind 
of dealings. The entry or exchange of, or commerce in any goods, 
products or intangible property of Israel was prohibited. Any person 
who was proved to be dealing with Israel and violating these rules would 





the foreign companies dealing with Israel would be 
banned in certain circumstances. 92 
In relation to foreign banks, they would be banned if they give loans 
to Israeli firms or institutions in a way that enabled them to carry out 
major projects. Moreover$ they were not allowed to establish firms or 
companies in Israel. The principles of the boycott may be changed and 
altered to coincide with the interests of the Arab cause. The 
regulations of the boycott cannot be applied unless an approach is made 
to the companies r': to enquire about their relations with Israelo 
and to allow them to comply with the boycott regulations. 
On July 23,1952, Gamal Abdel-Nasser, seized control of the Egyptian 
government in a bloodless military coup. His hatred for the British 
was announced in his speeches, as he regarded Britain-, jesponsible for 
the establishment of the Jewish state in Palestine and for occupying 
Egyptian territories for seventy-two years. 93 
After seizing power, Nasser's aim was to liquidate the British 
occupation in and outside Egypt. The Egyptian government encouraged 
liberation movements against the British in the Arabian Gulf and Africa. 
Nasser rejected the idea of linking the Middle East with Western 
defensive organizations, such as the organization of Baghdad Pact which 
was sponsored by the British. He nationalized the Suez Canal Company. 
The British government owned a controlling interest in the company's 
shares, a quarter of British imports passed through the Canal, and a 
third of the ships using the waterway were British. 
France had its own reasons for disliking the new government in Egypt. 
All the liberation movements against France in North Africa had been 
encouraged by Nasser. He was the main supplier of' weapons to the 
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Algerian revolutionary movement. During a meeting in Cairo, on March 
IFZ 
I-- 14,1956, Nasser assured French Foreign Minister that Egypt would refrain 
from supporting Algerian independence but did not. The second state 
after Britain to be affected by the Suez Canal nationalization was 
France. For Nasser, Fance had been regarded as an enemy since it 
occupied Arab territories and supplied Israel with modern weapons. 
As for Israel, Israeli territory was subject to guerrilla raids by the 
"fedaieen" movement, organised by the Egyptian government. It has been 
said that there was no specific provision in the Armistice Agreement of 
1949 between Egypt and Israel committing Egypt to prevent such raids. 
Moreover, the Gulf of Aqaba had been blocked to Israeli navigation in 
the Red Sea, and no goods f or Israel were allowed to pass through the 
Suez Canal. Israel was also worried about the growing influence of 
Nasser's policy in the Arab world, as the leadership of the Arab world 
was clearly shifting to him. On February, 28,1955, Israel launched an 
attack on Gaza that led to the killing of thirty eight Egyptian officers 
and men. Egypt retaliated with guerrilla raids. Nasser turned to the 
Eastern bloc for weaponsg since he. considered that attack as the turning 
point in his policy toward Israel. 
In order to finance his great economic project, the Aswan High Dam, 
Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal an July 26,1956 to use its revenues 
to finance the dam project. The British government, in response, decided 
to take military action against Egypt to seize the Suez Canal. France 
and Israel had agreed to take part in that action. 
At this point, it is worth mentioning that the decision of the British 
and French governments to intervene militarily in Egypt was not 
Justified under international law. According to Henkin, lawyers told 
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Eden that force would be illegal even as a last resort. 94 In the House 
of Lords, on September 12,1956, Lord MacNair, a leading British 
international lawyer, said that 11 as far as the events in the present 
controversy up to date are known to us, I am unable to see the legal 
justification of the threat or use of armed forces against Egypt in 
order to impose a solution of this dispute. "96 
The war plan agreed by the three was that Israel would attack the 
Egyptian boundaries in Sinai Peninsula, then a joint British and French 
military force would invade Egypt and seize the area of Suez Canal to 
guarantee international navigation. The military intervention had 
several aims: to control the Suez Canal navigation by the British so 
they could regain their prestige in the Arab world; to destroy the 
leadership of Nasser who helped liberation movements against the British 
and French; to link the new Egyptian government which would replace 
Nasser with Vestern collective defence, an idea that was rejected by 
Nasser. 
On October 29,1956, Israel, supported by a modern French army attacked 
Sinai. According to Defence Minister Dayan, "the purpose of the 
campaign was to wipe out the Egyptian army in Sinai, to destroy the 
"Fedaieen" bases in Gaza and to open up the Straits of Tiran-1111 Yet, 
when Israeli forces occupied Sinai, after the withdrawal of the Egyptian 
army to counter the Anglo-French attack, Ben Gurion, Israel's premier, 
said that "Sinai has been liberated by the Israeli army"s and he 
regarded Sinai as a part of the homeland which had been occupied by the 
invader. 97 
On the day after the Israeli attack, the Anglo-French military 
invasion started. The city of Port Said was occupied and the forces 
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began marching in order to seize all the Canal area. All Egyptian 
airfields were bombed, the Egyptian army could not sustain fighting 
against the forces of two major powers, and it was reduced to launching 
guerilla attacks. 
On November 2,1956, the UK General Assembly adopted Resolution 997 
whereby it called for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of all 
occupying forces from Egyptian territory. On November 4, a resolution 
to create a United Nations Emergency Force, which would separate the 
combatants along the Suez Canal and elsewhere in Sinai, was adopted by 
the General Assembly. 99 Eventually, the British and the French forces 
withdrew from Egypt under the pressure of the two superpowers$ 
particularly the direct pressure exerted by the US on the British 
government and Israel, whose f arces had evacuated Sinai af ter the 
agreement that the UK f arces would stay in Sharm-El-Sheikh to guarantee 
Israeli navigation in the Red Sea. Moreover, Egypt undertook to prevent 
guerilla actions against Israel from Egyptian territories and the Gaza 
strip. 
The outcome of the 1956 war was that Israel at the cost of 180 killed 
and 4 captured had succeeded in opening the Aqaba Gulf for Israeli 
navigation and preventing guerrilla raids from Egyptian territory. It 
failed to destroy the whole of the Egyptian army, and did not topple 
the Nasser government. Moreover, the Suez Canal was still blocked to 
Israeli navigation or cargo. On the Egyptian side, 2000 soldiers were 
killed and 6000 were captured. Although defeated in battlet it was 
widely recognized that Nasser had won the war politically. His 
struggle during the Suez crisis made him a hero before his nation and 
his leadership in the Arab world was enhanced. 
34 
Another outcome of this war was that the episode served to push Egypt 
further into the adoption of an extreme hardline policy against Israel. 
Under any criterion, the Israeli aggression was regarded as a violation 
of the provisions of the 1949 Armistice Agreement. It was also contrary 
to international law and the Israeli obligations as a member of the 
United Nations. Consequently, Egypt expanded its economic war against 
Israel through the policy of economic sanctions imposed by the Arab 
League. 
Another notable outcome was the failure of the Arab League and its 
Defence Pact vis-a-vis the attack on Egypt, and the League's role 
during the Suez War was of mere political nature. Despite the fact that 
the League's Council adopted several resolutions whereby it announced 
its full support for Egypt's struggle, nevertheless the League's role 
was neither decisive nor influential. In fact, it was undermined by the 
lack of any form of Arab military support for Egypt and the lack of a 
unified and strong Arab political stand alongside Egypt. One must 
admit that the Arab League system for collective self-defence failed for 
the second time to repel Israeli aggression. At this point, it is 
worth mentioning that the main factor behind the failure of the League 
during this period was internal differences within the League. 99 
The period following the 1956 war was one of the coýnparative quiet in 
the Israel i-Egyptian borders both along the Gaza Strip and in Sinai. 
This was largely due to the presence of UN forces (UNEF) in the area. 
In the meantime, Arab states were preoccupied with internal local 
crises, e. g., the crisis in Lebanon in 1958, the Syrian-Jordanian crisis 
in the 1960s, and the Yemen crisis since 1961.1" 
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Neverthless, an examination of Arab League policy during the period 
1964-1967 would suggest that the strategy adopted by the League had 
opened the door to Israel to initiate her aggression on June 5,1967. 
On the political side, the Arab League's first summit (1964), in 
reaction to the Israeli project to divert the River Jordan, established 
an authority for the implementation of an Arab counter-project for the 
exploitation of the Jordan's waters. 1c" They regarded Israel as the 
most dangerous threat to Arab security. This attitude was confirmed by 
the resolutions of the second summit which was held also in Egypt 
(Alexandria) in the same year Q964). 102 During their third summit 
(1965) in Morocco, the Arab heads of states decided upon a specific plan 
to liberate Palestine and 'it had also been agreed to use diplomatic 
strategy to raise the Palestinian question in the United Nations. 103 In 
sum, the League's political strategy was characterized by its severe 
hostility towards Israel. On the military side, the first summit 
meeting decided to establish a unified Arab military command to defend 
Arab territories against any threat by Israel, and earmarked t154 
million for this purpose. In his speech before the second summit 
(1964), the commander of the unified Arab force stated that the eastern 
front comprising Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon could not in its present 
condition stand up to an Israeli attack, and should be furnished with 
armies and facilities. The build-up of that front, it was estimated, 
needed a period of at least three years. At the end of the meeting, he 
was requested to prepare an Arab military plan to face Israel. "' 
By June, 1,1967, two military Joint-defence agreements were signed 
between Egypt and both Syria and Jordan. An Egyptian military officer 
was sent to Jordan as the commander of the Arab eastern front. Some 
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Arab states sent military forces to Egypt (e. g., Algeria and Kuwait). 
There was also full collaboration between Egypt and the Arab states 
within the framework of the Arab League. 106 
The 1967 War had several causes. In reaction to an Israeli irrigation 
project that would affect the water reaching Jordan, the Arab League 
decided to finance a project to divert the course of the Rivers Letani 
and Banias to prevent their waters from reaching Israel. Israel 
attacked the engineers working in the Arab project and their equipment 
was destroyed. 106 
At that time, the military wing of the PLO was launching intensive 
guerilla attacks on Israel from Syrian territory . Israel claimed 
that 
Syrian soldiers took part in this military action. Its aeroplanes 
retaliated by attacking Syrian territory and Israeli military forces 
gathered at the Syrian border. 11117 The leaders of Israel threatened to 
launch preemptive attacks to prevent guerilla raids and to secure its 
borders. 109 
Egypt, Igh"thd other hýalig, which had a mutual defence agreement with 
Syria, threatened that it was going to intervene under this agreement 
if Israel launched attacks on Syria. Both Egypt and Syria were also 
parties to the Arab Defence Pact. 1119 In May 1967, Egypt took three 
steps which were regarded as the direct reason for the war: the blocking 
of the Aqaba Gulf to Israeli navigation, the removal of UNEF from 
Egypt at its request and the deployment of large numbers of Egypt forces 
in Sinai. 110 From an Israeli official viewpoint, these Egyptian 
measurest as well as the Arab leaders' threats to destroy Israel, were 
regarded as legal justification giving Israel the right to exercise 
anticipatory self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter. "' 
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On the morning of June 5,1967, Israeli bombers began to attack 
Egyptian airfields, destroying aircraft on the ground and putting 
runways out of acti. on. In less than three hours 300 out of 340 Egyptian 
aircraft, representing almost all of the Egyptian air force were 
destroyed, mostly on the ground . Vithin half an hour of the 
beginning 
of the airstrikess Israeli ground forces launched an offensive against 
Egyptian positions in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. and within 
days reached the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. 
The Israeli airstrike on June 5 was not confined to Egypt. Having 
destoyed the Egyptian air force, the Israeli aircraft attacked Syrian 
and Jordanian airfields before noon and a number of aircraft on the 
ground. At the same time Israeli ground forces invaded Syria and 
Jordan. Vithin six days Israel occupied the whole of the Sinai 
Peninsula, the Old City of Jerusalem, the Vest Bank, the Gaza Strip, and 
the Golan Heights. 112 
So far as the legality of this war is concerned, there has never been a 
concensus of opinion as to whether or not Israel was legally permitted 
under international law to launch such an attack. Israel and its 
supporters claimed that, in the circumstances, the attack was in 
accordance with the right to exercise anticipatory self-defense. Egypt, 
supported by many states, held that the Israeli attack was a deliberate 
aggression. In Egypt's view, its measures taken in Sinai were to 
reinforce its defensive position against, rather than to attack, 
Israel. Moreover, Egypt had informed the UN that it would not launch 
any attack against Israel. 113 
From the Israeli perspective, the outcome of the war was amazing. By 
the end of the war it was in control of the whole of the former 
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territory of Palestine under the Mandate, the Golan Heights in Syria and 
the Sinai. The Gulf of Aqaba was opened for Israeli navigation. For the 
f irst time in history, Israel achieved a decisive victory against 
Egypt as well as other Arab states. Israeli writers began to write of 
Israel as an empire. In fact, the real outcome for Israel in this war 
was that the priorities for Arab countries had changed, the liberation 
of all Palestine being replaced by the liberation of the occupied 
territories. 
Map 4 The Arab-Israeli boundaries after 1967 
From 1967 onward the Arabs had to forget about the 1949 Armistice 
borders and the UN partition resolution of 1947, and to concentrate on 
the restoration of the lands occupied in 1967.114 For the Egyptians, 
the war ended in tragedy. One result of the fighting was the death of 
20,000 men, as well as thousands of wounded. President Nasser resigned, 
and Marshal Amer, the higher militdry commander, committed suicide. 
Nasser, however, reconsidered his resignation under public pressure. 
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Now Egypt's main concern was to liberate Sinai, either by peace or by 
war. "r- 
At the UN, the Security Council, four months from the conclusion of the 
June war, agreed an a peace f ormula based an the idea of " land f or 
peace", i. e., the Arabs would exchange their lands occupied in 1967 in 
return for peace with Israel. This formula was included in Security 
Council Resolution 242 adopted on November 22,1967. The operative 
paragraph of the resolution called for the establishment of a just and 
lasting peace which requires the application of the following 
principles: M Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories 
occupied in the recent conflict; (ii)Termination of all claims or states 
of belligerency and respect for and. acknowledgement of the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the 
area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 2. The necessity for 
guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in 
the area, for achieving a just settlement for the refugee problem and 
for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political 
independence of every state in the area, through measures including the 
establishment of demilitarized zones. 111's 
In spite of much criticism directed at Resolution 242, both on 
political and legal grounds, it has not been improved uponý4-a6nýlater 
Security Council resolutions. It represented, and still represents, 
the only resolution accepted by nearly all the parties in the Middle 
East, including the PLO which accepted it in 1988,117 as well as the 
superpowers. The resolution was reaffirmed in Security Council 
Resolution 338 of 1973. It is widely recognized that 11 The principles 
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formulated in the resolution are legally sound and have a permanent 
value and relevance to the Near East situation. "110 
In the wake of the 1967 War, the role played by the Arab League was of 
great significance as it sought to deprive Israel of gaining an 
overwhelming victory. On August 29,1967, the Arab heads of governments 
held their fourth meeting in Khartoum to consider the consequences of 
the defeat and to lay down the League's strategy to face the situation. 
The League's policy, as laid by the Khartoum conference can be described 
along the following main lines: 
-The frontline states were to obtain regular financial support to 
continue the struggle against Israel; 
-There would be no recognition of Israel, no negotiations, and no peace 
with Israel until its withdrawal from the Arab occupied lands; 
-The Arab oil states were to consider an oil embarge an the states 
supporting Israel. 119 
The main outcome of this policy was that Egypt was compensated for its 
heavy losses and was able to reuild its military forces. Further, 
according to an Israeli historian, ".. the Khartum Declaration was the 
first serious warning to the Israelis that their expectation of an 
imminent phone call from the Arab world (declaring surrender) might be a 
pipe dream. 11 120 
After six years of uneasy peace the fourth Arab Israeli war broke out 
on October 6,1973l when Egyptian and Syrian forces launched major 
offensives across the Suez and the Golan front respectively, chosing 
the day of atonement(Yom Kippur), the holiest day in the Jewish year, to 
do so and thereby taking the Israeli forces by surprise. 
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The first days of the war witnessed Egyptian victories when the 
Egyptians destroyed all the Israeli positions on the other side of the 
Suez Canal and occupied 10 miles of the west bank. Howeveroby the end 
of the fighting Egypt had large casualties when the Israeli forces 
succeeded in penetrating through to the east bank of the canal and 
occuping certain areas there. 121 The war lasted from October 6 until 
22, when both the parties announced their acceptance of Resolution 3380 
adopted by the UK Security Council. The resolution invited all the 
parties to observe a ceasefire and called on them to implement 
Resolution 242 of November 1967.122 The ceasefire came into effect on 
October 25 when the Security Council adopted Resolution 340, reiterating 
its previous decisions and deciding on the formation of a UK Emergency 
Force from amongst non-members countries of the Security Council. The 
UK forces arrived in Cairo on October 27, and helped to establish the 
ceasefire. 
As far as the objectives of the war are is concerned, it is important 
to emphasize that the war launched by the Egyptians did not aim to gain 
territory. According to Egyptian sources, the main aim of the operation 
was to restore the Egyptian army's confidence and to destroy the concept 
of Israeli security by launching a limited, but successful, military 
operation. 123 Another objective was to reactivate the issue 
politically, by showing that the entry of both Egypt and Syria in the 
war after more than six years of Israeli occupation was ample proof 
that the Arab countries would not accept the fait accnnPli, that Israel 
wanted to impose. 124 
From Egypt's perspective, the outcome of the war was successful. By the 
end of the war the Egyptian army had established itself along much of 
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the eastern bank of the Canal north of Ismailia, and had liberated a 
narrow strip of Sinai varying from three to ten miles in width in 
different sectors and amounting to some 500 square miles of territory. 
For the first time in the Egypt ian- Israeli wars, the Israelis suffered 
heavy casualties at the hands of the Egyptians. This military success, 
though eventually negated by the Israeli achievements by the end of 
the war, has been recognized by several military experts, including 
Israelis. 126 
As regards the Israelis, despite their successful counter-offensives 
across the Suez Canal giving them control of about 500 square miles of 
Egyptian territory west of the Suez Canal, they lost more than two 
thousand dead and over three thousand wounded with a high portion of 
officers among the casualties. This was a painful attrition for them. 
Besides, the Israeli army lost its reputation as being invincible, and a 
number of its military leaders were dismissed or suspended after the 
war. 12r- 
Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would allow the 
complete defeat of Lts allies in the war. As Kissinger saidt : "we 
can't allow a Soviet-supported operation to succeed against an 
American-supported operation. If it does, our credibility everywhere is 
severely shaken. 61127 A survey of the course of events during the war 
reveals that the US policy was in line with this view. Af ter the 
success of the Egyptian military operations for a ten-day periodg the US 
threw its weight behind Israel behind Israel by its airlift and military 
pictures by satellites in order to defeat the Egyptians. Similarlyp 
the Soviets made clear that they would no longer permit the Arabs to 
suffer a decisive defeat on the battlefield. By the end of the war 
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the Soviet Union interfered and put all its weight in imposing a' 
ceasefire to stop a victory by Israel. It was ready to send Soviet 
troops to fight in the Middle East to impose the Security Council 
decision. 129 
Thus, bearing in mind the fact that warfare had failed to bring a 
settlement or to guarantee Israeli security, and the fact that the 
States involved could not conduct their preferred foreign policy 
because of the superpowers' desire to maintain their policy of detente$ 
both Egypt and Israel had realized that a new era had begun, an era 
during which all Problems had to be resolved by negotiation rather than 
war. I 
This realisation opened the way for the Geneva Peace Conference of 
December 1973,129 and later for the conclusion of two agreements for 
disengagement of forces between Egypt and Israel. The first was signed 
on January 18,1974 and provided only for limitation of forces and the 
establishment of buffer-zones. On September 4,1975, after intensive US 
peace efforts, Egypt and Israel concluded a second agreement providing 
for a limited Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. 130 
The success of the League in influencing the attitude of Western 
policy-makers towards the Arabs was the result of two important 
factors. The Arab oil embargo threatened the European economy which 
imported 90 percent of its oil needs from the Middle Bast. European 
economic interests in the Arab world led to the establishment of an 
Euro-Arab Committee in 1974 to negotiate cooperation between the Arab 
League states and the EEC states. 131 
44 
Thp Arnh Oil Enbargo Durlng And After TbA Var Of 1973 
This policy was one of the important components and features of the 
League's policy during this period, and it gave rise to a lot of 
controversy. Using Arab oil as a political weapon in the pursuit of the 
Arab states' inteKests had been considered shortly before the outbreak 
of the 1973 Var, when officials of Saudi Arabia revealed plans to check 
the increase of their crude oil produqtion if the United States did not 
take a more impartial position in the Middle East. 132 The general 
objective of Arab oil policy was to gain the world's attention for the 
justice of the Arab cause. Among the obj ectives'of this policy were 
to encourage the majority of world states to severe diplomatic relations 
with Israel in order to isolate her in international society; to put 
pressure on the United States to reduce her support for Israel; and to 
influence Israel to withdraw from the Arab occupied territories. 133 
In applying this policy, the Arab states, as a point of departure, 
considered the United States ýthe principal and foremost source of 
Israeli power. Bfecause of the fact that the production of oil beyond 
certain limits did not make economic sense for many Arab states, 
unchecked production was therefore an economic sacrifice that could be 
interpreted as a political favour to the consuming countries. The 
latter, instead of responding positively to such a favour, tended to 
support Israel or at least ignore Arab legal rights. Consequently, the 
consuming countries were classified into three categories: friendly, 
neutral and "supporting the enemy*" Any state that supported or took 
some measures to support Arab rights was, to be treated as a friendly 
state that should recieve the same oil supply as prior to the embargo. 
Neutral states would be subject to the increasing cutback in oil 
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supplies. Those states supporting Israel would be subject to a total 
oil embargo. The decrease of the supplies provided to the various 
consuming states, and the embargo imposed an other states, 
ýmaý be 
altered proportionately to their support for, and cooperation with, 
Israel. This meant that a state classified as supporting the enemy 
may be classified as a friendly state if' it 'changed its foreign 
policy. 134 
The reasons for the importance of Arab oil resources to the world 
economy are well known. Saudi Arabia alone is thought to possess one 
quarter of the world's known oil resources and is the world's largest 
exporter. Numerous big industrial countries are dependent upon oil. 
Japan, which is nearly 100 percent dependent upon oil imports, obtains 
some 88 percent of its oil from the Arab states and Iran. Western 
European states depend on the Middle East for some 73 percent of their 
oil imports. 13r- It is widely recognized thet the maintenance of stable 
trade relations in Western countries for wealth, well-being, and overall 
power, including the power to maintain their national defences and 
security, rely on the imported oil. 136 
Turning to the outcome of this policy, it is widely recognized that it 
achieved considerable success. Perhaps it was the main factor behind 
the change of the United States peace strategy in the Middle East. 
President Carter admitted that the oil crisis in the USA in 1973 was 
behind his efforts that led to the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel 
in 1979.137 Arab diplomatic efforts to isolate Israel and to obtain the 
support of international society were eDh-Ruced bv this DolicY- The 
increase of the oil prices doubled the national incomes of the Arab oil 
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countries, which enabled them to support the economies of the 
confronting states. 139 
It has been argued that the Arab League oil policy was illegal under 
the rules of international law and the UN Charter. This policyo in the 
view of some writers, was a weapon for blackmailing the West and a 
threat to international peace. 139 Yet, from an Arab standpoint, this 
was not true. According to Arab writers, the policy was employed as an 
instrument for the respect and promotion of the rule of law in an area 
of international relations where such a rule has long been ignored for 
the rule of superior military force. 140 Consequently, the Measures werlý 
not taken to weaken unfriendly countries, but merely to dissuade them 
from continuing their encouragement of an illegal situation. And the 
Arab states have the legal right, under the rules of international law, 
to use their natural sources in a manner which suits their legitimate 
rights-"' 
SADATIS VISIT TO JERUSALRIJ 
On November 9,1977, Sadat declared in a speech at the People's 
Assembly in Cairo that for the sake of peace he was ready to go to 
Jerusalem. In his words, "I am willing to go to Geneva, nay to the end 
of the world. In fact I know that Israel will be astounded when I say 
that I am to go to their very home, to the Knesset, to debate with 
them. 11112 
An invitation from Begin arrived an November 9. and an official 
spokesman in Cairo announced that Sadat accepted the invitation and 
would proceed to Israel on November 19 in accordance with the invitation 
which he received from Begin through the US embassy. 143 
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In his speech to the Knesset on November 19, Sadat spelled out in very 
blunt terms what the Arabs considered the fundamental requirements for 
a just and durable peace in the Middle East He made it abundantly 
clear that he was seeking a comprehensive peace and not a separate peace 
with Israel. He presented the elements of Egypt's peace plan in the 
following terms: 
-the termination of the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories 
occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem; 
. 
-the realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and 
their right to self determination including the right to establish their 
own state; 
-the right of all states in the area to live within secure boundaries# 
based an the security of international borders established through 
agreed-upon arrangements and international guarantees; 
-the commitment by all states in the area to conduct their relations 
among themselves according to the purposes and principles of the UN 
Charter, in particular the peaceful settlement of disputes and the 
abstention from the threat or use of force; 
-the termination of all states of belligerency in the area. "' 
Reaction to the visit varied. While the Americans and most of the 
Western World welcomed this visit and considered it as one of the most 
dramatic events in modern history, in parts of the Middle East the 
reaction was just the opposite. Syria denounced the visit and 
considered it as a violation of all previous Arab agreements; it also 
broke its diplomatic relations with Egypt. Some officials in the 
Syriant Libyan and Iraqi govermemts called for Sadat's assasination. 
Iraq proposed an Arab mini-summit composed of the presidents of Syria, 
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Algeria, Libya, South Yemen and the PLO to form a rejectionist front 
against the Sadat initiative. 146 
Turning to the outcome of the visit, it is clear that it ended without 
achieving any agreement on the crucial issues of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. On the other hand, the visit made Sadat very vulnerable 
because of Arab accusations that he would seek only a bilateral 
agreement with Israel, thus abandoning the Palestinian cause merely to 
get back the Sinai. 146 
On December 24,1977, Begin arrived in Ismaelia, Egypt, with a peace 
project which included a proposal for an agreement on Sinai and another 
for establishing self-rule (autonomy) in the West Bank and Gaza. So 
far as the proposal on Sinai is concerned, its main outlines were 
described by Dayan in the following terms: 
"On demilitarization, Egyptian forces were not to move beyond the 
Milla-Gidi line, and the strip of territory between that line and the 
Canal was to. continue to be subject to the existing Reduction of Forces 
Agreement reached after the Yom Kippur War. Israeii civilian 
settlements were to remain, and to be under Israeli administration and 
jurisdiction. Israeli forces would be responsible for their defence. 
There was to be a transitional period of several years during which 
Israeli forces would fall back to a line in central Sinai, and maintain 
their air bases and early warning installations until their final 
withdrawal to the international frontier. Freedom of shipping through 
the Straits of Tiran would be ensured and supervised, either by a UN 
force, or by Joint Egypt-Israel units- if by a UN force, it could not be 
removed except by agreement of the two parties and a unanimous Security 
Council decision. The Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Eilat, to which 
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it gives entry, should be recognized by the two countries, in a special 
declaration, as an international waterway open to all vessells under all 
flags. " 147 
As to the Palestianians, Begin submitted a plan for the West Bank and 
Gaza which he described in biblical language as Judea and Samaria. The 
plan envisaged limited autonomy for Arab residents without statehood. 
Security and maintainance of public order would remain in Israel's 
hands. Also, the Israelis would have power to buy and to settle in the 
occupied territories. As to the future of the area, the plan indicated 
that Israel maintained its right and its claim of sovereignty over the 
area, but in view of the existence of other claims, it proposed that the 
question of sovereignty remain open. 148 
After the talks, at the press confrence held on December 26, Begin 
declared that Resolution 242 did not require a total Israeli withdrawal 
from the occupied territories. Thus, no successful outcome resulted 
from the meeting. As Riad observed, "The meeting ended without 
achieving anything beside the formation of two committees: one 
political, at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the two 
countries, and the other military, at the level of the Ministers of 
Defence. The possibility of a Geneva conference was therefore 
completely undermined. 11149 
In 1978j the Joint Israel i-Egyptian Committees convened several times 
but they failed to achieve agreement. 1 60 When Carter became aware of 
the failure of these Committees, he decided that the Americans had to 
play a leading role in the peace negotiations. He wrote: 
"Sadat's visit to Jerusalem had broken the Arab shell which had been 
built to isolate Israel# and there were a few exploratory talks between 
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the Israelis and Egyptians. However, it was becoming obvious that Sadat 
and Begin alone could not go very far in resolving the basic problems 
that had not been touched-the Palestinian issue, the withdrawal of 
Israeli forces from occupied territory, Israeli security, or the 
definition of a real peace... the process was breaking down again, and 
both Sadat and other Arab leaders, even including Assadg informed me 
that it remained necessary for the United States to continue playing a 
leading role in resolving the basic Middle East questions. ""' 
On January 3,1978, President Carter, upon his arrival in Aswan for a 
short visit, issued a statement indicating the US position an the 
principles upon which an ultimate agreement would be based. The 
statement included some carefully crafted phrases about the Palestinian 
question: 
"First, true peace must be based an normal relations among the parties 
to the peace. Peace means more than just an end to belligerency. 
Second, there must be withdrawal by Israel from territories occupied in 
1967 and agreement an secure and recognized borders for all parties in 
the context of normal and peaceful relations. 
Third, there must be a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its 
aspects. The solution must recognize the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinian people and enable the Palestinians to participate in the 
determination of their own future. 11162 
On August 6 and 7, Secretary Vance went to Jerusalem and Alexandria to 
deliver the handwritten letters from Carter to Begin and Sadat inviting 
them to meet the President at Camp David, beginning on September 5. to 
negotiate a framework for peace in the Middle East. The two leaders 
accepted Carter's invitation. 163 
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THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND THR RGYPTTAN-TqRARI. T PEACE TREATY 
At Camp David, the delegations took some two weeks of intensive 
discussion from September 6 to arrive at an agreed peace formula which 
was mainly based on the Security Council Resolution 242. These talks 
resulted in the signature in Washington on September 17 of two framework 
agreements, one on an overall Middle East settlement and the other 
specifically on the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and 
Israel within three months. 
The first of the Camp David Agreements (or Accords) dealt in particular 
with the granting of what was termed "full autonomy" to the Palestinian 
Arab inhabitants in the West Bank and Gaza. The second of the Camp 
David Agreements provided for agreed principles to resolve the main 
issues of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. It also provided that Egypt and 
Israel would seek to conclude, within three months, a full peace 
treaty. 164 
As-a- mat-ter of fact, the target date for an Egyptian-Israeli peace 
treaty could not be met because of disputes over some crucial issues. 
However, further US meditation efforts culminating in some Middle East. 
shuttle diplomacy by President Carter an March 8 to 13, resulted in the 
signing of the first ever Arab-Israeli Peace Treaty in Washington on 
March 26,1979.16s 
The Peace Treaty and its associated documents had been approved by the 
Knesset an March 22 by 95 to 11 (with two absentionst three not 
participating in the vote, and two absent). 1665 In Egypt, the People's 
Assembly approved it on April 10 by 328 votes to 15 (with one absention 
and 16 absent). Also, it was approved by the'electorate as a whole in 
a national referendum on April 19,1979. IS7 
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The main provisions of the Camp David Accords and the 1979 Treaty will 
be extensively analysed in the following chapters. Suffice it at this 
stage to say that, while the Accords and the Treaty have satisfactorily 
resolved the main issues of the conflict between Egypt and Israel, they 
failed, however, to resolve the issues of Israeli withdrawal from the 
West Bank and Gazal Palestinian self- determination and the future of 
East-Jerusalem. 
Undoubtedly, the failure to resolve the main issues of the Palestinian 
problem was the principal reason for Arab condemnation of the Camp. 
David Agreements. Even Arab moderate states, such as Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan, were disappointed by the Agreements. "To the Saudis and other 
moderate Arabs, the general framework document that emerged from the 
summit deliberations was at best a repackaged version of Begin's limited 
autonomy plan, with no promise of any fair expression of 
self-determination for the inhabitants of the conquered territories. 
Begin confirmed their suspicions in a speech in New York City 
immediately after Camp David that seemed to rule out any meaningful 
exercise of self-determination at the end of the agreed upon five-year 
transition period between the establishment of autonomy and the 
negotiation of a permanent status for the West Bank and Gaza. 04169 
In response to the Camp David Accords, the Arab heads of state held a 
summit meeting in Baghdad (1978) to consider the results of the Accords. 
They announced that they rejected the Egyptian- Israeli plans for peace 
because they provided only for a partial settlement and not a 
comprehensive settlement. During this meeting the principles of the 
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League's policy towards the conflict, for nearly a decade, were 
restated. 169 
Among the resolutions of the Baghdad Summit, it had been agreed to warn 
Egypt not to sign a peace treaty with Israel. If it did so, it' would 
be isolated in the Arab world, and several Arab sanctions would be 
imposed on it. However, on March 19,1979 Egypt ignored this warningl 
and signed a Peace Treaty with Israel. Consequently, the League's 
Council held another emergency meeting on March 31,1979 in Baghdad 
where it adopted resolutions which included a commitment to cut off all 
forms of economic and military assistance, both multilateral and 
bilateral. They also included diplomatic and political sanctions an 
Egypt-160 
Among the political and diplomatic sanctions were: to withdraw Arab 
ambassadors from Egypt immediately and severe diplomatic ties within 
one month; to regard Egypt's membership in the League as suspended to 
suspend Egypt's membership in all other Arab specialist organizations; 
to transfer the League's seat from Cairo to Tunis ; and to work towards 
suspending Egypt's membership in the Islamic Conference Organization and 
in the Non-Aligned Countries Conference. 161 
Among the economic sanctions were to halt the granting of any loanst 
banking facilities or any kind of aid by Arab governments or their 
institutions to Egypt; to prohibit the granting of economic aid from all 
Arab institutions operating within the framework of the League; to 
impose an Arab oil embargo on Egypt ; and to apply the regulations Of 
the boycott office in respect of any Egyptian firm or company dealing 
directly or indirectly with Israel. 162 Further, the resolutions called 
on the Arab governments to apply more economic measures against Egypt 
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since the measures resolved were regarded as "the minimum actions 
required for the confrontation of the Treaty. " With regard to 
military measures, the Arabs ended their financing of Egypt's military 
purchases. Moreover, the military cooperation between Egypt and the 
Arab states was stopped since it was no longer in the Arab Defence 
Council and the Arab League. Furthermore, the Arab Organization for 
Industralization (which was important to Egypt's military industry) was 
dissolved as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirate withdrew from 
it. 163 
These measures were carried out by all the Arab states with the 
exception of three, Sudan, Oman and Somalia. Also, some Arab states had 
taken additional measures against Egypt which were not ordered by the 
League. 164 
A great deal of controversy has surrounded the question of the legality 
of the sanctions imposed by the League an Egypt. The Egyptian position 
has been that these sanctions are illegal. This viewpoint rests mainly 
upon the basis that the sanctions are inconsistent with the Pact of the 
Arab League. No mention whatsoever was made in the Pact of the League's 
right to impose sanctions of this nature, nor it could it be interpreted 
as allowing such sanctions by inference. On the other hand, it seems 
that the League's decision to impose sanctions on Egypt was based on the 
assumption that regional organizations are authorized under Article 53 
of the Charter to impose sanctions, and that such a right was execised 
by international organizations an several occasions. A detailed 
examination of the legality of the sanctions, and whether resolution 
on the sanctions was ultrq 
-virpc; 
in the light of the League Pact and 
general principles of international law, is outside the scope of this 
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work. Yet, a brief mention of arguments for and against the legality of 
the sanctions could be useful and relevant. 
In favour of the legality of this type of measurest it may be argued 
that Article 53 of the United Nations Charter stipulates that "no 
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by 
regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council. ""' 
The interpretation given to the term "enforcement action, " and whether 
it includes measures of a non-military nature, has mainly been dealt 
with before the UK in connection with the issue of imposition of 
sanctions by the OAS. 166 
The question was f irst raised in 1960 in the Dominican 
Case. 
Following a resolution by the OAS to apply diplomatic and economic 
sanctions against the Dominican Republic for its acts of intervention 
against Venezuela, the USSR requested a meeting of the Security Council 
to consider the question of authorising these measures taken by the OAS 
under Article 53. Its representative before the Council took the view 
that the Security Council was "the only organ empowered to authorise the 
application of enforcement action by regional organisation against any 
state. 11167 The US representative, however, argued that the Security 
Councill's authorisation was only required for the imposition of forcible 
measures, not for those of a mere diplomatic and economic nature. Since 
this latter kind of action could legitmately be taken by any state in 
exercise of its sovereignty, therefore Article 53 could be regarded as 
permitting the right of regional organisations to apply such 
measures. 169 Eventually, the Council seems to have accepted the US 
interpretation when it adopted a resolution whereby it "took note" that 
the sanctions were being employed an a regional basis. 161 
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Again, in the Cuban Case of 19620 the question of the right of 
regional arganisation to apply economic sanctions was debated before the 
Security Council. The OAS had expelled the Cuban Goverment from the 
regional system and imposed economic sanctions on it. Cuba thereupon 
requested the Council to seek advisory opinion from the 
International Court of Justice on whether these sanctions were subject 
to Council approval. 170 In the debate, most of the members supported 
the opinion, based an the resolution on the Dominican 
Case, that non- 
military sanctions were permitted without authorisation of the 
Security Council. Eventually, the Council voted against submitting the 
question to the ICJ. 171 
The Dominican and Cuban cases suggest that the Arab League sanctions 
imposed against Egypt were permissible, and find a basis under the 
Charter provisions relating to regional arrangements as construed by 
the Security Council. 
It nay also be argued that the imposition of economic sanctions is not 
a new phenomenon in international relations. Apart from resorting to 
economic warfare in time of war, which has been widespread, it had been 
resorted to by states on various occasions since the beginning of this 
century, even in peacetime conditions. In 1909 Turkey imposed economic 
sanctions against the Greek Goverment by organizing a boycott of Greek 
goods. In China, the practice of economic boycott has almost been a 
national institution. In 1925, for example, as a result of disturbances 
in Shanghai in which a number of Chinese were killed, a boycott of 
British goods was initiated in China. 172. In the Netherlan4!; ý the 
embargo of strategic goods to such destinations as the sino-Soviet was 
executed under an export prohibition law issued in 1935.173 The practice 
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of states in this respect reflected a customary rule under which the 
institution of such measures has been accepted in international 
relations. 
In contemporary inter-state, ' relations the mosr, obvious examples of 
regional sanctions, beside's the sanctions authorized by the OAS which we 
mentioned above, arr , '. 1ose carried out by the OAU against South Africa, 
Portugal, Rhodesila-, and Israel. For instance, at the 1963 Addis Ababa 
Summit Conference the Organization of African Unity member states 
decided on the boycott of trade with Portugal and South Africa, the 
closure of African ports and airports to their shipping and aircraft, 
and the prohibition of the right of their aircraft to overfly the 
territories of African states. 174 
On the other hando the viewpoint of the Egyptians was that the 
sanctions constituted an illegal act for a number of considerations. In 
the first place, it is well established that the League is a loose 
confederation in which the sovereignty of each state would be retained 
and no encroachment on the sovereignty of the members permitted 176. 
A review of the travaux preparatoires reveals that the question of the 
degree of sovereignty the states were prepared to surrender was among 
the main questions discussed by the Preparatory Committee. While only 
one state, Syria, was prepared to surrender its sovereignty, most 
Arab States preferred a formula whereby the complete sovereignty of each 
state would be retained. Eventually, the form of organization an which 
consensus could be reached was in the nature of a loose confederation 
that would not affect the sovereignty and independence of the member 
states. 17G Thus, it is not surprising that the provisions Of the 
League's Pact included no explicit or implicit reference restricting 
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the conduct of the foreign policy of the members. Moreover, under 
Article 8 of the Pact, the members undertook to respect the system and 
policy of other governments and "pledge to abstain from any action 
calculated to change established systems of government. " Article 9 of 
the Pact provides for the right of the members to conclude treaties with 
other states without any restriction. 177 
Finally, it may be argued that the question of the legality of the 
sanctions in the light of the principles of international law and the 
provisions of the UN Charter is controversial. According to one trend 
of opinion, "unless carried out as a sanction either imposed by the 
world organization or by the state itself as a reprisal against a prior 
illegal act, a boycott initiated by the state constitutes a weapon 
designed to damage the trade of another state for which the latter as 
subject to that damage may seek redress for legal injury. 14170 
Apart from the problem of the legality of these sanctionso which is no 
longer of particular importance after Egypt's readmission to the Arab 
League in May 1988, it may be observed that perhaps the failure of Egypt 
to implement the "autonomy plan" or at least to gain concessions for the 
Palestinians during the autonomy negotiations with Israel could be 
mainly attributed to the weakness of Egypt's bargaining position after 
being banned in the Arab Varld. 
In April 25,1982 Israel's withdrawal from all , Egypt's occupied 
territories was completed in accordance with the 1979 Treaty. Israel 
returned the remainder of the Sinai Peninsula, including the oil fields 
and air bases, and dismantled its settlements. The year of 1982 marks a 
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turning point in the history of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict, not only 
because of Egypt's recovery of its territory, but because such 
withdrawal confirms Israel's intention as having no ambitions to remain 
or to annex Egypt's territory. 
Moreover, the way in which the Taba dispute had been resolved is 
another clear example showing how Egypt and Israel implemented the 
Treaty in good faith. Taba is a small area in the boundaries which 
Israel refused to return to Egypt on the ground that it is not Egyptian 
land. Having failed to resolve the dispute by negotiation, Egypt 
notified the government of Israel of its request for international 
arbitration, and Israel agreed. Later, on September 29,1988, the Award 
of the Egypt-Israel Arbitral tribunal declared its acceptance of Egypt's 
claim to the area. Consequently, the disputed area was returned to 
Egypt on March 15,1989.179 
On February 15,1989 an 11 Agreement Regarding the Permanent Boundaries 
between Egypt and Israel" was signed. lrý40 The value of this Agreement 
cannot be underestimated. For the first time in Israel's history it has 
a defined and permanent international boundary with an Arab state. 
Moreover, by the conclusion of this agreement, the final territorial 
dispute between Egypt and Israel was satisfactorily resolved, Thus, one 
may be entitled to suppose that no more war is likely to occur between 
the two states, at least over territorial issues. 
As to the Palestinian- Israeli -conflict during this period, several 
writers believed that the 1979 Treaty changed the character of the 
conflict as well as the course of events in the area. According to 
kp" 
William Quandt, "Whatý one may think of the Camp David Accords and the 
Egyptian Israeli Peace Treaty, few would deny that they changed the 
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course of events in the Middle East. With Israel and the largest and 
most powerful Arab country at peace, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
Palestinian issue took on a fundamentally different character. "", 
During this period, as President Carter observed, the Arabs, without 
Egypt, have been and are unlikely to initiate either "an effective peace 
or war with Israel. 10192 
Turning to the important events during this period, one can cite,. for 
example, the bombardment of an Iraqi nuclear reactor in*June 1981; the 
application of Israeli law to the Golan Heights in December 1981; the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 and the expulsion of the PLO 
from Lebanon during the invasion; the uprising of the Palestinian people 
in the West Bank and Gaza since 1987(Intef'ada); the Declaration of the 
Palestinian state in November 1988 which was accompanied by the PLO's- 
acceptance of Resolution 242; the return of Egypt to the Arab League in 
May 1989; and recently the Iraqi missiles attack on Israeli cities 
during the Gulf War of 1991. 
By and large, these events are beyond the scope of this study. 
However, a brief mention must be made of three events that bear upon the 
Camp David process. The first of these is the expulsion of the PLO from 
Lebanon. In June 6,1982, less than two months after its final 
withdrawal from Sinai, Israeli ground forces invaded Lebanon. It is 
widely recognized that the Israeli invasion had two main purposes, to 
destroy the PLO bases, and to establish a friendly regime in Lebanon. 
Within a few days Beirut was surrounded and, in the ten-week siege and 
bombardment, thousands were reported dead. Israel demanded the 
evacuation of the PLO forces. Because of the huge civilian losses, and 
the scale of destuction by Israeli forces surrounding Beirut# the PLO 
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agreed with the Lebanese government to pull out of Beirut subject to 
agreement on the conditions of withdrawal. Accordingly, after the 
arrival of the multinational force, the PLO withdrew its combatants to 
various Arab countries between August 21 and September 1,1982. 
Eventually, Israel withdrew most of its armed forces from Lebanon on 
June 6,1985, but retained what it described as a security zone all 
along its northern border which was twelve miles deep. 161 Before its 
withdrawal Israel concluded a Peace Agreement with Lebanon an May 171 
1983. However, in March 1984, the President of Lebanon announced the 
revocation of the Agreement. "'The main outcome of the war was that by 
forcing the PLO forces out of Lebanon Palestinian military options had 
been significantly reduced, thus paving the way for the 1988 
Declaration. 
On November 12 to 15,1988, in its l9th meeting in Algeria, the 
Palestinian National Council, acting as a parliament in exile for the 
Palestinians, proclaimed at the Council's final session on November 15 
" the establishment of the State of Palestine on our Palestinian 
land. 181" Arafat's unilateral declaration of statehood followed a vote 
by the PKC for a new moderate political programme, endorsing, for the 
f irst time, , UK Security Resolution 242 as a basis for a Middle East 
peace settlement. By December 1989 some 117 countries had recognized 
the new Palestinian State. 'Gr- The Israeli government rejected the 
declaration of statehood claiming that the P10 continued to be committed 
to the destruction of Israel. From a legal perspective, the PLO's 
acceptance of Resolution 242 had removed the main obstacle preventing it 
from taking part in the Camp David peace process which is based on 
Resolution 242, particularly in the light of the fact that the new 
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political programme fulfilled the American conditions stipulated for 
holding talks with the PLO. 187 
It was not surprising that by 1989 most Arab states, for reasons 
related to the chain of events discussed earlier, as well as strategic 
and historic ones, had become convinced that the isolation of Egypt in 
the Arab World must be brought to an end. In fact, the process of 
Egypt's return to the Arab nation began early in 1984 when Jordan 
decided to resume full diplomatic ties with Egypt regardless of the 
Baghdad resolutions of 1977.18a On November 12,1987, the Arab League 
summit conference, held in Amman, passed a resolution whereby Arab 
League states were allowed to resume diplomatic relations with Egypt. "' 
This gradual process of return was completed in 1989 when Egypt was 
formally invited to attend the Arab League Summit Conference held in 
Morocco in May 1989.190 In this meeting President Mubarak reaffirmed 
Egypt's commitment to its peace strategy and obligations, thus leaving 
the impression that Egypt's readmission would not be at the expense of 
its relations with Israel. No specific or formal procedures were adopted 
to readmit Egypt which resumed its membership by a simple invitation 
from King Hassan to attend the Arab League heads of state summit 
neeting'91 
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The tern "territorial issues" ref ers here to the territorial clauses of the 
1979 Treaty of Peace. Territorial clauses under international practice 
constitute an essential section of the structure of a normal peace treaty. 
Territorial clauses, for instance, can be found in all the peace treaties signed 
in Paris on February 10,1947 between the Allied and Associated Powers on one 
hand and Germany Is former wartime allies Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy and 
Romania on the other. ' These peace treaties, it is worth mentioning, were 
intended to realize a general system and a model of peace treaties. 
Generally speaking, the sections of the peace treaties appearing under this 
heading contain a wide variety of issues. Among these issues are the 
withdrawal of the occup; 
. 
1, forces, e. g., Arts. 14 and 73 of the Treaty with Italy 
p ovided for the withdrawal of allied forces from Italian territory within a 
period of 90 days after the coming into force of the Treaty. 2 
Another example of territorial issues is the determination of boundaries, e. 
Article 1 of the Treaty with Bulgaria provided that the frontiers were to be 
those which existed on January 1,1941. 
Also, annexation or cession of certain parts or regions from one state to 
another are among the territorial issuest e. g. 9 various Alpine. regions were to be 
ceded to France by Article 2 and Annex II and III of the Treaty with Italy. 
Similarly9 claims of sovereignty and the establishment of free zones or cities 
may be dealt under the sections dealing with the terriLorial issues. For 
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example, Italy renounced all claims to territorial sovereignty over her f ormer 
colonies in Af rica. 2 Articles 21 and 22 of the Treaty with Italy, f or 
example, provide for the establishment of the free territory of Trieste. ' 
Quite clearly, despite the fact that some issues sucb as Israel's exploitation 
of Egypt's natural resources in Sinai are overlookedr*, the Peace Treaty 
addressed a variety of significant territorial issues. 
In the first place, it deals with the problem of the withdrawal of the Israeli 
forces from Egypt's territory. r- Secondly, Article 1 (2) deals with the problem 
of the Israeli settlements in Sinai. 7 ThirdlYq Article V(2)provides for a new 
legal system to govern navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits (if 
Tiran. 6 
An examination of the position of the 1979- Treaty in relation to the 
above-mentioned issues will be our concern in the following two Chapters. 
Before embarking on an analysis of these issues, it might be appropriate to 
recall that in doing so we shall rely on the provisions of the 1979 Treaty as 
well as the Camp David Accords. The contents of both show that the Peace 




On June 5,1967 Israel, claiming the right to exercise self-defence under 
Article 51 of the Charterl launched an offensive against Egyptian positions in 
the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula using its air and ground forces. Within six 
days Israel had occupied the whole of the Sinai as well as Gaza Strip., * 
Ever since the War of 1967, several peace efforts had been made to secure the 
withdrawal of the Israeli forces, including attempts to implement Security 
Council Resolution 242 which calls for that withdrawal. Nevertheless, apart 
from partial withdrawal from a small area under the 1975 Separation- of-Forces 
Agreemento such efforts failed and most of Sinai. remained under occupation until 
the conclusion of the 1979 Treaty. 
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The object of this chapter is to examine how the 1979 Treaty approached 
the problem of the military withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Sinai. This 
problem has been chiefly dealt under the Treaty in paragraph 2 of Article 1 
which reads as follows: " Israel will withdraw all its armed forces and civilians 
from the Sinai behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated 
Palestine, as provided in the annexed protocol (Annex 1), and Egypt will resume 
the exercise of its full soverignty over the Sinai"" 
Xore provisions dealing with the details of the Israeli withdrawal can be 
found in other parts of the Treaty. They will be referred to and examined 
later. Suffice it to say at this stage that the provisions on the withdrawal as 
provided by the Treaty are of special importance because they provide a 
satisfactory resolution of the most notable issue of the Egyptian- Israeli 
conflictt viz. the complete Israeli withdrawal from Sinai because they provide 
explicitly for a clear application of the ambigious language of Resolution 
242 regarding the extent of the Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories 
occupied in 1967. Such an application of Resolution 242 constitutes a legal 
precedent for a total Israeli withdrawal which is of great importance to any 
future comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. To understand these 
provisions fully it is necessary to place them within the context of both the 
1979 Treaty and the Framework Treaty as a whole. Vith the assistance of a 
brief enquiry into the history of the diverse positions adopted by the parties 
and the UK resolutions dealing with Israel's occupation of Egypt's territory 
since 1967t an examination and evaluation of the relevant provisions will be 
offered. 
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A Review Qf Tht- SAttlPinpnt Positlans Of Egypt, srPaj and TbP UN 
Regarding The Vithdrawal Issue Between 1967-1978 
In 1967 one writer observed that "the Arab-Israeli conflict is a tragedy in 
the classic sense; that is, it involves a struggle of right against right"'. 
This phrase is illustrative of the atmosphere pervading the discussion in the 
aftermath of the 1967 war an the question of the Israeli withdrawal. 
For example, while Israel invoked its right to exercise self-defence under 
Article 51 of the Charter to Justify its attack on Egypt and the right to live 
in peace with its neighbours in order to remain in the territories it occupied 
until concluding that peace 13. Egypt, on the other hand, rejected Israel's 
"aggression" and occupation an the ground that it violated the principles of 
international lawt in particular, the principles of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of states, and inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by 
war". 
It would be difficult in this review to give a comprehesive account of all the 
relevant positions taken and the views adopted by the parties, and to provide 
an account of all the UK resolutions dealing with the question during the 
above-mentioned period. Therefore, our review of the positions concerned will 
be on selective rather than a comprehensive basis. 
The starting point for review of post-Six Day War settlements is Security 
Council Resolution 242 of November 22,1967. However, before doing so, a 
mention of the positions taken by Egypt and Israel in the wake of the Six Day 
War ought to be made. 
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__The- 
Positinnn Tn : [hi- Aftermath Of The SIr Day Vnr 
After its decisive military victory in the June-War, Israel offered to withdraw 
from Sinai provided that certain conditions were fulfilled. In the first place# 
it declared that it would not withdraw from Egypt's territory unless the latter 
terminated any claim to right of belligerency, recognized the state of Israel 
and signed a peace treaty with it. 16 Israel also held that "The June War 
ceasef ire lines -will not change except for secure borders and peace treaties 
which would terminate war with the Arab countries". "- 
In this connection, Israel revealed its intention to hold certain parts of 
Egypt's territory as part of its proposed secure boundary; for examplep 
according to the "Allon Plan" announced in July 1967, Israel demanded to remain 
in occupation of the Sharm El-Sheikh area and certain other parts of Sinai for 
security reasons. 17 
Israel insisted that its withdrawal was conditional on Egypt's acceptance of 
direct negotiations with the Israelis. In the words of Abba Eban, then 
Israeli foreign minister, "it is unrealistic to believe that the withdrawal is 
possible without negotiation. "' 19 
The above position adopted by Israel in the wake of the June War had been 
based on a number of considerations which can be summarized as follows: 
Israel, it is submitted, obtained Egypt's land in a defensive war permitted 
under Article 51 of the Charter. It follows therefore that it is legally 
permitted under international law to remain in the territories until the 
conclusion of a peace treaty. Professor Higgins, a holder of this view, 




There is nothing in either the Charter or general international law which 
leads one to suppose that military occupation, pending a peace treaty is 
illegal. The Allies, it will be recalled, did not claim title to Berlin in 1945; 
but neither did they. withdraw immediately they had entered it. The law of 
military occupation, with its complicated web of rights and duties, remains 
entirely relevantg and until such time as the Arab nations agree to negotiate a 
peace treaty, Israel is in legal terms entitled to remain in the territories she 
now holds. 
To justify its right to launch a defensive war, Israel advanced three main 
reasons: the deployment of a large Egyptian forces along the Israeli borders; : 20 
the evacuation of UNEF forces from Sinai at the request of Egypt; -:; ý' and Egypt's 
blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran in Xay 1967, which was 
regarded as a castiq hPIIJ22. This blockade was illegal, it is submittede 
because it violated Article 16 (4) of the Geneva Convention of 195823 and 
because Egypt failed to observe the conditions which it had agreed to in 
connection with Israel's withdrawal from Sharm al-Shaykh in 195721. Moreover, 
it was argued, if one applies both the Soviet draft definition of aggression 
formulated in 1956, and the General Assembly Resolution on the Definition of 
Aggression, formulated in 1974, Egypt's blockade qualified as an act of 
aggression f2G. Further, it had been argued that the blockade prevented Israel 
from receiving about 80% of its normal oil and other vital imports. " 
In additionj Israel's demand for secure boundaries is based on the contention 
that the 1949 Armistice Agreement determining the pre-June 1967 boundary was 
invalid because of Egypt's violation of the provisions of that Agreement. it 
follows, therefore, that under the rules of international law governing the 
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suspension and termination of treaties, Israel was no longer bound by its 
obligation, including the 1949 demarcation lines. 27 
Alsot it was argued that even if the 1949 Agreement between Egypt and Israel 
was effective, Article V of that Agreement stipulated that the line defined " 
shall be designated as the Armistice demarcation line" ; it "is not to be 
construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary, and is delineated 
without prejudice to rights$ claims and positions of either party to the 
Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine question"21. 
Moreover Article XII specified that the Armistice was established in order to 
facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in 
Palestine29- Thust Israel has the right to negotiate secure and final 
boundaries. At this point, it may be worth recalling that the US adopted a 
line in support of Israel's demand for secure and recognized boundaries, e. g., 
President Johnston's statement an June 19,1967 in which he stated that " the 
nations of the (Middle East) region have had only fragile and violated truce 
lines for twenty years. what they now need are recognized boundaries. "" 
A further justification for Israel's demand for secure and recognized 
boundaries was the argument that the establishment of such boundaries would 
bring peace to the Middle East. 
A full assessment of the Israeli position is not our concern here. Suffice it 
to emphasize at this stage that such position had lef t much room f or dispute 
since Israel, as it has been rightly observedq under the label of secure ý- 
borders, would be able to keep any territory it wished under the pretext of 
protecting its security3l. Quite clearly this would constitute a violation of 
several international norms, in particular the principles of territorial 
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integrity and sovereignt", ýj of states, the principle of inadmissibility of 
acquisition of territory by f orce and the principle of self-determination. 
In turning to Egypt's position, it may be observed at the outset that, since 
the end of the June Var, Egypt stuck to the position that Israel must withdraw 
from all the occupied territories and that withdrawal must be immediate and 
unconditional32. Also Egypt rejected Israel's notions of keeping parts of Sinai 
in the final settlement for security reasons33. Further, it also rejected 
Israel's argument that it is entitled to remain in Egypt's territory until the 
conclusion of a peace treaty. 3, * 
From a legal standpoint, Egypt's position was based upon several grounds. 
First, Israel was obliged by the rules of international law to withdraw from 
occupied Egyptian territory. This obligation derived in particular from the 
following fundamental legal principles: 
- The general principle of non-use of force prescribed by the U. N. Charter in 
Article 2(4)0 stipulating that all members shall refrain from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, an obligation which under paragraph 2 of the same Article should be 
fulfilled in good faith; 3r, 
- The principle of the illegality of the occupation of the territory of another 
state by force. Even according to Article 51 of the UK Charter, force may only 
be used by a state In the exercise of its inherent right of self-defence "if an 
armed attack occurs" and only "until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security"36; 
- The principle of inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force. This 
principle is in fact well established. It is inherent in the rules Of customary 
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international law developed by state practice during the nineteenth century. It 
is sanctioned by general international treaties such as the Covenent of the 
League of Nations, the Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928 and the UN Charter, under 
which it has been considered a necessary implication of the obligation in 
Article 2, to refrain from the use of force against any state. The principle 
was also insisted upon in the Stimson Doctrine, whereby the U. S. refused to 
recognize any Japanese acquisition resulting from Japan's invasion of Manchuria 
in 1931. It was also accepted in the form "no title by conquest" as a principle 
of American international IaW37. Further, it was explicitly reaffirmed in 
Article 17 of the 1948 Bogata Charter which states that no territorial 
acquisition or special advantage obtained by f orce shall be recognized. 38 
The second ground in support of Egypt's position is that Israel could not 
invoke Article 51 of the Charter to Justify a pre-emptive strike. While the 
Charter recognizes the right of self-defence against an armed attack, it does 
not permit a pre-emptive strike in advance of any attack. This view has been 
adopted by the majority of states and recognized by international lawyers39. 
For example, Philip Jessup observed that Article 51 suggested a limitation an 
the right of self-defence provided by customary international law, and that "it 
may be exercised only if an armed attack occurs. This restriction in Article 
51 - very definitely narrows the freedom of action which states had under 
traditional law. A case could be made out for self-defence under the 
traditional law where the injury was threatened but no attack had yet taken 
place. Under the Charter, alarming military preparations by a neighbouring 
state would Justify a resort to the Security Council, but would not Justify 
resort to anticipatory force by the state which believed itself threatened41140 
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Along the same line# Georg Schwarzenberger argued that the right of 
self-defence is not preventive and therefore "it does not cover preventive 
measures against ýPnote future contingencies. 1141 f 
Another ground supporting Egypt, s view is the argument submitted by the 
representative of Egypt In Security Council meeting of May, 29,1967: 
"The Gulf of Aqaba has always been a national inland waterway subject to 
absolute Arab sovereignty ... by its configuration it has a nature of a mare 
r1mmum which does not belong to the class of international waterway ... there is 
no shade of a doubt as to the continued existence of the state of war between 
the Israelis and the Arabs ... My Government has the legitimate right, in 
accordance with international law, to impose restriction on navigation in the 
Strait of Tiran with respect to shipping to an enemy, 1142 
Thus, the blockade was a legal exercise by Egypt of its right of sovereignty 
over its internal waters and an assertion of a right of belligerency recognized 
Aý I 
by international law. On one hand, the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and 9 
Israel did not terminate the state of war legally existing between them. It 
followed that the ' right to enf orce a blockade was not af fected by the 
armistice43. Further, Article II of the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and 
Israel provided that "no element of f orces of one party shall enter or pass 
through waters within three miles of the coast-line of the other party. "44 
In addition, even if Israel possessed the right of innocent passage in 
. 
the 
Straits of Tiran under Article 16 (4) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea 
of 1958, the relevant provision was not binding an Egypt because Egypt did not 
ratify that Treaty and because Article 16 (4), as rightly observed by the U. S. 
representatives j established a new rule rather than codified a customary one . 46 
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Before leaving this point, it is worthwhile to refer to the position adopted by 
the Arab League in the wake of the Six Day War. In the Arab League Summit 
Conference held in Khartum in August in 1967, Arab Leaders agreed to seek a 
peaceful settlement to secure the withdrawal of the Israeli forces, but in the 
framework of the three criteria: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel 
and no negotiation with Israel. In other words, the Arab leaders, while 
agreeing to seek a peaceful settlement, rejected, , -: -; L , the three conditions 
stipulated by Israel in return for its withdrawal, i. e., the termination of the 
state of war, the recognition of Israel and direct negotiations with Israel. " 
RPARalutirm 949 And The Withdrawal nf Israp-11. Forces From Egypt'R Tprritnry 
With all its defects and uncertainities, Resolution 242 remains the only 
internationally-agreed framework for peace in the Middle East. It nay be said 
that it is one of the exceptional resolutions in which, contrary to its usual 
practices of not going beyond calling for an end of hostilities, the Security 
Council recommanded in some detail a long term solution to a dispute. 
The Resolution is of general importance once it had been accepted by Most 
states involved in the peace process and by the PL047 in 1988 as constituting 
the agreed basis for any future comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Alsot it is of particular importance to any examination of the texts 
of the 1979 Treaty and the Framework Treaty because it was intended to 
constitute the legal basis of the principles included in both of them. This can 
be inferred from the first preambular paragraph of the Framework Treaty which 
reads in part as follows: 
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"The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and 
its neighbours is the Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts. 11413 
Along the same lines, the first preambular paragraph of the 1979 Treaty states 
that it is founded on: 
*The urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting 
peace in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242 and 
33811.49 
After this brief clarification of the importance of Resolution 2429 we turn now 
to consider its position with regard to the withdrawal of the Israeli forces 
from Egypt's occupied territory. 
Although the Resolution provides explicitly for the withdrawal of Israeli 
forces, it either overlooks or advances uncertain answers to some important 
questions raised regarding that withdrawal. The conditions of that withdrawal 
and the extent of the withdrawal, as well as the binding nature of the 
Resolutiong are among these questions. 
In relation to the conditions of the withdrawal, we may recall at the outset 
that the Resolution was a package deal based on certain basic principles. While 
it called for the withdrawal of Israel from Egypt's territory, it provided that 
this withdrawal was conditional on the application of the other principlesr-0. 
That is to say, Egypt was obliged, in return for that Israeli withdrawall to 
terminate the state of belligerency with Israelr-1, to recognize the state Of 
Israel and its right to live within secure and recognized boundaries 62, to 
respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Israe1r. 3 and finally to 
establish peace with Israel. " 
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In considering the above conditions in the Resolution, in the light of the 
positions taken by both Egypt and Israel in the wake of the June War, we may 
state the following: 
Quite clearly, Egypt's demand for unconditional Israeli withdrawal from its 
territory had been rejectedr-r,. On the other hand, Israel's conditions for the 
a L 
withdrawal were largely supported by the Resolution. The Resoluton accepted the 
(N 
Israeli conditions regarding the termination of the state of war, the right to 
be recognized by Egypt, the right to have secure boundaries and the right to 
establish peace with Egypt. However, Israel's demand for direct negotiations 
seems to have been rejected. r-r- 
As to the question of timing, it is clear that the Resolutior totally 
overlooked it. For example, no mention was made of the period during which the 
withdrawal was to be completed, nor the date of its beginning. Further, 
assuming that Israel agreed to withdraw, there still remained an intractable 
problem : which should come f irst in time, Israeli withdrawal f rom the 
territories which she was holding, or Egypt's acceptance of peace and 
recognition of Israel. According to the Arab interpretation, Egypt would only 
terminate the state of war with Israel once Israel had first withdrawn its 
forces from Sinai. This was based on the premise that the term "withdrawal" 
was placed physically first in the body of Resolution 242.69 
Also, Egypt would be put at a disadvantage in negotiations by virtue of 
Israel's continued occupation of its territoriesr-9. Further, it was argued that 
there was a recognized principle of international law that a treaty secured by 
force or under the pressure of military occupation was null and void. As 
Oppenheim pointed out, a peace treaty imposed by a victorious aggressor has no 
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legal validity6O. In support of this argument, it referred to Lauterpacht's 
Report of 1953 on the law of treaties to the International Law Commission: 
"A treaty imposed by or as result of f orce or threat of f orce... is invalid by 
virtue of the operation of the general principle of law which postulates f reedom 
of consent as an essential condition of the validity of consensual 
undertaking. "r" 
The same view was adopted by Brownlier-2 and by Quincy Wright who condemned 
Israel's claim to remain in occupation of Arab territories until it secured a 
peace treaty: 
"One cannot say that negotiations over territories are fair where one or the 
other parties occupies most of it ... Modern international law affirmed by the 
Stimson Doctrine holds that a treaty made by duress against the state is 
invalid. "" 
On the other hand, Israel held the view that, as the Resolution was a 
framework for an agreement, it followed therefore that the withdrawal should 
follow rather than preceed it, If Israel were to withdraw before negotiations 
and Arab states then refused to terminate belligerency, Israel's security might 
be seriously impaired with no way of rectifing the situation, short of another 
WarG4. Israel's argument was supported by the view - referred to earlier - 
that there is nothing in either the Charter or general international law which 
leads one to suppose that military occupation pending a peace treaty is 
illegal. rar, 
Before leaving this point, it may be worth mentioning that the US adopted 
the position that the provisions an Israel's withdrawal from the occupied 
territories were contingent upon the conclusion of peace between the Arab 
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states and Israel. In this connection Vlliam Rogers, US Secretary of State, 
declared: 
"To call for Israeli withdrawal as envisaged in the UK Resolution without 
achieving agreement on peace would be partisan toward the Arabs. To call an 
the Arabs to accept peace without Israeli withdrawal would be partisan toward 
Israel. Therefore, our policy is to encourage the Arabs to accept a permanent 
peace based on a binding agreement and to urge the Israelis to withdraw from 
occupied territory when their territorial integrity is assured as envisaged by 
the Security Council Resolution". r-6 
This view seems to be the one adopted by the 1979 Treaty, as we shall see 
later. 
In relation to the legal nature and the binding ef fect of the resolution, it 
may be observed that the Security Council did not specify under what article or 
chapter of the Charter it acted when adopting the Resolution of November 22, 
1967 G7. It follows that the legal character of the Resolution is, therefore# a 
matter for Anterpretation. In this respect, we can find two conflicting 
views: ` 
The first view holds that the Resolution is of a binding nature and therefore 
it should be implemented in all its parts. This view has been expressed by the 
Soviet Union. In presenting this view, two Soviet jurists state the following: 
"The Security Council is authorized, under the United Nations Charter, to take 
all necessary stepst including the use of armed force, against a state refusing 
to implement its resolution. The Security Council Resolution of November 22, 
1967 is a- juridical deed which ought to be executed in full detail, and 
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particularily as regards the withdrawal of the Israeli f orces to the lines prior 
to June 5.1'11 
Quite clearly the above passage implies that the Resolution was adopted by the 
Security Council within the framework of Chapter VII which deals with "Action 
with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of 
aggression". in particularl Article 39, the key provision in this chapter"01 
which reads as follows: 
"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to 
maintain or restore international peace_ and security. 0671 
ý .1-. 
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the resolution is in the nature of Mere,, 
4L 
recommendation taken by the Security Council under Chapter V172 which provides 
that the Security Council may recommend procedures or methods of adjustment in 
cases of dispute or similar situationS73 or may itself recommend terms of 
settlement in defined circumstanceS71 . The grounds advanced in support of this 
view can be summarized as follows: the language used by the Resolution did not 
mention the terms "threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression" whose 
invocation may perhaps prima faniA indicate an intention to take enforcement 
action upon non-compliance. Thus confirming that it was not taken within the 
framework of Article V1176 ; during the debate in the Security Councilt several 
representatives said or Implied that the Security Council should merely make 
recommendations on the Middle East under the peaceful settlement provisions Of 
the Charter 7G and; the official Security Council repertnire deals with the 
British draft as in part an application of Chapter VI of the UK Charter. 77 
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Apart from the dispute over its binding nature, it had been rightly observed, 
that Resolution 242 has been so widely accepted79 and referred to that one may 
well conclude that it has been treated as having a mandatory effect, in 
particular after it had. been emphasized in Security Council Resolution 338 on 
October 1973 adopted towards the end of the 1973 October Var . 79 
It remains now to consider the most significant question raised with regard to 
the withdrawal issue under the Resolution, namely the extent of the final line 
of Israeli withdrawal. There can be no doubt that the uncertainty resulting 
from the vague language used in dealing with such an essential issue made it a 
complex one. Several reasons may be mentioned as having accounted for such 
complexity. 
The English text of the Resolution deals with the extent of the Israeli 
withdrawal in vague language: Article 1 speaks of withdrawal of Israeli f orces 
"from territories occupied in the recent conflict", and not "from all the 
territories" occupied. Accordingly, the absence of the definite article "the" 
before the word "territory" has left the door open to the argument that the 
Resolution did not require withdrawal from all the territories'O. 
Notwithstanding the absence of the word "the" in the English text, the French 
text of the Resolution speaks about withdrawal from the territories occupied: it 
speaks about "retraft des foreps; armees Israeliennes des tPrritnIrPs Occ 
Inrn du ranAntel. The text of the Resolution contains no reference whatsoever 
of the pre-5 June boundaries. 
The Resolution refers to the right of every state in the area to live "within 
secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force". " Thust 
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according to a reasonable interpretation, it negates the necessity of a 
return to the lines existing prior to the hostilities of June 1967.83 
For the above reasons, a great deal of controversy has arisen over the 
extent of the Israeli withdrawal. For example, Israel and its 
supporters argued that the extent of its withdrawal could not be the 4 
June lines since the omission of the word "the" was deliberately made. 
It follows, therefore, that Israel was entitled to negotiate new 
boundaries which may include parts of Egypt's territory. On the other 
hand, Egypt and its supporters insisted an an opposing view that the 
Resolution undoubtedly required a total Israeli withdrawal from all 
occupied Egyptian Territory. 
The meaning attributed to Resolution 242 in the argument advanced by 
Israel and its supporters is that it did not require withdrawal of 
Israeli forces from all the lands occupied in the Six-Day Var, but 
required only the withdrawal to such lines as would constitute "secure 
boundaries" for Israel. 
Article 1(1) of the Resolution speaks of territory occupied in the 
recent conflict but not "all the territories". Moreover, that paragraph 
on withdrawal does not say to where the Israeli forces are to withdraw, 
nor does it say what is to be withdrawn; also it does not say when they 
are to withdraw. According to the argument, this is not accident and 
such omission is deliberate. 64 
Proof of this is the fact that the Security Council and the General 
Assembly had rejected all draft resolutions in which the intent was to 
98 
require the withdrawall immediate or otherwise, of all Israeli forces 
back to the lines they occupied on June 5,1967. OG Having in mind the 
fact that every word in the adopted clause was carefully weighedo they 
came to the conclusion that the language used by that paragraph does 
not require a total withdrawal66. 
As regards the French text of the Resolution which speaks of Israeli 
withdrawal from the territories "des territntres", and not from 
"territories", the Israelis held that in the case of divergence between 
two equally valid versions of a legal text, an important place, 
according to international law, is accorded to the language in which the 
text was originally draftedG7. 
Thus, in the light of the fact that the British proposal (S/8247) which 
became Resolution 242 after its adoption by the Security Council, 
carried the notation "Original English"99, it would be unjustified to 
disregard the English text in favour of the French text. 
Also Article 1(2) of the Resolution provides for the right of every 
stateý in the area "to live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries free from threats or acts of force", a description which 
could not be applied to the pre-June 5,1967 lines89 
Consideration must also be given to the meaning of the principle of 
"inadmissibility of the aquisition of territory by war" referred to in 
the second paragraph of the preamble of the Resolution. - According to 
Shabtai Rosenne, the meaning of the principle is nothing more than the 
established rule of international law that only a formal agreementl and 
more particularly after a war, usually a treaty of peace, is competent 
to transfer territory from one country to another. To justify his 
opinion, he held that the words of this principle are formulated in the 
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Spanish expression which has become almost epigrammatic in U. N. circles, 
namely "LavictorIA Tin dA derechos". This notion, appears in a number of 
important treaties concerning Latin America, and it lies behind the so 
called "Stimson Doctrine. " The expression was first used, he continued, 
by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina in December 1869 in his 
note regarding the war between certain Latin American states in which he 
argued that military victory by itself did not give rights to territory$ 
and that the disposition of territory could only follow from an 
international agreement between the parties concerned9O. 
From the above explanation, Rosenne draws the conclusion that the 
ti iiadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war as a general 
proposition cannot be accepted, and that a correct understanding of this 
principle suggests that there should be an agreement between the 
parties, after the war, to establish definitive territorial limits". 
Also, he added if this pri ncipleý -read S, in conjuction with the final 
clause an territorial arrangements which speaks of "secure and 
recognized boundaries", the meaning he attributes to that principle is 
couf irmed. 92 
Additional ground in support of this view is the argument that the pre- 
June 5,1967 linesq under Article IV(3) of the Armistice Agreement 
between Egypt and Israelq were provisional in character and did not 
prejudice the rights of the parties in respect of the final boundaries. 
This argument has been discussed earlier. 93 
Egypt and its supporters insist that the Resolution called for a total 
Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab occupied territories9l. According 
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to them, withdrawal from territories occupied in the recent conflict can 
only mean withdrawal from all the territories occupied in June 1967. 
The question is not one of semantics, but is a question of law. Under 
international law and the principles of the Charter as well as 
Resolution 242, Israel is bound to withdraw from all territories it 
occupied, since the Resolution should not be construed in a manner that 
implies that the Security Council was acting against the Charter and 
against accepted principles of law by allowing Israel to retain some of 
the territories it seized in the war. 
This view is supported by the Arab understanding of certain paragraphs 
of the Resolution. In the first place, the reference to the principle 
of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war means, as 
Lord Caradon indicated to the Arab Foreign Ministers, that Israel has to 
withdraw from all the Occupied territories96. 
Moreover, the Resolution clearly required withdrawal from occupied 
territories and not to "secure boundaries". As a result, withdrawal 
from occupied territories should not at any ratý- be confused with the 
establishment of secure boundaries. 96 
As regards the absence of the definite article before the word 
"territory" in Article 1(l) in the English text, Shihata points Out that 
while the Resolution does not use the definite article in the withdrawal 
paragraph, it amply describes the territories f rom which withdrawal is 
required as being "those occupied in the recent conflict" without any 
exception. Insistence an the relevance of the absence of the definite 
article, he continues, would lead to the absurd conclusion that some 
Israeli forces could be maintained in any territories from which 
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withdrawal is accomplished, as the Resolution fails also to provide for 
withdrawal of all the Israeli forces from such territories. 97 
Furthermore, the above argument may be enhanced by the fact that the 
text of the Resolution in the four other official languages (Frencho 
Spanish, Russian and Chinese) used the term "the territories" and not 
"territories" in the paragraph on withdrawal. For example, the French 
text refers to "Irletraft des fnrcps arme-PP TnrAP1JPnnPA_dPq territoires 
nnnupps lore du recent... 1199. It is well known that English and French 
enjoy equal status as official and working languages of the Security 
Council99. 
A total withdrawal is also consistent with the principles referred to 
in the operative paragraph 'which calls for "the respect for and 
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of every state in the area"; and it further affirms the 
necessity for guaranteeing "the territorial inviolability" of every 
state in the area. 100 
Apart from reasons based an the text of the Resolution, additional 
reasons in support of a total Israeli withdrawal have been advanced. 
For example, in the course of the 138 2nd Session of the Council 
during which the Resolution was adopted, the great majority of the 
representatives voting for the Resolution understood that it means total 
Israeli withdrawal. For instance, the Indian representative stated: 
"It is our understanding that the draft resolution, if approved by the 
Council, will commit it to application of the principle of total 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from' all the territories- I repeat all 
territories- occupied by Israel as a result of the conflict". 101 
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In this connection, several delegations, including India, Mali, ligert 
Bulgaria and the U. S. S. R. expressed the view that L1-- - riad voted f or the 1ýt 
Resolution precisely as India interpreted it. 102 
A total Israeli withdrawal is also consistent with the subsequently- 
adopted Resolutions of the General Assembly on the Middle East situation 
at its 25th, 26th, and 27th sessions. 103 
Along the same lineeg several resolutions adopted by international 
organizations have amply stated that Resolution 242 requires a total 
Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied in 1967. For 
example, the African Summit Conference held in Algeria in September 1968 
issued a resolution calling for Israel's withdrawal to the 4 June 
positions in accordance with Resolution 242104. Also 35 members of the 
U. N. severed their relations with Israel because of its failure to 
conform to that understanding. 106 
Another important reason in support of a total Israeli withdrawal from 
Egypt's territory is the argument that the 1967 lines between Egypt and 
Israel were not provisional. According to this view, the 1949 Armistice 
Agreement, under which the pre-June boundary was established, made a 
distinction between two types of linest firstly permanent armistice 
lines which coincided with the previously-established international 
boundaries between mandated Palestine and Egypt, and secondly other 
demarcation lines which separated the Gaza Strip from the Israeli-held 
territory. The latter lines were intended to be provisional and 
therefore could be changed in the ultimate settlement according to 
Article IV (3) of the Agreement. Thusl Israel's claim that its pre-June 
boundaries with Egypt are provisional is groundless. 106 
103 
The f inal reasons of f Wed >3(ý this view ta, itased an the assertion that 
Israel's continuous occupation is in conflict with the principles of 
international law and the U. N. Charter'07. It follows, therefore, that 
it is obliged to withdraw from Egypt's territory. The argument regarding 
the illegality of Israel's occupation has been pointed out earlier. 
In considering these two conflicting interpretations, we ire forced to 
agree with the view that the Resolution requires a total Israeli 
withdrawal from all the Arab territories seized in 1967. We cannot 
accept Israel's view that it does not recognize documents of the 
Security Council unless they are written in English, thus, removing at 
stroke four of the five official languages of the UN. 109 
Also, we cannot accept Israel's insistence, against the consensus of 
the international community, on tying the destiny of sovereign states# 
their history and geography, to the absence of a definite article which 
is not even needed grammatically to convey the required comprehensive 
meaning"'. 
In any event, the ambiguity surrounding the extent of the Israeli 
withdrawal as provided by Resolution 242 seems to be resolvedo as we 
shall see, by the Peace Treaty which clearly interprets it as requiring 
total Israeli withdrawal and consequently applied such interpretation to 
Egypt's territary. 110 
Thg Positlnn nn th! o Vithdrawal Nring Sadat'r. Visit tn JpruralPZ_Jlr' 1977 
It must be conceded that the starting point of the peace process which 
resulted in the 1979 Treaty was undoubtedly the historic and unexpected 
visit of President Sadat to Jerusalem. Adjýý Y9 
latters 
took a new 




declaring, for the first time during the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, Egypt's readiness to accept the existence of, and to 
conclude peace with, the state of Israel. "' 
Sadat's visit-is of particular importance, not only because without it) 
as is widely recognized, there would have been no peace treatyO but also 
because it represented a historic turning point in Egypt's settlement 
postion after which several dramatic changes regarding some important 
issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict accurred": 2. It is relevant and 
important therefore to examine Egypt's position on the question (If 
withdrawal during that period. 
In relation to the conditions of the withdrawal, it may be stated that 
Sadat's statement included certain changes in Egypt's previous position. 
In the first place, no mention of an immediate and unconditional 
withdrawal was made in the statement. This left the door open for the 
argument that Egypt had implicitly acknowledged the legal argument 
advanced by Israel thatj once a state has entered the territory of 
another in a legally justified use of force in self-defencelit is 
entitled to remain there until the conclusion of a peace treaty . Such a 
view, however, is not widely accepted"3. 
Also, it could mean that Egypt was no longer insisting on its 
interpretation that Resolution 242 required Israel's withdrawal before 
the establishment of peace with it. 
Yet, on the other hand, Egypt's agreement to negotiate for peace while 
Israel occupied its lands was rather a political decision dictated by 
certain political circumstances andt therefore, no legal conclusion 
should be drawn from it. In any event, whatever the legal consequences 
which may be drawn from such a position, Egypt's agreement to give up 
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its firm demand for unconditional and in diate withdrawal was a 
concession in favour of Israel. 
In assessing this change in Egypt's position, several comments require 
to be made. The change is consistent with the reasonable understanding 
of Resolution 242 which in fact does not require immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal. Moreover, the legal basis of this view can be 
found in the argument referred to earlier that Israel was legally 
permitted to wait until the conclusion of peace' 14. 
In addition, this change is inconsistent with the legal view that 
Israel's continuous military occupation of Egypt's territory was 
violating the rules of international law and the principles of the 
Charter which we discussed earlier. 
In turning to the position of the statement vis a vie the conditions 
stipulated by Israel in return of its withdrawal, Sadat declared Egypt's 
full acceptance of all the peace guarantees required by Israel. In his 
words: 
U we declare that we accept all the international guarantees you 
envisage and accept. We declare that we accept all the guarantees you 
want from the two superpowers or from either of them, or from the Big 
Five, or some of them. 111'r- 
A detailed examination of the peace guarantees is not our concern here. 
Suffice it to recall ektthis stage that Sadat's acceptance of peace 
guarantees is also consistent with Resolution 242, namely# Article 
2(c). 116 
As to the direct negotiations stipulated by Israel, Sadat implied in 
his statement that peace will be concluded within an international 
conference in Geneva' 17. This was an*implicit rejection of the Israeli 
f 
106 
demand for direct negotiations. Again it may be recalled that 
Resolution 242 did not require direct negotiations. 118 
With regard to the second issue, namely the timing of the Israeli 
withdrawal, no mention whatsoever is made of such issue. For example# 
the questions of when Israel is to begin its withdrawal or the period 
during which this withdrawal is to be completed, were not addressed. It 
is clear that these questions had been deliberately left to be decided 
during the peace negotiations. 
With regard to the third issue, namely the extent of the Israeli 
withdrawal from Egypt's territory, Sadat adhered to the principle of a 
total Israeli withdrawal not only from Egypt's territory, but also from 
all the Arab occupied territories. His demand for a total Israeli 
withdrawal was pointed out explicitly and implicitly in several parts of 
the statement. In his words: 
11 There are Arab territories which Israel has occupied by armed forces- 
we insist an complete withdrawal from these territories. " 119 
Also he stated in other part: 
"To us, the national sail is equal to the holy valley... none of us can, 
or accept, to cede one inch of it or accept the principle of debating or 
bargaining over it. 11120 
QuIbZlclearlyt Egypt's insistence On complete Israeli withdrawal is 
consistent with the Arab interpretation of Resolution 242 and the 
understanding expressed on many occasions by' various states and 
international organizations that Israel should withdraw from all the 
occupied territaries. 121 
Turning to the final issue, namely Israel's understanding of the term 
usecure and recognized boundaries"t referred to in Article 1(ii) Of 
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Resolution 2420 we may observe that Sadat adopted the view that this 
term should not be understood as providing an excuse for geographical 
expansion; instead it should mean proper security arrangements and more 
peace guarantees for Israel. In presenting his view on the meaning of 
the term "secure boundaries", he stated: 
"It means that Israel lives within her borders, secure against any 
aggression... It means that Israel obtains all kinds of guarantees that 
ensure those two factors. "122 
Egypt's position in this respect meant that it rejected Israel's demands 
proposed by several Israeli officials, that it must have a permanent 
presence at Sharm-el-Shelkh123. From a legal standpoints Egypt's 
understanding of the term "secure boundaries" was based on several 
international law principles, such as the principle of inadmissibility 
of the acquisition of territory by force, the principle of respect of 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of states, and the principle of 
self-determination, as developed under the U. N. 124 
Moreover, this understanding can be supported by the fact that the 
term "secure and recognized boundaries" in the British draft (which 
became Resolution 242) was taken from the earlier US draft submitted to 
the Security Council an November 7,1967. Secure boundaries were 
envisaged by the sponsors of the latter draft as a condition in the 
arrangements to be adopted and not in the geographic location"'- 
Before leaving this point, it may be worthwhile to point out that no 
change in the Israeli position during this period can be traced. In his 
statement followed Sadat's speech, Begin indicated that the Israelis 
"have a different position... with regard to the permanent borders". 
Nevertheless, he confirmed that the approach of the Israeli government 
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was that it was ready to negotiate peace on the basis of the Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338, without any prior condition. 127 
T- The Drafting History nf thp Vithdralffil Mause 
It is necessary at the outset to indicate that it is not our intention 
here to analyze the proposals and the drafts submitted by the parties 
6 
duringCamp David negotiations as they will be examined later in our 
analysis of the relevant provisions of the Peace Treaty. The following 
discussion, therefore, will be confined to a brief exposition of these 
drafts as submitted during the negotiations. 
The Camp David talks opened on September 5,1978 (and lasted for 
thirteen days)'20. On the next day, on September 6t Sadat submitted a 
plan which called, inter all&, for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from 
all the Arab occupied territories. The question of the Israeli 
withdrawal was chiefly dealt in Article 2 of the text of the Egyptian 
proposal. It reads as follows: 
"The parties agree that the establishment of a just and lasting peace 
among them requires the fulfillment of the following: first, withdrawal 
of Israel from the occupied territories in accordance with the principle, 
of inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. In Sinai and 
the Golan, withdrawal shall take place to the international boundaries 
between mandated Palestine and Egypt and Syria respectively"'. " 
The Egyptian draft was quite unacceptable to the Israeli negotiators 
for several reasons. In the first place, the language on the 
inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war was rejected by Begin 
on the ground that Israel had occupied the Arab lands in a "defensive 
act" rather than by a war. 130 
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Moreover, Israel's initial position was that it would not give up the 
Israeli military airfields in Sinai'21. Also, Dayan suggested an 
adjustment in the international boundaries between Egypt and Israel in 
return of the. latter's agreement to remove its settlements in Sinai'31. 
Further, if Egypt's draft was to be accepted, then the scope of the 
Israeli withdrawal, which would be based on the principle of the 
inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war, would extend in 
legal terms to all the Arab occupied territories. 133 
In an attempt to bridge the gap between Egypt's position and the 
Israeli reaction, the US submitted on September 10 its first draft. 134 
The relevant portion dealing with the question of the withdrawal reads 
as follows: 
"Israel has agreed to the restoration of the exercise of full Egyptian 
sovereignty in the Sinai up to the internationally recognized border 
between Egypt and Israel, and Egypt has agreed to establish full peace 
and normal relations with Israel. "136 
A quick look at the Egyptian and American draf t reveals two main 
differences. First, while the legal basis of Egypt's draft was the 
principle of inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by wars the 
American draft instead referred to the principle of respect of state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Also, the US draft contained no 
mention of other Arab occupied territoriest while Egypt's draft provided 
explicitly for Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories. 
Moreover, contrary to Egypt's draft$ the Americans used a language which 
referred implicitly rather than explicitly to the Israeli withdrawal 
from Egypt's territory. 
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As to the reaction of Egyptq it seems that the Egyptians found it 
acceptable provided that it was amended to refer explicitly to the 
1 Israeli withdrawal 
In response to Egypt's view, the US amended its draft an the withdrawal 
to provide explicitly for the Israeli withdrawal. On September 12, the 
second American draft was submitted' : 37 The relevant portion on the 
withdrawal ran as follows: 
"Egypt and Israel agreed to negotiate on: 
a)The full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the international 
recognized borders between Egypt and mandated Palestine, 
b) ... withdrawal of Israeli personnel from Sinai. 11139 
This version suggests that the expression "withdrawal of Israeli 
personnel from Sinai" was inserted to meet the Egyptian demand for 
clearer language. The term "Israeli personnel" is somewhat unclear and 
can be taken as a reference 
perhaps also to the settlers. 
both to Israeli military forces and 
At this time, it may be observed, the 
Israelis had not been yet agreed an the withdrawal of the settlers. 
Also, the above version refers to the final line of the withdraewal in 
terms of the international borders between Egypt and mandated Palestine, 
instead of the expression "internationally recognized border between 
Egypt and Israel" used in the first draft. The former expression which 
was taken from the Egyptian draft is more accurate as we shall indicate 
later. 
In turning now to the Israeli position, a distinction ought to be imade 
between its initial position taken in the first days of the negotiations 
and the final position. In the first stage Israel declared that it was 
ready to withdraw its military forces from Sinai provided that it could 
ill 
keep control over the airfields in Sinai'". These airfields were built 
by Israel during its military occupation of Sinai. Of course, such a 
demand was rejected by Egypt, since it would involve violation of 
Egypt's sovereignty and territorial integrity. 140 
Alternatively, the Israelis proposed that the airfield near Sharm el- 
Sheikh could be turned over to the UK peace-keeping forces, the one near 
El-Arish to the Americans, and the one near Etzion retained by the 
Israelis for some time. Again, Egypt rejected these proposals-141 
Eventually, after the Americans accepted a proposal that the US 
government would pay the costs of, and help in, building three airfields 
in Israel in return for Israel's abandonment of the Sinai's airfieldst 
Israel agreed to give up the three airfieldsg providing that Egypt would 
use only them for civilian purposes142 
Thus, the relevant paragraph of the Camp David Accords dealing with the 
airfields problem provides for: 
11 ... the use of airfields left by the Israelis near El-Arishl Rafahl Ras- 
en-Naqbl and Sharm el , Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including 
possible coin rcial use by all nations. "143 
Another relevant problem which arose during- the negotiation was the 
timing of the Israeli withdrwal from Egypt's territory. Under Articles 2 
and 6 of the Egyptian draft, the Israeli withdrawal was to be completed" 
within three months" from the signing of the the framework treaty. 144" 
This period was rejected by the Israelis, yet, by the end of the 
negotiations it had been agreed that Israel would evacuate a 
substantial area within nine months from the signing of the peace treaty 
; thereafter its withdrawal would be completed within three years. 
112 
Israeli security reasons were behind extending the period from three 
months to three years 146 
On summing up the postion of the three participants, we may conclude 
that the extent, the timing, and the conditions of the Israeli 
withdrawal from Egypt's territory did not constitute a serious problem 
during the negotiations. However, while the US and Egypt demanded 
complete withdrawal, Israelq under the pretext of the right to secure 
boundaries, insisted on its demand to remain in occupation of the 
airfield. It did not give up this demand until the final hours of the 
negotiation. 
While Egypt demanded that the scope of the withdrawal must include all 
the territories seized in 1967l Israel and the US preferred a language 
calling for withdrawal from Egypyt1s territory only. 
The text of the Camp David Agreements referred to the Question of -the 
Israeli withdrawal in the second part of the Agreement entitled 
"Framework For The Conclusion Of A Peace Treaty Between Egypt and 
Israel". In this connection two main provisions dealing with the 
withdrawal can be found: 
"a. The full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally 
recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine; 
b. The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the-Sinai. 
Another paragraph dealing with the period during which the Israeli 
withdrawal was to be completed was the final paragraph entitled Interim 
Withdrawal: 
"Between three -months and nine months after the signing of the Peace 
Treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a 
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point east of ElArish to RasMuhammed, the exact location of this line to 
be determined by mutual agreement. 11147 
As regards the conditions stipulated by Israel in return for its 
withdrawal, such as the peace guarantees, the stationing of U. N. forces 
and Israel's freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran, several 
provisions can be found. Yet, these conditions are not our concern at 
this stage since they will be examined at length in other parts. 
We proceed now to examine the relevant parts of the Camp David Accords 
and the 1979 Pace Treaty. 
I 
The main provisions 'dealing with Israel's withdrawal are included in 
Article 1(2) of the Treaty. For the purposes of the present analysis, it 
will be quoted again: 
"Israel will withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai 
behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine 
as provided in the annexed protocol (Annex 1), and Egypt will resume the 
exercise of its full sovereignty over Sinai". A textual interpretation 
of the, above paragraph suggests several observations. The term "armed 
forces" is derived from the language of Resolution 242, in Article l(l). 
This could be interpreted as being basedl in the first places on 
Israel's acceptance of and obligations under the Resolution. 
The term "the Sinaill refers obviously to all Egypt's occupied 
territories. In referring to Sinail'the framers clearly avoided the use 
of the term "occupied territories" which was used in, Resolution 242. 
Having in -mind the fact that all Arab occupied territories are within 
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the scope of the withdrawal required by Resolution 242, it seems that 
the Israeli lawyers insisted on the use of the term "Sinai" instead of 
the term "Egyptian occupied territories", as proposed in the Egyptian 
draft. They believed that such a language would exclude the possibility 
of the application of the provisions to other Arab occupied 
territories. 149 
Moreover, the phrase "International boundary between Egypt and mandated 
Palestine" is similar to the language used in Article VIII (2) of the 
Egyptian- Israeli Armistice Agreement of 1949, which determined the pre- 
June armistice lines. This could mean that the authors of the Treaty are 
in line with Egypt's view that its pre-June Armistice lines 149, with the 
exception of Gaza, was in accordance with the international permanent 
boundary. Thus, if this is true, it means that the authors denounced 
the Israeli claim to adjust its boundary with Egypt based on the premise 
that the pre-June line was provisional. 
The phrase "international boundary" appears for the first time in the 
Egyptian draft submitted at Camp David. Later it was used by the 
Americans in - their second draft instead of the phrase "the 
internationally recognized border between Egypt and Israel. " Clearlyp 
the former phrase is more accurate than the latter. In fact, while there 
was an international, permanent and recognized boundary between Egypt 
and mandated Palestines there had never been a recognized boundary 
between Egypt and Israel until the conclusion of the 1979 Treaty. "' 
Also, the use of this phrase, in particular the term "mandated 
Palestine" to refer to the final line of the withdrawal could mean that 
Egypt implicitly recognizes the state of Israel as encompassing the 
territory of mandated Palestine with the exception of Gaza and the West 
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Bank. In other words, it could mean that Egypt had accepted Israel's 
acquisition of that substantial part of the territory- allocated to the 
Palestinian State in the U. N. partition Resolution- and which it seized 
in 1948 and 1949.161 
The word "resume" used in the sentence, "Egypt will resume the exercise 
of its full sovereignty over the Sinai" suggests that this phrase is 
declaratory in character as it confirmed Egypt's previous sovereignty 
over Sinai, thus rejecting Israeli claims questioning Egypt's 
sovereignty over Sinai. 162 
The expression "exercise its full sovereignty" refers clearly to the 
principle of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
states. This is one of the fundamental principles of the Law of Nations 
by which a sovereign state is supreme within its territorial domain. ` 
This right imposes the duty on every state to refrain and to prevent 
its agents and subjects from committing any act which constitute a 
violation of another state's sovereignty and territorial integrity. It 
is also one of the fundamental principles of the U. N. Charter as 
enshrined in Article 2(4) of the U. N. Charter' 64 . The principle was also 
Included in the constitution of several international organizationst 
e. g., Article 3(3) of the Charter of the OAU. 'r-6 
A glance at Article 1(2) suggests that, in practicel the injection of 
that principle into the last sentence of the paragraph adds nothing to 
its general meaning, that is to say, assuming that such a referrence to 
the principle was omitted, Israel would have to withdraw from all 
Egypt's territory under the clear meaning of the rest of the paragraph. 
Thus, we may askj -what are the reasons for the reference to that 
principle 7 
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A careful reading of the paragraph suggests that the reference to that 
principle could be construed as follows: 
- From the Israeli perspective such reference may be understood to mean 
that Israel's withdrawal from Egypt's territory was legally based on the 
principle of respect of Egypt's sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
rather on the principle of inadmissibility of the acquisition of 
' . -I ýearlier, 
territory by war proposed by the Egyptian draft. As referred 
the reference to the latter principle might be understood as broadening 
the scope of the paragraph to embrace the rest of the Arab occupied 
territories. In other words, the target of this phrase was the occupied 
territory of the West Bank and Gaza, which do not belong to any 
sovereign statet and consequently, Israeli presence there is not in 
violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. 
In sum, we may conclude that by the inclusion of that expressiont 
Israel not only avoided the reference to the principle of 
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by wart but also 
excluded the West Bank and Gaza from the scope of the withdrawal clause. 
On the other hand, -from the Egyptian perspective, the objective of the 
reference to the principle is two-fold. First, the ref erence that 
Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over Sinai could 
be interpreted to mean that Israel denounces its previous claims that 
Egypt possesses no title over Sinai. To understand the importance of 
this point, we may refer in brief to the legal argument against Egypt's 
sovereignty over Sinai (one third of Egypt's territory). In this 
connection Stone wrote: 
0 As to Sinai, this remained under the sovereignty of Turkey right 
until the Treaty of Lausanne, 19239 Article 150 by which Turkey 
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renounced all titles thereto without however disposing of the 
sovereignty in favor of Egypt or any other particular State. What lay 
in Egypt after that time would appear to have been merely what was first 
accorded to the Khedivate of Egypt in 1892, and continued under the 
British protectorate until after Vorld Var 1, namely, a grant of 
"administration". After 1923, and even after Egypt became independents 
no other disposition, nor any new act of annexation by Egypt, is to be 
found. The only possible grounds for suggesting that Egypt had 
sovereignty over Sinai in 1967 would therefore have to be that her 
subsequent activities there sufficid for acquisitive prescription 
whether they sufficed to enlarge her "administration" into sovereignty$ 
and whether indeed they were not all sufficiently explained in terms of 
"administration" remained a debatable question in 1967.1111-6 
Secondly, the reference to the principle of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of states would affirm the necessity of a complete Israeli 
withdrawal from Sinai and would close the door to any unexpected Israeli 
claim or interpretation under which it may not complete its total 
withdrawal. An example of such unexpected claim, or interpretation is 
the Israeli claiiw with regard to Taba. An examination of the Taba Award 
will be made later. 167 
(2) A Contextual Analysis 
The first issue which needs to be examined in relation to the Israeli 
withdrawal as provided by the 1979 Treaty was the timing of the Israeli 
withdrawal. 
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Article 1(D of Annex one to the Treaty, indicated that "Israel will 
complete withdrawal of all its armed forces... from the Sinai not later 
than three years... "169 
Also, withdrawal during this period would be accomplished in two 
phases, interim and final withdrawal. The interim withdrawal, under 
Article 1(3) of Annex one, was to be completed within 9 months from the 
date. of exchange of instruments of ratification. The line of this 
interim withdrawal will be "behind the line from east of El-Arish to Ras 
Muhammed as delinated on Map 2.11169 
The final withdrawal from the rest of Sinai to the international 
boundaries was to be completed "not later than three years. " More 
details about the subphases of the Israeli withdrawal are provided in 
Article II of Appendix 2 Annex 1.160 
The stipulation of three years to complete the Israeli withdrawal is a 
long period compared to the three months period envisaged by the 
Egyptian draf t. The U. S. draft submitted on 10 September did not 
suggest any period and stated that "the timing of the withdrawal of all 
Israeli forces from Sinai... will be defined in the Peace Treaty. ""' 
In comparing this period to many international peace treaties, the 
three years period was a long one. For example, Article 20 of the Peace 
Treaty between the Allied Forces on one hand and Bulgaria on the other 
hand in 1947 provided for the withdrawal of Allied Forces from Bulgarian 
territory within a period of 90 days after the coming into force of the 
Treaty' 62. A similar period can be found in the Treaty between the 
Allie, 6 and Italy which provided in Articles 14 and 73 for the 
withdrawal of the Allied forces from the territory of Italy within 90 
days. 163 
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In any event, the stipulation of this long period for the Israeli 
withdrawal had been affected by the view that Israel must have time to 
prepare itself for the withdrawal, particularly, complete its security 
arrangements inside its final borders'". 
Moreover, as Saunders observes, the process of achieving peace in the 
Middle East needs time to allow the political conditions for peace to 
grow as they "cannot be decreed"166. In other words, such time would 
create a political environment that would encourage and ensure a 
permanent peace. 166 
Vith regard to the time as f rom which Israel was to begin its 
withdrawal , Article 1 (1) indicated that the withdrawal would begin as 
"from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this 
Treaty". 
The framers at this point are in line with Article 2 of the Egyptian 
Proposal at Camp David that "Israeli withdrawal shall commence 
immediately after the signing of the peace treaties" C. 7. However, the 
Treaty indicates that the withdrawal begins "from the date of the 
exchange of instruments of ratification"" and not from the signing of 
the Treaty, as Egypt proposed. At this point, we may recall that the 
Camp David Accords provided that the Israeli withdrawal was to begin as 
from the signing, and not from the ratification, of the Peace Treaty. "'-' 
Notwithstanding this, the timing of the withdrawal as defined by the 
Treaty settled the dilemma raised with regard to the implementation Of 
Resolution 242, namely what must come first in time, Israeli withdrawal 
or Egypt's acceptance of peace and recognition of Israel. It is clear 
that the Treaty adopted the view that peace with, and recognition Oft 
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Israel must precede withdrawal. Thur., it goes beyond what had been 
envisaged by the Resolution. 
At this point, it may be well to recall that the paragraph on the 
establishment of peace was placed, physically, in the Peace Treaty 
before the paragraph on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai. 
This may be compared with Resolution 242, where the paragraph on the 
withdrawal precedes the establishment of peace; and therefore the Arabs 
called for the Israeli withdrawal before concluding peace with Israel. 
As to the implementation of the provisions on the timing of the 
withdrawal, Israel, with the exception of Taba, had completed its 
withdrawal in the time defined, i. e., by April 1982.1"Jaba is the site 
of a hotel that the Israelis built near Eilat an land that, according to 
Egypt, belonged on the Egyptian side of the boundary after Israel's 
final withdrawal from the Sinai under the terms of the Peace Treaty. 
Israel asserted its claim to remain there. The dispute over this area 
was referred to international arbitration. In 1989, abiding by the 
award, Israel withdrew finally from the disputed area. 171 A more 
detailed analysis of the problem appears later in this chapter. 
The second issue arising in connection with the withdrawal of Israeli 
forces under the Treaty is the extent of that withdrawal. Article 1(2) 
made it clear that Israel would withdraw to the international boundaries 
between Egypt and mandated Palestine. For a better understanding of 
the final line of the withdrawal defined by the Treaty, it may be useful 
to refer to the three other possible lines of withdrawal which might 
have been chosen. 
The first possibility is the pre-June line. This line was established 
under the 1949 Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel, and was of 
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two types. One is the permanent line marking the international 
recognized boundaries between Egypt and mandated Palestine which 
referred to in the Armistice Agreement as "the Egypt-Palestine 
frontiers"; and the temporary line separating "the Gaza Strip from the 
Israeli-held territories". 172 
From a legal standpoint, the pre-June line is consistent with the 
extent of the withdrawal clause of the Security Council Resolution. 
Further, it is consistent with the overwhelming view that the Israeli 
occupation of the Arab territories seized in 1967 is illegal under 
fundamental Charter principles and U. N. resolutions. 173 The Egyptian 
draft envisaged an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June line. 
The second possible line is the one determining the Jewish state as 
proposed by and defined in Resolution 181(11) adopted by the General 
Assembly an 29 November 1947.171 This is the line according to which 
Israel was accepted and recognized. 176 In a letter addressed on 14 May 
1948 by Eliahu Epstein, Agent of the Provisional Government of Israel, 
to President Truman requesting recognition of Israel, the President was 
informed that: "The State of Israel has been proclaimed as an 
independent republic within frontier approved by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations... 11 17C. In support of this line, we may recall that 
the Israeli government also accepted in the Protocol of Lausanne of 12 
May 12 1949, the use of a map of Palestine identical to the UN partition 
plan as a basis for discussion of the ultimate settlement. 177 
An advocate of this view could also argue that Israel's annexation of 
the territories it occupied in 1949 in excess of the partition 
resolution was illegal under the principle of inadmissibilitY Of the 
122 
acquisition of territory by force and the principle of self 
deterimination. 
Notwithstanding the above, this line was not proposed during the 
negotiations. This was due to the fact that both Egypt and Israel agreed 
before the negotiation that the principles included in Resolution 242 
should be the basis of the settlement. As is well known# the 
resolution overlooked the problem of the territories siezed by Israel in 
1948 and 1949. In the words of Quincy Wright, " The resolution of 
November 22 nd is advantegeous to Israel in requiring withdrawal only 
from territories occupied in 1967. The territories occupied by Israel 
under the 1949 Armistice beyond the UN partition line of the 1947 might 
have been added. 96179 
The third possible line is the international recognized boundary 
between Egypt and mandated Palestine. For a better understanding of this 
line, we have to go back to 1906 when Turkey was the ruler of Palestine 
and the nominal ruler of Egypt. During that time, the boundary between 
the two countries was uncertain. In 1906, it was agreed between Britain, 
then the actual ruler of Egypt, and Turkey that the boundary of the two 
territories should be definitively established. 17 Thus, on October 
1st, 1906 an agreement was concluded between the Turkish Sultante and the 
Egyptian Khediviate. IGO Under this agreement the boundary between Egypt 
and Palestine was laid down and boundary pillars were erected along the 
separating line. 181 
This was the line suggested by the first US draft to be the final line 
of the Israeli withdrawal. It was, however, referred to in terms of the 
"internationally recognized border" between Egypt and Israel. Then 
later, in the second draft, it was referred to in terms of the 
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internationally recognized boundary between Egypt and mandated 
Palestine. Of course, thi6-was the line adopted by the Camp David 
Accords and the 1979 Treaty. 
We have mentioned earlier, in dealing with the meaning attributed to 
the term "mandated Palestine", that the language of the final line of 
the withdrawal suggests that Egypt recognized Israel as a sovereign 
state, not only over the territories alloted to the Jewish state, but 
also over that substantial part of the territory alloted to the Arab 
state in the Partition Plan and seized by Israel in 1948 and 1949. 
While there has never been a consensus of opinion as to the question 
whether or not Resolution 242 required unconditional Israeli 
withdrawall it is clear that the framers of the 1979 Treaty envisaged a 
conditional withdrawal. The Treaty, like Resolution 242j was a package- 
deal based on certain basic principles: Israel, an one hand, agreed to 
withdraw from all the Sinai, to dismantle its settlements, and to give 
up all the oil fields. Egypt agreed, in return, to conclude full peace 
with Israel which entailed full recognition, the termination of the 
state of belligerency, free passage for Israeli shipping through Egypt's 
waterways, the establishment of full diplomatic relations and the end of 
the boycott of Israel. 192 Also, Egypt agreed on several peace 
guarantees required for the security of Israel. 
Apart from these general conditions, review of the provisions dealing 
specifically with military withdrawal show that the phases of the 
withdrawal should be accompanied by certain conditions, These can be 
classified into two types: conditions regarding security and peace 
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guarantees, and conditions regarding the normalization of, and future 
relations between, Egypt and Israel. 
The security arrangements, military measures, and the peace guarantees 
under the Treaty will be examined in detail in another part of this 
work. 103 Suffice it to emphasize at this stage that Israel had obtained 
sufficient and effective guarantees. For example, Article 2 of Annex 1 
indicated that the withdrawal was to be accompanied by the establishment 
of demilitarized zones and some military measures. Also, Article 3 of 
the Appendix to Annex 1 provided for the stationing of U. N. forces to 
supervise the implementation of certain terns of the Treaty. In 
addition, Article V of that Appendix provided for interim buffer zones 
in Egypt where no military forces were to be permitted. Finally, 
Article II of the same Appendix provided for certain limitatior6L4ý 
Egypt's military forces and equipment. 
With regard to the second type of conditions, namely those relating to 
the normalization of relations between the parties, Article 1 of the 
Treaty provided for a linkage between the Israeli withdrawal on one hand 
and the normalization of relations and the termination of the economic 
boycott on the other hand. It reads as follows: 
" upon completion of the interim withdrawal provided for in Annex lo 
the Parties will establish normal and friendly relations in accordance 
with Article 111(3). 11194 
Fortunatelyl the Treaty provided an additional paragraph to explain the 
meaning of the term "normal and friendly relations". It is clear that 
the framers favoured a broad meaning for this term. Article 3(3) 
indicated that "The normal relationship will include full recognition 
of Israel; Diplomatic relations; Economic and cultural relations; 
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Termination of boycotts and discriminatory barriers to the free movement 
of people and goods and; The mutual enjoyment by citizens of the due 
process of law". 1" 
In comparing the above paragraph with other meanings attributed to the 
same termSduring the peace negotiations, the following observations 
require to be made. 
This paragraph was originally taken from the first American draft 
submitted at Camp David, which referred to the normal relations in the 
following terms: 
"Signatories shall proceed to establish among themselves relationships 
normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should 
undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations. Steps to be taken in this respect include: a) full recognition, 
including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; b) abolishing 
economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; 
c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other 
parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law". 19r, 
This quotation was finally approved and became paragraph 2 of Section C 
of the Camp David Accords. 
However, the above broad meaning of the term "normal relations" runs 
contrary to the narrow meaning suggested in the Egyptian draft of 
September 6,1978. Article 2(7) of this draft understood the normal 
relations in terms of "full recognition and abolishing the economic 
boycott". 197 
This wide meaning went beyond what had been suggested in Resolution 
242. The Resolution referred to the termination of all states of 
belligerency and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
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political independence of every state in the area. Obviously, neither 
diplomatic relations nor economic ties had been envisaged. 
In conjunction with the establishment of normal relations as a 
condition of the Israeli withdrawal, the Treaty provided also for two 
additional conditions which should be fulfilled after the first phase of 
the Israeli withdrawal. The first was the exchange of ambassadors. 
Under Article 1 of Annex 3,11 the Parties agree to establish diplomatic 
and consular relations and to exchange ambassadors upon completion of 
the interim withdrawal" 190. Obviously, the term "diplomatic relations" 
seems also to have a specific meaning under this Article. Generally, the 
establishment of diplolmatic relations is not an international 
obligation under the rules of international law"'. Article 2 of the 
Vienna Convention an Diplomatic Relations 1961 provides that the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between states, and of permanent 
diplomatic missions, takes place by mutual consent. 11190 
Thus, in spite of the fact that the establishment of diplomatic 
relations is not an international obligation, and the fact that even if 
such relations exist, it does not necessarily entail the exchange of 
ambassadors, Egypto however, agreed to exchange ambassadors with Israel 
while the latter was occupying its territory. 
Another condition in return of the Israeli withdrawal was that Egypt 
was obliged, under Annex III of the Agreed Minutes of the Treaty, to 
fulfill Israeli oil needs from its oil exports. The relevant provision 
reads in part as follows: 
11 ... [Sluch relations will include normal commercial sales of oil by 
Egypt to Israel, and that Israel shall be fully entitled to make bids 
for Egyptian-origin oil not needed for Egyptian domestic 011 
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consumption, and Egypt and its oil concessionaires will entertain bids 
made by Israel an the same basis and terms as apply to other bidders for 
such oil. "191 
This com rcial clause was beyond what was envisaged at Camp David. 
Yet, according to Israeli sources, the objective of this clause was to 
confirm the termination of the economic boycott, to allow Israel to buy 
oil directly from Egypt and transport it in Israeli tankers through the 
Gulf of Aqaba, thus confirming the end of the boycott and the existence 
of normal relations. Another objective was, of course, to secure 
Israeli oil needs in case of any world oil crisis. "-12 
Another inportant condition stipulated in return for the Israeli 
withdrawal was that Egypt was obliged under Article VI of the Treaty to 
abandon its obligations under the Arab Joint-Defence Pact of 1951 and 
other mutual defence treaties with Arab states'93, if such obligations 
were in conflict with Egypt's obligation under the 1979 Treaty. This 
condition was mainly included in Article VI(5) which reads as follows: 
"Subject to Article 103 of the Uited Nations Charter, in the event of a 
conflict between the obligation of the parties under the present Treaty 
and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty 
will be binding and implemented". 194 
Any review of the trauvaux preparatoire of the Treaty reveals clearly 
that the principal target of this Article is the Joint Defence and 
Economic Co-operation Treaty of 1951 between the States of the Arab 
League (known as the Arab Defence Pact). 19G This means that in the event 
of a conflict between Egypt's military obligations under the Arab 
Defense Pact on the one hand, and its obligations to keep peaceful 
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relationý with Israel under the Peace Treaty on the other, Egypt's 
obligation under the Peace Treaty must prevailed. 1`16 
So far as this condition is concerned, there has never been a consensus 
of opinion between Egypt and Israel as to the exact meaning of the above 
article. From an Israeli perspective, this article means that Egypto 
under any circumstances, because of its obligations under the Arab 
Defence Pact or any mutual defense treaty, is not legally permitted to 
take part in Arab military action against Israel, even if the latter was 
attacking an Arab League state. 197 
On the other hand, Egypt held that its obligation under the Arab 
Defense Pact is part of its obligation as a UN member. Consequently, 
Article VI does not prevent Egypt from coming to the aid of a country 
with which it has a mutual defense treaty or a collective security 
agreement if such a country should come under armed attack by Israel. 
Reasons in support of these two conflicting views need to be 
clarified-199 
Before embarking on the argument for and against the effect of Article 
VI on Egypt's Arab obligation, it is useful to offer a brief account of 
the legislative history of this Article. 
It is sound to assume that the Article on conflict of obligations had 
never been raised or discussed at Camp David. Nor was a reference made 
to such problem in the text of the Camp David Accords. 199 
The first text of this Article can be found in the first draft Of the 
Peace Treaty which was nearly accepted by Egyptian and Israeli 
delegations in Washington in November 1978. Article 6 of the draft 
treaty was similar to that one which finally appears as Article VI of 
the 1979 Treaty. 200 
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By the end of November, 1978, despite the fact that the draft article 
was approved by the Egyptian delegation in Washington, President Sadat 
was reported to have been angry at the article "since that made it seem 
as if his obligations to Israel took precedence over his obligations to 
his Arab allies". : 201 
on November 30, Carter received a letter from Sadat whereby he stated 
that this article was impossible to accept and, therefore, needed to be 
revised-"' 
On the other hand, the Israeli reaction to the draft article was 
different. On November 21,1978, it was declared that the Israeli 
cabinet had voted to accept the draft treaty, including the article on 
the priority of obligationS. 203 
The Americans held that the text of the treaty agreed an 11 November 
1978 should be considered closed, including article 6. Carter objected 
to the idea of revising the treaty, but did suggest that interpretative 
notes could be appended to it. 204 
Carter's proposal was accepted by Egypt, as Sadat agreed that Article 6 
could remain essentially unchanged, provided an interpretative note 
could be added making clear that this treaty did not prevail over other 
treaties to which Egypt was a party. Thus, a US interpretative legal 
opinion was agreed and submitted to Egypt and Israel. This legal 
opinion stated that Article 6 "did not prevent Egypt from coming to the 
aid of a country with which she had a mutual defence treaty or a 
collective security agreement if such a country should come under armed 
attack" . 205 
As expected, this legal opinion was not accepted by Israel. The 
Israeli cabinet announced its rejection in the following terms: 
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"The Cabinet takes note of the letter of the Foreign Minister of 28 
December 1978 to the Secretary of the State of the United Statest which 
rejects completely the American interpretation of Article 6 (on conflict 
of obligatgions). Israel will approach the United States Government with 
a view to ensuring a single and unequivocal meaning to this Article of 
the peace treaty" . 206 
This angry Israeli reaction resulted in a halt in the peace talks. In 
an attempt to revive the talks, the Americans agreed with the Israelis 
that a new interpretation to their original interpretation was to be 
added. This new interpretation was to be in the form of an agreed 
letter which Secertary Vance would send to the Israelis. On the contents 
of this letter, Dayan wrote: 
"It was agreed that Vance's letter to us should state that the Israel- 
Arab conflict was to be resolved through peaceful means, and the United 
States held that neither side had the right to use, or threaten to use, 
military means to do so, In accordance with this principlet Egypt would 
be neither obliged nor entitled to extend help to her allies if they 
used military force against Israel because of Israel's presence in the 
territories captured in 1967. The determining sentence on this Subject 
would state that Israel's presence in these territories did not 
constitute a military attack or an act of aggression which justified 
military action against her. 
On reprisal operations, the letter was to state that military action 
taken by Israel for self-defence including actions such as those against 
terrorist attacks could not Justify military help against Israel. """ 
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Of course, the Egyptians rejected this proposed letter on the ground 
that, by such an interpretation, the Americans were granting legitimacy 
to Israel's occupation of conquered territory. 2" 
By early 1979, the Americans decided to drop the legal interpretation 
they had offered to both Israel and Egypt on the meaning of priority of 
obligations in Article 6. Instead, they proposed some slight revisions 
of Article 6 which were finally accepted by the parties. "' 
Tbj- vlax tbat Artlc'Lý V1 Of tb"' TreatY PrevejktELIýUpt from Darticipating 
In any Arab systen for collective self-dpfpUce against Tsrnpl, 
Taking as a point of departure the assumption that the tzazeala 
preparatnirpq of the 1951 Arab Defence Pact shows that the Arab 
collective defence system was created and developed in order to be 
directed against Israel, the Israeli view was essentially based on the 
argument that, as the Treaty is the basis for peace and the Defence Pact 
is the basis for war, Egypt cannot have its cake and eat it, but rather 
must decide whether it is really committed to peace, and if so renounce 
the hR111coqA Defense Pact. This view is based an a number of 
considerations. 
In the first place, there is a possible contradiction between the Arab 
Defence Pact and the 1979 Treaty. This is caused by the f act that 
Egypt and Israel have adopted different interpretations of Article 51 of 
the UN Charter. While Israel has been a traditional supporter of the 
anticipatory self-defence concept which allows a state to act in self- 
defence before the aggressor if it faced an imminant danger, Egypt, 
however, has been a supporter of a srict interpretation of the right of 
self-defence and has rejected the anticipatory self defense theory-210 
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This difference will clearly cause difficulties if Israel launches a 
preemptive strike against an Arab State. In this event Egypt, may be 
obliged to take part against Israel for three reasons. Egypt considers 
that the aggressor is the first state to employ force. 211 
Also, Article 2 of the Arab Defence Pact stipulates that armed 
aggression against any one or more members would be considered as an 
attack against all, and that all members undertake without delay to 
employ the appropriate measures, including the use of armed forces-211 
And the UK Declaration on the Definition of Aggression of 1974 gives 
priority, in general, to a restrictive interpretation of the right to 
self-defence . 213 
The Israelis argued that Egypt must renounce the bellinnse Defence Pact 
to avoid such a contradiction. 214 
Moreover, the optional nature of the 1951 Arab Defence Pact makes it 
possible for Egypt to withdrawa from this Pact as to avoid such a 
contradiction. 216 Article 12 of the Pact referred to the possibility of 
withdrawal in the following terms: 
11 Af ter a lapse of 10 years from the date of ratification of this 
Treaty, any one from the contracting states may withdraw from it, 
providing 12 months' notice is previously given to the Secretary-General 
of the Arab League, the Secretary-General of the League shall inform the 
other contracting states of such notice. " 
Thus, the Israelis argued that by virtue of this Article EgyPto whose 
membership in the Treatyli-la more than 10 years, can legally withdraw 
from the Defense Pact to maintain its peace with Israel. 21, -- 
Another reason in support of this interpretation is the Israeli 
argument that they made it clear, during the preparatory work of what 
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became Article VI of the Treaty, that the target of this Article is the 
Arab Defence Pact, as well as the fifteen mutual defence treaties 
concluded between Egypt and other Arab states. 217 Prime Kinister Begin 
told President Carter that Artice VI was designed to prevent Egypt from 
taking part in any Arab joint action against Israel because of an Arab 
contractual obligation, and is the heart of the Peace Treaty; and 
without it Israel would not sign the Treaty. 21a Dayan expressed the view 
that, 
"To find a golden mean whereby Egypt could both remain in the Arab anti- 
Israel camp and yet sign a peace treaty with us seemed as impossible as 
trying to square the circle. 11219 
In the course of the negotiations, Dayan asked Egypt's Prime Minister 
Khalil, during a meeting in Brussels in December 1978, what would be 
Egypt's obligation if Syria attacked the Golan Heights and "claimed 
that this was a defensive war to liberate the holy soil? " Khalil 
replied that Egypt would side with Syria but would take no part in the 
war. 220 Also, according to Dayan, when Khalil was asked what would be 
the situation "if Israel had no alternative but to attack the PLO 
terrorist bases in Lebanon by invading the latter? " The Egyptian 
Premier repeated that his government would join those who condemn 
Israel but would not go to war, and that Egypt would be active with 
other Arab states in a diplomatic but not in a military compaign. 2: 21 
The Israelis therefore held that the Egyptian had agreed during the 
negotiations to Israel's understanding of Article VI. 
Moreover, a review of the traveaux p1: eparatoir, -. c; reveals that Israel 
strongly rejected an American interpretation of Article VI to be 
attached to the Treaty as an interpretative "legal opinion" of the 
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Government of the U. S. 22'2 "According to Israeli sources, the rejection 
of this note sprang from the difficulty of determining when and whether 
a country was the attacker or the attacked. 22ýý- 
In support of their interpretation of Article VI, the Israelis also 
argued that Egypt1s right to participate in the Arab defence system was 
authorized under Article 52 of the U. N. Charter which dealt with 
regional arrangements. Article 52 of the Charter, they argued, permits 
but does not impose regional arrangements, Therefore, such obligation 
is jus dispositlyum and cannot be regarded as jus cogens. In this 
connection Schwelb states, "The Charter of the United Nations does not 
say that all of its provisions are rules of jus cogena. It contains a 
few provisions which are clearly jus dispositivum and from which 
derogations are permitted. Examples are; .... Article 52 which permits but 
does not impose regional arrangements". 224 
Hence, there is no jus cogena rule in contemporary international law 
which prevents Egypt and Israel from concluding an agreement conflicting 
with Egypt's obligations under the Arab League self-defence system. 
The ViekL that Article VI of the Treaty does ]Int 11reyent 139""Mn 
jultl1ling its abligatinj)n under the Arab Dp t 
Contrary to the Israeli understanding of Article VI, Egypt expressed 
the view that the Peace Treaty, which established a "Just, comprehensive 
and lasting peace" between itself and Israel. in no way 
contradicted the Defence Pact as long as Israel did not intend to 
launch aggressions on Arab States. 22s Egypt insisted that its 
obligations under the Arab Defence Pact could not be renouncedo and, 
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consequently, it would particapate in any military action if Israel 
attacked any member of the Arab League. 226 
Egypt argued that its obligation to take part in regional collective 
security arrangements, such as the Arab Def ence Pact, was part of its 
obligations under the UN Charter, This obligation is supported by 
Article 103 of the Charter which reads as follows: 
"In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of 
the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under 
any other international agreement, their obligations under the present 
Charter shall prevail" . 227 
It has been agreed that among the situations envisaged by Article 103 
was the situation where there is a conflict between the obligation of a 
member under the Charter and the obligation of that member under an 
agreement with another member contracted after entry into force by the 
Charter. "' 
Thus, by extension, Article 103 of the Charter maintained Egypt's 
obligation in the event of a conflict between the Arab Defence Pact 
and its obligations under the Peace Treaty. 
To prove that Egypt's obligations under the Arab Defence Pact Was part 
of its obligations under the U. N. Charter, it was argued that the Arab 
League system for collective self-defence, established under the 1951 
Arab Defence Pact, was part of the UK system for collective security. 
It has been said that the emphasis given by the U. N. Charter to regional 
defence arrangements was among the main reasons which led to the 
creation of the Arab Defence Pact . 229 
As a consequence, this Pact i5w regarded as part of an international 
system established by the Charter in order to maintain international 
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peace and security. The invitation extended by the UK to the Arab League 
and to the OAS to attend as observers at the UN may be mentioned as 
supportive of the view that regional arrangement are part of the UN 
system.: 230 
Secondly, it was argued that Egypt's obligations under the Arab Defence 
Pact and its mutual defence treaties with other Arab states are part of 
its obligation under Article 51 of the Charter, which provides for the 
states' "inherent right of individual or collective self-defencew. As 
is well known, Article 51 was taken from customary international law 
and, is df a jus cogens nature . 231 
Thus, the Egyptians argued that, not only does Article 52 of the 
Charter legitimate the Defense Pact, but Article 51 is also regarded 
as the very basis of the Arab Defence Pact. 
In the course of the debate in the six session of the General Assembly, 
the view that collective defence pacts are based on Article 51 was held 
by western states. When the North Atlantic Treaty was criticised by 
the Soviet Union because it included states without geographical 
connections, and without a common language, culture and history and no 
regional action under Article 52 was therefore involved, other 
representatives replied that the North Atlantic Treaty is based on 
Article 51.232 
Thirdly, in support of their interpretation , the Egyptians also argued 
that the Arab Defence Pact was not directed against Israel, which was 
not singled out in the Pact, but against any potential aggression. From 
Egypt view, it was directed mainly against a possible Soviet 
lntervention2ý113. 
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. Consequently, the Pact does not constitue a threat to Israel' security 
so long as it does not commit any aggression against its Arab neighbors. 
Fourthly, from a political perspective, the adoption of the Israeli 
interpretation demanding Egypt's withdrawal from the Arab Defence Pact 
would not lead to the establishment of a comprehensive peace in the 
area which is the main purpose of the Treaty. This is because such 
withdrawal from the Arab Defence Pact would remove Egypt's considerable 
weight from the military equation in the Kiddle East, thus leaving 
Israel as a major power in the area. This would give the Israelis, as 
actually happened, a renewed freedom to pursue their goals of fortifying 
and settling the occcupied territories and removing perceived threats by 
preemptivelagainst some of its neighbours234 
Finally, the draft of the US interpretative legal opinion on Article 
VI of the Treaty, which stated that nothing would prevent Egypt from 
honouring its commitments under other treaties in the event of armed 
attack an one of its allies, runs counter to the Israeli interpretation 
and may be mentioned as supportive of Egypt's interpretation. 
In considering the above contradictory views advanced by Egypt and 
Israel, and before attempting to arrive at any conclusion concerning the 
question whether Article VI affects Egypt's obligations under the Arab 
Defence Pact, the following observations required to be made: 
-The crux of the matter was that Egypt, by introducing its 
interpretation, wanted peace with Israel but not its isolation among the 
Arabs. Yhereas, on the other hand, the Israelis wanted Egypt to be 
isolated since that would help Israel's defence strategy; 
-One cannot accept the Israeli argument that Egypt should renounce the 
Arab Defence Pact to avoid any possible confusion because Israel could 
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still exercise anticipatory self-defence under the western concept of 
Article 51 of the Charter. There is no doubt that Egypt's membership of 
the Defence Pact was still possible provided it would take into account 
the Israeli understanding of Article 51. 
- However, one cannot deny the fact that, even if Egypt accepted 
Israel's right of anticipatory self-defence, there remains a case in 
which Egypt might have to choose between its obligations under the 
Treaty and its obligations under the Defence Pact. Under Article 6 of 
the Defence Pact, the Joint Defence Council is competent to decide 
whether an act of aggression had occured. The decisions of the Joint 
VIA- 
Defence Council, in this respect, are to be taken by the A hird-maJority 
and are binding an all parties to the Pact. 2-, ", In practice, this mean 
that Egypt may find itself obliged to intervene against Israel, even if 
it voted that Israel was not aggressor. At this point, one must admit 
that the 1979 Treaty does not provide a satisfactory solution for that 
problem. 
-However, Egypt's practice in the aftermath of the 1979 Peace Treaty 
suggests that it accepted, to some extent, Israel's right to exercise 
anticipatory self-defence. An example is Egypt"s reaction to the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. There is no evidence that Egypt 
took any kind of military action nor extended any military aid to help 
the Arab forces fighting Israel during this war. 
From all of what hrrvý* been said, one can conclude that Article VI 
posed rather than solved the question under consideration. However, a 
more sensible approach would seem to be that Egypt's membership in the 
Arab Defence Pact, for the sake of peace and stability in the area, must 
be kept and its obligations under other mutual defence treaties should 
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be honoured providing they respect and take into account Israel's right 
to exercise anticipatory self-defence so long as such an exercise is 
within the limits and in accordence with the conditions stipulated and 
agreed by international law. 
A reading at the provisions dealing with the withdrawal issue reveals 
that they cover the most important aspects of the problem, that is to 
say the total Israeli withdrawal from Egypt's territory, the evacuation 
of the three airfields built by Israel in Sinai and the time-table of 
the Israeli withdrawal. They also covered the peace guarantees and other 
conditions stipulated in return for the withdrawal. 
However, it may be observed that some issues were deliberately excluded 
from the scope of the withdrawal clause. In the first place, the rest of 
the Arab occupied territories were excluded from the scope of the 
provisions. Further, the authors of the Treaty deliberately excluded 
issues relating to compensation L any damage resulting from the Israeli 
military occupation. Similarly, issues relating to the legality of the 
Israeli occupation were excluded. 
From a comparison between the scope of the withdrawal clause under the 
Treaty and the scope of the withdrawal clause under Resolution 242, 
several comments may be made. While the Resolution covered certain 
aspects of the withdrawal in somewhat vague language, perhaps 
deliberatelyle. g., the extent and the timing of the withdrawal as well as 
the peace guarantees, the Peace Treaty covered several issues in clear 
language leaving no room for dispute over its meaning. 
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However, the scope of the Treaty's provisions is deliberately limited 
in order to exclude the territories of the Golan Heights, Gaza and the 
West Bank. This undermine6 the Treaty in the light of the fact that 
its main purpose was to establish a comprehensive peace in the area, 
rather than, a separate peace between Egypt and Israel. 
Before proceeding further, it may be asked, whether and in what 
circumstances the principle of a total Israeli withdrawal applied to 
Sinai under the Treaty's provisions can be applied in any future 
settlement concerning the rest of the Arab territories seized in 1967 7 
It must be admitted that there is no certain or satisfactory answer to 
that question. From a political perspective, Egypt wanted to prove that 
it gains something for the Arab cause, thus insisting that the total 
withdrawal applied to Sinai should be applied to the rest of the Arab 
territories seized in 1967 in any future settlement. 217 On the other 
hand, because of its territorial claims with regard to Gaza and the West 
Bank, Israel holds that what had been applied to Sinai under the Treaty 
is not applicable to the rest of the occupied territories. 23`ý 
From a legal standpoint, the uncertainty surrounding this question 
presumably stems from a conflict between the meaning of certain 
preambular paragraphs on one hand and the scope of the withdrawal clause 
on the other. 
A careful reading of the Treaty's preamble would clearly suggest that 
all principles applied to the conflict between Egypt and Israel are 
intended to constitute a basis for peace between Israel and each of the 
other "Arab neighbours" which is prepared to negotiate peace. "' 
However, Article 1(2), dealing with the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, 
contained no explicit or implicit mention of the other Arab territories. 
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One must admit that it would seem difficult to find in that Article a 
satisfactory basis for Israeli withdrawal from the other Arab 
territories. 
The record of the negotiations reveals that, whilst the preambular 
paragraph was designed to encourage the Palestinians, Jordan and Syria 
to join the peace process, because the principles of the withdrawal of 
Israeli forces and settlers would apply to their territories, the 
formulation and the wording of Article 1(2) was deliberately designed to 
eliminate, or at least minimize, the effect of that preambluar 
paragraph. 
One possible way around this question is to accept the Israeli view 
that what had been applied to Sinai cannot be applied to other Arab 
territories particularly in the West Bank and Gaza. In the words of an 
Israeli official "if someone thinks that there is any analogy between 
what had been agreed for Sinai and what might happen in the West Bank 
and Gaza, he would be making a basic error of judgement. 11240 
In the course of the negotiations, the Israeli delegation rejected in 
clear terms any langauge which may be understood as a reference to a 
total Israeli withdrawal, as, for example, Israel's rejection of the 
inclusion of 'the principle inadmissibility of acquisation of territory 
by war' in the text of the Treaty. "' Also, Israel's practice in the 
aftermath of the 1979 Treaty does not support any interpretation which 
might require total withdrawal from all Arab occupied territories. 
Rather, it could mean the reverse, namely, an Israeli intention to 
remain in the occupied territories or it least most of them. Examples 
of such practice are Israel's annexation of East-Jerusalemm and the 
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Golan Hight after the Peace Treaty, as well as its settlement policy in 
these territory after the Treaty. 242 
Another different answer to that question is that advanced by Egypt. 
Based an the assumption that the problem of the ambiguity of Resolution 
242 regarding the extent of the Israeli withdrawal had been resolved by 
the 1979 Treaty which provided for a total Israeli withdrawal from 
Egypt's territory. 141, it follows that, by implication, Israel is 
required to withdraw from all the territories falling under the scope of 
Resolution 2420 viz, all the other Arab lands occupied in 19U. There 
is no better quotation in this respet than that by Foreign minister, 
Ghali, in a statement before the People Assembly in Egypt following the 
conclusion of the Treaty: 
11 ... for 
the first time Israel has signed an interpretation of Resolution 
242, according to which it has to withdraw from the occupied 
territories. Also, Israel agreed to withdraw to the international 
boundary between Egypt and Mandated Palestine. This was included in the 
Treaty so as the other Arab states could benefit from such precedent, 
thus Syria, for instance, could ask Israel to withdraw from all the 
occupied territory and settlements because this was applied under the 
Treaty" 244 
In assessing the above views, it would be difficult to subscribe to the 
view expressed by Israel that because its intention during the 
negotiations was not to withdraw from the other Arab territories, the 
reference in the preamble to the applicability of such withdrawal from 
these territories must be overlooked. 
One cannot agree, from a legal standpoint, that Israel was obliged 
under the Peace Treaty, even by implication, to withdraw from the Golan 
I 
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Heights as well as 
ýhe West Bank and Gaza. If such an important 
obligation was intendod, it should have been clearly stated. 
However, to say this is not to accept the view that Israel is not 
obliged to withdrqw from the Syrian and Palestine territories occupied 
in 1967. As we, prove(I earlier, the Israelis are obliged to wihdraw from 
all these territories under Resolution 242 which is binding on them. 
To conclude, one can state that the 1979 Treaty can be used by other 
Arabs as a precedent, but only as a negotiating position. No legal 
right was given to them under the 1979 Treaty in this respect. 
However Resolution 242 does give rights to Arab states in relation to 
their territory. 
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Before leaving this section an the Israeli withdrawal, a final point needs not 
to be overlooked, namely, the dispute between Egypt and Israel over Taba. As is 
well known, by April 1982, Israel completed its final withdrawal from S(iiýa 
with the exception of a strip of land at Taba on the shore of the Gulf of 
Aqaba. Taba is the site of the hotel that the Israelis built near Eliat on land 
that, according to Egypt, belonged on the Egyptian side of the boundry. Israel 
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Map 7 The Taba strip dispute between Egypt and Israel 
So far as the Taba problem is concerned, it may be important at the outset to 
point out that the problem is no longer of practical importance as it was 
finally settled by the Taba Award of 29 September 1988. -;:, Ir, However, it is 
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still of particular importance because it was concerned with the interpretation, 
as well as the implementation, of the 1979 Treaty. Mý- a_aattar-4&;, ý fact, 
Israel Is obligation, under Article 1 (2) of the Treaty, to withdraw "behind the 
international boundary"--4G, could not be implemented to the satisfaction of 
both parties so long as there existed a disagreement over this area. 
Among the main reasons behind the Taba dfspute was the language used by the 
authors in Article II of the 1979 Treaty which reads in part as follows: 
11 The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized 
international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of 
Palestine, as shown on the map at Annex II, without prejudice to the issue of 
the. status of the Gaza Strip. The Parties recognize this boundary as inviolable. 
Each will respect the territorial integrity of the other, including their 
territorial waters and airspacell. 247 
Clearly, as the Taba Tribunal observed "the description of the boundary is not 
very clear or specific, particularly the word 'recognized' is in the context 
ambiguous . 11248 
The question ra! sed in this respect is: what was exactly the border-line 
recognized during the mandatory period ? To this question, Professor Lapidoth, 
im 
the Israeli Judge in Taba Tribunal, "' indicated that there were four possible 
answers: 
Wthe line defined in the 1906 Agreement; 
(b)the line demarcated by the telegraph poles in October 1905; 
(c)the line formed by the masonry pillars built in 1906-1907 which replaced 
the telegraph poles and; 
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Wthe line formed by any pillars which existed de facto on the ground in 1923 
and which may have been erected after 1906-1907. -ý: r-O 
To understand the meaning and the differences between the above lines as well 
as the background to the dispute, it is useful to go back to 1906 in order to 
trace its origins. In that year Turkish forces occupied the coastal settlement 
of Taba, but were subsequently forced to withdraw under British pressure. 
During this time Turkey was the actual ruler of Palestine and the nominal ruler 
of Egypt. The actual ruler of Egypt was Britain. The boundary between Egypt and 
Palestine was uncertain. ý2r-' 
After negotiations between Anglo-Egyptian and Turkish representatives, it was 
agreed, in May 1906, that the boundary between the two territories should be 
definitivelY established. In implementation of this agreement, a joint 
commission was appointed by Egypt and Turkey to negotiate the possible line 
of the boundary. The area adjacent to the line of the prospective boundary from 
Taba in the south to Rafa in the north was f irst surveyed and a map was 
prepared.; 2" 
On October 11 1906, an Agreement determining the international boundary 
between Egypt and Palestine was reached. 211 So far as the terminus of the line 
at Taba is concerned, the boundary at its southern terminus was described in 
the following terms: 
"The administrative separating line, as shown an the map attached to this 
Agreement, begins at the Gulf of Aqaba and follows along the eastern ridge 
overlooking Wadi Taba to the top of Jebel Fort, from thence the separating line 
extends by straight lines as follows ... 11.2r-4 
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An important and relevant provision can be found in Article 3 of the 1906 
Agreement which reads as follows: 
"Boundary pillars will be erected, in the presence of the Joint Commission, at 
intervisible points along the separating lines, from the point on the 
Mediterranean shore to the point on the shore of the Gulf of Aqaba". "' 
The term "intervisible points" means points each of which can be seen from 
points before and points after, and from each of which one can see the point 
before and the point after. The considerable significance of this Article will 
become apparent later. 2 c- 1,: 
Immediately after the Agreement was signed, temporary markers, in the shape of 
a series of telegraph poles, were fixed by a joint CoMMiSSion. 2G 7 Subsequently# 
a process of replacing the telegraph poles by permanent masonry pillars began. 
On December 31,1906, Colonel Parker, the then Governer of Sinai,. 2r-a accompanied 
by the Turkish Commisioners who had negotiated the Agreement, supervised the 
construction of the first pillar at Taba and took a photograph of the occasion. 
This photograph was used later to identify with precision that pillar which 
no longer existed as the cliff an which the original parker pilliar had stood, 
as revealed by Israel for the first time during the oral pleading of Taba Case$ 
had in fact been removed by blasting when Israel constructed a new coast road 
between Taba and Eliat in 1970 .2 C-9 
At this point, it is worth mentioning that no authenic copy of the large-scale 
map annexed to the 1906 Agreement was found either in Egypt or in Turkey. 
Likewise, no formal maps or authenic reports describing the work of the 
Cmmmission, 
which demarcated the boundary in accordance with the 1906 
Agreement, had been left. 260 
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The Mandate Agreement gave no precise definition of the boundary between Egypt 
and Palestine and no map defining the area of Palestine was attached to the 
Agreement.: 261 However, in 1925, the British Government declared in the House of 
Commons that " the line binding the territories under Egyptian and Turkish 
administration respectively was defined in 1906 and has not since been 
modif ied. "--1*2 
Again, in June 1926, the British Government assured Egypt that the frontier 
as defined in the year 1906 between Egypt and Palestine would not be altered. 
During the mandate, there was an agreement between British officials in 
Palestine and the Egyptians that the boundary was the same. 2r-: 3 This line 
remained up to the establishment of the state of Israel in Kay 1948. 
In the June War of 19670 Israel's capture of the Sinai peninsula from Egypt 
brought the Taba area under Israeli control. During the period between 1967 
and 1982 Israel made some changes 
* 
in the area, e. g., they built a luxury hotel 
and a new road as well as ' remo some boundary pillars . 2G4 
In 1979, under Article IV(3) of the Peace Treaty, a Joint Commission was 
established "to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty. " Among the 
functions of this Commission, as indicated by Appendix to Annex 1, Art. IV. 
3(d), was to "organize the demarcation of the international boundary ". 2c's 
In implementation of this function, the Commission regarded its task as being 
the reconstruction of pillars where pillars had existed but were damaged. As 
regards pillars whose locations were not identified, there was disagreement 
among the parties. In this respect, Egypt took the position that the task Of 
the Commission was to identify the location of the pillars as they were, 
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whereas Israel argued that the task of the Commission was to implement the 
1906 Agreement regardless of the previous locations. 261- 
In facto this remained the basic difference between the parties which led 
them to resort to arbitration proceedings after their failure to resolve the 
matter by other means. Such a right to resort to arbitration was permissible, 
and indeed manadatory under Article VII of the 1979 Treaty which provides for 
the following : 
0 1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Treaty 
shall be resolved by negotiations. 2. Any such disputes which cannot be 
settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to 
arbitrat ion"267 
Thus, in a Compromis signed an September 11,1986, the parties agreed on the 
establishment of a five-member arbitration tribunal, of whom three members 
would have to be mutually acceptable to Egypt and Israel, while each country 
would have the exclusive right to appoint one member. 269 
The task of the Tribunal was defined as follows: 
"The Tribunal is requested to decide the location of the boundary pillars of the 
recognized international boundray between Egypt and the former mandated 
territory of Palestine ... 112,39 
As far as Israel was concerned, the only agreement defining the border-line 
between Egypt and Israel was the 1906 Agreement between Turkey and Egypt. It 
follows that any de-faata demarcation of the boundary which was inconsistent 
with the legal boundary as defined by the 1906 Agreement could not be 
recognized as the international boundary between Egypt and Israel. 
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The Israeli argument was basicly that the de fnntn demarcation of the final 
boundary pillar at Taba did not satisfy the requirements of intervisibility 
stipulated in Article 3 of 1906 Agreement; consequently, the Israelis argued 
that they could not recognize the location of this pillar as constituting part 
of their international boundary with Egypt. Instead of the illegal location, 
the Israeli preferred another location which, according to them, not only met 
the requirement of intervisibility, but also was the original location that was 
ignored incorrectly in the later &- fanto demarcation. If this location was 
accepted then Taba would be part of Israel . 270 
In support of this view, other reasons were mentioned: 
- In her dissenting opinion in the Taba Case, Professor Lapidoth took up the 
thesis of the two-stages renvoi: "the 1979 Treaty contains a renvoi to the 
recognized mandatory boundary and the latter in turn refers us back to the 1906 
line as laid down by the Agreement and recognized during the mandatory 
period . 41271 It follows that j in the final analysis, according to her, the 1979 
Treaty should be understood as referring to the line defined by the 1906 
Agreement which was demarcated an the ground by the telegraph pole . 272 
-Also, according to the Israeli argument, in 1909 Egypt used precise coordinates 
to identify the location of the terminus of the boundary and described it as 
ending on a granite knob near the sea. this description was given in the 
Egyptian Statistinal Yparbook of 1909t an official Egyptian Government 
puplication. This granite knob still stood and was the hill just to the South 
of the Hotel built by Israel at Taba. If this hill had been accepted, the 
disputed area would have been within Israeli territory . 273 
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In the course of the hearing in the Taba Case, Israel produced an evidence 
from Lt. Col. Rushworth, who was at one time the head of the map-naking section 
of the British Ministry of Defence, to the effect that an error with regard to 
the location of the boundary pillar at Taba had been made at a crucial stage in 
the preparation of the map. The 1915 map (known as Newcombe map) was the 
parent of a whole family of British and Egyptian maps that were in common use 
throughout the period of the mandate,: 274 
The Israelis argued that, because of the fact that the Newcomb nap was not 
published untill after the outbreak of World War I, Turkey, as the sovereign 
over Palestine, never had an opportunity to react specifically to the boundary 
indicated in that map . 27 r- As is well-known, Turkey renounced, in the Treaty Of 
Lausanne, 1923, all right or title to a vast area including the whole of 
Palestine, and in 1922 Britain was granted the mandate over Palestine. 27a 
The head of the British team which produced the survey of the 1915 map, Col. T. 
E. Lawrence ("Lawrence of Arabia"), admitted later that, acting under 
instructions, he had "invented" certain details of the map. This resulted in an 
undefined area of roughly triangular shape, its southern edge extending about 
three-quarters of a mile eastwards along the coast from Taba, with the 
remaining two sides converging at a point about a mile inland. -2,71 
Turning to the view advanced by Egypto it was argued that the phrase 11 the 
recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former Mandated 
territory of Palestine" used in Article 2 of the 1979 Treaty should be 
understood as a reference to the line linking the boundary pillars which 
existed on the ground between 1922 and 1948. Consequently. it was the location 
on the ground during the mandatory period which was intended. It f ollowed, 
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that, since the location of the boundary pillar at Taba between 1922 and 1948 
was accepted as part of the international boundary between Egypt and Israeli 
then the disputed area in Taba would be, as it always was, within Egypt's 
territory . 279 
In support of its view on the location of the boundary pillar at Tabal Egypt 
produced the photograph that Col. Parker took on 31 December 1906 of the 
construction of the first masonary pillar at Taba. 279 
Alsot it was argued that the Treaty of 1906 contained a geographical 
description of - the final section of the boundary'at Taba. This description 
meant clearly that the pillars in thes area would not be intervisible. 
Consequentlyl according to Bowett, "the supposed divegence between the 1906 
Treaty line (the so called legal boundary) and the demarcation by the masonry 
pillars did not in fact exit". This, it was argued, invalidated much of the 
Israeli reasoning in the case. 2130 
Moreover, if this description was to be taken Into accounto then the Egyptian 
location of the boundary pillar would conform to the text of the 1906 Treaty 
and the Israeli location would not.: 2G' In support Of its view, Egypt referred 
to the principle of stability of international boundaries, insisting that the 
Israeli claims to Taba run counter to that important principle. In this 
respect, Egypt invoked, Inter nlis, the need 11 to bring into operation the 
general legal principles of the stability and finality of boundaries. the 
succession of States to territory, estoppel, acquiescence, and de--1aQt2 agreement 
so as to preclude Israel's claims based on application of the terms Of the 1906 
Agreement" . 212 
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Egypt demonstrated that the post-1982 Israeli maps showed the boundary to be 
aligned differently from the pre-1982 Israeli maps. Raising the inference that 
the maps had been altered in order to suit the Israeli case, . Egypt based its 
allegation regarding the maps an an article published in 1987 in "Hotam"q an 
Israeli newspaper, which accused the government of alterating Israeli maps-20*4 
There were also allegations against Israel of having destroyed boundary 
pillars, of having falsified photographs and of having withheld important 
evidence. 2-11 
On 29 September 1988, the Taba Award was delivered by the Arbitration 
Tribunal. It is not intended here to analyze or evaluate this Award in great 
detail as it is outside the scope of this work. Few writings on the Award in 
can be found elsewhere . 29r. 
However, it seems useful and relevant to end the discussion with some 
observations on the arguments advanced by Egypt and Israel regarding Taba by 
reference to the Award. 
So far as the meaning of the phrase "recognized international boundary between 
Egypt and former mandated territory of Palestine 11 is concerned, the Tribunal 
pointed out that "the description of the boundary is not very clear or specific, 
particularly the word recognized is in the context ambiguous" s2cýG However, the 
Tribunal rejected Israel's interpretation that the words refer only to the line 
defined by the 1906 Agreement, and not to the demarcation line. Quoting from 
and commenting on the Tribunal's view regarding this pointo Professor Prosper 
Weil wrote: 
11 The Award states that these expressions cannot be interpreted as referring to 
the description of the line rather than to its demarcation (para. 170). And the 
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final reason put forward by the Tribunal: why should the Treaty of Peace be 
understood as referring to the Agreement of 1906 "if reference could just as 
well have been made directly to the 1906 Agreement ? 01.207 
Then he goes on to criticize the attitude of the Tribunal: 
This latter argument is, to say the least, not convincing. It couldo likewiset 
be asked why the Peace Treaty should be understood as referring to the 
demarcation in existence on the ground during the Mandate, if reference could 
just as well have been made directly to that demarcation. 11200 
As regards the Israeli argument that the statement in the Egyptian, 
Statiqtlnal Yearbook of 1909 supports its claims, the Tribunal dismissed it 
saying that " the evidentiary value of such technical publications designed to 
provide general information is low, for such publications are not designed as 
authoritative statements about boundaries'l.: 29-: 
This position of the Tribunal was criticized by E. Lauterpacht who wrote: 
"This entirely disregards the fact that what one is concerned with is not the 
general status of the publication but the specific quality of the information it 
contains. And one could not be more specific than the description given in the 
Statistical Yearboak. And why should the evidence in the yeal: bDuk be less 
authoritative than a map especially in the face of evidence that the relevant 
sector of the map was inaccurate? ".: 29c, 
As regards the argument by Israel that the pillars at Taba were erected 
inconsistently with the 1906 Agreement and were to be disregarded as being 
erected in error and that the locations suggested by Israel conformed with the 
1906 Agreement, the Tribunal heldýthat a Joint agreed demaraction should prevail 
over the text: 
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11 If a boundary line is once demaracated Jointly by the parties concerned, the 
demaracation is considered as an authentic interpretation of the boundary 
agreement even if deviations may have occurred or if there are some 
inconsistencies with the maps". 291 
Then the Tribunal stated that even if a pillar existing during the Mandate had 
been placed in an erroneous location in terms of the 1906 line, that pillar was 
nevertheless to be regarded as a pillar of the recognized international boundary 
between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, since neither the 
Mandatory Power nor Egypt had protested it, and they had rather, by their 
conduct, accepted and recognized it. 29; 2 
Finally, it seems that Egypt's argument that Israeli claims are inconsistent 
with the principle of the stability of intenational boundaries was accepted by 
the Tribunal. A reference to the applicability of such a principle to the 
dispute can be found in the Award. (para. 235) 
The opinion of the Tribunal Via'S- cri-tiLzed by some writers who held that the 
principle of stability of boundaries is not applicable to the Taba dispute and 
that the Tribunal's approach on this point was "running so clearly to the 
mainstream of international law on the subject"293 
A holder of this view is expressed by Professor Weil who argued that there 
was a classic distinction under international law between disputes relating to 
the delimitation of a boundary, a legal and political operation which tends to 
fix the territorial limits of the authority of the state, that is, to define the 
course of the line in law; and disputes of attribution or demarcation, a 
technical operation of implementation which transfers to the ground the terms 
of an established delimitation. 
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So far as disputes of attribution are concerned, he continued, effective 
control prevails over legal title. Whereas in disputes of delimitations legal 
title prevails over effective control, namely the principle of uti possidetir. 
jUria. 294 It follows that, since the Taba dispute, from a legal standpoint, was 
one of delimitation only , then the Tribunal could have granted predominance 
to 
legal title over effective controlt namely, to give priority to the provision of 
the 1906 Treaty over the situation on the ground in 1923. However, the 
Tribunal did give priority to the situation on the ground in 1923 over the 
legal line defined by the 1906 Agreement. 2ý1r, He then concluded: 
"in these circumstances$ one may ýahder about the reasons which induced the 
Tribunal to adopt an approach running so clearly against the mainstream of 
international law in this subject. 29r- 
As is well known, the Taba Award was implemented in a good faith. Israel 
completed its final withdrawal from Taba and the area was returned to Egypt On 
March 15,1989. Several days earlier, viz, on February 26,1989, at the Tabals 
Sonesta Hotel which Egypt acquired by purchase, an Agreement regarding the 
permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel was concluded. 297 
Certainly the importance of the eventual resolution of the Taba Disputel 
despite sharp differences of opinion between Egypt and Israel, lies in what it 
shows about the role of arbitral settlement 'of International disputes. In the 
w ords of Lauterpacht, "The eventual resolution of the problem by arbitration 
represents an important addition to the list of successful contributions that 
the process of impartial legal settlement has made to the settlement of 
international disputes. 11.299 
S 
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. Indeed, the foregoing analysis of the Taba case and the way in which the 
Award was implemented would lead one to believe that litigation could be among 
the best methods of settling some of the complicated problems of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, in particular, that disputes relating to territory or boundary. 
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General: 
There can be no doubt that the issue of Israeli settlements in the Arab 
occupied territories is one of the most important and complex issues in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The settlement policy is deeply rooted in the mind and 
strategy of the Israelis. In the past Israel could not have come into being 
without the radical transformation of the population of Palestine resulting from 
its long adopted settlement policy. 
At present, Israel's national security is based on its strategy to increase its 
population -in order to establish itself as a major power in the area. This 
strategy can only be achieved by bringing Jewish immigrants and settling then 
in the occupied territories. ' According to Arab sourcesi Israel has a long- 
term plan to bring and absorb four million Russian Jews and settle them in Gaza 
and the West Bank. 2 
Thus, it is not surprising that any review of the political programmes and 
platforms of Israel's main parties would reveal that there exists an 
overwhelming consensus among them on the necessity of adopting such a policy-' 
Arab states' '-held that Israel's settlement policy is illegal under 
international law. 4 They argue that the continuation and persistence of Israel 
in pursuing this policy will endanger peace and security in the area. The Arab 
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League Summit Conference held in May 1990 in Baghdad condemned and deplored 
this policy particularly Israel's recent plan to bring one million immigrants 
Russian Jews to live in new settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. In their 
resolution, the Arab leaders observed that such policy would lead to another war 
in the area. r- 
In the meantime, Israel's settlement policy was the subject of several United 
ffations' inquiries and resolutionsr- in which this policy has been condemned on 
the ground that it constitutes "a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and 
also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensiveýý Just and 
lasting peace in the Xiddle East. "7 
Israel's agreement, under the 1979 Peace Treaty, to evacuate its settlements in 
Sinai constitutes the first case in its history where it agreed to abandon 
established settlements. Thus, -the significance of the present provisions on 
the settlements is that they demonstrate the handling by the Treaty's authors 
of an issue not addressed in Security Council Resolution 242 and that they 
provide a revealing precedent with regard to the resolution of the settlement 
problemo which may be applicable in future to the rest of the Arab occupied 
territories. 
The problem of the Israeli settlements in Sinai was chief ly dealt under the 
Treaty in paragraph 2 of Article 1 (2): 
"Israel will withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai 
behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine, as 
provided in the annexed protocol (Annex 1) , and Egypt will resume the exercise 
of its f ull sovereignty over the Sinai. " 
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To understand fully the above provision with regard to the settlements it, is 
necessary to place it within the context of the Treaty as a whole and examine 
it in the light of its drafting history. Vith the assistance of a brief inquiry 
into the legal status of the Israeli settlement policy in Sinai under 
international law, an examination and evaluation of the Treaty's position will 
be offered. 
The View that Tgraells SettlpynpintR lin -qj])nj were not TIlegid. - 
It was claimed by Israel, and the few writers who support it, that its 
settlement policy in Sinai was not in violation of the rules of international 
law. To find legal bases for Israel's political claims to the right to 
establish settlements in Sinait four main arguments have been advanced: 
(1) Israel, it is alleged, was not legally bound to apply the law of military 
occupation to SinaiO though it observed such law dp facta. 0 This is based on 
the assumption that Israel was denying the sovereignty of Egypt over the Sinai 
Peninsula. It follows that, since the law of belligerent occupation presupposes 
that the displaced government was a legitimate one 
1> 
and if it does not so 
qualifyo the occupant is not bound to apply the law. 9 
With regard to the argument disputing the Egyptian title over Sinai. we have 
referred to it earlier and there is no need to repeat it here. 10 
In support of the claim that the law of occupation presupposes the legitimacy 
of the displaced government, several views interpreting the law Of occupation in 
this respect were advanced. For example Blum wrote: 
"the traditional rules of international law governing belligerent 
occupation are based on a twofold assumption, namely, (a) that it was the 
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legitimate sovereign which was ousted from the territory under occupation; 
and (b) that the ousting side qualifies as a belligerent occupant with 
respect to the territory. According to Glahn, "belligerent occupation ... as 
regulated by customary and conventional international law, presupposes a 
state of affairs in which the sovereign, the legitimate government of the 
occupied territory, is at war with the government of the occupying forces. 
This assumption of the concurrent existence in respect of the same 
territory of both an ousted legitimate sovereign and a belligerent 
occupant lies at the root of all those rules of international law, which, 
while recognizing and sanctioning the occupant's rights to administer the 
occupied territory, aim at the same time to safeguard the reversionary 
rights of the ousted sovereign. It would seem to follow that, in a case 
like the present where the ousted state never was the legitimate sovereign, 
those rules of belligerent occupation directed to safeguarding that 
sovereign's reversionary rights have no application. "' 
At the same lrý it has been argued that, under the Hague Conventionj 
"territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority 
of the hostile army. " 12 The word "territory", according to Israelp should be 
interpreted very narrowly, and should encompass only those territories Over 
which the preceding sovereign had something likede jure sovereignty and the 
title to the land is not contested. 13 
A similar narrow interpretation should be accorded to the meaning of the word 
"territory" used in Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. " This Article 
provides that the Convention will apply to all cases of partial or total 
occupation of the "territory" of a High Contracting Party. 'r- 
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(2) The law of occupation ceases to apply when active hostility ends. The, 
second argument advanced in support of this view is based on the Israeli 
contention that the law of military occupation prohibiting Israeli settlements 
ceases to apply when active hostilities end or when an occupation continues for 
a long time. r- 
(3) Israel's settlement policy in Sinai is not in contravention of the law of 
belligerent occupation. This argument is based on the contention that even if 
the law of military occupation is applicable, a proper and correct understanding 
of its relevant provisions will lead to the conclusion that Israel's 
settlements in Sinai were not in contravention of its provisions . 17 
Allan Gerson, a holder of this view, states that while the Hague Regulations of 
1907 are silent on the issue of civilian settlements, a careful reading and 
application of Article 49 of the Geneva Convention dealing with the settlement 
issue suggests that Israel's settlement policy was not illegal. According to 
him, Article 49 prohibits only settlements that involve displacement of the 
existing population. 19 In support of this understanding, he referred to 
Oppenheim's comment on Article 49 that the prohibition regarding the transfer 
of civilian population into the occupied territories was "intended to cover 
cases of the occupant bringing in its nationals for the purposes of displacing 
the population of the occupied territory. "' 9 
An application of this to Israel's settlements will reveal, according to Gerson, 
that Israel does not pursue 11 a policy aimed at the systematic conversion of 
the administered territories ... Israeli settlement in the territories has been in 
the nature of ad hoc responses to incipient trends rather than established 
policy'. This may be enhanced, according to him, by the fact that areas settled 
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0 
in the Sinai by Israeli nationals accounted f or roughly a little more than one 
per cent of the Sinai's total land mass. 20 
From the above, Gerson draws the conclusion that "Israeli settlement does not 
directly contravene the Geneva Convention, assuming its applicability"" - 
(4) Precedents from state practice have also been cited in support of Israel's 
position and practice. For example, the U. S. after the Second World War 
declared that it was not legally bound to apply the law of military occupation 
with respect to the territories of the defeated Axis Powers. Another example 
cited was the rejection of France to apply Articles 42 to 56 of the Hague Rules 
of 1907 to the territory of Alsace-Lorraine . 22 
in considering the aforesaid view as expressed by Israel and its supporters, 
one cannot* however, accept it. 
First, Israel's argument that the law of occupation was not applicable to Sinai 
as Egypt's sovereignty over Sinai was disputed cannot be taken seriously from 
an international law standpoint. It is a well-known fact that such a 
questioning of Egypt's sovereignty over Sinai had never been raised# nor had 
Israel itself claimed sovereignty over it. In the words of Clagetts "I have 
not seen a more frivolous argument for questioning Egyptian sovereignty in the 
Sinai, and I do not believe that any exists. 1123 
Xoreover, it is widely recognized that an occupier should not be allowed to 
ignore the law of occupation simply by questioning the title of its opponent- 
That law must be applied regardless of whether the sovereignty of the displaced 
state is open to question. In the words of one writer who rejects Israel's 
position and practice: 
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"The Israeli position has not been accepted by any other government. There 
was a specific resolution an this subject matter at the United Nations in which 
Israel's position on the applicability of the Geneva Convention was unanimously 
rejected; even the United States voted against the Israeli contention. The 
Israeli argument that the law does not apply might, however, be used as a 
precedent by other countries which find themselves as occupying powers over 
territory whose title it disputes. If this view succeeds, the law of occupation 
will probably be a dead letter. 1124 
Further, Israel's narrow interpretation of the word "territory" used by Articles 
42 of the Hague Regulation and 49 of the Geneva Convention is not consistent 
with the prevailing view adopted by the majority of states. In this regard, it 
has been observed that the negotiating record of the Hague and Geneva 
Conventions indicates that 11 the only thing stated by those who put the word 
"territory" into these treaties for the first time is that the word should be 
read broadly. " This alone, it is submitted, makes it difficult to accept a 
narrow interpretation of what the word should mean. -26 
Furthermore, there is a consensus of opinion among scholars that neither the 
cessation of active hostilities nor a cease-fire agreement has any effect on the 
rights or obligations of belligerent occupiers unless a cease-fire agreement 
provides for deviations from the law of occupation. It is clear that such an 
agreement does not exist. 26 
Likewise, Israel's argument that Article 49 of the Geneva Convention prohibits 
only settlements that involve displacement of the existing population cannot be 
accepted since there is nothing in that Article suggesting such an 
interpretation. Cummings, who rejects that interpretationg says, " the intention 
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to prevent displacement emphasized by Oppenhein should not be regarded as the 
only purpose of Article 49. Particularly since it is not substantiated in the' 
negotiating record of the treaty, it would be inappropriate to derogate the 1ý 
express language of the Article through such an interpretation . 
1027 
Finally, the claim that Israeli settlement policy in Sinai was more rhetorical 
than real is doubtful for several reasons. In the first place, it is inconsistent 
with the finding of the U. N. Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices 
Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories: 
11 The evidence that the Special Committee has recieved reflects a policy on 
the part of the Government of Israel designed to ef f ect radical changes in the 
physical character and demographic composition of several areas of the 
territory under occupation ... Keasures taken under this policy include the 
establishment of settlements for Israeli Jews in, for example, occupied 
Jerusalem, Hebron, certain parts of the Jordan'Valley, the Golan Heights, Gazal 
Northern Sinai and Sharm El-Sheikh. 1128 
Another proof that Israel's settlement policy was real is the existence, in the 
government of Israel, of a Ministerial Committee for Settlement of the 
Territories. This Committee "by its very existence" showed, according to the U. N. 
Committee, beyond doubt, that it is a policy of the Government of Israel to 
settle the territories occupied. "29 
Also, the U. N. Committee referred to numerous announcements on the settlement 
issue made by Israeli ministers and leaders, and found that, 11 their general 
tenor, the frequency with which they have been repeated and the various 
measures adopted by the Government of Israel, such as the establishment of 
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settlements, justify in the Special Committee's opinion the conclusion that these 
statements are a faithful reflection of official Israeli policy. "30 
Apart from the finding of the U. N. Special Committee, it is worthwhile to 
refer to Israel's previous plan to build the city of Yamit, in the north-eastern 
corner of Sinai which was designed to absorb thousands of Israeli settlers. " 
On one occasion Sadat said that one of the main reasons for the October War 
was the settlement at Yamit. This is another clear example indicating the real 
nature of Israel's settlement policy. 32 
II. The Vipw that Israel, 
The opposing point of view, and one held by the majority of states, is based 
on the premise that Israel's status in the Sinai was of a belligerent occupant 
with all the attendant rights and obligations under international law. 
Accordingly, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and the Hague Convention of 
1907 provide the applicable standard for Judging Israel's conduct. Taking into 
account the fact that the military occupier is not permitted under these two 
conventions to establish settlements in the occupied territoriest it follows 
that Israel's settlements in Sinai were not permitted under the law of 
occupation. Thus, Israel's settlement policy in Sinai was illegal . 33 
In particular, the settlement policy was explicitly in violation of Article 49 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of Var of 12 August, 1949. Article 49 of this Convention prohibits in 
absolute terms the settlement of occupied territories. It reads in part as 
follows: 
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11 The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian 
population into the territory it occupies. 1134 
The official commentary prepared by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) described the above provision as being 11 intended to prevent the 
practice adopted during the Second World War by certain powers, which 
transferred portions of their own population to occupied territory for political 
and racial reasons, or in order, as they claimed, to colonize these 
territories . "3r, 
The negotiati'06 record of the above provision indicates that there was concern 
expressed by some participating states in relation to the broadness of this 
provision; however, the language, as it was adopted, does not lend itself to a 
narrow interpretation. 36 
Israel's settlements also violate the provisions of the Hague Convention on the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907. Although this Convention 
contains no direct mention of the settlement issue, Article 23 (g) forbids the 
occupier from seizing the enemy's property unless such "seizure be imperatively 
demanded by the necessities of war. '137 Taking into account the fact that the 
creation of settlements involves two elements, the appropriation of land and the 
establishment of settlers on such land, it follows that the appropriation of the 
lands in Sinai in order to establish Israeli settlements was in violation of 
that Article-39 
Further, Israel is obliged under Article 55 to "safeguard the capital" of the 
property and to administer it in accordance with the "rules of usufruct". 39 It 
is clear that the seizure of Egypt'e land and the establishment of settlements 
on such land is inconsistent with the rules imposed by that Article. 
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In sum, Israells, settlement policy, it is submitted, violates the spirit of the 
Hague Convention since the basic duty under it is to preserve the existing 
situation. "' 
Additional reason in support of the illegality of Israel's settlements is the 
contention that Resolution 242, in its operative paragraph 1(I) calls for the 
withdrawal of Israel's armed forces from territories occupied in the 1979 
conf lict. It follows that it requires Israel, as a matter of legal obligation, 
to withdraw from the occupied lands. - Such withdrawal should include settlers 
as well as military forces . 41 
Another argument in support of the illegitimacy of Israeli settlements is 
based on the fact that this policy has been explicitly deplored or condemned in 
several U. N. resolutions adopted by both the General Assembly and the Security 
Council. " A clear example indicating the U. N. position vis a vis the 
settlements can be found in General Assembly Resolution 2443 of December 1968 
calling for the establishment of a special comnittee to investigate Israeli 
practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied 
territories. On September 17,1971 the Special Committee transmitted its full 
report to the General Assembly in which it confirmed that Israel is following a 
settlement policy in the occupied territories in a manner calculating to exclude 
all possibility of restitution to lawful ownership. In addition, the Committee 
Report found that: 
"Every attempt on the part of the Government of Israel at carrying out a 
policy of annexation and settlement amounts to a denial of the fundamental 
human rights of the local inhabitants. in particular the right to self- 
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determination and the right to retain their homeland, and a repudiation by the 
Government of Israel of accepted norms of international law. 1143 
Another U. N. resolution indicates its position vis a vis Israel's settlement 
policy is Security Council Resolution 465 of 1 March 1980. It not only 
proclaimed the legal invalidity of Israeli settlements, but also called for their 
dismantlement. It reads in part as follows: 
" ... all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic 
composition, institutional structure, or status of the Palestinian and other Arab 
territories occupied since 19679 including Jerusalem, or any part thereof, have 
no legal validity and that Israel's policy and practices of settling parts of 
its population and new immigrants in those territories constitute a flagrant 
violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War- and also constitute a serious obstruction to 
achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East . 1114 
With regard to the above view, one cannot agree with the argument that 
Resolution 242 prohibits the establishment of Israeli settlements in the 
occupied territories. That is not to sayt however, that we accept Israel's 
understanding that the term "secure boundaries" as used in Article 1(IID of the 
Resolution permits the establishment of settlements which could be useds 
according to Begin, as buffer zones between Egypt and Israel . 4r, The Resolution 
neither prohibits nor permits the establishment of such settlements for the 
simple reason that the first Israeli settlement in the occupied territory was 
established in 1968, a year after the Resolution was adopted . 46 
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One is f orced to conclude that the Israeli settllement policy is illegal under 
the rules of international law, in particular in the light of the Security 
Council Resolution 465 refered to earlier. 
Having discussed the legality of Israel's settlement policy in Sinai under 
international law, we proceed now to consider the position of the parties on 
the settlement issue at the begining of the peace process, namely, during 
Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977. 
Israel expressed the view that it was ready to evacuate its settlements in 
Sinai except those in the north-eastern and south-eastern Sinai which should 
remain within its control . 47 However, this was not a final position since 
Israel, as indicated earlier. held the view that no party should rule out any 
subject on the claim that it was not negotiable . 49 
As to Egypt's position, although the text of Sadat's statement at the Knesset 
on November 20,1977 contained no explicit mention of the settlement issue, it 
may be correct, however, to say that it implied a rejection of Israel's 
settlement policy in Sinai, in particular its proposal to keep some of these 
settlements as part of its final secure boundaries. 
Certain expressions in the speech refer to Israel's legal status in Sinai as a 
military occupier: 11 There is an Arab land which Israel occupied by military 
f orce .... Conceive with me .... ending the Israeli occupation . 4'44-' The speech 
demands 
a total Israeli withdrawal from Egypt's territory: 11 ... we insist on complete 
withdrawal from that land. 116c, Of course, such complete withdrawal must 
include the military forces as well as the settlers. 
0 
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To reaffirm Egypt's strong position vie a vis Israel's demand to keep some of 
its settlements permanently in Sinai, Sadat declared: " ... our land does not yield 
itself to bargaining. It is not even open to argument, To us, the national soil 
is equal to the holy valley ... None of us can, or accept to cede one 
inch of ito 
or accept the principle of debating or bargaining over it. 1161 
Sadat's description of Sinai as a holy place was taken from and referring to 
certain versions in the Nuran" on Sinai. The purpose of such a transportation 
of a religious term to a political fieldr, 2 is perhaps to point out that Egypt's 
position was not based only on legal and political condition, but also an 
particular religious considerations. This clearly reflects Egypt's strong and 
firm opposition against any kind of Israeli presence in Sinai. 
The main discussions and proposals on the settlement issue can be found in the 
negotiations taking place at Camp David where the problem was finally resolved. 
However, the text of the Camp David Agreements contains no provision on the 
settlement issue. The reason for this will be indicated below. Thus, the Camp 
David negotiations, in this respect, are of special value and importance. 
As mentioned earlier, Egypt submitted its proposal for a "Framework Agreement" 
on September 61 1978. The second part of Article 2 of the draft deals with the 
problem of the settlements. It calls for "Removal of the Israeli settlements in 
the occupied territories according to a time-table to be agreed upon within the 
period referred to in Article 6.116-3 
Like the military withdrawall the legal basis of Israel's evacuation Of its 
settlements was the principle of inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory 
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by war. This principle is referred to in the f irst part of Article 2 of the 
draft and is taken from the preamble to Resolution 242. 
The period during which Israel was to remove its settlements, is three months 
"as from the conclusion of the "Framework Treaty". This has been provided in 
Article 6 of the draft. r,, * In other words, Egypt suggested a total withdrawal Of 
the settlers before signing the "Peace Treaty". 
This provision an the settlements was severly criticized by the Israeli 
delegation and it was unacceptable on many grounds. The language on the 
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force has always been 
rejected by Israel. The reasons behind such rejection were indicated earlier. '-S 
While the settlements in the other Arab occupied territories fell within the 
scope of the Egyptian draft on the settlements, Israel, however, was not ready 
to aboadon its settlements in the Golan Heights or the West Bank and Gaza for 
the sake of a separate peace with Egypt. 
The timing suggested for the evacuation was inconsistent with Israel's view 
that peace should precede, not only the military withdrawal, but also the 
evacuation of the settlements. 
Article 2 of the Egyptian draft could be interpreted to mean that Israel had 
to pay compensation to the Egyptian civilians for the damage which resulted 
from the operations in establishing settlements. Israel was not prepared to 
pay any compensation because, according to Begin, it was not defeated in the 
war. Only defeated nations, in his view, had to pay compensation. " Egypt's 
right to compensation from Israel is not our concern here. 
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In response to the above criticism, Sadat agreed on two concessions: to omit 
the language on the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war; and to 
allow the Israeli settlers to remain in Egypt for three years. 
In the meantime, the U. S. delegation opposed Israel's demand to keep its 
settlements in Sinai, and took the position that the settlements were illegal 
and had to be dismantled or removed. Brzezinski went further and informed 
Begin that such settlements were not only illegal, but also a form of 
colonialism. 
Nevertheless$ the Americans worked out a proposal to narrow the gap between 
Egypt and Israel. On September 10, the U. S. submitted its first proposal at 
Camp David. The relevant provision suggested by the Americans deals both with 
the military withdrawal and the evacuation of the settlers. It was quoted 
earlier in dealing with the withdrawal clause, and it may be quoted again for 
the purpose of the present analysis: 
"Israel has agreed to the restoration of the exercise of full Egyptian 
sovereignty in the Sinai up to the internationally recognized border between 
Egypt and Israel. 1167 
This clause contained no explicit mention of the Israeli settlements. Also, 
the principle of inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war was 
omitted. Further, the geographical scope of this Article is limited to Sinai6a; 
thus, the settlements in the rest of the occupied territories fell outside its 




Notwithstanding the above, the Americans assumed that the text was well 
balanced and covered a total Israeli withdrawal, including both the settlers and 
the forces. 
As was mentioned earlier, the Egyptians doubted whether it was advisable to 
accept a text which referred vaguely to a very important issue, namely, the 
Israeli withdrawal and the settlements. They preferred language calling for a 
total withdrawalt including the Israeli settlers. 1-9 
In response, the Americans amended that text in their second written proposal 
submitted at Camp David on 12 September: 
"Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate (on) 
a. the -full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally 
recognized border between Egypt and mandated Falestinet 
b- the time of withdrawal of Israeli personnel from the Sinai. "60 
As mentioned earlier, the phrase "withdrawal of Israeli personnel from the 
Sinai" had been inserted in the last part of the amended text to meet Egypt's 
demand for clearer language on the withdrawal. The word "personnel" is used as 
referring both to the forces and the settlers. Thus, an the ground that this 
text ensured a total Israeli withdrawal from Egypt's territory, it was accepted 
by the Egyptians. 61 
In fact, it was this text which, after a minor change, was finally approved and 
adopted by the authors of the 1979 Peace Treaty. 
With regard to the position by the Israelis, a distinction may be made between 
the initial position taken by them during the first ten days of the negotiations 
and their final position. From September 6 to 161 Israel turned down all the 
aforementioned proposals. According to Dayan, Israel insisted on its previous 
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proposal that some of its strategic settlements in Sinai should remain in its 
control in the final resolution. Of course, this proposal was rejected by Egypt 
as encroaching on its sovereignty. 62 During the negotiations, Sadat mentioned 
that, as long as issues relating to sovereignty and territory are concerned, no 
concessions could be made. 1-3 Hence, Dayan of fered to let the title to the 
settlements be transferred to Egypt, but allow the Israelis to live there for a 
limited timel i. e., a period of 20 years. Carter tried to convince Sadat to 
accept this proposal since it is not in violation of Egypt's sovereignty, but 
Sadat rejected it. 64 At the same time, Begin insisted that the Israeli 
settlements in Sinai were legally permitted under Resolution 242.1-1- It was 
important$ he continued, that the few Israeli settlers in the Sinai be accepted 
by the Egyptian people as no threat to them and as no encroachment on their 
sovereignty. '-'- 
Because of these differences of opinion concerning the settlement issue, Dayan 
proposed that the issue be postponed until resolution of all the problems 
between Egypt and Israel. 67 
By September 16, the only remaining obstacle to a Sinai agreement seemed to be 
the settlements. There was a conflict among the Israeli delegation: "Begin 
wanted no commitment to withdrawal; Dayan was willing to promise withdrawal 
after an extended period of time (20 years); and Weizman believed that the 
settlers should leave if the Knesset would agree. 1'r-13 
The last view was the basis of the f inal position taken by Israel in which it 
agreed to remove all its settlements provided that such evacuation was to be 
approved by the Israeli Knesset. This position was accepted by Egypt. 
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Thus, on September 17, Begin wrote a letter to Carter confirming that within 
two weeks after his return to Israel, he would submit a motion before Israel's 
Knesset to decide on the following question: 
If during the nedgotiations to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and 
Egypt all outstanding issues are agreed upon, are you in favour of the removal 
of the Israeli settlers from the northern and southern Sinai areas or are you 
in favour of keeping the aforementioned settlers in those areas 
In the meantime, Sadat wrote a letter to Carter in which he reaffirmed Egypt's 
position with respect to the settlements: 
11 LAU Israeli settlers must be withdrawn from Sinai according to a 
timetable within the period specified for the implementation of the peace 
treaty. 
2. Agreement by the Israeli Government and its constitutional institutions to 
this basic principle is therefore a prerequsite to starting negotiations for 
concluding a peace treaty. 
3. If Israel fails to meet this commitment, the "Framework" shall be void and 
invalid . 1170 
By the end of September 1979, the Israeli Knesset adopted a resolution in 
which it authorized the government to evacuate the settlements in Sinai in the 
following terms: 
".... If in the negotiations between Egypt and Israel towards the signing of a 
peace treaty, agreement ia reached ... and finds expression in a written documentl 
the Knesset authorizes the Government ... to evacuate the Israeli settlers from 
Sinai and resettle them anew. 1971 
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In the course of the subsequent negotiations which followed the conclusion of 
the Camp David Agreements, Israeli settlements in Sinai did not constitute any 
obstacle. The parties agreed on a formula essentinally taken from the second 
American proposal. 
An Analysis of the 1979 Treaty's PravlRinns: 
In spite the fact that the settlement issue was, and is stillj one of the 
important and complicated issues of the Arab-Israeli conflicto the text of the 
Treaty contains no sep-Vate provision to deal with it. Instead, it seems that 
the authors of the Treaty favoured a formula in which the settlement issue 
would be incorporated in or/and linked to the provisions dealing with the 
withdrawal of the military forces. For example, Articlel(2) of the Treaty 
speaks of withdrawal of all the Israeli "armed forces and civilians from Sinai. " 
Again, Article 1(D of Annex 1, which deals with the period during which Israel 
will complete its withdrawal, uses the expression 11 withdrawal of Israeli armed 
forces and civilians. " Along the same lines, Art. 1(1) of Appendix to Annex 1, 
which deals with the phases of the Israeli withdrawal, uses the same 
expression . 72 
Language of this kind is somewhat disturbing since it gives rise to the 
question of what was the intention of the framers behind the linkage between 
the withdrawal of the forces and settlers. Taking into account the fact that 
every word and expression of the Treaty is carefully weighed and chOsent" we 
proceed to examine the possible answers of that question. 
0a one hand, one may argue that such linkage was intended to express the 
frameres' view that the evacuation of the settlers was conditional on the 
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withdrawal of the military f arces. On the other hand, it may be argued that 
the evacuation of the settlers was not conditional on the military withdrawal, 
but both of them, however, are subject to certain principles included in the 
withdrawal clause, viz. the extent, the period, and the phases, of the 
withdrawal. 
The argument that the withdrawal of the settlers is conditional an the military 
withdrawal has some support. 
Whenever the Treaty referred to the withdrawal of the forces and settlers, the 
term "armed forces" was physically placed before the word "civilian". This 
could mean that the military withdrawal must precede the evacuation of the 
settlers. 
It may be also argued that, during the preparatory work, Israel made it clear 
that its military occupation, for security reasons, must be accompanied by the 
establishment of civilian settlements. Based on the (incorrect) assumption that 
Israeli settlement policy in the occupied territory was not illegal under 
international law, it can be argued that such a linkage is legally permissible. 
If this interpretation is correct, it would mean that the Treaty is in line 
with Israel's view that where it has military presence, it is entitled to 
establish and to keep civilian settlements . 74 Yet, this interpretation, far from 
being legally permitted, could undermine the Treaty in two other aspects. it 
may reflect a deviation from the rules of international law, that is to say, 
there is a clear distinction under international law between "the right to 
remain in occupation of a territory" and the right "to establish settlements in 
such a territory. " While the former may be legal under certain circumstances, " 
the latter is absolutely illegal under any circumstances. Nevertheless, the 
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1979 Peace Treaty seems to adopt a different position, since the notion of the 
withdrawal of the illegal Israeli settlers, under its provision, has become 
deliberately blurred with the end of the military occupation ( which might be 
legal and subject to conditions for Its withdrawal). 
The linkage between the withdrawal of the forces and the settlers constituted, ' 
a legal precedent which, if applied in the future, could lead to absurd 
consequences in relation to the Vest Bank and Gaza. Taking into account the 
fact that under the Preamble of both the Camp David Accords and the Treaty, 
Israel could argue that this legal precedent is intended to constitute a 
principle applicable to the would-be settlement between her and the Arabs 
concerning the West Bank and Gaza. If a similar linkage was accepted, then 
Israel, whose intention is to have a permanent military presence in certain 
areas there, would be able to maintain its settlements in these area. It may 
be well to recall here that Israel's practice after the Peace Treaty reveals its 
intention to maintain military presence as well as settlements in certain areas 
in the West Bank and Gaza. 76 Of course, this is inconsistent with the 
international norms prohibiting such settledments. 
Turning to the second possible interpretation i. e., the evacuation of the 
settlers under the Treaty is not conditional. In support of this view, it could 
be argued that a careful reading of the relevant provision would reveal that 
there is no linkage between the two kinds of withdrawal; rather it employed the 
expression "withdrawal of military forces and civilians" only when dealing with 
the extent, the period and the phases of the withdrawal. Such partial linkage 
could not be interpreted to mean that the evacuation of the settlers is subject 
to the military withdrawal. Moreover, recourse to the preparatory work and the 
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circumstances of the conclusion of the Treaty would suggest that the evacuation 
of the settlements is unconditional. For example, Sadat, in Camp David, not 
only rejected any conditions with regard to such evacuation, but also Made it 
clear in his letter dated September 17,1978, that the evacuation of the settler 
is a basic principle and a prerequisite to starting peace negotiations . 77 Also 
in the Camp David negotiations, the Americans expressed the view that the 
Israeli settlements were not only illegal but also constituted af arm of 
colonalism and therefore had to be dismantled or removed. 79 In addition, an 
examination of the decision of the Israeli Knesset, referred to earlier, which 
authorized the Israeli Government to dismantle the settlements in Sinai, would 
reveal that it contained no conditions. Finally, a conditional withdrawal of 
the settlers was inconsistent with the rules of international law. It is well 
established that whatever the correct construction of a treaty, it cannot be 
interpreted as violating international law. 
Thus, despite the language used, which strongly links the evacuation of the 
settlers to the withdrawal of the forces, we cannot interpret, such linkage to 
mean that the former is conditional on the latter. 
The word "civilians", included in the first sentence of Articlel (2) and 
repeated again in other partS79, was used as a reference to the "settlers". To 
understand this word, we may refer to other similar words that might have been 
used. In this connection, the authors had to choose between three possible 
words. The first is the word "personnel" which was used by the second American 
draft in the course of the preparatory work of the Article an the settlements. 
It is necessary to construe the word "personnel", as used in the relevant 
paragraph In the U. S. draft, as referring both to Israeli military forces and to 
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the settlers. Perhaps the Egyptians regarded this word as somewhat vague and 
therefore they prefered clearer language an this important issue. 
The second possible word is "settlers". The relevant provision of the 
Egyptian draft which was quoted earlier refers directly to the "removal of the 
Israeli settlements". Of course, any language referring directly to the 
settlements or the settlers was rejected by Israel for reasons mentioned above. 
The third word is "civilians". Probably this word is derived from the language 
of, and referred to Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, in 
particular paragraph 6 of that Article which reads as follows: 
"The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian 
population into the territory it occupies. 1191, 
Taking into account the wide ly-recogn ized view that the Israeli settlements were 
explicitly prohibited by Article 49 which reflected customary international 
law8l, it follows that such reference could mean that the evacuation of the 
settlers was based on the rules of international law rather a bilateral 
agreement. 
From the Egyptian perspective, the word "civilians" is accepted since it could 
be taken as referring to the illegality of Israeli settlements in Sinai and 
referred to Israel's obligation under the law of military occupation. 
As to the Israelis, the word "civilians" was accepted because it could be used 
instead of the word "settlers" which they were anxious to avoid, and because it 
could not be interpreted as referring to the settlers of the other occupied 
territories. 
Thus, for these reasons, the word "civilians" was chosen by the drafters* 
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The last part of paragraph 2 provides that "Egypt will resume the exercise of, 
its full sovereignty over the Sinai". The legal meaning of this expression in 
respect of the withdrawal issue has been discussed in section one of this 
chapter. It remains now to consider its meaning with regard to the withdrawal 
issue. 
We have oroved earlier that the word "resume" was used to reaf f irn Israel's 
recognition of Egypt's long-established title over Sinai. This could mean that 
the authors of the Treaty denounced the previous Israeli argument for the 
legality of its settlements in Sinai which was based an the premise that the 
law of military occupation did not apply to Sinai as it does not belong to 
Egypt or any sovereign. 82 
The expression "exercise its full sovereignty" was a clear reference to the 
principle of respect for sovereignty and territorial Integrity of states. The 
value and the legal meaning of that principle were pointed out earlier. Suffice 
it to say here that the purpose of such reference in respect of the settlements 
is twofold: 
(1) To ensure the total evacuation of the Israeli settlers f ram Sinai. No one 
can deny that the mere presence of the settlers in Sinai was inconsistent with 
the meaning attributed to that principle under international law; 
(2) To confirm that Israel's evacuation of its settlers in Sinai was based on, 
and in accordance with, that principle rather any international principle , 
particularly the principle of inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by 
force. In the course of the preparatory work of that Article, the Israeli 
negotiators avoided the inclusion of language that could be interpreted as 
commiting Israel to evacuate its settlements in the other Arab occupied 
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territories. Thus, by reference to this principle, no similar evacuation can be 
envisaged in Gaza and the Vest Bank for the simple reason that, so far as 
sovereignty is concerned, no state has a valid title over Gaza and the West 
Bank . 93 
Surely the settlers' withdrawal was part of the deal under the 1979 Treaty. 
Yet, the above analysis of the meaning both of the word "civilians" and the 
expression "exercise of its full sovereignty" suggests that the legal bases of 
Israel's obligation to withdraw its settlers from Sinai are the relevant rules 
of international law which we have indicated above, rather than any bilateral 
agreement. 
However, the question which may be raised In this respect is whether or not 
Resolution 242 constituted a judical basis for the withdrawal of the settlers 
from Sinai. The answer of this question is of special importance as it would 
help in ascertaining the scope of the settlement clause. 
The correct answer to that question seems to be in the negative. In fact one 
finds it somewhat difficult to assume that Resolution 242 constituted a legal 
basis for the evacuation for the Israeli settlers in Sinai. The Resolution 
contained no explicit or implicit mention of the settlement issue. We have 
rejected earlier the view that it implies a prohibition of such settlements. " 
In the course of the preparatory work, any proposed term or expression taken 
from or referred to the Resolution was deliberately omitted. Consequently, the 
provision on the settlements contains any reference to the Resolution. 
In relation to the period during which the evacuation of the settlements is to 
be completed, Article 1 (1) of Annex 1 provides: 
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"Israel will complete withdrawal of all its armed forces and civilians from the 
Sinai not later than three years from the date of exchange of instruments of 
ratification of this Treaty. "" 
More details on the period and the timing of the evacuation of the settlers 
were set out in Article 1 (1) of Appendix to Annex one which reads in part as 
f ollows: 
11 The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and civilians from the Sinai will be 
accomplished in two phases as described in Article 1 of Annex 1. The 
description and timing of the withdrawal are included in this Appendix. "96 
A study of the provisions dealing with the settlement issue reveals that it 
covers certain important aspects of the problem while leaving aside other 
important issues. On the one hand, the Treaty provides f or a set of rules 
governing the most significant aspects of the settlement issue, e. g., the total 
evacuation of the settlers, the timing and the period during which such 
evacuation is to be completed, the judical bases and the final line of the 
settlers 'withdrawal. On the other hand, certain issues have been deliberately 
excluded from the scope of the provision. In the first place, the question Of 
the settlements in Gaza and the West Bank and the Golan Heights was excluded 
from its scope. Thus, its geographical scope is limited only to Sinai. 
Moreover, the provision' deliberately does not seek to regulate issues relating 
to compensation for the damage resulting from the operations against the 
civilian population during the establishment of the settlements in Sinai. As an 
example, hundreds of Egyptian farmers in Sinai were dismissed from their lands 
and homes when Israel was building the city of Yamit67 in North Sinai, At this 
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point, it is worth while to refer that paragraph eighth of Article 2 of the 
Egyptian draft at Camp David provides the following: 
11 Israel undertakes to pay full and prompt compensation for the damage which 
resulted from the operations of its armed forces against the civilian population 
and installations ... 11919 
Egypt's demand for compensation was based upon Article 52 of the Hague 
Regulationsl which provides thato where property is requisitioned* payment is to 
be made at once or, if not possible, as soon as the occupier is so able,, "'- 
contributions in kind shall be given and the payment of the amount due shall be 
made as soon as possible. 9c, 
However, the Egyptian draft was rejected and--'the rights of the Egyptian 
civilians were illeizally, overlooked, 
Before leaving this section, a final important question must be addressedo 
namely, whether and in what circumstances the settlement clause under the Peace 
Treaty is applicable to the settlements in the other Arab occupied territories ? 
Before answering this question, some relevant and important considerations 
should be taken into account. These are: 
(1) It is clear that the settlement clause as included in Articlel (2) contains 
no explicit or implicit mention of the settlements in other Arab occupied 
territories. One must admit that it would seem difficult to find in that 
Article a satisfactory basis for the evacuation of the settlements in the other 
occupied territories; 
(2) However, we have, proved in the previous section on the military withdrawal 
that, under the preamble of the Peace Treaty, any Arab party which Joins the 
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peace process will be legally entitled under -j%r+nln conditions to benefit from 
the principles applied in settling the -dyptian- Israeli conflict. 
(3) The language and the wording of the provisions an the settlements give 
rise to the question of whether or not the evacuation of the settlers is 
conditional on the military withdrawal. We have indicated earlier that such 
question has two possible answers, one in the affirmative and the other is in 
the negative. 
Thus, one possible way to answer the question of the applicability of the 
settlement provisions to the settlements in the other Arab territories is to 
assume, for the purposes of the argument, that the evacuation of the settlers is 
conditional an the military withdrawal under-the Ireaty. It follows that Arab 
states which Join the peace process will be entitled to benefit from the 
settlement clause and consequently demand the dismantling of the settlements in 
their territory. Yet, an' the other hand, any Arab states have to accept that 
such dismantling should be part of and conditional an the military withdrawal 
and the conditions stipulated in return of that withdrawal. 
In practice, this interpretation would enable Israel, for example, to maintain 
its settlements in the Golan Heights in Syria until the implementation of an 
agreement on the withdrawal of the forces. Further, Israel, which intends to 
keep a permanent military presence in certain strategic areas in the West Bank 
and Gaza, would also be entitled to keep its settlements in these occupied areas 
for indefinite period. . Of course. this answer is inconsistent with the rules Of 
international law and the relevant U. N. resolutions calling for unconditional 
dismantling of the settlements in the occupied territories. 
2-o 
This answer, howevero seems to affect the rights of third states and 
therefore cannot be accepted. In the words of Judge Huber in the Tefland of 
NlinA-; arbitration, 11 ... whatever may be the right construction of a treaty, it 
cannot be interpreted as disposing of the rights of independent third 
Powers. 1191 
The correct answer of the question under consideration, in our view, is that 
Israel is obliged to evacuate its settlements in the Arab occupied territories 
because such an obligation stems from the rules of international law and the 
relevant resolutions of the U. N. A careful reading of the Treaty's position in 
this respect would lead to the same conclusion. On one hand, the evacuation of 
the settlers under the Treaty, as we, Droved 'earlier, was not conditional. On 
the other hand, the language on th6 -eLetitlements made it clear that such_ 
evacuation was based on Israel's obligation under international law rather - 
bilateral agreement. This was indicated earlier in some detail. 
Thus, Israel's evacuation of its settlements in Sinai should be looked upon as 
a legal precedent applicable without prior conditions to all the settlements in 
the Arab occupied territories. 
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The problem of the legal status of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of 
Tiran is goverened by Article V, Paragraph 2 of the 1979 Treaty which 
declares the following: 
"the parties consider the straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be 
international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non- 
suspendable freedom of navigation and airflight"92 
There is no doubt that this Article embarks on the establishment, 
through a bilateral treaty, of a new regime to govern international 
navigation iý-the Gulf including Israeli navgation in the Gulf. To fully/ 
understand Article V(2), it is necessary to place it within the context 
of the 1979 Treaty as a whole. With the assistance of a brief inquiry 
into the legislative history of the law applicable to the Gulf and state 
practice with regard to the passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and the 
straits since 1949, an examination and evaluation of the new regime will 
be offered. 
In order to understand the legal aspects of the problem under 
consideration, some geographical facts about the Gulf of Aqaba must be 
mentioned at the outset. 
According to the 
! 
Secretariat Study of Bays and Estuaries, the Coasts of 
which belong to different Statesl "The Gulf of Aqaba is a long narrow 
gulf on the the eastern side of the Sinai Peninsula. The western share 
is Egyptian, the eastern shore is Saudi Arabian and the head of the Gulf 
is Israeli and Jordanian territory. The islands of Tiran and Sanafir 
front the entrance"93 
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The Red Sea at its northern extremity, the western arm is the Gulf of 
Suez which leads into the Suez Canal. The Gulf is somewhat over one 
hundred miles in length, and varies in width between three miles in the 
narrow bay at its northen end to seventeen miles at its width point. 
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Map 8 THe Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran 
The islands of Tiran and Sanafir have been under Egyptian occupatioa 
since 1950. Saudi Arabia, howeverg claimed the two islands. The 
entrance of the Gulf is through the Sraits of Tiran. There are two 
passages in the Sraits; Enterprise passage and Graf ton passage. The " 
formert which lies close to the Sinai Peninsula, ig the principad' 
channel into the Gulf and the only channel which can be navigated safely 
by vessels of substantial S12e. Grafton passage, separated from 
Enterprise passage by a series of reefs, lies close to Tiran islands. 
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This entrance appears seldom to be used as the reef s there 
f)n 
render 
navigation difficult. 94 
For legal purposes the Gulf of Aqaba and the straits of Tiran are 
considered to be an inland sea which are connected with the high seas 
by means of a strait and consequently they are subject to the regime of 
inland sea in international law. 96 
Under customary international law, a distinction was made between 
straits connecting two parts of the high seas, and those connecting 
parts of the high seas with an inland sea. While the former*were subject 
to the right of innocent passage, the legal status of the latter had 
never been definitively determined. 9G 
It may be observed, in this regard that, the second Sub-Committee of 
the Hague Codification Conference did not formulate rules for inland 
seas surrounded by more than one state. 97 Thus the legal status of the 
Gulf of Aqaba under international law remained uncertain. 
A review of the work of the International Law Commission reveals that 
its draft article did not contain any rules with respect to bays 
surrounded by more than one coastal state. The reason given for not 
formulating rules applicable to such bays was the Commission's lack of 
"sufficient data at its disposal concerning the number of cases 
involved". 96 
Further, the Special Report of the ILC, in 1956, expressed the view 
that the situation of the Gulf of Aqaba is "exceptional-possibly 
unique"". 
Nevertheless, under Article 16(4) of the 1958 Territorial Sea 
Convention, the legal regime applicable to "straits connecting two parts 
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of the high seas" was expanded so as to include straits at the entrance 
of Inland seas surrounded by more than one state. 
11 There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships 
through the straits which are used for international navigation between 
one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the 
territorial seas of a foreign state"100 
This means that passage through the Gulf was subject to a regime of 
non-suspedable innocent passage. However, it has been rightly observed 
that the Convention merely regulates access to the strait at the 
entrance of the Gulf, while remaining completely silent as to the Gulf 
itself. 101 
In any event this rule, included in Article 16(4), was regarded by Arab 
states as not part of customary international law and only binding on 
ratification. 102 
In the UK Convention on the Law of the Sea of 19820 Article 45(l) 
provided that the regime of innocent passage shall apply to straits 
connect4, &. betweenhigh seas and. territorial seas. This Article was 
regarded as applicable to the straits of Tiran. 103 Again, it may be 
observed that the regime applicable to the wate of the Gulf itself has 
remained uncertain under the Convention. 
Having outlined the legal status of the Gulf under customary 
international law and multilateral treaties, and the uncertainty 
surrounding it, we now turn to consider state practice regarding the 
problem of the passage through the Aqaba Gulf. 
State practice, in the period between 1948 and 19790 reveals that 
states, by reasons partly of their attitude towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, and partly of the fact that International rules governing the 
212 
status of the Gulf are uncertain, adopted different attitudes towards 
the problem. However, in this connection three main attitudes can be 
traced: 
In the first place the attitude adopted by the Western states and 
Israel provides that the Gulf of Aqaba, by reasons partly of its breadth 
U'b &I/. N 
and partly of the f act that its shores border ýa If our dif f erent states, 
constitutes international waters. It follows that freedom of navigation 
should be ensured in it. In other words, according to them, the Gulf and 
the straits must be open f or non-suspendable freedom of navigation 
similar to navigation in the high seas. 104 There is no better 
quotation in support of this view than what has been stated by the 
representative of the Netherlandýat the General Assembly: 
"Firstoinasnuch as the Gulf of Aqaba is bordered by four different 
States and has a width in excess of the three miles of territorial 
waters of the four littoral States on either side, it is, under the 
rules of international law, to be regarded as part of the open sea. 
Secondly,. the Straits of Tiran consequently are, in the legal senseg 
straits connecting two open seas, normally used for international 
navigation. Thirdly, in regard to such straits, there is a right of 
free passage even if the straits are so narrow that they fall entirely 
within the territorial waters of one or more states. This rule was 
acknowledged by the International Court of Justice in the case of the 
Corfu Channel (Judgrment of December 15,1949; I. C. J. Reparts 1949#p. 244) 
and also by the International Law Commission in its report f or 1956 
(A/3159). Fourthly, if a strait falls entirely within the territorial 
waters of one or more of the littoral States, there is still a right of 
innocent passage, but then the littoral States have the rights if 
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necessary, to verify the innocent character of the passage. Fif thly, 
this right of verification, however, does not exist in those cases where 
the strait connects two parts of the open sea. It must, therefore, be 
concluded that all States have the right of free and unhampered passage 
for their vessels through the Straits of Tiran". 106 
This attitude was declared by Israel 'several occasions. "16 It was 
also supported by many Vestern states (e. g., the US, France and Italy) 
during the debate an the problem in the UK General Assembly in March 
1957.107 
Some states held the view that the Gulf of Aqaba and the straits must 
be subject to the regime of territorial seas. Foreign ships, theref are, 
have the right of innocent passage in its waters. In his report to the 
General Assembly in 19571 Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold took the 
position that there 'was a right of innocent passage but the extent of 
that right was subject to legal controversy. 109 This view was adopted by 
Egypt on certain occasions: in 1950, following-its occupation of the 
two Saudi Arabian islands at the entrance of the Aqaba Gulft Egypt 
informed the US that it would guarantee the freedom of innocent passage 
in the Gulf. According to the Aide Memoire sent by the Egyptian 
Government to the American Embassy: 
".. This occupation is not conceieved in a spirit to hinder in whatever 
way it may be the innocent passage across the maritime space separating 
these two islands from the Egyptian coast of Sinai. It goes without 
saying that this passage, the only practicable, will remain free as in 
the past being in comformity with the international practice and the 
recognized principle of international law. 0109 
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Moreover, Egypt declared in the 1950 that its restriction and 
procedures against Israel in the Gulf were based an the existence of war 
between them. I1 10 
Further, the internal regulation of the littoral states of the Gulf 
asserted that its waters are territorial seas. We may refer in this 
respect to Article 5 of The Territorial Waters Decree in Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt which extended the territorial sea "for a distance of six 
nautical miles. ""' Likewise Israel's Territorial Water Decree of 1955 
has a similar provision. 112 
In 19570 several states declared in the UK that the Gulf of Aqaba 
should be governed by the rules of innocent passage though there was 
disagreement on the question of what constitutes innocent passage. The 
Indian Representative stated for example that: 
"this right of innocent passage, so-called, actually means that# first 
of all, one must prove innocence. Innocence depends upon the character 
of the party claiming the passage; it depends upon the purpose of the 
passage, and also upon the freight that is carried. "113 
The delegate of Italy challk6-hged India's opinion and stated that: 
"This interpretation would nullify the rule of innocent passage, since 
it is obvious that, if it were valid, the littoral States would no 
longer have the duty of justifying their refusal of passage to a vessel 
an specific occasions and for specific reasons; rather, it would rest 
with the vessel to prove that its passage was innocent. 11114 
The third attitude held that waters of the Gulf of Aqaba posseses the 
character of historic waters. In a Xemorandum to the UK registering 
the position of Saudi Arabia on the problem of the Straits of Tiran and 
the Gulf of Aqaba, it was argued that the Gulf was an Arab marp-CIAUMM 
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for over thirteen centuriest and that Israel's footholds on the Aqaba 
Gulf were illegal. As a result, the waters of the Gulf , under the 
doctrine of historic bays should be treated as internal waters. 116 This 
means that the coastal state is not bound to admit the innocent passage 
of foreign vessels In the waters. 
The legal basis of this view, which was held for some time, by 
Egypt, 1 1-3 as well as other states, is based on the following 
considerations. 
First, Israel's foothold on the Aqaba Gulf, apart from its illegal 
origin, was based on the Armistice Agreements which by their character 
and express provision vest no sovereignty whatsoever and leave the 
territory, including the Aqaba Gulf, subject to rights, claims, and 
reservations. The armistice lines were purely dictated by military 
considerations and have no political significance. 117 
Secondly, the Gulf has been an exclusive Arab route under Arab 
sovereignty since the establishment of the Arab Empire in 700 A. D. Its 
regular use as a sea route to Moslem holy places ever since that time 
cannot be denied. 110 
Thirdly, in the Case of the Gulf nf Fnnc%pcn, the Central American Court 
of Justice, in its decision of Xarch 1917, found that the origin of the 
status of the jGulf as a historic water dates back to 1522 when it was 
discovered. 119 The Gulf of Aqaba and the Gulf of Fonseca are 
characterized by the fact that some of the coastal states are not 
situated in their entrance, and the two waters areas are approximately 
of similar size and restricted configuration. 120 
Fourthly, a careful reading of some international 
ponventions 
concluded 
before 1948 would support the above view . For example the drafters of 
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the 1888 Constantinople Convention left the Gulf of Aqaba outside the 
scope of the passage defined for the Suez Canal, because they regarded 
the Gulf as a locked Arab water without any international character. 12, 
Another example is the omission of the Gulf of Aqaba in the 
international Sanitary Convention of 1912; 122 
Fifthly, Shukairy, asserted that "not a single international authority 
makes any mention of the Gulf as an international waterway" 123 For 
example, the AmPrIcan Journal of infi-rnAtinnni 111w, in April 1929, 
described the Gulf of Aqaba as internal waters. 124 
To sum up, we may conclude that the uncertainty surrounding the legal 
status of the Gulf had been confirmed by state practice. However, in this 
respect, this writer agrees with the view expressed by Secretary of 
State Dulles that: 
".. the straits of Tiran are territorial because they are less than six 
miles wide... But it is also a principle of international law that even 
though waters are territorial if they give access to a body of waterf 
comprehends international waterwayj there is a right of free and 
innocent passage .. that passage should be open unless Ethere is a] 
contrary decision by the International Court of Justice. 11126 
.1 Textual and 
Cnntu%3rtjja1 Anajyg3is of Artie. V (2) W Thf, 1979 T3rpjLt 
The 1979 Treaty9 according to its preamblej was based on the provision% 
of the Camp David Accords and the Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
338. Consequently, in spite of the fact that Article V(2) did not refer 
to any of these documents, there is no doubt that it was based on them. 
In dealing with the problem of the Aqaba Gulf, the Camp David Agreement 
made the following provision: 
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"The Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways 
to be open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of 
navigation and overflight. "126 
dleac. Lyl, this provision is based on the Security Council Resolutioý 
24z-, -namely, Paragraph 2(a) of which referred to "the necessity .. for 
guaranteeig the freedom of navigation through, international waters in 
the area. 11127 Resolution 338 of OctDiýL-, 22,1973, called upon the 
parties concerned to "start in diately the implementation of the 
Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts. 
04120 
Hence if the new regime is based on Resolution 2420 then a correct 
interpretation of the relevant parts of the resolution needs to be 
explored. 
The language used in Resolution 242 suggests the following 
observations. 
First, the term international waterways is derived from the language 
of the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Casp#i2q and 
it could be underZtood to mean waterways used for international 
041- 
navigation, rather waters used exclusively for local navigation and 
leading to the internal waters of coastal state; 130 
Secondly, the term freedom of navigation could be interpreted as a 
refernce to the high seas freedom of navigation. 131 However, some believe 
that it should be understood as "a reference to the general principles 
that should underline the regime of the passage... rather than as 
indication of the applicability of the high seas freedom Of 
navigation. "112 
Thirdlyq the use of the word "thrrdgu-- has been understood as a 
reference to the issue of passage through the Straits of Tiran rather 
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I than as a reference to the regime applicable to the Suez Canal'33. The 
latter is governed by the 1888 Constantinople Convention. 
Further legal analysis of Resolution 242 raised the following question: 
which article of the UK Charter was the resolution based on ? In 
answering this question, two views can be found. 
Some observed that the action of the Security Council in that context 
was based an consideration of expediency rather than relying on legal 
grounds or specific Charter provision. 134 Others thought that the 
Council was aiming to bring to an end the situation which at that time 
, constituted a potential 
danger to the world peace and security. I 
This leads to the conclusion that the legal regime provided by the 
Security Council should be limited to those states that have accepted 
the resolution. 
Nevertheless, an the other hand, some held the view that Resolutions 
242 and 338 are binding on all members of the UK and that the Security 
Council view on the question of the Gulf and the Straits overrides both 
the Territorial Sea Convention of 1958 and the UK Law of the Sea 
Convention of 1982.136 
At any rate, the prevailing view is that the scope of Resolution 242 
with regard to the regime of the Gulf is limited to Egypt and Israel 
because they have accepted it. 136 
Turning to the legal regime of the Gulf under the 1979 Treatyp we may 
state that the scope of the new regime is limited to Egypt and Israel. 
This is due to the following reasons: the new regime is based on the 
legal regime of the Gulf under Resolution 242 whose scope is confined# 
as Indicated earlier, to Egypt and Israel; the binding nature of the 
new regime is due to the bilateral agreement between Egypt and Israel 
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rather than any international customary and multilateral treaties on 
the law of the sea. 137 
As a result the new regime is not binding on Saudi Arabiý and Jordan 
which both declared their rejection of the Treaty. 139 
The first sentence of the Article is declaratory in character' 39: "the 
parties consider the straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be 
international waterways". "' This could be interpreted to mean that the 
new regime stems from the rules of general international law rather than 
bilateral agreement between the two states. 
The word "Strait" of Tiran, which used instead of the ward "Straits" of 
Tiran, suggest that it refers to the western and principal entrance of 
the Gulf known as "Enterprise passage" which falls within the 
territorial sea of Egypt. The term "Straits of Tiran*# which was not 
mentioned, is always used to refer to the two channels, Enterprise 
Passage and Grafton Passage. 141 The latter passage falls within the 
territorial sea of Saudi Arabia. This could be interpreted to mean that 
the intention of the parties was to avoid any problem likely to occur 
if Saudi Arabia rejected the Treaty. It could also be understood as a 
reference to the nature of' the regime as resting upon a bilateral 
agreement. 
The term 11 international waterways" is taken from Resolution 242 and, 
as mentioned earlier, is derived from the language of the Ici in the 
rnrfu Channel case. This could be understood as a reference to the idea 
that the freedom of navigation in the Gulf and the Straits should be 
similar to the freedom of navigation applied in the Corfu Channel. Such 
understanding leads to the conclusion that the Gulf and the Straits 
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should be subject to the regime of navigation in the high seas. This 
conclusion is supported by the fact that no hint of territorial 
competence with regard to the passage had been mentioned. 142 The term 
freedom of navigation is usually associated with the regime of the high 
seas. 143 It was used by Article (2) of the 1958 Convention an the legal 
status of the High sea. Reisman regarded it as "a term comprehensive in 
intention, including movemento observation, inspection, maneuversq tests 
and so forth carried out above, on and below the surface. 11144 Under 
freedom of navigation warships have complete immunity from any state 
other than the flag state. 146 
However, on the other hand, the term has been used from 1973 by the UN 
Conference on The law of the Sea (UNCLOSIID in relation to the right of 
"transit passage". The concept of transit passage was defined as the 
exercise... of freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the 
purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of strait. 01146 
To sum upt we may state that, while the term 'freedom of navigation' 
has been normally used to describe the regime of the high seas, it is 
also used since 1973 to refer to the new concept of transit passage in 
territolal seas. 147 
The terms "non-suspendable" and "unimpeded" which were used by the 1979 
Treaty before the term freedom of navigation is similar to the terms 
used by Article 16(4) of the 1958 Convention which states that: 
11 There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships 
through straits which are used for international navigation between one 
part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the 
territorial seas of foreign state"149 
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Further, the terms were also used by Article 45 (2) of the same 
Convention to describe the legal system applicable to straits at the 
entrance to an inland seas. 149 However, the same term has usually been 
used to describe the freedom of navigation in the high seas. 
The question of the nature of the new legal regime and whether it 
falls under the regime of innocent passage or under the high seas, 
regime is raised by the above argument. The answer of this question is 
of special significance for two main reasons, 
First, there-is no mention of any duty on the part of the passing ships 
and aircraft or of the extent of the coastal state's competence and 
rights; 150 
Secondly, the Peace Treaty assigned to a third party (i. e., UN forces or 
its alternative multinational force) the task of " ensuring the freedom 
of navigation through the Straits of Tiran in accordance with Article V 
of the Treaty of Peace. "151 
In answering the above questiong el-Baradei argued that the parties 
intended to establish a regime that goes beyond the regime of innocent 
passage, but that falls short of the freedom of navigation and overflight 
applicable in the high seas. He added that the objective of the parties 
intended to establish a regime analogous in content to the UNCLOS 
regime of transit passagel which assures the rights of the international 
community while preserving coastal states' rights of protection and 
self-preservation. 162 
In support of his viewo el-Baradei advanced a number of reasnons. 
First, the parties continue to regard the Gulf as part of their 
territorial seas. The reference to the performance of normal police 
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functions made in Annex 1 of the 1979 Treaty nay be recalled. Secondlyt 
the parties agreed that their permissible military activities in some 
parts of territoial would be restricted. "It does not therefore seem 
plauible in such a securitY-conscious agreement that the intention was 
to create rights for third states exceeding the rights of the parties 
themselves" 1 11. Thirdly, if the Gulf was subject to the high seas' 
regime, the states' rights of protection and self-preservation may be 
affected by security risking activities, e. g., the conduct of military 
maneuveý or carrying out of research activities. Ir-4 
From a legal prespective, this view was not accepted by writers for the 
following reasons: 166 
First, no direct or indirect reference has been made to the right of 
transit passage in the treaty. Nor did the preparatory work refer to 
it. Having in mind the fact that the new concept of transit passage was 
already known since 1973, it may be correct to suppose that it Was 
delibrately Ignored by the drafters of the Treaty. 
Also, according to Israeli sources, the Israeli negotiators rejected 
the idea of applying the regime of transit passage to the Gulf. 161 
According to Reisman, the coastal state has the right to suspend 
transit passage. As he put it: "a state bordering a strait might 
unilaterally determine that a particular transit in given circumstances 
violates... Article 39(l)(b) hence is not transit passage in the meaning 
in the Convention and may either be prohibited entirely or permitted 
only upon the fulfillment of conditions. 0167 
There is no doubt. that such right to suspend the navigation is 
inconsistent with Article V(2) which refered to non-suspension and 
unimpeded navigation. 
223 
Ve have pointed out earlier that the new regime is based on the regime 
provided by Paragraph 2(a) of resolution 242. The legal regime 
applicable to the Gulft according to that resolution, is similar to the 
regime applicable to the rnrfu rbAnnpl, i. e., the regime of the high 
seas. Further, the fact that the concept of transit passage was not 
known when Resolution 242 was adopted in 1967 may be referred to in 
support of this argument. 
The Peace Treaty, perhaps deliberately, did not mention any duty on 
the parts of the passing ships for the simple reasons that the intention 
of the drafters was to subject their new regime to the high seas norms. 
If this was the intention, then there is no need to mention duties, 
rights, or competence because the high seas are subject to international 
law aloneq and national authority exercised thereupon must conform to 
international custom or convention. 
Egypt's practice in the aftermath of the 1979 Treaty shows that it did 
not take any procedures or declared any act which may affect any kind of 
navigation in the Gulf and the Straits. Israel's practice is along in 
the same line. An example is the Agreement on the Creation of the 
Multinational Forces and Observers (MFO) signed by Egypt and Israel in 
1981, whereby no mention of Egypt's competence or national authority 
regarding foreign ships in the Gulf and the Straits of Tiran has been 
made. 168 
From the above, we may conclude that the new regime established by the 
1979 Treaty cannot fall under the transit passage regime or even any 
similar one. 
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The question which arises now is, to what extent can the new regime be 
considered as similar or/and subject to the international rules 
governing the high seas? 
In considering the regime of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran 
under the 1979 Peace Treaty, Reisman wrote: 
".. With that sort of formula tortured, casu/stic interpretation is not 
necessary... the waterways are chracterized as international and any hint 
of territorial competence with regard to the passage repeatedly 
excluded; there is no right of transit characteriable by the coastal 
state, but instead the traditional freedom of navigation... interpreted 
logically or teleogically Camp David produces freedom of navigation-NI69 
As is well known, Article V(2) was based on the Camp David Agreeiants. 
The Security Council has dealt specially with the issue of the Aqaba 
Gulf and the Straits of Tiran in Resolutions 242 and 338. These two 
resolutions, as we indicated earlier, have considered the Gulf as 
subject to the rules governing the high seas. Consequently, the new 
regime established by the parties under the 1979 Treaty must be governed 
by the rules of the high seas because of the binding nature of these 
resolutions. 
The textual interpretation of Article V(2) suggestes that the intention 
of the drafters was to subjct the Gulf to the rules of the high seas. 
This was clear by using terms associated to the high seas regime. For 
example, the parties consider the Gulf and the Straits as "international 
waterways. " Another example is the phrase" unimpeded and non- 
suspendable freedom of navigation". This phrase, as we explained 
ealier, must be interpreted as a reference to the regime applicable to 
the high seas. 160 
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The practice of Israel and the US after the Treaty conf irmed that 
they considered the Gulf and the Straits as being governed by the rules 
of the high seas. To ýrovk this we may refer to the Memorandum of 
Agreement between the Governments of the US and Israel signed in 1979 
after the conclusion of the Treaty. 'r-I According to Article 3 of this 
Memorandum, if a violation of the Treaty should threaten the security of 
Israell including, inter alin a blockade of Israel's use of international 
waterways, the US will be prepared to consider such measures as "the 
exercise of maritime rights to put an end to the violation". "' 
Clearly, as some writers observed, the expression "international 
waterway" could refer to the Gulf and the Straits of Tiran as well as 
other relevant passages. 163 
A similar position can be found in the statement by the Chairman of 
the US delegation to UNCLOS III made on January 29,1982: 
11 The U. S. fully supports , the continuing applicability and force of 
freedom of navigation and overflight for the Straits of Tiran and the 
Gulf of Aqaba as set out in the7freaty ofýeace is fully compatible with 
the LOS convention and will continue to prevail. The conclusion of the 
of 164 LOS convention will not affect these provisions in any way . 
Likewise, after its signature of the 1979 Treaty, Egypt did not take or 
declare any action which may affect international navigation in the 
Gulf. For example, Egypt's declaration upon its ratification of the 1982 
Convention, while it refers to its right to take some measures relating 
to its right of self-preservation in the Gulf, did not refer to any 
competence concerning foreign ships in the Gulf. 'r-r- Competence, as 
rightly observed, is the key difference between freedom of navigation 
and innocent passage. In the former, competence about the character of 
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the user vests in the flag state; in the latter it vests in the coastal 
statel". Egypt's declaration, therefore, could be understood as 
supportive of the view that it considers the Gulf as subject to the 
regime of the high seas. 
Finally, the interpretation that the Gulf is subject to the transit 
passage regime encounters a number of obstacles. For example, there is 
need for more provisions to regulate matters such as submerged passage, 
the duties on the part of passing ships, the competence of the coastal 
states and so on. Such matters are still controversial and were not 
settled by the rules governing the transit passage regime. 
From the above considerations, one can conclude that the new regime is 
subject to the regime applicable to high seas. 
Having reached the above conclusion, the question arises: what is the 
position of other coastal states In the Gulf, namely, Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan$ with regard to the application of the new regime to them? 
Having in mind the fact that the new regime is not a codification of 
customary international law, IG7 and that both Saudi Arabia and Jordan 
have expressed their rejection of the 1979 Treaty, including the new 
regime of the Gulf and the Straits on several occasions, lr-'9 one can 
state that this regime is not binding on them. 
As a result, that part of the Gulf constituting the territorial seas of 
Egypt and Israel should be subject to the rules governing the high seas. 
The other parts of the Gulf, namely, the territorial seas of Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia would be subject to the rules of international law, i. e., 
the regime of innocent passage with its broad coastal competence, 
passage duties and overflight limitation. 
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In practice, however, the Straits of Tiran will not be affected by the 
application of a diversity of legal norms since it falls within the 
territorial seas of Egypt. Moreover, access to Israel through the 
Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba could be gained through or over 
the Egyptian and Israeli territorial seas. This would be the case even 
if Saudi Arabia was restored to the islands occupied by Egypt at the 
entrance of the Straits. 
Thp Attltudp nf The Aralh League Towards The New Regl= 
The rejection of the new regime, declared by Saudi Arabia and Jordan in 
the af termath of the Peace Treaty, cannot be separated from the Arab 
League's complete rejection of the peace process between Egypt and 
Israel including the two Agreements. The Arab League's rejection# which 
was declared at the Baghdad Summit(1978) and the Arab League Foreign 
Ministers Conference of 1979l was mainly due to political reasons which 
we pointed out in other parts of this work. 169 However, the Arab policy 
regarding the legal status of the Gulf seemed to be affected by two 
main considerations: first, the polititical one that the legal status of 
the Gulf should be part of a. comprehensive settlement of the Arab 
Israeli conflict; secondly, the legal and practical problem stemmed from 
the factt referred to earlier, that Israel's frontier in the Gulf is Of 
a temporary nature. 
Neverthelessi the question that needs to be answered is: whether the 
attitude of the Arab League towards the new regime of the Gulf 
established by the 1979 Treaty changed in the aftermath of the 1982 
Summit meeting when the Arab leaders adopted the 1982 peace plan (known 
as Fez Plan). 
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fact, there is no mention of the question of the Gulf As a-z 
either in the text of the plan or in the discussions during the 
meetings. This could lead to the interpretation that the League's 
intention was to subject the Gulf to the norms of international 
customary law and multilateral treaties. Yet, a careful reading of the 
Fez plan refutes this interpretation. 
In the f irst place, it is clear that the problem of the Israeli 
boundary in the Gulf of Aqaba no longer exists since it was not included 
in the Arab territorial claims. The Fez plan called for a complete 
withdrawal only from the ".. Arab territory occupied in 1967.0 170 By 
implication, this means that the plan considered Israel's boundaries of 
the pre-June 1967 war, including the Gulf frontier, as legal and final 
boundaries. 
Further, the plan called for "the United Nations Security Council to 
provide guarantees for peace" and 11 to guarantee implementation" of the 
Arab plan. "I This could be understood as an implicit approval of 
Resolution 242. Clearly, if the UK Security Council is to play any role 
to settle the Arab Israeli conflict. this would be dominated by its 
Resolution 242 which is of special importance and binding nature. 
Omission, by the 1982 Arab Summit, of the League's former rejection of 
resolution 242 is supportive of that conclusion . 
To the above, it may be added that apart from its position on the 
Palestine questions the principles of the Fez plan, as we proved, are in 
line with the principles of Resolution 242. 
Thus we can conclude that the Fez plan does not, from a legal view, 
reject the new legal regime of the Gulf of Aqaba provided by the 1979 
Treaty. However, in the meantime, it seems that the Fez plan did not 
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envisage any final determination of the question of the Aqaba Gulf to be 
decided separately, since the League does not allow any of its member 
states to conclude bilateral agreement with Israel. 172 
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This chapter is concerned with the attItude of the Peace Treaty towards 
the Palestinian state and the peoples, right to self-determination. 
Here, it is necessary to stress that, although nQ-Igqntion has been made 
of such right in the Peace Treatyjtselý, all the issues zilating to the 
Palestinians' rights were dealt/ by the Camp ýfavid Accords of 1978, 
particularly in the document entitled "Framework for Peace in the Middle 
East". ' 
For legal purposes, the relevant provisions of the Camp David Accords 
dealing with the rights of the Palestinian people must ba regarded as an 
integral part of the Peace Treaty. This can easily be understood from 
paragraph 2 of the preamble to the Peace Treaty which provides that the 
parties reaffirm their adherence to the "Framework for Peace in the 
Middle East* agreed at Camp David, dated September 17,1978.2 
The scheme envisaged by the Camp David Accords can be described briefly 
along the following lines. A self-governing authority on the West Bank 
and Gaza is to be set up for a transitional period (of up to five 
years); the authority is to be elected by inhabitants of the West Bank 
and Gaza (presumably, only present inhabitants). 3 During the 
transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israeli Jordan and a 
self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to 
decide on the modalities of the admission of persons displaced from the 
West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent 
disruption and disorder. 4 Israel's security interests, in this respect, 
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are to be taken into account and there is to be no return of persons 
displaced in 1948 from territory which then became Israel. 6 
As to the general refugee problem, i. e. the Arab refugees of 1948, 
Egypt and Israel are to "work with each other and with other interested 
parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent 
implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem. " Yet, no time 
period is set for the general resolution of the refugee problem; nor is 
there any indication that the problem must be resolved by means of a 
wholesale "right of return". Such expedients as resettlement, 
compensation and other alternatives are not excluded in those cases even 
where the first choice of the refugees concerned is repatriation-6 
After this clarification, in order to understand and evaluate the 
aforementioned scheme, it is necessary in the first place to undertake a 
brief inquiry into the right of the Palestinian people under the rules 
of international law. With the assistance of this inquiry, a textual 
and contextual legal interpretation of the Accords and the Peace Treaty 
will then be offered. 
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Before taking up the matter under consideration, it might be convenient 
at this point to note very briefly that there has never been a consensus 
of opinion as to the issues relating to the Palestinians' right to 
self-determination. For instance, the Palestinian people as a whole, 
according to one view, are entitled to self-determination. It follows 
therefore that they have the right to return and establish their own 
state. On the other hand, an opposing view takes up a position that the 
Palestinians are not entitled to self-determination, irrespective of the 
General Assembly resolutions in this regard. 
These two contradictory views are the subject of the following 
discucssion. 
The Palentiminn Pfanplux are Pntitlcmd to SAlf-DetprIgInatlon 
This view claims that the Palestinians are a people whose right of 
self-determination has been violated by the State of Israel. What 
claimed is not a right of self-determination arising only in the 
present, but a right which came into existence before 1948, and which 
has not been terminated .7 The main tenet of this position is 
that 
legitimate rights, such as self-determination, are not extinguishable by 
the coercive displacement or preventing the return of the "people" from 
the "territory" after the right has accrued to this very "people" On 
that very "territory". 13 There can be no doubt that this claim may raise 
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a number of complex issues related to the doctrine of self-determination 
in international law. This complexity arises because of two main 
considerations: the inevitable contradiction between the implementation 
of the Palestinians' self-determination on one hand, and the principle 
of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state of Israel on the 
other, 9 and the lack of consensus of opinion as to the legal character 
of the principle of self-determination. 10 
Notwithstanding, this discussion will be devoted to three main issues: 
First, the legal reasons for justifying the Palestinians' right to 
self-determination; Secondlyl the problem of which territory whose fate 
is to be determined by the Palestinians and, Thirdly, the problem of 
timingl namely, at what point does the population of Palestine represent 
the true population for the purpose of self-determination? 
Reasons in support of thR PalestlnianSO right tn Self-determination 
It is worth remembering that the legal basis for such a claim has been 
the subject of long and arduous discussion. Yet, these reasons are in 
general based upon two main considerations: that the Palestinians have 
fulfilled the conditions required to exercise the right of 
self-determination under international law" and, that the Arabs' claim 
that the "so called-Israel" is an illegal state whose establishment was 
in conflict with the rules of international law. 12 
This view asserts that the right of self-determination under 
contemporary international law is a legally operative right backed by 
legal obligation and not merely a pious hope devoid of legal 
substance. " If self-determination is a mere political principle which 
is not recognized as a binding rule of international law, the argument 
of this view will be far from ConVinCing. 14 
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The view that self-determination has developed into an international 
legal right is supported by several writers such as Higgins who 
rejected the interpretation that self-determination remains a mere 
"principle" and Article 2(7) is an effective defence against its 
implementation: 
"To insist upon this interpretation is to fail to give any weight either 
to the doctrine of bona fides or to the practice of states as revealed 
by unanimous and consistent behaviour. 1116 
The right of self-determination presupposes the existence of two 
interrelated factors : people and territory. It also requires the 
existence of a genuine link between the people and the territory claimed 
by them. The Palestinians, as it is rightly observed, have fulfilled 
these requirements. They are descendants of Abraham, Semites by race 
who have continuously inhabited the area known as Palestine since time 
immemorial. The territory belonging to these people are the lands known 
as Palestine, which incorporates Israel, Gaza and the West Bank. Their 
genuine link to this territory is well known and cannot be denied-` 
The existence of this Palestinian right before the establishment of 
Israel would lead to a reasonable conclusion that, once such a 
legitimate right had come into existence, it cannot be terminated by the 
coercive displacement of the Palestinians. Some authors believe that 
the Palestinians' right to self-determination was established under the 
Covenant of the League of Nations in 1922.17 Under this view, the ideas 
of President Wilson were generally accepted and incorporated in 1919 in 
Article 22. The text of this Article, which was applied to communities 
detached from the Ottoman Empire, including Palestine, pointed out that: 
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11 ... their existence as independent nations can be provisionally 
recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and 
assistance by a mandatory until such times as they were able to stand 
alone". 18 
There is no doubt, according to this view, that this Article referred 
to the right of self-determination of those peoples including the 
Palestinians. "3 At this point, it may be worth mentioning that Article 6 
of the Palestinian National Covenant is based on the above opinion, as 
we shall indicate later. 20 Others incline to the opinion that the 
Palestinian right to self-determination came into existence by the U. N. 
Resolution for the Partition of Palestine adopted in 1947,21 which seems 
a more reasonable view, as we shall see later. 22 
There is no doubt that the change in the indigenous Arab character of 
Palestine, caused by the Jewish immigration, was the legal foundation of 
the 1947 U. N. Resolution for the Partition of Palestine which lead to 
the establishment of Israel. 
Before considering the reasons forwarded to Justify the illegality of 
this immigration, the census figures ought to be mentioned to clarify 
the extent of this immigration: 
Throughout the mandate period, the Jewish population increased more 
than tenfold, from 56,000 in 1918, the number of Jews in Palestine 
increased to 83t7g4l according to the census of 1931$ and to 608,230 in 
1946 out of a total population of 1,972t560. In other words, while the 
non-Jewish population was go per cent in 1918 when the British forces 
entered Palestine, it was reduced to 55 percent in 1947 at the end of 
the mandate. 23 
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According to this view, the overwhelming Jewish immigration was in 
violation of international law. In the first place, it was against the 
will of the original inhabitants. Their clear opposition was 
demonstrated in riots and civil wars against Jewish communities in order 
to stop the immigration. 24 In support of this argument, the following 
quotation of ttD K"(; ->SCommission may be cited: 
"It is to be remembered that the non-Jewish population of Palestine, 
nearly nine-tenth of the whole, are emphatically against the Zionist 
Programme - 112 6 
The deliberate overlooking of the Palestinian wishes is in direct 
conflict with the practice of the League of Nations, which was pointed 
out by Mr. Yanaghita, in a memorandum to the Third Session of the 
Permanent Mandate Commission. He stated: 
11 If ... it happens that the interests of two classes of inhabitantss 
those previously living in a mandate area and those arriving later prove 
irreconcilablej the mandatory administration will naturally give first 
consideration to those of the original inhabitants. 112G 
It has been estimated that one half of the Jewish population in 1947 
had illegally entered Palestine, did not obtain Palestinian nationality$ 
and were not officially recorded. 27 Further, this overwhelming 
immigration was contrary to the formal policy of the British Government, 
which declared in 1939 that the entire population ratio was to be kept 
at the level It had reached of one third Jewish and two thirds 
non-Jewish Arabs. 29 Furthermore, unlimited immigration was against the 
spirit of the mandate, as well as against certain provisions of the 
legal instrument governing the mandate. 29 As long as the mandate was 
regarded as "a sacred trust of civilization", 30 the change of the 
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demographic structure of the original population in favour of a Jewish 
minority cannot be in accordance with the aim and spirit of the 
mandate . 31 
This inference could be supported by a number of instances illustrating 
the existence of conflicts between certain provisions govening the 
mandate on the one hand, and unlimited Jewish immigration on the other. 
It is in conflict with Article 22 of the League of Nations which 
provides that the main aim of the mandate system is the well-being of 
the inhabitants of the mandate territory. It is clear from this history 
of Palestine that the immigration was inimical to the "well being" of 
the Palestinians. Another illustration is the conflict between the 
massive immigration and certain provisions of the Balfour Declaration, 
which required the United Kingdom to ensure that: 
"Nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious 
rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. 1132 
It nay be worth remembering that the text of the mandate included in its 
preamble the text of the Balfour Declaration. 33 
Thus, it has been rightly concluded that "the mandate system and its 
successor, the trusteeship system of the U. N., did not envisage or 
permit a trust territory to be so administrated as to allow an imposed 
or forceful demographic transformation designed to alter the indigenous 
character of that territory and to remove its original inhabitants. 0134 
It is a well-known contention by Arab states that Israel, as an illegal 
state is not protected by the principle of the sovereignty and 
Sro 
terrirorial integrity of states. This reason has been forwarded as to #N 
avoid the inescapable contradiction between the implementation of the 
Palestinians' right to self-determination an one hand and the principles 
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of international law which protect the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Israel on the other. The argument forwarded by some 
authors to support the illegality of Israel is well known. 3s Howeverl in 
recent years, it may be observed that many of the Arab States no longer 
support such a claim. 
The U. N. General Assembly's resolutions have supported and recognized 
the Palestinians' right to self-determination. It is argued that the 
General Assembly of the United Nations adopted several resolutions in 
which the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination has been 
recognized. 36 
Resolution 2672 C, passed in 1970, was the first to use the phrase 
"people of Palestine" and to acknowlege their right to 
"self-determination. 4137 Before this time, the Palestinian problem was 
regarded by the U. N. as a refugee problem. 90 In 1971 and 1972, similar 
resolutions were adopted. These resolutions, however, refer only 
vaguely to the people of Palestine without specifying what was meant by 
Palestine. " 
In 1974, the General Assembly adopted the most complete statement to 
date of its conceptions of Palestinian rights. 40 In its relevant part, 
Resolution 3236 of 1974 states that: 
"The General Assembly, 
Recalling its relevant resolutions which affirm the right of the 
Palestinian people to self-determination 
(1) Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in 
Palestine, including 
a. The right to self-determination without external interference, 
b. The right to national independence and sovereignty. 
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(2) Reaffirms also the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return 
to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and 
uprooted, and call for their return. 
1141 
The Resolution undoubtedly confirmed that the Palestinians have the 
right to return within the overall context of self-determination-" 
In interpreting the meaning envisaged by Resolution 3263 as to 
Palestiniam self-determination, two opinions were advanced. Some held 
that it would appear to be entirely consistent with the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization's idea of a democratic secular Palestinian state 
to replace Israel. 43 Other authors believe that the resolution suggests 
a Palestinian state along the lines proposed in the plan of partition of 
1947 . 44 This latter interpretation seems to be supported by the "Report 
of the Committee an the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the 
Palestinian People" . 49 which included repeated references to the 
partition plan, Resolution 181(11) as well as an acknowledglement of 
Israel itself . 46 
Having explained the grounds for the legitimacy of the right of the 
Palestinian people to self-determination, another important question 
remains, namely, the question of the territories whose fate is to be 
determined by the Palestinian people. From the outset, it must be 
admitted that the question is difficult to answer satisfactorily. 
Howeverl this is not to say that answers have not been advanced. 
Indeed, three types of answer have been advanced: 
The first answer, as put forward by the Palestinian National Covenant 
and some authors, provides that the area including the territories of 
Israel as well as Gaza and the West Bank is the territory whose fate 
must be determined by the Palestinians. 47 This answer, as a matter of 
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reasonable inference, should lead to the dismantling of Israel and "the 
establishment - in Palestine - of a secular, democratic and progressive 
society without distinction or discrimination as between Jews, 
Christians and Moslems. 1149 
One must admit that this solution would realize satifactorily the 
rights claimed by the Palestinians. However, the implementation of such 
a solution appears to be in conflict with rules of contemporary 
international law. 
The destruction of Israel, as envisaged by this view, is against the 
principle of sovereign equality of States upon which, according to 
Article 2(1) of the Charter, the United Nations is based . 49 It is 
in 
conflict with the 1960 Declaration on colonial independence (Resolution 
1514 (XV) ) which provides that: 
"Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national 
unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with 
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations-60 
Along the same linest Secretary General U Thant affirmed that: 
"When a state joins the United Nations, there is an implied acceptance 
by the entire membership of its territorial integrity and sovereignty 
the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and I do 
not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession of parts of 
its member states. 1161 
The destruction of Israel is in conflict with Security Council 
Resolution 242 which is based an the principle of respect for the 
sovereignty and political independence of every state in the Middle 
East. " 
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Israel's rejection of this solution would result in the continuation of 
a war//syýýem in the region, which constitutes a threat to international 
peace'41=ýý dnd such a situation is in conflict with a rule governing the 
exercise of self-determination, namely the rule based on the opinion 
that self-determination is only possible within a general environment of 
peace, G4 which means that it is sometimes necessary to curb 
self-determination for the sake of peace. 66 As stated by Franklin 
Roosevelt, "the choice freely exercised by a nation must not threaten 
.. wit)- disaster of war. " This opinion is supported by state practice, 
specially the iwo Super Powers. 66 
Along the same lines, at San Francisco, it has been aptly observed that 
"Self-determination... was regarded, not as an independent value, but 
only as secondary to the goal of peace, with the obvious consequence 
that it might and indeed should be set aside when its fulfillment give 
rise to tension and conflict among states". 67 
Turning to the second answer, it has been suggested that the area whose 
fate is to be determined by self-determination are the territories 
earmarked to the Arab-Palestinian state in the 1947 U. N. Partition 
Resolution. 69 This view rests upon the U. N. General Assembly Resolution 
181 of 29 November 1947, which divided the territories of Palestine 
between the Arab and the Jewish inhabitants. It also rests upon 
Israel's acceptance of the Partition Resolution including its approval 
of the frontiers provided by the Partition Plan. c-O Thus the Proclamation 
of the Independence of Israel stated "the state of Israel is prepared to 
co-operate with the agencies and representatives of the United Nations 
in implementing the Resolution of the General Assembly of the 29th 
November 1947". 61 In a letter addressed on 14 May 1948 by Epestein, 
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Agent for the Provisional Government of Israel, to President Truman 
requesting recognitionj the President was notified that: 
"The State of Israel has been proclaimed as an independent republic 
within frontiers approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations 
in its resolution of November 29,1947, and that a provisional 
government has been charged to assume the rights and duties of 
government for preserving law and order within the boundaries of 
Israel". 62 
From the above passages, there is no ground to deny that the frontiers 
of the Partition Plan were accepted by Israel, at least in 1948. This 
view is consistent with the solution provided by the General Assembly 
Resolution 3236 of 1974 which has been interpreted as envisaging a 
Palestinian state within the territories earmarked to them by the 1947 
Partition Plan. This was indicated when we discussed the Resolution 
earlier. G3 
One must admit that, from a political perspective, such a solution may 
constitute a compromise which could be accepted by many Palestinians in 
the light of the view that something is better than nothing. 64 However, 
from a legal perspective, some authors raise the claim that the U. N. 
Partition Resolution of 1947 was invalid. 66 
Consequently, it cannot be regarded as a legal basis for any solution. 
The arguments against the legitimacy Of the Partition Plan have been 
thoroughly examined by others, and kt _is irrelevant to be repeated. 
However, it may be relevant to refer to the opinions Of some 
international authorities who recently expressed a somewhat similar 
view, For example, Brownlie has said: 
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"It is doubtful if the United Nations has a capacity to convey title, 
Inter alia because the Organization cannot assume the role of 
territorial sovereign ... Thus the resolution of 1947 containing a 
partition plan for Palestine was probably ultra vires [outside the 
competence of the United Nations], and if it was not, was not binding an 
member states in any casell. rr- 
Along the same lines, Quincy Wright recently expressed the view that 
"the legality of the General Assembly's recommendations for the 
partition of Palestine was doubtful', . 67 
The third answer suggested that the area including Gaza and the West 
Bank, which has been occupied by Israel since 1967, is the territory 
whose fate could be determined by the Palestinians. " 
It is well established that Israel has no legal right under 
contemporary international law to occupy and annex these territories 
which it has occupied by force since 1967. Israel, therefore, is 
obliged to terminate its military occupation. 70 The legal obligation of 
Israel to withdraw from Gaza and the West Bank derives specifically from 
three fundamental legal principles. They may be worth mentioning in 
brief: 
- The general principle of non-use of force prescribed by the U. N. 
Charter in Article 2(4) stipulating that all members shall refrain from 
the threat or the use of force. 
- The principle of the illegality of the military occupation of the 
territory of another state by force. Even under Article 51 of the 
Charter, force may only be used by a state in the exercise of its 
inherent right of self-defence "if an armed attack occurs" and only 
"until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
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international peace and security". 71 The principle of illegality is 
further elaborated in the 1970 United Nations General Assembly's 
Declaration on the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
7 'k- 
Relations and Co-operation among States, 
The principle of inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force. 
This principle is stipulated in paragraph 1 of the General Assembly 
Declaration on the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States, and in paragraph 5 of the 
Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security. 71 They both 
read: 
"the territory of a state shall not be the object of acquisition by 
another state resulting from the threat or use of force ... no 
territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall 
be recognized as legal. 1074 
Further it has been rightly observed that the implementation of the 
Palestinian right to self-determination within the territories of Gaza 
and the West Bank will not give rise to any problem related to the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Israel. It may also minimize 
the possibilities of war in the area. 76 
In the light of the foregoing, it can be submitted that this last 
solution on the one hand reflects an ignorance of the right of the 
Palestinian people to self-determination and reveals the weaknesses of 
international law in finding a workable solution based on justice for 
the Palestinian people. On the other hand, it would be fair to say that 
this solution may be legally accepted if there exists, as mentioned 
earlier, a norm of international law which permits self-determination to 
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be put aside when its fulfillment would give rise to tension and 
conflict among states . 76 
The question of the territory whose fate should be determined by the 
Palestinians gives rise to another legal question, namely, the difficult 
problem of the critical date to distinguish between the indig*nous 
inhabitants of Palestine and other illegal Jewish populationj entering 
Palestine during the mandate. There is no consensus among supporters of 
the Palestinian people as to the choice of a cut-off date. 
Apart from a rejected view that 1971 may be chosen as a cut-off date 
because self-determination has been recognized as a legally binding rule 
for Palestinians since that year 77 we need to distinguish between two 
main opinions accepted by the Palestinians. 
The first, in brief, claimed that 1923 must be chosen as the critical 
year because, in their opinion, it is the commencement of the Zionist 
invasion. 711 This is the position of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization which was expressed in Article 6 of the 1968 Palestine 
National Covenant: 
"Jews who were living permanently in Palestine until the beginning of 
the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians. '179 According to 
this argument, the population of Palestine which is entitled to exercise 
self-determination is estimated to be one third Jewish. 00 
The legal basis of this choice is once more the claim that the 
Palestinian right to self-determination came into existence by Article 
22 of the League of Nations and, since that time, has never been 
terminated, and that all the subsequent evente leading to the 
establishment of Israel were illegal and in violation of the 
Palestinians' right to self-determination. 
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This cut-off date is debatable since Palestinian Arab representatives 
agreed in ensuing years to an immigration quota which allowed for the 
lawful entry of many more European Jews. 81 This cut-off date would lead 
to the destruction of Israel. We have 15roved ýearlier that such 
destruction is not acceptable under international law. The claim upon 
which this solution is based is doubtful because there is a lack of 
consensus as to whether Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations provided for self-determination for the Palestinians. The 
majority of international writers, at that time, did not recognize the 
existence of self-determination as a legal right. 02 That date seems to 
be in conflict with the attitude of the U. N, towards the problem. Any 
review of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly supporting 
the Palestinian right would reveal that it was never envisaged. 
Moreover, it is also in conflict with Resolution 242 of the Security 
Council, which provides full respect for Israel's sovereignty within its 
frontiers before the 1967 war. 83 
For the foregoing reasons, this cut-off date cannot be accepted. 
On turning to the second attitude, some authors hold that 1947 should 
be chosen as the cut-off year. 64 In their opinion, the right of the 
Palestinian people to self-determination came into existence by virtue 
of the Partition Plan of 1947, and it was accepted by Israel. The 
Jewish population under this argument is estimated to be 45 per cent of 
the whole population, and they would be obliged to accept, and to live 
in, the area earmarked to them by the 1947 Resolution. 1=1s 
There is no doubt that self-determination was recognized as a principle 
of international law under the U. N. Charter. Consequentlys it is 
correct to say that the Palestinians' self-determination came into 
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existence in, or immediately before, 1947.96 The choice of that cut-off 
date would lead to a final settlement of the problem of the Palestinian 
refugees of 1948. It would give a right to these refugees to return to 
their homes and property, as recognized by the General Assembly in 
Resolution 194 (111) of 11 December 1948, and since that time, in the 
years 1952 through 1975, in the General Assembly annually reaffirming 
Resolution 194-87 
The question which arises is whether or not Israel is in fact free 
under international law to refuse such a solution. Once again it may be 
stated that Israel has the right under international law, for reasons 
discussed in another part, 99 to refuse any partial destruction or 
secessation. 
Before leaving the argument which supports the Palestinian right to 
self-determinationt it seems relevant to refer in brief to some 
additional legal points. 
In the first place, whatever the methods that may be chosen to 
ascertain the wishes of the Palestinian people, the view of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization, it is submitted, must not be 
ignored. The importance of the views of liberation movements has been 
recognized by United Nations practice in several cases. ". In this 
regard, Judge Ammoun in his separate opinion in the Western Sahara Case 
pointed out that the views of the national liberation movements are 
"more decisive than a referendum". 90 
The Palestinian Liberation Organisation is widely recognised, by the 
United Nations, the Arab League and the majority of States as the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people. '250 
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Moreover, in assertaining the wishes of the Palestinian people in Gaza 
and the West Bank, the Jewish settlers, it is submitted, have no right 
to decide the fate of this area. The legal ground of this opinion rests 
upon the fact that Israel, as a belligerent occupant, has no right under 
international law to establish settlements in occupied areas. The 
argument for the illegality of such settlements is not our concern 
here. 92 
Furthermore, the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination 
includes their right to establish an independent state. The words of 
Resolution 3236 of 1974 accept 11 ... the inalienable right of the 
Palestinian people in Palestine including : 
(a) The right to self-determination without external interference 
(b) The right of national independence and sovereignty. 1193 
The view that thp PalpRtinlann are nut Pntitlpd to exercise the right 
11f Self-Dptprmination 
It remains to consider the opposing point of view, as forwarded by 
international authors supporting Israel. This view rests its case on 
the denial of the Palestinian right to self-determination. The legal 
justification of this view rests upon three main claims : the first is 
that the principle of self-determination was not recognised as a binding 
rule of positive international law when Israel came into existence; 
secondly, it is claimed that the Arab Palestinian state has been already 
established on parts of the mandate territory under the name of Jordan 
and, thirdly, it is claimed that the Arab Palestinians living in Israel 
are not entitled to such a right under contemporary international law. 
263 
It is asserted that self-determination was not recognised as a binding 
rule of positive international law in 1948. The argument here is based 
on the premise that, if self-determination was not a principle of 
international law in 1948 when the state of Israel was proclaimed, the 
Palestinian claim to self-determination would lack any legal 
foundation. 94 Some writers have gone as far as to deny the existence of 
this principle under contemporary international law, ss while others hold 
the view that it became a principle of international law in 1969 or 
1970.96 The legal argument in support of each opinion is not our concern 
now. At any event, in support of the denial of the existence of 
self-determination in the period before 1948, a number of legal 
arguments have been forwarded. Any review to the standard writings of 
classical international law would reveal no reference to 
self-determination, or to anything that might be construed as its 
equivalent. Further, classical international law has conceded that a 
right and a title to sovereignty flow from conquest or usurpation. 97 
In the period after World War I, President vilson's ideas on 
self-determination were considered in the light of the adjustment of 
colonial claims as among the victors, rather than of independence, 3c,. 
The history of United States practice in that period shows that all 
statements regarding self-determination, unless made in circumstances 
which indicate that they represent undertakings given by that country to 
another, were mere declarations of policy, lacking any legal 
significance. 99 
The Covenant of the League of Nations can hardly be described as 
including a recognition of any right to self-determination. The only 
general mention of a principle of self-determination occurred in Article 
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5, but even this was more narrowly confined than has sometimes been 
implied. 100 The reference in Article 22, that in so far as former enemy 
territories were being placed under the mandate system "the wishes of 
these communities must be a pri ncipfS consideration in the selection of 
the mandatory", and that the well-being of the inhabitants was a 
paramount concern, cannot be accepted as a recognition of 
self-determination. Ic" It nay be useful to recall the fact that the 
draft of Article 22 suggested by President Wilson was rejected by the 
Alliance because the term "self-determination" was explicitly used. "' 
In an attempt to strengthen the argument, reference has been made to 
the report of the Commisssion of Jurists which had been set up to deal 
with the Aaland I51ands dispute. The report stated: 
"Although the principle of self-determination of peoples plays an 
important part in modern political thought, especially since the Great 
War, it must be pointed out that there is no mention of it in the 
Covenant of the League of Nations. The recognition of this principle in 
a certain number of international treaties cannot be considered as 
sufficient to put it upon the same footing as a positive rule of the Law 
of Nations... To concede to minorities of either of language or religion, 
or to any fraction of population, the right to withdraw from the 
community to which they belong because it is their wish or their good 
pleasure, would be to destroy order and stability within states and to 
inaugurate anarchy in international life. It would be to uphold a 
theory incompatible with the very idea of a state as a territorial and 
political unity, "'(13 
State practice during the Second World War shows that 
self-determination was conceived merely as a political principle which 
265 
imposed no legal obligation, For example, after Roosevelt persuaded 
Churchill to include in the Atlantic Charter a statenent of respect for 
the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which 
they will live, Churchill soon made it clear that Britain did not regard 
this as constituting a legal obligation. 11114 
Another reason in support 
self-determination under the U. N. 
of denying the existence of 
Charter is the c)pinion that the 
Charter, though referring twice to the term, said so little of a 
concrete character an self-determination. According to this opinion, 
there is little ground for arguing that the delegates at San Francisco 
were really concerned with what is now known as the right of 
self-determination. This understanding, it is argued, has been inferred 
from the interpretation of Article 41 which refers to relations among 
states, rather than groups. Therefore, the word "people" in the term 
"self-determination of peoples" means only sovereignty of stater.. This 
interpretation, it was added, is rooted in the preparatory work of the 
U. N. Charter. 'Or- 
In order to support this argument, thev ieferred to Kelsen's opinion 
that the relevant article refers to relations among states and: 
"therefore the term "peoples" too - in connection with "equal rights@$ - 
means probably states, since only states have "equal rights" according 
to general international law. That the purpose of the Organization is 
to develop friendly relations among states based on respect for the 
principle of self-determination of "peoples" does not mean that friendly 
relations among states depend an democratic forms of government and that 
the purpose of the Organization is to favour such form of government. 
This would not be compatible with the principle of "sovereign equality" 
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of the Members, nor with the principle of non-intervention in domestic 
affairs established in Article 2, paragraph 7. If the term "peoples" in 
Article 1, paragraph 2, means the same as the term "nations" in the 
Preamble, then "self-determination of peoples" in Article 1 can mean 
only "sovereignty of the states". 1110*5, 
Further, no reference was made to self-determination in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in the early years of the U. N. 
This has been regarded as more evidence that the U. N. members were not 
concerned with such a right. 
The final reason for the contention that the practice of the U. N. 
towards the question reveals that self-determination was not recognized 
as a binding rule of positive international law. A holder of this view 
is Leo Gross, who illustrates that, in spite of the fact that an 
impressiveý, large number of people have been granted or conceded 
self-determination, it is not possible to supply the missing element, 
namely, that practice was based on a sense of legal obligation: 
11 On the contrary, the practice of decolonization is a perfect 
illustration of the usage dictated by political expediency or necessity 
or sheer convenience. And moreover, it is neither constant nor 
uniform! '107 
Thus, this view concluded that neither the Charter nor the subsequent 
practice supports the proposition that the principle of 
self-determination is to be interpreted as a right in the early days of 
the U. N. 
It also contended that the Arab Palestinian state had been established 
in the Palestine mandate under the name of Jordan. 101-1 According to this 
view, the Arab Palestine state was already been established in 1922 on 
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eighty per cent of the whole territory of the Palestine mandate under 
the name of Jordan. Accordingly, as long as the Palestinians exercised 
self-determination in Jordan, and since the right of self-determination 
can be exercised only once, 109 the Palestinians are not allowed to 
exercise this right again. It is added that, if there are some 
Palestinians living outside Palestine and wishing to exercise 
self-determination, they can exercise their right within the territory 
of Jordan, not Israel. 110 
This argument rests upon the contention that the whole territory of 
Jordan was part of the mandate granted by the League of Nations to 
Britain in 1922. Transjordan was taken out of the mandate provision and 
allocated to the creation within Palestine of the Emirate of 
Transjordan, which became independent in 1946. The Palestinians 
represent more than 60 per cent of the population of Jordan where they 
enjoy the suffirage and all political rights. "' Further, those 
Palestinians regard Jordan as an integral part of Palestine. 112 
It is also contended that Palestinian Arabs living in Israel are not 
entitled to self-determination under international law because they not 
only enjoy suffOrage and full political rights as Israeli citizens# but 
also because they are bound by the principle that no continuing right of 
self-determination for any part of the population survives once 
independent statehood has been achieved. 113 
The legal argument to Justify this view is based mainly on the 
interpretation of paragraph 7 of the Declaration of Friendly Relations 
of 1970, which indicates that the exercise of self-determination must 
not affect the territorial integrity of states except those states which 
are not "conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal 
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rights and self-determination. ""' This means that self-determination 
to people inside the political boundaries of existing sovereign states 
will be applicable only in situations where the government does not 
represent the governed. 
In the words of the International Commission of Jurists in its 1972 
study entitled Fast PAkIstnn "... the conflicting principles of 
territorial integrity had to be given full weight when considering the 
principle of self-determination ... however this principle is subject 
to the requirement that the government does comply with the principle of 
equal rights and does represent the whole people without distinction. 
If one of the constituent peoples of a state is denied equal rights and 
is discriminated against, it is submitted that their full right of 
self-determination will revive. ""'- 
On this basis the Palestinian Arabs living in Israel and enjoying full 
political rights cannot be entitled to self-determination. 
This conclusion is also supported by the fact that any inquiry into the 
legal content of a right of secessionist self-determination is not 
supported by an analysis of the practice of states. "r, 
Having set out the view supporting the right of Palestinian people to 
self-determination, followed by the other contradicte: ý view that the 
Palestinians are not entitled to self-determination, some evaluation of 
these two views will now be attempted. 
In relation to the first view which supports the Palestinian people's 
right to self-determination, the following observations ought to be 
made. In the first place, we cannot accept the claim that the right of 
the Palestinian people to self-determination came into existence in 
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Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The substantial 
grounds of rejecting this claim are based on both the principles of 
international law and the practice of states. It is also supported by 
the view of the majority of international writers who did not recognize, 
as indicated earlier, the existence of self-determination as a rule of 
international law prior to 19451 17 This leads us to reject, in turn, all 
relevant consequences which are mainly based on this article. 
Accordingly, it may be correct to regard the opinion that the territory 
whose fate is to be determined by the Palestinians must include Israel 
as not well established. 
Also, the choice of 1923 as a cut-off date cannot be accepted for the 
same reason, and for the reasons discussed earlier. 
While we can agree with the viewpoint that the right of the Palestinian 
people to self-determination was established by the U. N. Partition 
Plan, we have to admit that the legal consequences of this opinion is 
inconsistent with certain rules of international law. For example, this 
opinion would lead to the establishment of a Palestine state in parts of 
Israel as envisaged by the Partition Plan. 
In these circumstances, it would seem that any attempt to divide the 
state of Israel will be in conflict with the principle of the 
territorial integrity of states and Article 1(2) of the United Nations 
Charter. It is also in conflict with Resolution 242. The detailed 
reasons were indicated earlier. 
Also, for the same reasons, the choice of 1947, as a cut-off date, 
cannot be legally accepted. 
However, the aforementioned argument is not to say that we are against 
the establishment of a Palestine State according to the 1947 Partition 
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Plan, but the legal and practical difficulties surrounding such a 
solution should not be ignored. 
An examination of the second view which denies the right of the 
Palestinian people to self-determination reveals that it is based, to a 
large extent, on two disputed claims, that self-determination was not 
recognized as a binding rule of international law and, that the 
Palestinian Arab state has been established under the name of Jordan. 
We cannot, from a legal view, accept the opinion that 
self-determination is not recognized as a legal principle of 
international law, or perhaps became so only after 1969. Certainly, the 
right of self-determination has been recognized by the Charter of the 
United Nations. Article 1(2) of the Charter, which sets out the 
Purposes and Principles of the Organization, declares that it is based 
an "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples ... ". And again, 
Article 55 considers that friendly relations between nations are to be 
based "on respect for the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples", while in Chapter XI, which is concerned 
with non-self governing territories, Article 73 notes that members 
assuming responsibility for such territories are "to develop 
self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the 
peoples and to assist them in the progressive development for their free 
political institutions. 11"19 
Moreover, the legal character of self-determination as an operative 
legal right has been asserted by U. N. practice as reflected in the 
relevant resolutions. It nay be well to recall the large number of 
cases of decolonization in which the U. N. has invoked self-determination 
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, e. g. the overwhelming acceptance of the 1960 Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960 (Resolution 
1514 (XV) ) and its 1961 successor (Resolution 1654 (XVI) ) setting up a 
special Committee to oversee the application of the Declaration. 119 
The majority of international writers accept self-determination as a 
legally binding right. Higgins, for instance, after examining United 
Nations practice and the 1960 Declaration, pointed out that "that 
Declaration, taken together with seventeen years of evolving practice by 
the United Nations' organs, provides ample evidence that there now exists 
a legal right of self-determination. 11120 
Further evidence in support of the above is afforded by those who are 
inclined to accept self-determination, not only as a legal right, but 
also as a norm of Jus cogen,:;. In the words of a formal report submitted 
to the United Nations by Gros Espiell: 
"Todayl no one can challenge the fact that, in the light of contemporary 
international realities, the principle of self-determination necessarily 
possesses the character of jus cogens. " 
Along the same lines, Vedel cogently argued on behalf of Morcco in the 
Western -. 
'; Abnrq Qw; P that, if there is jus cog ns in the United Nations 
in matters of self-determination, it consists of decolonization as an 
122 end result rather than self-determination as a technique. " 
Finally, any review of the opinions of the International Court of 
Justice, particularly in the Western S hara rAr--P, would reveal that the 
principle of self-determination has been considered as an important rule 
of contemporary international law. 123 
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In relation to the second claim, we cannot accept that the Arab state 
of Palestine has been established under the name of Jordan as part of 
the mandate provision. This rejection in fact is based on historical 
fact that the Territory of Jordan, which was called Transjordan, had not 
been part of historical Palestine. In Ottoman times, it had been 
administratively part of the Province of Syria and was called the 
district of Al Balqa. When the question of delimiting the British and 
French mandates arose, Britain insisted on the inclusion of the district 
of Al Balqa in its mandate over Palestine because it wished to entrust 
its administration to Amir Abdullah, son of King Hussein Ben Ali, the 
Sharif of Mecca, to reward him for help during the war against the 
Turks. The new state assumed the name of Transjordan and was set up as 
an Emirate. It remained under a protective treaty relationship with 
Britain until 25 May 1946, when it was formally detached from the 
Palestine mandate, and Amir Abdullah was recognized as King of 
Transjordan. In 1949 the new Kingdom took the name of Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan. 124 
Before leaving this evaluation, it seems inescapable to raise and 
attempt to answer the question of whether or not it is permissible under 
international law to put aside international rules protecting the 
territorial integrity of Israel for the sake of applying the 
Palestinians' self-determination. 
To anewer this queetion, we need to consider the prevailing view on the 
conflict between the principles of territorial integrity and 
self-determination. The most authoritative statement in international 
law relevant to this question is paragraph 7 of the 1970 Declaration on 
Friendly Relations. As noted, this paragraph appears to give prima 
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f-aciP, ýPspect to the territorial integrity of states and to protect 
centered order. However, it confirms that not all states will enjoy 
this inviolability of their territorial integrity, but only those states 
"conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination. This opinion was supported by the International 
Commission of Jurists in its 1972 study entitled "Ila Events in West 
Pakistan". 126 
In applying the opinion of the Commission to the case of Palestinian 
Arabs living in Israel, it may be correct to say that they are not 
entitled to self-determination under international law as long as they 
enjoy suffýrage and equal political rights with the other inhabitants of 
Israel. However, an the other hand, Israel's policy of preventing the 
return of the Arab refugees of 1948 may be regarded as a denial of equal 
rights and discrimination against the Palestinian Arabs. Consequently, 
this denial and that discrimination could give rise to the right of this 
people to self-determination. 12s 
From the above evaluation, it seems quite correct to draw the following 
conclusions. 
1. There is nc doubt that the Palestinian people are entitled to 
self-determination under international law since that right came into 
existence at the latest by the 1947 Partition Resolution. 
2. As noted above, the difficulties inherent in the application Of such 
right may lead to confining its application to the area including Gaza 
and the West Bank unless Israel agrees to give up the area allocated to 
the Palestinian Arabs by the Partition Plan. 
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3. Whatever the methods used to ascertain the wishes of the 
Palestinians, the views of the Palestinian Liberation Organization must 
not be ignored. 
4. The Palestinians' right to self-determination includes the right of 
the 1948 refugees to return to their homelands in Israel. In the words 
of Secretary General U Thant, in his Annual Report to the 22nd Session 
of the General Assembly: 
"People everywhere, and this certainly applies to the Palestinian 
refugees, have a natural right to be in their homeland and to have a 
future. 16127 
. It is necessary at the outset to recall that, as neither the Palestinians nor 
their representatives have signed the Camp David Accords and the 1979 Treaty, 
then, strictly speaking, all the provisions in the Accords and the Treaty 
regarding the resolution of their problems may not be invoked against them. 
It is generally recognized, as a principle of international law, that treaties 
create rights and duties only for the parties to them (panta tertlis nec 
nonernnPn prodesse posstint). 1243 
In the Island of Palmas Case for instance, Judge Huber said: 
"It appears further to be evident that treaties concluded by Spain with third 
powers recognizing her sovereignty over the Philippines could not be binding 
upon the Netherlands. " Later Judge Huber went on to say that: 
"The inchoate title of Netherlands could not have been modified by a treaty 
concluded between third powers. " 129 
Similarly, in the case of the Free Zones of Upp! jr Savoy and the District of 
Gex, the P. C. I. J. held that Article. 435 of the Treaty of Versailles was not 
binding upon Switzerland which was not a pa rty to the treaty, "except to the 
extent to which that country had accepted it". 130 
This principle has also gained the recognition of the international community 
and is codified in the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties. 131 
276 
In sum, we may state that it is an accepted principle of international law that 
a bilateral treaty or a particular provision in such a treaty could have an 
effect upon non-parties only if they accept it or when the treaty or a 
provision passed into customary law. 132 
Certainly, the Camp David formula was rejected 'by the Palestinian people. In 
his letter to the U. N. Secretary General dated March 24,1979, P. L. O. Chairman, 
Yasir Arafat, pointed out that "the Palestinian people have unanimously rejected 
this agreement and everything related to it, especially the suspect proposals 
for self-government, which will consolidate the occupation and submit our people 
to a new form of slavery. "' 33 
To that nay be added that the fact that the authors of the Agreement 
possessed no competence or capacity to decide the Palestinian question or the 
future of the West Bank and Gaza'; 34 On the one hand, Israel is the military 
occupier of the Vest Bank and Gaza. The status of a military occupier is well 
defined under international law an occupier does not acquire sovereignty and 
can only act as an admistrator. There exists no rule of international law which 
confers on a military occupier any power to decide the political and 
constitutional future of the inhabitants or the status of the occupied territory. 
In the words of Henry Cattan, "By assuming in the Camp David Accords a right 
to decide these matters and to sit as arbiter over the destinies of the 
Palestinian people, Israel was usurping a power in violation of the law Of 
nations. ""' 
Similarly, Egypt possessed no right or power to decide the future of the 
Palestinians. Sadat "was not their guardian, nor did he hold a mandate to 
represent them. "1: 3r, 
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As to the Americans, it has been rightly observed that there existed no legal 
basis upon which their participation in deciding the future of the Palestinian 
people can be justified. As one Palestinian has put it, "President Carter had as 
much a right to decide the future of the Palestinians and Palestinian territory 
as the Palestinians have a right to decide the future of U. S. citizens or of U. S. 
territory. " I a7 
To argue that the provisions dealing with the Palestinian problem are not 
binding on the Palestinians is not to deny the binding force of these 
provisions as between the parties. Undoubtedly the releva-t T)rDvisions of the 
Camp David Accords are binding an Israel regardless "of the fact that 
Palestinian factions have rejected the Accords. However as regards the 1979 
Treaty, due to the fact that it dealt with Palestinian issues in a separate 
instrument appended to it, doubts have been raised as to the binding nature of 
that instrument, particularly whether or not it constitutes an integral part of 
the Treaty. "' 
This instrument is an agreement between Egypt and Israel concerning how and 
when the "autonomy scheme" provided for by the Camp David Accords is to be 
implemented. It established a kind of link between the implementation of the 
Peace Treaty and the Camp David Accords in order to indicate that the parties 
are aiming at achieving a comprehensive, rather than separate, peace. "' Yet, 
for reasons which are not our concern, "O the authors of the Treaty decided to 
put it in the form of a joint letter from Sadat and Begin to Carter in which 
they informed him about the agreement. This letter, it may be observed, was 
signed on the same day as the Treaty. 141 
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The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties distinguishes between "Travaux 
preparatoires" which according to Article 32 are merely supplementary means of 
interpretation, ' 4: 2 and agreements or instruments related to the Treaty which 
according to Article 31 are to be considered as part of the context for the 
purpose of interpreting a Treaty. The meaning and scope of the term "context" 
are defined in Article 31(2) in the following terms: 
"The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, 
in addition to the text, including its preable and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the 
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with 
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument 
related to the treaty. 191 A4 
Clearly, for a document to be regarded as forming part of the context of a 
treaty for the purpose of its interpretation, it must be the result of an 
agreement by all the-parties to the treaty, must have been made in connection 
with the conclusion of the treaty and must be understood as such by all of 
them. ' 4r, 
As regards the criteria for determining which instrument is to be considered 
as an integral part of the Treaty or part of the context f or the purpose of 
interpretation, Valdock referred to two cases in which two opposite views were 
taken by the International Court of Justice. 14r- 
In the Ambatlelns Case, one of the main contentions of the United Kingdom 
Government against Greece was that the Declaration, which was signed at the 
same time as the Treaty of 1926, was not a part of that Treaty and the 
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provisions of that Declaration were not provisions of that Treaty. One of the 
reasons given by the United Kingdom for this submission was that the 
Declaration was signed separately from the Treaty itself, though by the same 
signatories and an the same day. Another of the stated reasons was that the 
Declaration did not expressly state that it was to be regarded as an integral 
part of the Treaty' 47 . The Court, however, after referring to certain 
circumstances relating to the construction of the Declaration found as a fact 
that "the intention of the Declaration was to prevent the Treaty of 1926 from 
being interpreted as coming into full force in so sweeping a manner as to 
prejudice claims based on the older Treaty of 1866". 141 The Court, then 
concluded : "Thus the provisions of the Declaration are in the nature of an 
interpretation clause, and as such, should be regarded as an integral part of 
the Treaty, even if this was not stated in terms. 11149 
Here, there is a clear expression in favour of regarding as an integral part of 
the Treaty instruments such as the Sadat-Begin Joint letter appended to the 
1979 Treaty. In fact, this is the view expressed by Egypt. 'r-1 
However, while this ruling is clear it should be remembered that, as Waldock 
observed, it was contrary to the views expressed in the Advisory opinion on 
Adm1gs1nn to the United Nations. In the Admissions Case, the Court had defined 
everything as travaux preparations which was not part of the actual text of the 
Treaty and could only bew used as a supplementary method of interpretation., 6, 
Having in his mind the above cases, Valdock in his report to the International 
Law Commission an the provision, which became Article 31(2) of the Vienna 
Convention, pointed out the criteria for deciding whether an instrument is to be 
considered as an integral part of a treaty. 
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*The fact that these documents are recognized in para. 2 as forming part of the 
"context" does not mean that they are necessarily to be considered as an 
integral part of the treaty. Whether they are an actual part of the treaty 
depends on the intention of the parties in each case. 1116: 2 
From the above, the conclusion to be drawn with regard to the legal status of 
the Sadat-Begin joint letter is that at least it should be recognized as part of 
the context of the 1979 Treaty within the meaning of Article 31(2) of the 
Vienna Convention. 
In asserting the scope of the Camp David scheme, we may note at the outset 
that it covers mainly the problem of the West Bank and Gaza. The section of the 
Agreement dealing with the Palestinians is entitled the "West Bank and Gaza". 
The first important question arises as to whether the scope of the provisions 
covers all the Palestinian people. The answer to that question is undoubtedly in 
the negative. Such answer may be inferred from a careful reading of paragraph 
A. Certainly, the wording of this paragraph covers three groups of the 
Palestinian people. The first group includes the Palestinians living in the West 
Bank and Gaza whose problem was addressed by paragraph A. 1(a) and (b). The 
second group includes the Palestinians who were displaced from the 'West Bank 
and Gaza by the Israeli military authorities after the June 1967 War. The 
problem of this group was dealt by paragraph A. 3.1 11 The third group includes 
the Palestinian refugess of 1948 whose problem was tackled by paragraph A. 4. 
It follows that other Palestinian groups have been left outside the scope of 
the Camp David formula. Suygh pointed out three Palestinian groups falling 
outside the scope of the scheme : the Palestinians who left Gaza and the West 
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Bank by their own will after the Israeli occupation of 1967; those who left 
their homes in Palestine in 1948, either by their own free will or by force but 
not officially registered as refugees by the U. N. R. W. A.; and the Arab 
Palestinians living in Israel. lr*A 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the scope of the scheme covers some 
important groups of the Palestinian people. The scope, looked at from this 
angle, reflects the intention of Israel, perhaps for the first time in its 
history, to give particular solutions to the Palestinian problem. "' 
Quite apart from the above advantage, the scheme is inadequate since it leaves 
some groups of Palestinians outside its scope. Additionally, the extent of the 
scope differs from group to group and from place to place. For example, while 
it covers all the Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank, it covers only 
part of the Palestinians displaced from these areas after 1967, but it does not 
cover any of the Palestinians living in Israel. 
Furthermorep the scope as defined at Camp David, lacks the necessary precision 
and gives rise to disputes as well as uncertainty, such as in the case of East 
Jerusalem and the Israeli settlers in the area. 
While the gaegraphical scope of Resolution 242 covers the Palestinian 
territories occupied in 1967, including undoubtedly East Jerusalem, 6, ý` the scope 
of the Camp David Accords does not cover East Jerusalem. In his reply to 
Jordanian questions concerning the meaning of the Camp David Accords, President 
Carter indicated that a distinction must be made between Jerusalem and the rest 
of the West Bank because of the City'B special status and circumstances. ' 57 
According to him: 
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"The issue of the status of Jerusalem was not resolved at Camp David and must 
be dealt with in subsequent negotiations. The questions of how the Arab 
inhabitants of East Jerusalem relate to the self-governing authority remains to 
be determined in the negotiations on the transitional arrangements. ""' 
The delimitation of the provisions to exclude the territory of East Jerusalem 
represents a deviation from the position adopted by Resolution 242. This must 
undermine the Accords as it Is legally based on Resolution. 242. 
A further worthwhile question in this respect is whether or not the Israeli 
settlers living in Gaza and the West Bank fall under the scope of the 
provisions. This question will be examined later. Suffice to point out at this 
stage that the wording of paragraph Al which used the word "inhabitants" 
instead of the words "Palestinian inhabitants" suggests that the intention was 
to refer to all the inhabitants in the area, including the Arabs as well as the 
Israeli settlers. 
The refugee problem was dealt with in paragraph A4 of the Agreement which 
reads as follows: 
"Egypt and Israel will work with each other. and with other interested parties 
to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation 
of the resolution of the refugee problem. "Iss 
Clearly, the language of the above text is taken from, and refers to, para. 2(b) 
of Security Council Resolution 242 which calls for "a just solution for the 
refugee problem. "Ic, " Like Resolution 242, the above text used the word "refugee" 
as a reference to the Palestinian as well as Jewish refugees. r-' It is not 
intended here to examine in detail the position of the Camp David Accords 
towards the refugee problem, because of to the simple fact that it referred to 
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and adopted the position of Resolution 242. The position of the latter on 
refugees has been examined by several writers elsewhere and it seem unnecessary 
to repeat what had been said in this respect suffice it here to refer very 
briefly to the position. 
Para 2(b) of Resolution 242 affirms "the necessity for achieving a just 
settlement of the refugee problem". A careful reading of this wording suggests a 
number of observations. 
The use of the term "refugee" instead of the term "Palestinian refugee" has 
been understood as a reference, not only to the 1948 Arab refugees but also to 
the Jewish refugees who fled to Israel from Arab states during the Arab-Israeli 
wars. This interpretation leads to the conclusion that the intention of this 
paragraph is to link a solution for the Palestinian refugees with a solution for 
the Jewish refugees. Israel has suggested that Arab states must absorb the 
refugees of 1948 in return for Israel's absorption of a similar number of 
Jewish refugees who have fled from Arab states. 1r,: 2 
Certainly, this paragraph overlooked the right of the 1948 refugees to return 
to their homeland in Israel. There is no express provision, nor explicit or 
implicit mention of the General Assembly Resolution 194 of 1949 which called 
for their return. Even if we accept, for the sake of argument, that the term 
"Just settlement" includes the right of those refugees to return, such return 
cannot be within a context of self-determination. It is well established that 
the recognition of Israel's sovereignty and territorial integrity as stipulated 
by Resolution 242 means the abrogation of the Partition resolution of 1947 and 
the approval of Israel's sovereignty over most of the territories earmarked to 
the Arab Palestinians by the Partition resolution. ' r--11 Also, the wording of this 
284 
article suggests that its intention was to provide the goneral principle which 
výould constitute the basis for settling the problem of the Palestinian refugees 
(i. e. by linking it to the Jewish refugees) rather than to prescribp the specific 
terms of a settlement. 
Finally, this paragraph is, in effect, an agreement to q(-Pk fut. her agreement. 
Thus, according to Tac na- Arica-Arb-itLa t lull (1925), it created an obligation In 
international law to negotiate in good faith. Iii other words, this paragraph is 
a recommendation to negotiate the refugee problem in good faith. "I 
* Pie-1967 boundaries 
Some: United Nabws; figuies based on 1985 data 
Map 9 The ralestinian Dlaspora 
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The Vest Rqlnk aind Gaza 
The first Camp David Agreement provides for a three-stage scheme to resolve 
the problem of the West Bank and Gaza. In af irst stage, Egypt, Israel and 
Jordan would negotiate and agree on the modalities for establishing a 
self-governing authority for these areas and would define its powers and 
responsibilites. 'r-r- After the completion of the negotiations, free elections 
would be held to elect a self-governing authority. "-r- 
In a second stage, transitional arrangements would be set up for a period not 
exceeding five years. During this period the inhabitants would be granted full 
autonomy. IG7- The Israeli military government and its civilian administration 
would be withdrawn, "' to be replaced by the elected self-governing 
authority. "-'. Upon the establishment of this local government most Israeli 
military forces would be withdrawn and those remaining would be redeployed into 
specified security locations. 170 
In a third and final stage, the Palestinians would be able to determine the 
future of the area before the end of the transitional period. According to the 
Agreement, by the end of the third year after the beginning of the transitional 
period, negotiations would take place to determine the final status of the West 
Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbours. 171 
It must be acknowledged that the provisions on the West Bank and Gaza 
abounded with so much ambiguity that it was obvious that several phrases and 
expressions were carefully designed to "fuzz over the issue rather than resolve 
it. 11 172 As John Murphy observes: 
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"The provisions on Palestinian self-government are largely hortatory, 
deliberately ambiguous and envisage that agreement on the more difficult issues 
arising out of the situation will be reached in future negotiations. ""' 
One must admit that the differing interpretations of the Agreement on the West 
Bank and Gaza adopted by each party tend to give the impression that it is not 
one single agreement, but two separate stances which happen, somehow, to be 
included in the same document. This is evident in two respects. First, the 
inability of the two states (i. e. Egypt and Israel) to reach a Consensus as to 
the main provisions; second, the dispute over the exact meaning of several 
expressions which were deliberately inserted and which need to be "defined" and 
"refined". 174 
This being the case, it is necessary to begin the present analysis by some 
observations an certain terms and expressions whose exact meaning gives rise 
to dispute among the parties. 
"Full autonomy" is the first term which needs to be considered. Para. A. I. (a) of 
the first Camp David Agreement provides that the inhabitants of the West Bank 
and Gaza will be granted "full autonomy-" 1715 It is widely recognised that 
autonomy is a very broad term which has no precise meaning. Carter recorded 
that he spent several hours at Camp David with Begin "seeking a common 
understanding of what autonomy meant - unsuccessful ly. 01 17 r-"While the term 
autonomy is not a term of art under international law" observe Parry and Grant 
"it is widely used in the literature of international law . 11177 
A typical definition of the term can be found in Crawford: 
"Autonomous areas are regions of a State, usually possessing some ethnic or 
cultural distictiveness which have been granted separate powers of internal 
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administration, to whatever degree$ without being detached from the State of 
which they are part. For such status to be of present interest, it must be in 
some way internationally binding upon the central authorities. Given such 
guarantees, the local entity may have a certain status, although since that does 
not normally involve any foreign relations capacity, it is necessarily limited. 
Until a very advanced stage is reached in the progess towards self-government, 
such areas are not states. 11178 
In their recent survey of twenty two autonomous areas, Hannon and Lillich, 
after referring to "the extreme diversity of the entities surveyed and the wide 
variation exhibited in the degree of autonomy or international self-government 
each one enjoys, " reached the conclusion that "autonomy remains a useful, if 
imprecise, concept within which flexible and unique political structures may be 
developed. 11 179 
The use of the term "autonomy" in the Agreement gives rise to the question of 
the difference between autonomy and self-determination. 
According to one view, autonomy may be regarded as internal 
self-determination. Pomerance observed that, in the Wilsonian view, 
self-determination was a composite concept involving chiefly the right Of 
people to choose sovereignty (i. e. external self-determination) and the right of 
people to select its own form of government (i. e. internal 
self-determination). ' 80 Independence he believed, need not be one of the 
options offered to the population when it is determining its future status-, " 
In the Western Sahara Case. the Court emphasized the free and genuine expression 
of the will of the people of the territory as to their future and studiously 
avoided any reference to the necessity of including the independence option. "32 
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This argument cant however, be criticized. It is not consistent with U. N. 
practice, which suggests that self-determination and independence are 
synonymous in most cases. 193 It is also not in line with the substantial 
majority of jurists who support the view that the principle of self- 
determination must include, but not necessarily require, the right to 
independence. ' *'A An opposite view as to the difference between autonomy and 
self-determination was advanced by Talal who wrote: 
"In legal and political terms autonomy and self-determination are not identical 
and may embody conflicting ideas. They differ in a number of respects. The 
right of self-determination derives from the general principle that the people 
determine the destiny of the territory. Autonomy derives from the converse 
proposition that the territory determines the destiny of the people in it. 
Autonomy in the modern sense is a question of degree, ranging from a grant of 
limited municipal or local government conferring authority in such matters as 
street lighting and children's play-grounds, to extensive regional, governmental 
powers in a federal association or union. The right of self-determination of 
peoples arises independently of grant and confers upon them the international 
law right to determine their political destiny without subjection to the control 
of any state. ""' 
It is interesting to observe that a distinction may be made between 
transitional and permanent autonomous regimes. In practice, the former have been 
granted a much more limited degree of autonomy to the local community during 
the transitional periodo de facto government has often been in the hands of an 
administering authority of local inhabitants. ' 8r- 
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The conclusion to be drawn with regard to the meaning of the term "full 
autonomy" in the Camp David Agreement is that, although the term autonomy has 
no precise meaning, it has been used by the authors of the Agreement as a 
reference to a wide and extensive degree of self-governing authority amounting 
to the powers and competence of a de facto government. Yet, it appears that the 
term was acceptable to the Egyptians and the Israelis for different reasons. 
From an Israeli perspective, the word "autonomy" was chosen in preference to 
the word "sovereignty. " Israel was not ready to give up its sovereignty over the 
Vest Bank and Gaza-' S7 Also the term "autonomy" would not place Israel under 
any precise obligation since the term has no strict legal meaning, and covers 
different degrees of self-government ranging from a grant of limited local 
government to extensive regional governmental power in a federal union. 
From Egypt's perspective, although the Egyptians did not favour the use of the 
term because it enabled Israel to keep sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza 
during the transitional period, the term, however, was accepted for two reasons. 
First, the Israelis agreed on Egypt's demand to insert the word "full" before 
the word "autonomy". Clearly the term "full autonomy" must be interpreted as a 
reference to an extensive rather than a limited degree of autonomy, thus the 
Israelis could not claim in the future that they intended only a limited degree 
of autonomy. Secondly, the term "full autonomy" is to be understood as a 
reference to a de far-to Palestinian government which eventually would be a 
state. It seems that such meaning was in the mind of the Israeli opposition 
leader when he criticised the Agreement at the Israeli Knesset because "the 
autonomy plan" would lead to the establishment of an independent Palestinian 
state. 113 8 
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The phrase "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" needs to be 
clarified. Paragraph A(c) of the Camp David Accords provides that "the 
resolution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate rights of 
the Palestinian people. """ This expression is inaccurate and liable to cause 
confusion. In some cases, it was apparently a synonym for the right to 
self-determination, as in some Arab literature; 190 elsewhere, it has a different 
meaning which does not include the right to self-determination, as, for 
instance, in paragraph B9 (a) of the first American draft at Camp David-` 
Unfortunately, there is no satisfactory answer to the question of whether or not 
the right to self-determination was intended by the phrase. A review of the 
preparatory work of the Camp David Agreement reveals that this expression 
appeared in the first American draft which read 11 ... The solution must recognize 
the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people". 192 This term was proposed as 
an alternative to the language an the Palestinian's self-determination proposed 
in the Egyptian draft, 19: 3 but rejected totally by the Israelis. In the view of 
the Americans, this term is appropriate and well-balanced as it satisfies both 
the Egyptians and the Israelis. 
Arab critics who oppose the Camp David Accords believe that the words 
"legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" are deliberately designed to 
frustrate the Palestinian rights to self-determination by implying that some 
Palestinian rights - most particularly the right to an independent state Of 
Palestine - cannot be pursued. ' 94 The Israelis, of course, do not recognize that 
the words "legitimate rights" are intended to cover self-determination. At Camp 
David the Israelis rejected any language on such a right. Further, they carefully 
avoided any implicit reference to self-determination. For instance, in a letter 
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appended to the Camp David Accords, Carter f elt constrained to point out to 
Begin that he was informed by him that "in each paragraph of the Agreed 
Framework Document the expressions "Palestinians" or "Palestinian People" are 
being and will be construed and understood by you as "Palestinian Arabs". "" 
Clearly, the aim of this letter was to avoid any argument that Israel 
recognized the Palestinians as a people and, therefore, that they are entitled 
under the U. N. Charter to self-determination. ' 'If- 
From the Egyptian perspective the term "legitimate rights" included the right 
to self-determination According to the Egyptians, the term was clarified by the 
General Assembly Resolution 3236 (XXIX) adopted on November 22,1974, which 
reaffirmed: 
"The inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including: 
A) The right to self-determination without external interference, 
B) The right to national independence and sovereignty. "' 97 
The position of the U. S. in respect to the issue under consideration is still 
not clear. After the conclusion of the Camp David Accords, in a letter to the 
U. S. Government, King Hussein of Jordan raised the question as to whether the 
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza can exercise in freedom the right of 
self-determination in order to decide their political future'99 A careful 
reading of Carter's reply suggests that the U. S. government preferred not to Put 
a direct or explicit answer to that question. In fact, the reply implied that 
the issue might be decided by the parties concerned in the negotiations on the 
final status of the Vest Bank and Gaza, and that, whatever the final agreement, 
the Palestinians would be entitled to reJect or accept it. 199 In his words: 
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"The Framework provides for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of 
the West Bank and Gaza to participate fully in the negotiations that will 
determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and, in addition, for their 
elected representatives to ratify or reject the agreement reached in those 
negotiations. ""'11 
What does the Camp David Agreement mean when it refers to the representatives 
of the Palestinian people? 201 Again, no clear answer to that question can be 
found, nor is any comprehensive definition attempted. 
Before proceeding to explore the different interpretations advanced in respect 
of this phrase, it is important to indicate that such a phrase could be 
understood as referring to one or more of the following Palestinian groups: 
1) The inhabitants of the Vest Bank and Gaza; 
2) The Arab Palestinians living in Israel as Israeli citizens; 
3) The Palestinians living outside the territory of the former mandated 
Palestine as refugees; and 
4) The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). 
The U. S. government, i. e. the Carter administration, declared its position in 
the following words: 
"The United States interprets the phrase "the representatives of the Palestinian 
people" not in terms of any single group or organization as representing the 
Palestinian people, but as encompassing those elected or chosen for 
participation in negotiations. It is expected that they will accept the purposes 
of the negotiations as defined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 
242, and in the framework to live in peace and good neighbourly relations with 
Israel . 212 
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This quotation is taken from Carter's reply to Jordan in answer to the U. S. 
interpretation of certain provisions of the Camp David Accords. The U. S. 
suggested a distinction be made between two groups of Palestinians, those who 
accept Resolution 242 and recognize Israel's right to live in peace, and those 
who reject both. The former group could take part in the negotiations, while the 
latter could not. Clearly, the aim of such a distinction was to prevent the 
P. L. O. and its supporters from participating in the negotiations. As is well 
known, the PLO, until November 1988,2113 rejected Security Council Resolution 
242. Under the Palestine National Charter of 1964 and 1968, particularly 
Articles 23 and 26 respectively, the PLO claims to be responsible for the 
liberation of Palestine . 2114 
Another aim of the American interpretation was to encourage moderate elements 
in the PLO to accept Resolution 242 and so take part in the proposed 
negotiations. Under the Nixon-Kissinger administration, Israel reached an 
agreement with the U. S. that the Americans would not hold any negotiation with 
the PLO unless it recognized Resolution 242. This agreement was still binding 
on the U. S. in 1978/79.2"5 Vhatever the intention behind this interpretation, it 
would be unreasonable now, due to the P. L. O's recognition of Resolution 242, to 
argue for the expulsion of the PLO from the negotiations. As is well known, the 
Palestinian National Council, meeting in Algeria on November 15,1988, 
proclaimed a new moderate political programme endorsing, for the first time, 
U. N. Security Council Resolution 21r- 
As to the Israelils, they maintained that the phrase "representative of the 
Palestinian people" does not cover the PLO, Israel's view is that, while the 
negotiations with the Palestinians would be based, according to the Camp David 
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Accordsl on Resolution 242, the PLO did not recognize that Resolution. And the 
words "as mutually agreed" were deliberatly inserted, after the term "other 
Palestinians" in paragraph A. 2(b). 207 Vhile such a term may cover the PLO, as 
well as other Palestinians, the purpose of the term "as mutually agreed. " was to 
permit Israel to reject the PLO In fact, this policy of "no recognition" is 
deeply rooted in IsraelU thinking and strategy, as is confirmed in the 
programmes of its main political parties. 20LI For example, in the Likud party 
platform of 1981, it is stated that "... the Terrorist organization which calls 
itself "P. L. O. " seeks to destroy the state of Israel. There will be no 
negotiations with this murderous organization. 112119 
Nothwithstanding, the acceptance of Resolution 242 in the Algeria Declaration 
of 1988, the Israeli government has rejected the Declaration and the new 
political programme, and has claimed that the PLO continues to be committed to 
the destruction of Israel. 210 
To the foregoing, we may add that in recent peace talks. the Israeli government 
has rejected an American proposal according to which the PLO may be consulted 
in respect of forming the delegation of the Palestinian representatives. 2" 
Egypt, an the other hand, held the view that in the Camp David Agreement no 
mention whatsoever is made of such exclusion of the PLO or it supporters . 212 
. 4oreover, after the PLO recognition of Resolution 242 there is no 
legal basis 
upon which such exclusion could be based. In fact, during the autonomy 
negotiations in 1980, Israel agreed that any Palestinian living in the Idest Bank 
and Gaza could be elected to represent the Palestinians regardless of his 
political attitudes. 213 
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"The legitimate security concerns of the Parties" is another ambiguous 
expression which raises rather than resolves problems. Paragraph A. 1. (a) of the 
Accords provides that the arrangements for the full autonomy "should give due 
consideration both to the principle of self -government by the inhabitants of 
these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties 
involved. "-' 14 The use of the word "legitimate" before the term "security 
concerns" suggests that some security concerns of the parties are 
illegitimate . 21 r, The authors, however, neither identify these security concerns 
nor propose any test for determining whether or not a security demand advanced 
could be regarded as legitimate. The difficulty stems from the fact that each of 
the parties had its own understanding of the term. Egypt, for example, suggested 
that Israel's security concerns could be satisfied by stationing U. N. Forces in 
certain strategic areas in the Vest Bank and Gaza following Israel's complete 
withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 lines. 2-Ir- In Egypt's view, Israel had to accept 
these arrangements as they are in accordance with Resolution 242, which 
constituted the basis of the negotiations. 2 17 Israel, an the other hand, held 
that its security concerns could only be achieved by maintaining a military 
presence, as well as Jewish settlements, in the West Bank and Gaza. 2111 From an 
Israeli view these arrangements are consistent with Resolution 242, particularly 
paragraph 2(c) which affirms the necessity for guaranteeing the territorial 
inviolability and political independence of every state in the area through 
security measures. 119 In fact, the question remains unresolved. 
The term "self-governing authority" was repeated in several paragraphs in the 
Agreement. The authors, however, did not specify the intended meaning. There are 
three possible answers. The term could be a reference to an administrative 
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council which would be entitled to exercise exclusive authority.: 220 The term 
could also be intended to refer to an assembly, namely, a legislative body which 
would exercise powers and functions an the lines of the British parliamentary 
model. 221 The term could be intended to refer to a full, local government, 
which would be entitled to exercise legislative, executive and Judicial 
authorities. 
From an Israeli perspective, the term referred to an adminstrative council 
which would be directly elected by the inhabitants. This council would be 
entitled to exercise executive authority as well as a very limited degree of 
legislative and Judicial authority. 222 
On the other hand, Egypt understood the term as a reference to an assembly 
composed of a large number of f reely-elected members. This assembly would, in 
turn, elect the administrative council from among its members and would 
exercise powerst functions and competences as in the British parliamentary 
model . 223 
Notwithstanding the above views, one must admit that what is particularly 
disturbing to a lawyer is the way in wich the term "self-governing authority" 
has been used in the Camp David Accords: that is to say, the meaning of the 
term "self-governing" in one paragraph differed from its meaning in other 
paragraphs. For example, while the words "administrative council" were inserted 
after the term 1'se lf- governing authority" in para. A. 1(c) to emphasize the 
meaning intended, a reasonable understanding of the term in para. A. 1(a) (where 
the words "administrative council" were not included) suggests that it is used 
as a reference to a legislative body (an Assembly). In the meantime, in other 
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parts of the agreement the term "self-governing authority" can be understood as 
a reference to the local government as a whole224 
As mentioned earlier, the Accords provided for a three-stage resolution of the 
problem of the Palestinians; thus, it is necessary to distinguish (1) provisions 
on the arrangements leading to the establishment of autonomy; (2) provisions on 
the autonomy; and (3) provisions on the final status. 
(1) In relation to the first point, the Camp David Accords provide for two main 
arrangements which were to be accomplished in the period prior to the 
establishment of the self-governing authority. These are negotiations on the 
powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority, and free elections 
among the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to choose the self-governing 
authority. 
As far as the negotiations are concerned, three main questions need to be 
explored. Who are going to negotiate? What is to be discussed? When are the 
negotiations to begin and end? 
The first Camp David Agreement referred to the parties who were to participate 
in the negotiations in the following terms: 
"Egypt, Israel and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the 
elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of 
Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other 
Palestinians as mutually agreed. 11226 
This wording indicates clearly that there was no intention to accept the 
participation of a separate Palestinian delegation, nor to allow any 
Palestinians living outside the Occupied Territories to take part in the 
negotiations unless approved by Israel. 
298 
From an Israeli perspective, an agreement to hold negotiations with a separate 
Palestinian delegation would mean a deviation from Israel's long and firm 
position that it cannot deal with the Palestinians as a separate entity because 
it does not recognize them as a people in the legal meaning of that term . 226 
If the wording of the above text were to be expanded to include a separate 
Palestinian delegation, it could be construed as an implicit recognition of the 
Palestinians as a people. Also, from a political view, Israel believed that any 
Palestinian delegation would be under the influence of the PLO whose aim, 
according to Israel, was the destruction of the state of Israel. The drafting 
history of this text reveals that the idea of not permitting the Palestinians to 
have a separate delegation appeared in the first American draft submitted at 
Camp David. Its relevant portion reads: 
"Egypt, Israel and Jordan will determine the modalities for establishing the 
elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegates may 
include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza . 10227 
A study of this American draft suggests that, as well as not permitting the 
Palestinians to have a separate delegation, it also excluded from the scope of 
the draft any Palistinians living outside the West Bank and Gaza. The only 
group of Palestinians allowed to take part in the negotiations are "Palestinians 
from the West Bank and Gaza". 
This language, which contained no reference to Palestinians from outside Gaza 
and the Vest Bank was not accepted by Egypt. It demanded, therefore, that this 
draft should be amended in order to permit other Palestinians to take part in 
the negotiations . 2211, 
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Egypt, it may be recalled, had been obliged under the Resolution of the Arab 
League Summit Conference of 1974 to regard the PLO as the sale and legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people. 229 Had Egypt accepted the American 
draft in this respect, it would have violated its obligation as an Arab League 
member. Israel, an the other hand, was not ready to negotiate with the other 
Palestinians because they were mainly either members or supporters of the 
PL02: 30 In order to bridge the gap between the two views, the Americans 
proposed to add the expression "other Palestinians as mutually agreed. " This was 
regarded as a well-balanced expression. The term "Palestinians from outside" 
satisfied the Egyptians, while the term "as mutually agreed" satisfied the 
Israeli's who would be allowed to reject or accept any Palestinians from outside 
the Occupied Territories. 
The question of whether or not the PLO was permitted to take part in the 
negotiations has been referred to earlier. It is sufficient at this stage to note 
that it remains unsettled . 231 
Having defined the parties who would negotiate, an important question arises 
as to the situation if the Palestinians or Jordanians refused to join the 
negotiations. Would this undermine or delay the implementation of the agreed 
provisions on the West Bank and Gaza? A somewhat vague answer to that 
question can be found in a letter from Sadat to Carter appended to the Camp 
David Accords. This letter, dated September 22,1978, pointed out 
"To ensure the implementation of the provisions relating to the West Bank and 
Gaza and in order to safeguard the legitimate rights of the Palestinian peoplep 
Egypt will be prepared to assume the Arab role emanating from these provisionst 
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following consultations with Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian 
people. 1123; 2 
The wording of the above letter indicates that it was designed to cover a 
possible situation in which the Palestinians and Jordanians reJected 
negotiations with Israel, but were willing to consult with Egypt in order to 
represent them in the negotiations. There is no indication of what was meant by 
the word "consultation". Moreover, this letter does not cover a possible 
situation in which the Palestinians and/or the Jordanians refused even to 
consult with Egypt. Later, in another letter appended to the 1979 Treaty, Sadat 
and Begin agreed that: 
"In the event Jordan decides not to take part in the negotiations, the 
negotiations will be held by Egypt and Israel. "-233 
Clearly, the language used in the above letter indicates that there was no 
intention to exlude the Palestinians from the negotiations, although Jordan may 
be excluded at its own instance. 
Having indicated the parties who will participate in the negotiations, it 
remains to consider the topics which will be discussed. In this respect 
paragraph Al (b) of the Camp David Accords provided: 
"The parties will negotiate an agreement which will def ine the powers and 
responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West 
Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there 
will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security 
locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal 
and external security and public order. 11.234 
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This text specified in clear language the issues which will be negotiated, 
namelyt the power and responsibilites of the self-governing authority and 
arrangments for assuring security and public order. 
There is no reference whatsoever in the whole text of the Treaty that other 
issues outside the scope of this Article could be discussed; that is to say, in 
legal terms, the parties to the negotiations could not raise or suggest topics 
outside the scope of this Article for discussion. The objective here is the 
election issue. While it was reasonable to put the elections among the topics 
off the agenda, by leaving it outside the scope of the discussion, the result 
was to leave all the important and crucial matters to be decided exclusively by 
Israel. This is a concession made by the authors to Israel, perhaps to encourage 
it to enter peace with Egypt. 
The language used inaccurate terms and expressions that need to be defined. 
Unfortunately, no definition of such words can be found either in the provisions 
or in the travaux preparatnires. For example, the expression "arrangements for 
assuring internal and external security and public order" was not defined. In 
considering this expression, no one can underestimate the practical difficulties 
that might arise. There was no consensus among the parties as to what such 
arrangements may entail. While the Israelis could interpret this term in its 
broad meaning in order to limit the degree of autonomy granted to the Arabs, 
the Arab delegations, seeking to enhance the powers and authorities of the local 
government vis-a-vis Israel, could interpret the term in a narrow way. 
Again, the use of ambiguous language is not surprising. Quandt, a member of the 
American team at Camp David, admitted that, by the end of the negotiations, 
when the authors realized that the crucial Vest Bank and Gaza issue could not 
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be fully resolved, they approved an Israeli proposal to employ ambiguous 
language and a vague formula for such unresolved issues. 2as 
As regards the question of the timing of the negotiations, the Camp David 
Accords contained no reference to this issue. However, reference can be found in 
a joint letter from Sadat and Begin to Carter appended to the Peace Treaty. 
According to this letter dated March 1979, Egypt and Israel "agreed to start 
negotiations withý a month after the f irst exchange of instruments of 
ratification of the Peace Treaty. "116 The letter affirmed also that: 
"Egypt and Israel set for themselves the goal of completing the negotiations 
within one year. " In another part, the letter provided that: 
"The two governments agree ... to conclude these negotiations at the earliest 
possible date . 012: 37 
2bservations on the attitude of the Camp David Accords and the Peace 
Treaty towards the question of timing require to be made. The reference to the 
timing of the negotiations in a letter appended to the Treaty, but not included 
in its text, suggests that the agreement an timing was not part of the legal 
obligations of the parties under the Treaty. Also, the language used suggests 
that the intention was to propose imprecise and non-binding dates. The term 
"earliest possible date", for example, suggests such an understanding. Also, the 
word "goal" refers to something which may or may not be achieved. The 
stipulation that the autonomy negotiations will begin after one month from the 
ratification of the Peace Treaty suggests the existence of a link between the 
West Bank formula agreed at Camp David and the Peace Treaty. According to the 
Egyptians, such linkage is legally binding because the Sadat-Begin joint letter 
appended to the 1979 Peace Treaty is an integral part of the Peace Treaty-230 
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From a political and legal perspective, the Egyptians wanted to prove to the 
Arab world that they did not sign a separate peace with Israel. Further, Egypt 
was obliged by Arab League resolutions to seek a comprehensive, rather a 
separate, peace with Israel.: 233 
On the other hand, Israel held the view that the Sadat - Begin letter did not 
create a binding obligation. Rather, it could be regarded as a political and 
"non-binding obligation . 11.240 The binding nature of that letter was discussed 
earlier. Suffice it at this stage to note that the prevailing view during the 
process of the negotiations was that : 
"The treaty must be legally independent of whatever happened on the West Bank 
and Gaza, even though some degree of political linkage might exist . "2 41 
In fact, the authors thought that the West Bank formula might fail because of 
the actions or inactions of the Jordanians or Palestinians. 
The second step to be taken af ter the completion of the negotiations on 
autonomy was to hold free elections. Paragraph A. 1 (a) of the Camp David Accords 
provided that 
"The Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be 
withdrawn as soon as self-governing authority has been f reely elected by the 
inhabitant of these areas. ". 242 
Another reference to the election issue can be found in the Sadat-Begin letter: 
"Elections will be held as expeditiously as possible after agreement has been 
reached between the parties . 14243 
Clearly, there is a general agreement in principle that the proposed elections 
should be freely held, but there is no clarification whatsoever of how to deal 
in practice with several problems expected to be raised in respect of the "free 
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elections. " For example, are the Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza 
going to participate in the elections? Who is going to supervise these 
elections? How will the number of constituencies be determined? Has Israel the 
right to prevent some Palestinians from taking part in the elections under 
claims of national security? In the light of the fact that many Palestinian 
leaders in the Vest Bank and Gaza were either in Israeli prisons or displaced 
outside the area, what is their position in the election process? 
It is interesting to observe that, so far there is no consensus among the 
parties concerned in respect of these questions. 
The language on the elections could be understood to mean that the intention 
17 
was to hold the elections under the supervision and the instruction' of the 
Israeli military government in Gaza and the West Bank. In this respect, the 
exclusion of the election issue from the scope of the paragraph an the 
negotiations, as well as the absence of any detailed provision on the elections, 
should be considered with the text of paragraph A. 1. (a) which provides that the 
military government has to be withdrawn after (but not before) the elections. It 
follows that a reasonable understanding of this formulation suggests that the 
intention was to hold the elections under the military government. 
The drafting history of the paragraph on the elections reveals that the 
American draft submitted at Camp David on September 10,1978, adopted the same 
line. Its relevant paragraph on the elections reads: 
"The Israeli military government and administration will be abolished and 
withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority can be freely elected by the 
inhabitants of these areas . 11244 
305 
Undoubtedly, this draft implied that the elections were to be held in the 
presence of the military government. The rest of the American draft contained 
no mention of the election issue. It appears that the intention was to avoid 
addressing the complex issues arising in respect of the elections. One must 
admit that, regardless of the intention behind such language, it would be 
paradoxical to provide for free elections under, or in the presence of, a 
military government representing the occupying power. 
Before proceeding further, a brief mention of how Egypt and Israel interpreted 
and understood the term "free election" ought to be made. 
In respect of the necessity of guaranteeing the impartiality of the elections, 
Egypt proposed a number of points: international supervision of the elections 
processf the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the paces in which the 
voting will take place; a joint Palestinian- Israeli Gommission to be formed to 
prepare for the elections; the Palestinian voters should have immunity against 
any procedure which may be taken by the Israeli's against them; and Israeli 
personnel to be prevented from entering Gaza and the West Bank on election 
day.: 24r- According to Egyptian sources, the Israeli's agreed during the autonomy 
negotiations to hold the elections under international supervision. The 
remaining points have not been settled. 246 
Israel, on the other hand, maintained that, due to considerations of national 
security, it should have the right to object to, and prevent, any candidate from 
being elected, in particular the supporters of the PLOj47 
Before leaving this point, a final and relevant question must not be 
overlooked, namelyt whether the Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza were 
to be entitled to participate in the elections. Again, the Accords and the Peace 
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Treaty provided no answer. A review of the preparatory work reveals that each 
party had its own, and different, answer to the question. 
From an Israeli perspective, based on the assumption that its settlement 
policy was legal and therefore that the settlers would remain permanently in 
the area, the settlers in the West Bank and Gaza had the right to participate in 
the elections as candidates and voters. This view was reflected in the original 
autonomy plan submitted in 1977, Articles 4 and 5 providing respectively for 
the following: 
114. Any resident, 18 years old and above, without distinction of citizenship, or 
if stateless, will be entitled to vote in the elections to the Administrative 
Council. 
5. Any resident whose name is included in the list of candidates for the 
Administrative Council and who, on the day the list is submitted, is 25 years 
old or above, will be entitled to be elected in the Council. "'211 
Clearly, the word "resident" in the above text refers to the Palestinians as 
well as Jewish settlers in the area. Further, the words "without distinction of 
citizenship" were added to emphasize the meaning intended by the word 
"resident. " Thust there is no doubt that the Israeli settlers under the above 
text have the right to vote and to be elected. However, it is interesting to 
note that the Israeli autonomy plan of 1982 contained no mention of the Israeli 
settlers in the area. Rather, it spoke in Article. 1 of a self-governing 
authority that would comprise one body representing only the Arab inhabitants, 
thus excluding any role for the Jewish settlers in the elections. 211 
]Iotwithstanding these two contradicting views, the American officials believed 
that the Camp David Accords did not deal with the status of the Israeli 
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settlements in the area, and therefore, their relationship with the 
self-governing authority would have to be dealt within the course of the 
negotiations. "" 
Having examined the procedures leading to the establishment of the 
self-governing authority we proceed now to consider the provisions on the 
self-governing authority. 
The main provisions relating to the self-governing authority in the Camp David 
Accords read as follows: 
"In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements 
the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be 
withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been f reely elected by the 
inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. 
The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and 
responsibilities of the self-governing authority. 
The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and 
external security and public order. A strong local police force will be 
establishedt which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and 
Jordanian forces will participate in Joint patrols and in the manning of control 
posts to assure the security of the borders. 
When the self-governing authority (Administrative Council) in the West Bank 
and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years 
will begin. "261 
Another mention of the self-governing authority can be found in the Sadat- 
Begin joint letter appended to the Peace Treaty: 
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11 ... The establishment of 
the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza 
in order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants. The self-governing 
authority will be established and inaugurated within one month after it has 
been elected, at which time the transitional period of five years will begin. 
The Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be 
withdrawn to be replaced by the self-governing authority as specified in the 
'Framework for Peace in the Middle East'll. 2r-2 
The wording of these provisions clearly indicates that, while the intention of 
the authors was to leave the whole matter of the self-governing authority to be 
resolved in the negotiations, certain issues had been settled at Camp David, e. g. 
the agreement that the self-governing authority would establish a strong local 
police force. 
Generally speaking, the structure of a "local government" or "an autonomous 
entity" may be examined by reference to three main points: the legislative 
authority; the executive authority; and the Judicial authority; as well as other 
particular issues such as control over foreign relations, defence and natural 
resources. For the sake of clarity, it would help if we examined the relevant 
provisions relating to autonomy aloniz these points. 
So far as a legislative authority is concerned, it is interesting to observe 
that neither the Camp David Accords nor the Joint-letter appended to the 1979 
Treaty contained any mention of the legislature. The question of whether or not 
tuey, are legally permitted to establish a legislative authority is, therefore, a 
matter of interpretation, and two conflicting views have been advanced. 
According to one view, the provisions must be understood as implying a 
legislative body possessing the power to enact laws and regulations. 2F-3 The 
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second view holds that the intention was to give the administrative council 
power to promulgate regulations . 2654 
The first view is based on the argument that a reasonable understanding of the 
whole text and language used suggests that the self-governing authority should 
be entitled to exercise an extensive degree of legislative competence, which 
would necessarily include the enactment of laws as well as regulations. 2", In 
support of this view, the following reasons can be mentioned: 
= The term "full autonomy" has been used, as mentioned earlier, to refer to a 
wide and extensive degree of autonomy. Understood in conjunction with the term 
"transitional period" the term "full autonomy" must be construed as a reference 
to a de facto government which includes a legislative body. 
= The statement in paragraph A. 1 that the self-governing authority would 
"replace" the military government, as mentioned earlier, implies that the 
self-governing authority, should exercise all the powers exercised by the 
military government, including the enactment of laws and regulations. 211 
= Turning back to the records of the negotiations, it appears that the first 
American draft at Camp David was in line with the Egyptian view, According to 
this draft, the self-governing authority would replace the military government 
which would be "abolished . 41267 As mentioned earlier, the word "replace" has to 
be considered in conjunction with the word "abolished". It follows that the 
self-governing authority should exercise all the powers and competence of the 
abolished government. As is well-known the Israeli military government is 
empowered to enact laws.: 2r-9 
= It may be also argued that an extensive review of international practice 
reveals that the great majority of autonomous entities have a locally-elected 
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legislative body as the fundamental source of local government power. 2G9 
According to Hannum and Lillich, "while the extent of legislative competence 
varies considerablyt as do the designations both for the body itself 
(legislature, council, parliament) and for the instruments enacted (laws, 
decrees, regulations), the existence of an elected legislative body is nearly 
universal. 11260 
In sum, the Egyptians maintained that the term "self-governing authority" 
refers to "an authority which governs itself by itself... no outside source vests 
it with its autharity. "; 2r, '. The intention was to establish a de facto democratic 
structure of government by and for the people that would be able, after the 
transitional period, to form a de Jure government. 
In practicel the Egyptians envisaged an elected body (asssembly) whose members 
would fulfill the legislative functions as well as exercise the powers that an 
elected representative body usually does. This view can be f ound in Egypt's 
"Proposed Model of Full Autonomy f or the West Bank and Gaza Strip. ',. 2r-2 
According to this proposal, the self-governing authority would be composed of 
two main organs, a council and "An assembly composed of all freely-elected 
representatives f rom the Vest Bank and Gaza ... The Assembly will take over and 
replace the authority of the military government in enacting laws and 
regulations, formulating and supervising policies, adapting the budget, levying 
taxes, etc. Its internal organization of chairmen with one or more 
vice-chairman, its rules of procedure and the number and composition of its 
committees will be determined by the Assembly itself. "2r-3 
In another part of that proposal, the Egyptians suggested that: 
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"The S. G. A. (self-governing authority) will be composed of 80-100 members freely 
elected f rom the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza. "21" 
9 The second view, advanced by Israel, held that the intention was not to 
establish a legislative body. Rather, it was to give the self-governing 
authority, which would take the form of an administrative council, the authority 
to promulgate regulations in respect of matters operated by it. In support of 
this view, the following reasons can be mentioned. 
In the first place, the term "self-governing authority", according to Israel, 
had only one meaning, i. e. administrative council. The wording of paragraph A. 1. c 
supported this as the words "administrative council" were inserted after the 
term "self-governing authority" to emphasise the meaning intended-"' 
Moreover, the Israelis did not accept Egypt's view that the self-governing 
authority should have all the powers exercised by the military government after 
its withdrawal. According to Begin, what the word "withdrawal" meant, very 
simply, was that the Israeli military presence would be physically withdrawn, 
but not abolished.: 2r, 6 The powers of the administrative council would devolve 
from this military government which would continue to exercise functions, 
including the enactment of laws . 2G7 Along the same lines, Ruth Lapidoth argued: 
"The Camp David Accords did not provide for the automatic transfer of all the 
powers of the military government and its civilian administration to the 
self-governing authority. If such a complete transfer of authority had been 
aimed at, it would not have been necessary to state, as the Camp David 
framework did, that "the Parties will negotiate an agreement which will define 
the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority". 112c-1 
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The drafting history of the paragraph on the transfer of power to the 
self-governing authority reveals that the word "abolished" as used in the 
proposed text was deleted in the final draft. That is to say, while the U. S. 
draft used the expression "the Israeli military government and administration 
will be abolished and withdrawn, 112c-ý-, the word "abolished" did not appear in the 
final text which became paragraph A 1(a) of the Camp David Accords. 
Also, it can be argued that, despite the fact that a large number of autonomous 
entities have legislative bodies, there exist several governed only by an 
administrative council, as, for example, in the transitional League of Nations 
administration for the Saar, which was governed by an administrative council 
without any legislative body . 270 Similarly, the Landowners' Council in Shanghai 
and the systems of cultural autonomy within the Belgian linquistic communites 
and under the Ottoman millet systems are examples of autonomous entities which 
lack a separate legislative body . 271 
In support of this view, the Israelis argued that they made it clear before and 
after the Camp David Accords that no separate legislative body was envisaged. 
The original Israeli autonomy plan submitted by Begin on December 28,1977, 
refers to this limited function. Paragraph 10 of that plan provided that the 
administrative council shall: 
"Promulgate regulations relating to the operation of these departments (which it 
will operate)272 
Alsot paragraph 19 of the same proposal provided that a committee will be 
established to determine: 




Again, the Israelis adhered to the same line during the autonomy negotiations 
which followed the conclusion of the 1979 Treaty. In their proposal submitted 
in January 1982 the Israelis suggested that the proposed council "will, 
moreover, have a wide range of powers to promulgate regulations as required by 
a body of this kind . 11274 
Notwithstanding the above, it is clear that Israel's rejection of the existence 
of a legislative body, and the very limited power which was proposed by the 
Israelis to be granted to the administrative council, should be understood in 
the light of its view that the Palestinians should permanently remain under its 
sovereignty after the end of the transitional period . 275 
So far as Judicial authority is concerned, it may be useful at the outset to 
indicate that it was firmly recognized that a free and independent Judiciary 
formed part of any politically autonomous entity . 276 However, this independence 
does not necessarily imply total separation from the central or sovereign 
judicial authority as it is common for appeals from local courts to be heard in 
higher courts in the central government. 277 
Generally speaking two areas can be regarded as criteria for determining the 
degree of local Judical autonomy; the manner of selection of local judges, 
particularly the judges of the highest local court, and whether or not local 
matters may be appealed to a higher tribunal outside the autonomous entity's 
jurisdiction . 278 
It has been observed that entities with high or even moderate degrees of 
autonomy have total control over the appointment of local judges, e. g., the 
proposed Turkish "Federal State of Cyprus, Eritrea, Catalonia, the Emirates and 
the Swiss cantons . 279 
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Yet, even where local courts are otherwise independent and selected by local 
authoritiest most autonomous entities are subject to the ultimate control of the 
highest court of the national Judiciary. It was also observed that such appeals 
are appropriate only to consider the cons ititutionality of local enactments or 
challenges that local actions are contrary to, or beyond the powers of, the 
basic constituent documents defining the relationship between the autonomous 
and principal entities. 290 
Turning to the Camp David Accords and the Peace Treaty, no explicit or 
implicit mention of the judical authority can be found. Moreover, a review of 
the Camp David talks and the travaux preparatoires of the Peace Treaty suggests 
that the issue of the judicial authority, as part of the would-be self-governing 
authority$ was never discussed. 
From the above, it seems reasonable to suppose that the intention was to leave 
such questions to be decided in the negotiations. 
Notwithstanding, it is not irrelevant before leaving this point to refer in 
brief to the views expressed by Egypt and Israel in respect of the local 
judicial authority in the West Bank and Gaza. 
Prior to the conclusion of the Camp David Accords and the Peace Treaty, the 
only reference to the Judicial authority can be found in Begin's Autonomy Plan 
announced on December 28,1977. It pointed out that the "administration of 
justice" was among the departments which would be operated by the 
administrative council. 2191 
In the aftermath of the Peace Treaty, a similar text can be found in the 
Israeli Autonomy Plan submitted in January 1982: 
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"The powers to be granted to the authorityO under these proposals, are in the 
f ollowing domains: 
1. Administration of Justice, Supervision of the administrative system of the 
courts in the areas dealing with matters connected with the prosecution 
system and with the registration of companies, partnerships, patents, 
trademarks, etc. "; 261: 2 
It is interesting to observe that this text overlooked several important issues 
in respect of the Judicial authority, e. g. the relations between the local courts 
and the Israeli courts and the appointment of Judges. Also, no mention of a 
supreme court or appeal courts was made. 
Turning to Egypt's view, we may note that it employed clear language calling 
for an efficient and independent judiciary. The Egyptian proposed model for full 
autonomy refers to that issue in paragraph IV. 4(e): 
"The judicial authority will be manifested in a system of courts of law, courts 
of appeal and supreme court enjoying full guarantees for independence and 
efficiency in their administration of Justice. "-2133 
Although the examination of the above text is outside the realm of this work, it 
is interesting to observe that the Egyptian proposal implied a total separation 
of the local courts from the Israeli courts. 
Two observations in connection with the views of both Egypt and Israel appear 
necessary. While Egypt envisaged a complete and independent judiclarys the 
Israelis proposed a moderate degree of local judical autonomy, but not 
completely independence. Israel's view in this respect was in line with the 
general trend of international practice in this respect. 204 Several important 
issues relating to the judicial authority have been overlooked, e. g. the relation 
I 
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between the local courts and the sovereign state, the appointment of Judges and, 
finally and most significantly, the legal staus of the Israeli settlers in the 
area vis a vis the Arab local courts there. The absence of clear provisions on 
such issues will open the door to differences and difficulties. 
Vhile the preceding analysis shows, for example, that an autonomous entity nay 
or may not have a legislative bodyq there is no doubt that any autonomous 
entity must have an identifiable executive branch of government headed by a 
chief executivel be that a governor, president, prime minister or an executive or 
administrative council 296 
Generally speaking, an executive council is gianted power to administer all the 
affairs of the local inhabitants, with the exception only of foreign affairs and 
defence. Autonomy is not sovereignty and these two attributes of a sovereign 
state could not be conferred on an autonomous unit . 28G 
In examining the executive authority under the Camp David autonomy plan, 
discussion will be confined to two main points: the political character of the 
administrative councilt particularly the question of whether it represents the 
central or local governmento how and by whom it is selected; and the extent of 
the powers of the local government, particularly its power over foreign 
relations, external and internal security, and natural resources. 
In respect of the question of selecting the administrative council, the wording 
of the Camp David Plan clearly indicated that the self-governing authority 
would be elected by the local inhabitants.: 297 At this point, a distinction 
should be made between the Israeli and. Egyptian interpretations. Based on its 
interpretation that the term "self-governing authority" refers to an 
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administrative council, Israel held that the executive authority would be 
selected directly by the local population and, thus, it would be responsible to 
them, rather than to the Israeli government. 2911 The origins of this view can be 
found in the first autonomy plan submitted by Israel in 1977, Article 3 of 
which reads: 
"The residents of Judea, Syiaria and the Gaza district will elect an 
Administrative Council composed of eleven members. The Administrative Council 
will operate in accordance with the principles laid down in this paper. 1126"-" 
A similar approach was adopted by the Israeli Autonomy Plan submitted in 
January 1982 which referred to "an elected representative body ... that will be 
able to carry out the functions assigned to it as an administrative council. "-29c' 
On the other hand, Egypt's view was based an the assumption, mentioned earlier, 
that the Accords provided for the election of an assembly which will exercise 
powers and competences on the British parliamentary model. It followed that the 
executive authority should be selected by, and from among, the members of the 
assembly. In this connection, we may recall that Egypt adhered to this view in 
the autonomy negotiations following the conclusion of the 1979 Treaty.: 291 Its 
Proposal Model for Full Autonomy submitted on January 28,1980 provide for "A 
council composed of ten to fifteen members to be elected from among the 
membership of the assembly . 
11292 
As to the question of whether the administrative council would administer the 
laws and enactments of the Israeli governmentt and whether the latter would 
retain separate powers to enforce national laws, two answers can be found. 
On the one hand, Egypt held that the council should administer the laws 
enacted by itself and that the Israeli government did not retain any power to 
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enf orce Israeli laws.: 293 Yet, the weakness of this argument is that, whatever 
interpretation one may extract from the provisions, there is no doubt that, if 
the Camp David agreement is implemented, the administrative council will 
administer Israeli laws relating to external defence and foreign affairs. Also, 
the Israeli government in legal terms would be entitled to enforce law 
concerning these two areas. 
On the other hand, if we accept Israel's view that the "council" would not be 
entitled to enact laws, then the answer will be clear. The council would 
administer Israel's laws and enactments, and its government would retain power 
to enforce laws against the Palestinian council. 
As to the question of who will supervise the administrative council, it may be 
noted that no clear answer can be f ound. Any answer must be a matter of 
negotiation as well as interpretation. Let us consider the views expressed an 
that issue in the preparatory work and in the aftermath of the 1979 Treaty. 
While, as a matter of reasonable inference, the council elected solely by the 
local people should be exclusively responsible to them, the Israelis maintained 
that the administrative council should be responsible to, and supervised by, the 
military government. Brzezinski recorded that he was informed by Begin that the 
authority of the local government in the West Bank should be devolved from the 
Israeli military governor and hence could be revoked by him . 294 
In the proposal submitted by Egypt at Camp David on September 6,1978, the 
Egyptians suggested that a distinction be made between the local government in 
Gaza and the local government in the West Bank. The former was to be supervised 
by Egypto while the latter to be supervised by Jordan. -"'-Is In this respecto the 
relevant text reads: 
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"There shall be a transitional period not to exceed f ive years from the date of 
the signing of the "Framework" during which Jordan shall supervise the 
administration of the West Bank and Egypt shall supervise the administration of 
the Gaza Strip. "-2915 
It is interesting to observe that at a later stage Egypt's proposal that she 
and Jordan should supervise the local government changed. In the autonomy 
negotiations that followed the conclusion of the 1979 Treatyi Egypt expressed 
the view that an elected Palestinian assembly must supervise the administrative 
council. 
As to the American position, it is clear that they favoured leaving the 
question of who would supervise the self-governing authority to be decided in 
the future. In this respect, the American draft provided that the parties would 
negotiate an agreement which would define "the ... responsibilities of the 
self-governing authority. 00297 Clearly, the negotiations ofi the responsibilities 
must settle the question of supervision. The wording of the American draft was 
adopted by the authors and appeared in paragraph A-l(b). 
Its 
Ve turn now to consider the extent of powers of the authority over local and 
national matters. At the outset, we may note that the Camp David Accordso as 
well as the joint letter appended to the 1979 Treaty, contained no mention of 
these mattersl with the exception of a reference to local police forces and 
joint Jordanian-Israeli patrols to secure the borders. 
Generally speaking, the term "autonomy 11 refers to the authority of the l0cal 
government over the affairs of the inhabitants, with the exception of foreign 
relations and defence which are matters that should be reserved to the central 
or national government. 299 
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We can therefore conclude that the Treaty should be construed as granting the 
Palestinian local government authority and powers over all matters, except 
foreign relations and defence. 
Fortunately, a careful examination of the proposal submitted during and after 
the Camp David Accords suggests an agreement among the parties in this respect. 
Thus, both the Egyptian and Israeli proposals suggest that the self-governing 
authority will be granted the power over agriculture, finance$ education, housing 
etc. - all clearly internal matters . 299 
Howeverg despite the agreement among the parties on these matters, a dispute 
arose among the parties in respect of land and natural resources in the area. 
Israell an the one hand, held the view that, at Camp David, it agreed to grant 
full autonomy for the inhabitants, but not over the territory of the West Bank 
and Gaza. 
Paragraph A. 1 (a) used the expression "in order to provide full autonomy to the 
inhabitants. " If the territory was to be included, the word "inhabitants" should 
have been deleted and replaced by other words referring explicitly or implicitly 
to the territory. According to the Israelis it follows that all matters relating 
to land were reserved to the Israeli government. 3011 The aim of this Israeli 
interpretation was twofold. First, Israel wanted to maintain its right to 
establish new settlements in the Vest Bank and Gaza. If the Palestinian local 
government was to have control over land, the Israelis might not be able to 
establish new settlements. As we mentioned earlier, the Israeli government, as 
well as the opposition parties in Israel, believe that "such settlement is a 
Jewish inalienable right and an integral part of our national security. 11301 
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Secondlyo Israel wanted to keep tight control over the water resources of the 
West Bank. These water resources are the main sources of water for the Israeli 
coastal plain. 30: 2 Alsol Israel wanted to guarantee the supply of water to the 
settlers and their farms in the Vest Bank, which had been subject to Israeli 
control previously. Order 192 promulgated by the "Officer Commanding - Israel 
Defence Forces in Judea and Samaria" provided that Israeli officials are 
responsible for all the matters relating to the water resources and their use 
by the inhabitants . 303 
For these reasons, the Israeli Commission to study the autonomy plan 
recommended that the water resources in the West Bank and Gaza remain under 
Israeli contral. 114 This Israeli view was rejected by Egypt on the ground that 
the term "full autonomy" implied the transfer of authority over the land and 
natural resources to the self-governing authority. 306 
As regards the establishment of local police forcesp the Camp David Accords 
have the following provision: 
*To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be 
constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants 
of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing liaison on 
internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian and Egyptian 
officers. "3116 
The warding of this paragraph indicates clearly that once the transitional 
period has begun security would no longer remain, as it is now, an exclusive 
Israeli responsibility. In the words of a former Israeli official, "Whichever way 
one turns this textt whatever interpretations one may extract from it, what is 
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quite clear is that, if the Camp David agreement is implemented, it is not 
Israel that will control the internal security of the West Bank and Gaza . 013117 
The establishment of a local police force is in line with the general trend 
that local police forces are seen as a normal component of the governmental 
power of any autonomous entity. 31113 Hannum and Lillich observe that with the 
exception of cases such as the Ottoman millet which depended on Turkish civil 
authorities for execution of their decisions within the religious and cultural 
spheres, most autonomous entities have a local police force to enforce local 
legislation in the delegated areas, e. g. taxation, trade, social welfare and 
protection of the environment 30<--: 0 
The warding used on the Palestinian police force is taken from the original 
autonomy plan submitted by Begin in 1977. Under Article 10 of this proposall 
"the supervision of local police forces" was included within the specific powers 
delegated to the self-governing authority. 31c, At Camp David the first American 
proposal submitted on September 10,1978 referred to the local force in the 
following terms: 
"It will also include arrangementý for assuring internal and external security 
and public orderp including the respective roles of Israeli armed forces and 
local police. 1131 I 
As to external security and defence, there is an' overwhelming consensus that 
responsibility for, and authority over, national defence matters rest with the 
central or sovereign government. 312 The only exception to this general 
principle is the proposed Turkish Federated State of Cyprus which assigned to 
its President, under Articles 80 and 135 of the Turkish Cypriot Constitutiono 
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the responsibility for preserving the integrity of the state and the right to 
receive any aid from foreign states, including military aid.: 21: 2 
Turning back to the Camp David Accords, we can find two relevant provisions. 
The first suggests that this matter will be defined in the negotiations. It 
reads as follows: "The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring 
internal and external security and public order. 11314 
The second provision suggests that Jordan will take part in respect of the 
external security of the West Bank and Gaza. It reads as follows: 
"In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and 
in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders. 1131r, 
The wording of these paragraphs clearly indicates that the intention was to 
make a distinction between external security and the security of the borders. 
While there were a number of options in respect of the former, the Camp David 
Agreement specified one option in respect of the latter, namely, joint 
Jordanian- Israeli forces to safeguard the borders. In respect of this pointo 
some comments require to be made. 
The Camp David Agreement did not provide an answer to the question as to what 
exactly were to be the borders which need to be safeguarded. The borders could 
mean the borderline between Jordan and the West Bank, i. e. the River Jordan. A 
senior Arab diplomat held that this was the line intended: 316 
"the borders here, from the context, have only one meaning-, the River Jordan, 
which meant that the Framework had fallen into a serious trap; the recognition 
of the River Jordan as the borderline between Israel and Jordan. `: -, 17 
Alternatively, it could mean the pre-1967 border between Israel and the West 
Bank and Gaza. One must admit that no authoritative answer can be advanced. 
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The language on the joint Jordanian-Israeli patrols to safeguard the borders is 
somewhat disturbing. In practice# as well as in military terms, the Israelis do 
not need Jordanian forces to secure their "borders", If this is to be true in 
the future, the question arises as to the intention of the authors behind such a 
reference to including Jordan. 
From an Israeli perspective, this reference implied that Jordan would assume a 
role in deciding the final status of the area, thereby rejecting implicitly a 
possible independent Palestinian state. As we shall see later, the American and 
some Israeli parties favoured the view that the Vest Bank and Gaza should be 
finally linked to Jordan. 319 
Also, this reference would encourage Jordan to join the peace process. Perhaps 
the reference to a Jordanian role in the local police force319 as well as in the 
security of the "borders" could be construed as an implicit recognition by the 
authors of Jordan's claim to cYr/and role in the future of the area.: 31211 
It is clear that one of the most controversial problems arising from the Camp 
David Accords is that of the f inal status of the West Bank and Gaza. It is 
relevant to recall that the purpose of Camp David had not been to establish the 
final status at that time. The participants, Egypt, Israel and the U. S. A., agreed 
to the view that the situation required an interim solution for a specified 
period. 321 
From the perspective of the Camp David Accords, it was not legitimate to 
decide the future of the Palestinians who were not represented there . 322 
Moreover, if an immediate solution to the problem was forced 
-) 
the parties would 
have been unable to produce any agreement an this particular issue. -1: 23 In fact, 
the basic idea was the importance of the time factor. As Blum observes: 
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"The timing was extremely important. If a cooling-off period could be secured, 
if an atmosphere of co-operation could be established, if the barriers of mutual 
suspicion that had been built over a period of 50 years could be broken down, 
then in three to five years many of the day's seemingly insurmountable problems 
might become soluble. "-24 
The only mention of the final status of the West Bank and Gaza can be found in 
paragraph Al (c): 
"As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of 
the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final 
status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relation with its neighbours. 1132r, 
Although the wording of this text clearly indicates that the intention was to 
leave the question of the f inal status of the area to be decided in the 
negotiations which would begin within three years of the transitional period, 
both the parties claimed that the Accords implied certain options in respect of 
the future of the area. On the one hand, Israel claimed that certain paragraphs 
of the Accords excluded the possibility of an independent Palestinian state. The 
other view, which was. of courseadvanced by Egypt, held that the Accords did 
imply reference to the Palestinian right to self-determination, including the 
right to establish an independent state. 
The view that the Camp David Accords exclude the option of an independent 
Palestinian state are based on the assumption that, while there were a number 
of conceivable options with respect to the final status of the area concerned, 
certain options were deliberately excluded by the participants. Among them was 
the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. 326 
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In the first place, it has been argued that the Camp David Accords provided 
that the boundaries between Jordan and Israel would be determined within the 
framework of the Peace Treaty to be negotiated directly between Jordan and 
Israel. It follows that, since there would be a boundary between Jordan and 
Israel, the Camp David Accords did not envisage the possibility of a third 
state on the territory of the former Palestine Mandate. 327 
One must admit. that there is an objection to this view articulated by Blum. 
There is no clear and precise language in the Accords providing f or the 
establishment of boundary between Jordan and Israel. The relevant portion which 
was in Blum's mind is worth quoting: 
11 ... to negotiate the Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking 
into account 
the agreement reached on the final status of the Vest Bank and Gaza. The 
negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of U. N. 
Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other 
matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security 
arrangements. "3211 
It is correct that the words "location of boundaries" do not necessarily mean 
the Jordanian/ Israeli boundary. If such a meaning had been intended, the words 
"between Jordan and Israel" would have been added to emphasize that important 
meaning. 
Further, the Accords contain no mention of the term "self-determination". 
Having in mind the fact that the term "self-determination" carried with it 
notions of independence and sovereignty, it follows that the absence of this 
term could mean that the intention of the authors was not to establish a third 
state. 32' According to this view, the Accords avoided the term 
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"self-determination" because the Palestinians were not entitled to such a right. 
The argument against the Palestinian self-determination was mentioned 
earlier.: 33c' 
The word "autonomy" should be understood as a clear indication that 
sovereignty was not intended to be granted to the Palestinians. In the words of 
Blum: 
"The autonomy idea proposed that the Arab residents in those areas run their 
own affairs, including agriculture, trade and industry, education, justice, 
finance and practically all other matters with the exceptions only of foreign 
affairs and defence. Autonomy was not sovereignty, and these two attributes of 
a sovereign state could not be conferred on an autonomous unit which was not, 
and which under the Camp David Accords was not intended to become, a sovereign 
unit. "3: 31 
Also, it was argued that Security Council Resolution 242, upon which the Camp 
David Accords and the Peace Treaty were based, made no reference whatsoever to 
the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people. The only reference to 
them in that resolution was the reference to the just solution' of the refugee 
problem and the reference was not to Arab refugees alone. The f irst U. N. 
resolution referring to the Palestinian right to self-determination was adopted 
in 1969, two years after the adoption of Resolution 242. Also, it does not 
require total Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. As sucho the 
resolution under any circumstances cannot be construed as implying Palestinian 
self-determination. 
The drafting history of the Accords reveals that any phrase, term or word 
referring explicitly or implicitly to a Palestinian state or to the Palestinian 
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right to self-determination had been deleted. For example, Article 2 (5) of the 
Egyptian Proposal which provides that "the Palestinian people shall exercise 
their fundamental right to self-determination and shall be enabled to establish 
their national entity": 332; this language was totally rejected by the Israelis. 3213 
Another example is the letter from Carter to Begin dated September 22 1978 
which was appended to the Camp David Accords. According to this letter Carter 
acknowledged that he had been informed by the Israelis that "In each paragraph 
of the Agreed Framework Document the expressions "Palestinians" or "Palestinian 
People" aie being and will be construed and understood by you as "Palestinian 
Arabs"* 334 Clearly, the target of this letter is the term "Palestinian People" 
which could be construed as referring to 
%% 
people within the legal meaning 
intended by Article 1 of the U. N. International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights which provides "All people have the right of self-determination... " 
To the above, it may be added that in the course of the negotiations, as 
Brzezinski records, "the Israelis repeatedly expressed their concern that the 
Palestinians should not end up acquiring an independent state. "311 
Also, in drafting the paragraph on the final status of Gaza and the West Bank 
the original text of the American draft pointed out that the final status of the 
area should be based on all the principles of Resolution 242: 
"the negotiators ... will settle the inal status of the West Bank and Gaza af 
ter 
the transitional period- and its relationship with its neighbours on the basis 
of all of the principles of the U. N. Security Council Resolution 242, including 
the mutual obligations of peace, the necessity for security arrangements for all 
parties concerned following the transitional period, the withdrawal of Israeli 
forces. 11331- 
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This languages however, was not accepted by Begin since it would imply a total 
Israeli withdrawal which may or may not be followed by an independent 
Palestinian state . 337 The paragraph was amended to read: 
11 ... the negotiations (on the final status) shall be based an all the provisions 
and principles of U. N. Security Council Resolution 242.11: 3: 39 
The warding of the above text clearly indicates that the negotiations onlyt but 
not necessarily the final status would be based on Resolution 242. In Begin's 
view this meant that the final status may not necessarily be in accordance with 
the principle of the Resolution. *339 The amended text appeared in paragraph 
A. 1(c) of the Camp David Accords. 
Israel's practice, in the aftermath of the Camp David Accords, suggests that 
its intention was not to agree on the establishment of a Palestinian state after 
the transitional period. An example of such practice is Israel's extention of 
its public services, like electricity and transport, to the West Bank and 
Gaza.: 311 Such practice can be found in statements declared by Israeli officials 
on several occasions against the establishment of the Palestinian state. A 
striking example is that of Prime Minister Begin in 1981 declaring his 
government policy concerning the Vest Bank and Gaza: 
III, Menachem, son of Zelev and Hana Begin, do solemly swear that as long as I 
serve the nation as Prime Minister$ we will not leave any part of Judea# 
Samaria, the Gaza Strip or the Golan Heights. 11341 
This statementl as Carter observed, contravenes the basic terms of the Camp 
David Accords. 
In support of the interpretation that the Camp David Accords do not envisage 
an independent Palestinian state, reference nay be made to the Reagan Peace 
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Plan of September 1982 which was based on the Camp David Accords and 
Resolution 242. The relevant part of this plan reads as follows: 
"Beyond the transition period, as we look to the future of the West Bank and 
Gaza, it is clear to me that peace cannot be achieved by the formation of an 
independent Palestinian state in those territories ... But it is the f irm view of 
the United States that self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and 
Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just and 
lasting peace. 11342 
Finally, Israeli claims that it has acquired a title to Gaza and the West 
Bank . 343 
The other view is that the Camp David Accords conceivekthe formation of a 
Palestinian state in i3aza and the Vest Bank af ter the transitional period, and 
was strongly supported by Egypt on a number of grounds. 
The reference in paragraph A. 1(c) to the idea that the final solution "must 
recognise the legitimate right" of the Palestinian people should be considered 
in conjunction with the phrase providing that the negotiations on the final 
status shall be "based on all the provisions and principles of the U. K. Security 
Council Resolution 242.1' It f ollows that the exercise of the right to 
self-determination would be the only logical conclusion which could reasonably 
be derived from the meaning of the two phrases. As Ambassador Nabil El Arabyt 
former Egyptian representative to the U. N., put it: 
Jk 
nit is inconceivable to entertain the tought that an agreement to confirm the tl- 
application of Resolution 2421 which entails withdrawal from the West Bank and 
Gaza and the recognition of the legitimate rights of -the Palestinian people, 
could be misconstrued and presented as limiting the exercise of the most 
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fundamental and sacred of these rights. The exercise of the right to 
self-determination is inevitably the only logical conclusion that could 
reasonably be derived from the binding commitments arrived at Camp David. 11344 
To construe the Accords as limiting the rights of the Palestinian people to 
self-determination would prejudice them as against other groups in two aspects. 
It would run counter to the various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly$ 
between 1969 and 1975 which call for respect for and the implementation of the 
inalienable rights of the Palestinians to self-determination, national 
independence and sovereignty. In particular, resolution 3236 (XXIX) on November 
22,1974 which reads in part as follows: 
11 ... Recognizing that the Palestinian people is entitled to self-determination in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
... Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, 
including: 
(a) The right to self-determination without external interference; 
(b) The right to national independence and sovereignty ; 11=446 
Furtheri the Accords should not be construed in a manner that implied that the 
authors intention was to violate a principle of the highest international order. 
while it is widely accepted that self-determination is or has become a 
recognized principle of modern international law 34S some believed that it is a 
Jun nngens principle under the General Assembly practice. Professor Vedell 
arguing on behalf of Morocco in the Western Sahara CagP, stated: 
AIf 'tthere is jus cogens in the United Nations in matters of self-determination, 
it consists of decolonization as an end result rather than self-determination as 
a technique or method. 0347 
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One cannot accept completely, from a textual standpoint, the view that the 
Treaty contains some provision depriving the Palestinians of such a right. Thus, 
there is no need to resort to the travaux preparataires in order to investigate 
the Israeli intention, whatever it was. 
Further, the American rejection of the formation of a Palestinian state in the 
Vest Bank and Gaza, as in the Reagan Plan which based on the Camp David 
formula, should not be regarded as a legal interpretation of the Accords. 
Rather, it is a political plan which was based on strategic and ýolitical 
considerations rather than on legal interpretation. 
1-cr clonclua-p-. -. -ýne must "adzit that a reasonable understanding of the relevant 
provisions of the Accords suggests that they neither exclude the possibility of , 
nor provide for, the formation of a Palestinian state. The whole matter was left 
to be decided in the future. 
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It is generally recognized that in any peace settlement in the Middle 
East the solution to the question of Jerusalem and its Holy Places will 
play a significant part. To a large extent this is true because 
Jerusalem is at the physical centre of the conflict and because the 
tension surrounding it is symbolic of the division between the Arabs and 
the Israelis. In the words of Sir Alec Douglas-Home: 
"There is one special problem, which in some ways symbolizes the 
Arab/Israel problem as a whole. I mean the problem of Jerusalem. 
The complexity of this problem and the depth of feeling about the 
city are so great as to make any compromise between the positions of 
the two sides hard to conceive. Some agreement on the status of the 
city, some agreement providing for freedom of access to the Holy 
Places and for their protection will be an essential part of a 
settlement. But this may have to be almost the last problem to be 
tackled. "' 
Ifevertheless, the Camp David Agreements contain no reference to 
Jerusalemo although a reference was included in the exchange of three 
letters appended to the instruments by Presidents Carter and Sadat and 
Prime Minister Begin. 
The Carter letter declared that the U. S. Policy on Jerusalem remained 
as stated by Ambassadors Goldberg and Yost at the United NationS2. 
The Begin letter pointed out that Israel's position was based on the 
law adopted by the Knesset an June 28,1967 according to which the 
Israeli government was empowered by decree to apply the law, the 
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jurisdiction and the administration of the state to any part of Ertez 
Israel. Under this law, the Israeli government in July 1967 decreed 
that Jerusalem was one city indivisible and the capital of the state of 
Israel. -'-' 
The Sadat letter declared Egypt's position in some detail. 4 In the 
first place, Arab Jerusalem was an integral part of the West Bank and 
Gaza and, therefore, it should be under Arab sovereignty. Egypt 
considered all the measures taken by Israel to be null and void. it 
called also for the application of the relevant Security Council 
resolutions to Jerusalem, particularly Resolutions 242 and 267. 
Further, it proposed that the essential functions in the city should be 
undivided and a Joint municipal council composed of an equal number of 
Arab and Israeli, nembers should supervise the carrying out of these 
functions. As regards the Holy Places, Sadat indicated that all people 
must have free access to the city and to enjoy free exercise of worship. 
In this respect, he proposed that the Holy Places of each faith should 
be, placed under the adminstration and control of their representatives'. 
Clearly, these letters reflected a fundamental difference of opinion 
among the participants. Israel wanted to have permanent sovereignty 
over East Jerusalem, while Egypt held that the 'Old City' should be 
returned to the Arabst as it was an integral part of Gaza and the West 
Bank. The U. S. adopted a vague position which could be construed as 
referring implicitly to the U. N. Plan for the Internationalization of 
jerusalem. r- 
Despite such fundamental differences in their positions, it was no 
secret that at the Camp David'talks they agreed after long and arduous 
discussions to a carefully-warded paragraph on this sensitive issue .7 
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This paragraph will be quoted and examined laterG. However, as Carter 
recorded, after several days of unanimous agreement, both Sadat and 
Begin decided that there were already enough controversial elements in 
the Accords9 and requested that this paragraph be deleted from the final 
text. " 
A review of the political literature on Jerusalem reveals that various 
names have been used to refer to Jerusalem or certain parts of the city, 
e. g. the Old City# the Arab City, the Walled City, Eastern Jerusalem, 
the New City, the Jewish Cityt Western Jerusalem and the Holy City. 
Moreover, in much of Arab political literature, the word Jerusalem or 
"Al Qods" is usually used to refer to the Eastern Arab sector of the 
city taken by Israel in 1967.10 These various names may cause 
confusion. It may be useful at the outset to refer to some geographical 
facts on Jerusalem to clarify the exact extent of the area under 
discussion. 
Jerusalem is located on the ridge of the Judean Mountains between the 
mountains of Beth-El in the north and of Hebron in the south. To the 
West of the city are slopes of the Judean Mountains, and to the east 
lies the Judean desert, which descends to the Dead Sea. " Jerusalemt or 
the Holy City, has three parts, the Walled City, the Arab quarter north 
of the Walled City, and the New City west of it. 
So far as the Walled City is concerned, it is the religious focus of 
Jerusalem. Within the Walled City are the three edifices that most 
link each of the three great monotheistic religions to the Holy City: 
the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, the Mosque Haram esh Sharif, and the 
Wailing Wall. It is an extremely small area, whose walls were erected 
by the Ottomans in 1542. The population within the Walled City has been 
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almost entirely Arab for over a thousand years. 12 The British Mandatory 
Government's census for 1931 found 25,183 people living within the 
Valled City at that time. Of this total, some 20,000 were Arabs (both 
Christian and Muslim), about 5,000 were Jews, with a handful of 
Armenians. Subsequent to that date, there was a steady decline in the 
Jewish population within the Walled City, accounting for 41000 in 1946 
and about 2,000 in April 1948.13 
Outside the Walled City, generally running north of the walls is an 
area populated almost entirely by Arabs. This area is known as the Arab 
quarter. 14 The words "East Jerusalem" refer to the area embracing the 
Walled City and the Arab quarter north of it. 
To the west of the Walled City is the New City, by far the most 
populous sectiong and predominantly Jewish. It was established in the 
mid-nineteenth century by a number of American Jews who sent sizable 
contributions to foster a Jewish community in the Jerusalem area16. It 
began as a housing project near the Walled City for Jews. From this 
nucleus the New City grew slowly north and west of the Walled City. The 
great bulk of the Jewish population of Jerusalem is, however, of recent 
origin. Only after the establishment of the British Mandate over 
Palestine in the 1920s did the Jewish Community in Jerusalem grow to any 
significant size. 'r, By 1931 some 46,000 Jews were living in the New 
City, and by 1946 the number had grown to 95,000, the increase primarily 
the result of Jewish immigration to Palestine following the rise of 
Hitler. By 1948 the Jewish population in the New City exceeded 
1000000.17 
In conclusion, Jerusalem is essentially two cities; an Arab East 
Jerusalem and a Jewish West Jerusalem. It is within East Jerusalem that 
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one finds virtually all of the Holy Places; tills is, in fact, the 
"Jerusalem" of religious significance. In contrast, West Jerusalem Is 
modern, more expressive of Western culture, and linked politically, 
economically and ideologically with the Israeli commi nities along the 
Mediterranean coast rather than with the immediate hinterland of the 
Holy City. '" 
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Jerusalem is one of the oldest cities in the world and was founded by 
the Canaanites in the eighteenth century B. C. Thus the city was in 
existence before the arrival of the Israelites in the land of Canaan. 
According to the Jewish Encyclopaedia, Jerusalem was expressly called a 
"foreign city" not belonging to the Israelites. - 
Since its foundation, the city has changed hands more than twenty-five 
times. We can begin with the Jebusites, a Canaanite subgroup who 
inhabited the city for some 800 years. During these years Jerusalem 
remained a Canaanite city. 21ýý, Around 1000 B. C. It was captured by David 
and claimed as the City of David. It should be noted, however, that 
when David captured the city he did not displace its original 
inhabitants, allowing them to remain in their city. Later it was 
conquered by one empire after another Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian, 
Ptolemaic, Selucid and Roman. 
In 638 A. D. the Caliph Omar captured Jerusalem for Islam. Later it was 
held by Seljuk Turks, by Christian Crusaders, and by Egyptian 
Mameluks.: 21 
During the four centuries from 151,7 to 1917, Jerusalem, as part of 
Palestine, was under the exclusive control of the Ottoman Empire. For 
four hundred years, a united city was governed by a single sovereign in 
a manner- which by and large permitted adequate pursuit of the three 
dominant religious faiths. 22 
From 1917 to 1947, Jerusalem was under British control, first as 
occupiers of the city during and imm diately after the First World War 
and then as the administering authority under the League of Nations 
mandate granted in 1922. During this period the city was governed by a 
single sovereign. 
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Thus, as far as title is concerned, we may observe that during 3000 
years of histaryt control over Jerusalem has been almost invariably 
acquired by conquest. However, in 1923, by Article 16 of the Treaty of 
Lausanne of 1923, Turkey renounced all rights and titles to Palestine 
and agreed that the future of the territory was to be settled by the 
parties concerned, i. e. the Principal Allied and Associated PowerS23. 
In fact, the "Parties concerned" had already settled the future of 
Palestine. On July 24,1922, the League of Nations, with the assent of 
the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, had granted a mandate in 
respect of Palestine to the British Government24 
Hence, as Lauterpacht rightly observed, we have a situation in which 
Turkey's title to Palestine devolved upon the Principal Allied and 
Associated Powers which, in turn, had in effect conveyed their rights to 
the League of NationS. 26 
After the grant of the mandate, sovereignty over Palestine, according 
to the prevailing view, was vested in the League and the administering 
authority acting Jointly26. In 1946, the League of Nations was 
dissolved. There was, however, no formal conveyance by the League to 
the U. N. of the rights and powers of the former in relation to the 
mandated territarieS27, l In 1950, however, the International Court of 
Justice in an advisory Opinion on the International Status nf south-West 
Afr-jr& expressed the view that the status of a mandated territory 
transferred from the League of Nations to the United Nations could be 
altered only with the consent of the United Nations. 20 
Towards the end of the British mandate, the Palestine Partition 
Resolution was adopted by the General Assembly in 1947 providing for the 
establishment of Jerusalem as corpus separmtuz under a special 
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international regime to be administrated by the Trusteeship Council of 
the United Nations. 2-: 0 Thus, the city was to fall outside the 
jurisdiction of the Jewish and Arab states envisaged by the Partition 
Resolution. The three territorial units, Jerusalem and the two 
independent states, were to be linked in an economic union. Under this 
plan, Jerusalem would have been a city of approximately equal Arab and 
Jewish populations, with Moslem Arabs more numerous than Christian 
Arabs. 30 
In 1948 the first Arab-Israeli war broke out. By the end of this war, 
Jordanian forces had seized the Arab sector of the city, while Israeli 
forces had captured Western Jerusalem. Later, on April 3 1949, Israel 
and Jordan signed an armistice agreement in which the de facto division 
of Jerusalem and its consequent non-internationalization was 
crystalized3l. Under Article 8 of this agreement free access to the 
Holy Places in the city was guaranteed by the parties. 32 
While Jordan and Israel took steps to formalize their respective 
control over East and West Jerusalem, the United Nations continued to 
discuss the internationalizion of the Holy City. On December 11,1948, 
the General Assembly asked the Palestinian Conciliation Commission to 
present "detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the 
Jerusalem area"'. In the same resolution, the General Assembly again 
affirmed its position that the Holy Places "be under effective United 
Nations supervision"33. 
During the same period, the Arab League Council, in October 1949 
adopted a resolution in favour of the internationalization of 
Jerusalem. 34 This resolution reflected a shift in Arab policy which was 
not accepted by Jordan. In 1950, the Ruler of Jordan declared the 
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unification of Jordan and the Vest Bank with East Jerusalem as a second 
capital of the new state: 3s. In the same year, the Knesset adopted a 
resolution to proclaiming Jerusalem the capital of Israe136 
From 1949 to 1967 the U. N. took no action with regard to the status of 
Jerusalem. Lauterpacht held the view that the absence of the question 
of Jerusalem from discussions in the U. N. for fifteen years meant that 
the members were content to accept the de facto unilateral control of 
Israel and Jordan over the Holy Places within their respective 
jurisdictions. 37 
In 1967 Israeli forces occupied East Jerusalem during the Six-Day War 
and the Jordanian forces which had governed the city since 1948, were 
driven out. As soon as the Israelis entered the Old City they took 
several measures to reunite the administration of the two parts of the 
city. 28 On June 27 the Israeli Knesset enacted three laws to enable the 
Israeli authorities to take the necessary measures for the unification 
of Jerusalem. Under this enactment East Jerusalem was regarded as 
part of the municipal City of Jerusalem. 39 
The Israeli action on Jerusalem provoked criticism at the United 
Nations-40 Some members described the administrative and legislative 
measures taken by Israel for the unification of the city as 
annexat JOU41. On July 4,1967, the General Assembly (by a vote of 99 to 
0 with 20 abstentions) adopted a resolution in which it expressed its 
deep concern at the situation in Jerusalem resulting from the measures 
taken by Israel to change the status of the city. The resolution 
considered the measures 'invalid' and called upon Israel to rescind 
them. 42 
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Although U. N. resolutions since 1967 have emphasized the illegality 
and nullity of Israeli actions in the Old City and called upon Israel to 
withdraw from the Old City of Jerusalem, the Israelis have refused to 
abide by the U. N. resolutions in this respect. This point will be 
discussed later. 
When the Camp David talks opened on September 5,1978, there was an 
agreement among Egypt, Israel and the United States that Jerusalem would 
be an undivided city with free access to all the Holy Shrines situated 
in the city. 43 However, the very next day, Sadat submitted a plan 
which, Inter alial called for Israel to relinquish control over Arab 
Jerusalem and for Arab sovereignty and administration to be restored 
there. The relevant version of the Egyptian proposal at Camp David 
reads as follows: 
"Israel shall withdraw from Jerusalem to the demarcation lines of the 
Armistice Agreement of 1949 in conformity with the principle of the 
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. Arab sovereignty 
and administration shall be restored to the Arab Sector. 
A joint municipal council composed of an equal number of Palestinian 
and Israeli members shall be entrusted with regulating and supervising 
the following matters:, (a) Public utilities throughout the City; (b) 
Public transportation and traffic; (c)Postal and telephone services; 
(d) Tourism. 
The Parties undertake to ensure the free exercise of worship, the 
freedom of access, visit and transit to the Holy Places without 
distinction or discrimination. 1144 
It is instructive to examine the genesis and meaning of this formulat 
since it represents thý final position taken by Egypt an the Jerusalem 
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question as expressed in Sadat's letter appended to the Treaty Like the 
military withdrawal from Egypt's territory, the legal basis of Israel's 
withdrawal from East Jerusalem was the principle of the inadmissibility 
of the acquisition of territory by force. Such language on the 
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force was taken from 
the Preamble to Security Council Resolution 242. The prevailing view 
was that Israel is obliged under the Resolution to withdraw from all the 
territories it seized in the Six-Day Var", thus rejecting all Israeli 
claims that East Jerusalem is outside the scope of the withdrawal 
envisaged by the Resolution. 
This view is consistent with the Arab League's view expressed an many 
occasions. For example, the Arab League Peace Plan adopted in Fez on 
September 9,1982 is based on several principles, among which is "the 
withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 
including Arab Al Qods"46. 
The view that Jerusalem is part of the Arab occupied territories was 
held by the US when the question of Jerusalem was debated before the 
Security Council in 1969. The US position as expressed by Ambassador 
Yost, in July 3 1969, will be examined later. It may be sufficient at 
this stage to note that he made it clear that the US considers that the 
part of Jerusalem that came under the control of Israel in the June war 
is occupied territory. 47 
So far as sovereignty is concerned, it is clear that Egyptis proposal 
on Jerusalem was not in line with the idea of the unification of 
Jerusalem. Rather, Egypt preferred a divided city-in which both the 
Israelis and Arabs could exercise full sovereignty over their 
respective sectors of the city. A divided Jerusalem with two sovereigns 
369 
was inconsistent, not only with the U. N. resolutions on Jerusalem, but 
also with Israel's position calling for a Unified Jerusalem under its 
sovereignty. 
Egypt's position was inconsistent with the special international regime 
for Jerusalem which was defined by the 1947 Partition Resolution and 
then redefined by General Assembly Resolution 149 on December 11,1948. 
It was recommended that the City of Jerusalem be established as mr-pim 
Ppparntu]a under a special international regime, to be administered' by 
the Trusteeship Council on behalf of the United Nations. This regime 
0 
was to involve the appointment of a governir, responsible to the 
Trusteeship Council, the establishment of a special police force whose 
members were to be recruited from outside Palestine, the election of a 
legislative council and the demilitarization of the City. It was 
reconnended that the internationalization should cover the entire area 
of greater Jerusalem. Thus, the city was to fall outside the 
jurisdiction of the Jewish and Arab states 'envisaged by the Partition 
Resolution. 48 
From the above, it is clear that, unlike the Egyptian proposal, the 
relevant U. N. resolutions neither approved Arab or Israeli sovereignty 
over Jerusalem nor envisaged a divided city. Further, Egypt's demand 
for Arab sovereignty over East Jerusalem was not in line with Israel's 
policy and practice with regard to East Jerusalem since, 1967 . 49 
As far as the Holy Places were concerned, Egypt's demand for the free 
exercise of worship and freedom of access to the Holy Places was 
consistent, with the relevant U. N. resolutions - indeed perhaps the 
expression "free exercise of worship" was taken from Article, 13 of the 
Mandate over Palestine-60 
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Nevertheless, it may be noted that, while Article 15 of the Mandate 
provided that the freedom of access to the Holy Places and the free 
exercise of worship were subject to the maintenance of public order and 
morals, Egypt's proposal contains no similar limitations or conditions. 
At this points it is worth mentioning that Israel's Draft Resolution 
submitted to the U. N. with regard to the Holy Places an November 1947 
suggested a similar restriction. Article 4(7) of this Draft reads: 
"Subject only to requirements of national security, public order and 
decorum, healtho liberty of access, visit and transit to the Holy Places 
in Jerusalem shall be accorded to all persons without distinction in 
respect of nationality in conformity with the rights in force an 14 May 
194B. "11 
A similar restriction can be found in Article 29 of the Draft Statute 
for the City of Jerusalem prepared by the Trusteeship Council: 
"Subject only to the requirement of public order and security and of 
public morals. and public healthl freedom of entry into and of temporary 
residence in the City shall be ensured to all foreign pilgrims and 
visitors without distinction as to nationality or faith. 1162 
Similarlyl Article 13(b) of Part III of the original Partition 
Resolution 181 subjected the free access to the Holy Places and the free 
exercise of worship to the requirement of public order and decorum-, " 
The formulation of the paragraph on the proposed Joint municipal council 
seems to imply that the administration of the city would be shareds 
with the authority of both the Palestinians and Israelis extending to 
political and economic spheres as well as other matters. Such a re- 
division of the administration of the city was not accepted by Israel. 
It could also mean that. the Palestinians would participate in the 
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administration of the western part of the city, the sector upon which 
Israel had exercised de facto full sovereignty since 1948. 
Finally, Egypt's proposal defined the final line of the Israeli 
withdrawal from East Jerusalem in terms of the Armistice line of 1949. 
Such reference to the 1949 Armistice Agreement between Jordan and Israel 
could mean that Egypt was rejecting the Israeli demand to establish a 
new and final borderline in Jerusalem which would be different from the 
pre-June 1967 line. 64 
The Egyptian draft on Jerusalem provoked sharp criticism among the 
Israeli delegation-66 The draft was totally unacceptable even as a 
starting point for negotiations for several reasons. The language on the 
inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war had consistently been 
objected to by the Israelis. 
Also, the reference to an Israeli withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 line or 
the 1949 armistice line was contrary to Israel's long-standing position 
that the pre-June line did not constitute a final and permanent 
international boundary. 66 
Further, so far as sovereignty over East Jerusalem is concerned, the 
Israelis were not willing to give it up to the Jordanians or the 
Palestinians. As we shall discuss later, the Israelis have their own 
legal claims in respect of sovereignty over East Jerusalem. 67 
Finally, had Egypt's proposal been accepted, Jerusalem would have 
been re-divided again. Israel was not willing to accept such a re- 
division. Moreover, before entering the negotiationst there existed an 
implicit agreement among the parties that the Holy City must remain 
undivided. 58 
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Predictably, the sharp differences between the Egyptians and the 
Israelis resulted in deadlock on the Jerusalem question. 
The Americans attempted to break the deadlock. Carter, who was 
unofficially informed by Sadat that Egypt's proposal did not represent 
its, final position, r-11 set about drafting an American proposal which he 
hoped would bridge the gap between the parties. 
on September 10, an American draft was submitted. Paragraph B(5) of 
this draft dealt with the Jerusalem question in the following terms: 
"Jerusalem, the city of peace, shall not be divided. It is a City holy 
to Jewl Muslim and Christian and all peoples must have free access to it 
and enjoy the free exercise of worship and the right to visit and 
transit to the Holy Places without distinction or discrimination. The 
Holy Places of each faith will be under the administration of their 
representatives. For peace to endure, each community in Jerusalem must 
be able to express freely its cultural and religious values in an 
acceptable political framework. A representative municipal council shall 
supervise essential functions in the city. An agreement on relationships 
in Jerusalem should be reached in the negotiations dealing with the 
final status of the West Bank and Gaza. "60 
Clearly, this was a carefully-worded paragraph in respect of which some 
nbservations require to be made. 
In the first place, - we may observe that the key features of the 
Jerusalem clause in the American plan closely parallel certain 
recommendations of a 1975 Middle East Study Group convened by the 
Brookings Institution. 61 According to the Report of this Study Groups 
the Jerusalem question could only be resolved within the framework of a 
general settlements if the following criteria, as a minimum, were 
373 
fulfilled: (a) there should be unimpeded access to all the Holy Places 
and each should be under the custodianship of its own faith;. (b) there 
should be no barriers dividing the city which would prevent free 
circulation throughout it; (c) each national group within the city 
should, if it so desires, have substantial political autonomy within the 
area where it predominates. 62 
The wording of the American draft distinguished between the secular 
administration of the City of Jerusalem an the one hand# and the 
religious administration of the Holy Shrines an the other. In respect 
of the formerl the text contained no clear language on the question who 
would be responsible for the secular administration of the city. 
While it referred to a "representative municipal council" to "supervise 
the essential functions", there was no clear indication of the 
composition of this council or what was meant by "essential functions. " 
Clearly, this vague language was deliberately employed. So f ar as 
religious administration is concerned, the text made it clear that the 
Holy Places of each faith would be under the administration of their 
representatives. 
The American attitude towards the religious places was in line with 
the U. S. policy under President Lyndon Johnston, in particular his 
statement of June 19,1967: 
"There must be adequate recognition of the special interest of the 
three great religions in the Holy Places of Jerusalem. 1163 
This statement drew a distinction between the City of Jerusalem on one 
hand and the Holy Places on the other. The U. S. I under this statement# 
was only interested in the Holy Places. 
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Moreover, this clause, unlike Egypt's proposal, contained no mention 
of restoring Arab sovereignty over East Jerusalem. Nor did it refer 
to any Israeli withdrawal from the Old City to the pre-June lines. To 
say this is not to interpret the American proposal as ruling out any 
possible Israeli withdrawal or the restoration of Arab sovereignty over 
East Jerusalem. In fact, the draft made it clear that the final status 
of the city must be negotiated between the parties concerned. 
The reference to a "municipal council" was taken from Egypt's draft. 
Yet, the Americans avoided any reference to the composition of that 
council. In other words, they deleted Egypt's phrase that the Council 
was to be composed of an equal number of Palestinian and Israeli 
members". Undoubtedly, the aim of such deletion was to satisfy the 
Israelis - Further, the functions of that council were not defined. The 
term "essential functionsis provided no clear indication in'this respect. 
One must admit that many practical difficulties might arise in respect 
of this composition and the functions of that council. The only 
alternative to overcome such difficulties was clear language. 
The phrase "each community in, Jerusalem must be able to express freely 
its cultural and religious values in an acceptable political framework" 
was used to satisfy the aspirations of the Arab Palestinians in 
Jerusalem. Clearly, it implied some kind of autonomy for the Arab 
society in Jerusalem. Ve may observe that the word "must" was used 
instead of other words, such as "should" or "may", in order to emphasize 
the meaning intended, i. e. that Arab affairs were to be taken out of the 
hands of the Israelis. In other words, considerable local autonomy 
should be guaranteed to both the Palestinians and Israelis in Jerusalem. 
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This idea, as mentioned earlier, was taken from the recommendations of 
the 1975 Middle East Study Group on Jerusalem 
With regard to free access to the city and the freedom of worship, the 
American draft, like Egypt's draft, did not provide that such freedom of 
worship could be subjected to conditions of Israel's national security 
or public order. 
Finallyt no reference to any form of internationalization of Jerusalem 
was made. The U. S. had obviously abandoned its earlier view an the 
internationalization of Jerusalem and left the future of the city to be 
decided by its inhabitants and not by any outside power. 
From an Israeli perspective, the text was acceptable. It contained no 
mention of an Israeli withdrawal from East Jerusalem. Nor did it refer 
to any restoration of Arab sovereignty over East Jerusalem. Alsoo 
reference to the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force 
was deleted. Finally, there was no reference to the city being 
divided. Begin described this text as "a beautiful number, deeply 
appreciated and positive. 1'r-A Yet, Begin proposed the insertion of the 
words "the capital of Israel" after the word "Jerusalem! "Or- so as to 
read "Jerusalem the capital of Israel. " Begin's proposal was dropped 
when Dayan ridiculed the idea that Sadat might accept such wording. " 
The Egyptians, on the other hand, believed that this text reflected a 
substantial retreat from the previous US position. 6 7 Carter tried, to 
convince Sadat that it would be better not to attempt to solve the 
Jerusalem problem at Camp David. Rather, it was better for Sadat to let 
y, ing Hussein and others share the responsibility for any agreement 
concerning the Holy City. c-0, However, perhaps because of the pressure 
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exercised on Sadat by the Egyptian delegation, Sadat asked the Americans 
to amend their text. 
Consequently, the Americans amended the Jerusalem clause to be read as 
follows: "Jerusalem, the city of peace, is holy to Judaism, Christianityl 
and Islam. and all peoples must have free access to it and enjoy the 
free exercise of worship and the right to visit and transit to the holy 
places without distinction or discrimination. The holy places of each 
faith will be under the administration and control of their 
representatives. A municipal council representative of the inhabitants 
of the city shall supervise essential functions in the city such as 
public utilities, public transportation, and tourism and shall ensure 
that each community can maintain its own cultural and educational 
institutions. "69 
There are three differences between the original and the amended texts. 
While the original version contained no mention of the proposed 
municipal councill the phrase "representatives of the inhabitants of the 
city" was inserted after the word "municipal council. " The purpose of 
this addition was to confirm the idea that the Arab inhabitants would 
participate in the administration of the city. 
The amended version provided three examples of the term "essential 
functions-" Indeed, the phrase "such as public utilities, public 
transporation and tourise, could mean that the secular administration 
of the city would be shared with the authority of Arab and Israeli 
inhabitants extending to civic9 public, economic and religious life of 
the city. 
The first draft did not specify which authority would be responsible 
for guaranteeing that each community could maintain its own culture and 
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educational institutions. The amended draft made it clear that the 
municipal council was to assume this responsibility. 
Despite these amendments which favoured the Arab inhabitants of 
Jerusalem, the version remained acceptable to the Israelis so long as it 
did not call for their military withdrawal from, nor refer specifically 
to the restoration of Arab sovereignty over, East Jerusalem. 
As to the Egyptians, Sadat, who was partly satisfied by the amended 
text, was 'induced' by Carter to accept the text on the understanding 
that there would be an exchange of letters confirming the historic U. S. 
position that East Jerusalem was part of the West Bank and Gaza . 70 
on September 14, Sadat informed Carter that he could only accept the 
Jerusalem clause if provision was made for the flag of Islam to fly over 
Islamic Holy Places, although he expected that Begin would be reluctant 
to agree to this because of Its symbolism of savereignty, 71 As 
expected, Begin rejected this proposal. 
Yet, on September 16, the second last day of the Camp David Conferencet 
Carter told the Israelis that Sadat accepted the paragraph as drafted$ 
but that he wanted "a separate exchange of letters so that each nation 
could make public its own different ideas as part of the official 
records. " "The Israelis would not have to participate in the exchange" 
Carter added "but could let their views be known if they preferred. "" 
In accordance with Carter's promise to Sadat, the Americans prepared a 
draft letter stating the U. S. position on Jerusalem. It read in part as 
follows: 
"In the official US view East Jerusaelm should be considered occupied 
territories subject to the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949 
and its final status should be resolved in future negotiations. "73 
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The wording of the draft indicates clearly that, so far the final. 
status of Jerusalem was concerned, the US would support the withdrawal 
of the Israeli forces and the restoration of Arab sovereignty over East 
Jerusale M. 74 
In spite of the fact that there was nothing new in the formulation of 
this letter, which has been taken from statements by two former U. S. 
ambassadors to the United Hations, 7& the Israelis sharply criticized it. 
They maintained that Carter had reversed his earlier stand on supporting 
the unification of JerusaleM. 76 They also considered that the wording of 
the draft letter was in conflict with the agreed paragraph an 
JerusaleM. 77 Further, the Israelis doubted that international law 
accorded any legal effect to a presidential pronouncement appended to an 
international treaty. 70 Dayan argued: 
"The agreement to be signed was an Israel-Egypt Agreement. Why then 
should it include a statement an the position taken by the United 
States? Was it an agreement between Israel and the United StateS? "79 
Hence, the Israelis declared that they would not sign any agreement to 
which was attached a letter proclaiming Jerusalem as occupied territory. 
Begin threatened to walk out of the negotiations, and he seemed to be 
serious. 90 This resulted in a crisis which threatened to terminate the 
whole proceedings. 81 
Ultimately, it was agreed that the U. S. would restate its position by 
referring to the Goldberg and Yost statementsp but would not quote from 
them. 132 
From the Israeli view, Carter's decision to omit any specific reference 
to Jerusalem as an occupied city made the letter impartial. 83 The 
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reference to Goldberg could satisfy Begino and the reference to Yost 
could satisfy Sadat in part. 84 
However, Quandt believed that "in substantive terms this changed 
nothing. But somehow Begin was able to accept the less precise 
formulation. "86 
Ve-proceed now to examine the final position adopted by Egypt, Israel 
and the U. S. as expressed in the letters appended to the Accords. 
As regards the U. S.. we may observe at the outset that, in spite of the 
fact that it signed the Camp David agreements simply as a witness and 
not as a party, it found it necessary and proper to publicbyý define its 
position on the issue of Jerusalem. On no other issue did the U. S. feel 
compelled to set forth an official independent viewpoint in the final 
document. " 
The Carter letter, which was directed to Sadat and not to Begin, 07 read 
in part as follows: 
"The position of the United States on Jerusalem remains as stated - by 
Ambassador Goldberg in the United Nations General Assembly on July 140 
1967, and subsequently by Ambassador Yost in the United Nations Security 
Council on July 1,1969. " 88 
Two points are worthy of note. The reference to statements by Goldberg 
and Yost indicates clearly that there was nothing new in respect of the 
U. S. position vis a vis Jerusalem. In facts the former position, adopted 
by the U. S. at the U. N. in 1967 and 1969, had been examined in, several 
writings. It does not seem necessary, therefore, to repeat what had been 
said. 89 Suffice it to refer in brief to the main outlines of the 
Goldberg and Yost statements, noting the argument that there existed a 
contradiction between the Goldberg statement and that of Yost. 
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On July 14,1967 Ambassador Goldberg had occasion to deliver a major 
policy address to the General Assembly on the subject of Jerusalem. In 
the face of Israel's refusal to restore the status quo ante as called 
for by the Assembly's July 4 Resolution, Pakistan had introduced a new 
draft resolution deploring Israel's stand and reiterating the call to 
Israel to rescind all measures taken. Its draft resolution was adopted 
without opposition (by a vote of 100 to 0 with 18 abstentions including 
the US). ` In explaining the US vote, Ambassador Goldberg indicated his 
country's position on the Jerusalem question. "' The key features of 
this position can be summarized briefly. 
As regards the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, there was no 
mention of Israel as a military occupier. Nor was there any reference to 
the restoration of Jordanian or Arab sovereignty over East Jerusalem. 
As regards the legislative and administrative measures taken by Israel 
for the unification of Jerusalem, Goldberg indicated that these measures 
do not constitute annexation in the view of the US Government. In his 
words: 
"The resolution (of the General Assembly on July 4) does not fully 
correspond to our views$ particularly since it appears to accept by its 
call for recission of measures that the administrative measures taken 
contitute annexation of Jerusalem by Israel. '192 This may be understood 
as implying American approval of the measures , taken by Israel. Such 
approval, however, had no legal effect on the future status of the Holy 
City. This was clearly indicated by Goldberg: 
,, With regard to the specific measures taken by the government of Israel 
on June 28,1 wish to make it clear that the United States does not 
accept or recognize these measures as altering the status of Jerusalem. 
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My Government does not recognize that the administrative measures taken 
by the Government of Israel on June 28 can be regarded as the last word 
on the matter, and we regret that they were taken. We insist that the 
measures taken cannot be considered other than interim and provisional, 
and not prejudging the final and permanent status of Jerusalem. "" 
This view on the effect of the Israeli measures was based on a 
statement issued by the State Department on June 28,1967, which 
confirmed that such action "cannot be regarded as determining the future 
of the Holy Places or the status of Jerusalem In relation to them. ", "* 
As far as the Holy Places were concerned, Goldberg quoted his earlier 
statement to the General Assembly on July 3,1967: 
"the safeguarding of the Holy Places, and freedom of access to them for 
all, should be internationally guaranteed; and the status of Jerusalem 
in relation to them should be decided not unilaterally but in 
consultation with all concerned. 1196 
Goldberg made it clear that the above statement represents the 
considered and continuing policy of the United States Government. 
However, Goldberg provided no answer to the question of who would be 
responsible for guaranteeing this freedom. Presumably this question 
would be determined in the future by all the parties concerned. There 
was no specific reference to Israel assuming this responsibility. 
Goldberg indicated that the United States did not "believe the problem 
of Jerusalem can realistically be solved apart from the other related 
aspects of Jerusalem and of the Middle Eastern situation. "ve As to who 
would have permanent sovereignty over East Jerusalem, Goldberg referred 
to the U. S. vote for the Latin American draft which called for the 
internationalization of Jerusalem. " Taking into account the fact that 
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the statement did not call for restoration of Jordanian sovereignty 
over, nor approved Israel's occupation off East Jerusalem, it is clear 
that the U. S. adhered to its previous position that neither Jordan nor 
Israel should have sovereignty over the city; rather they should 
administer the city under the supervision of the United Nations. ", 
There is no better quotation summarizing the U, S. policy on Jerusalem 
than that contained in a State Department memorandum: 
"We believe that an agreement between Israel and Trans-yordan looking 
toward the division of Jerusalem into two areas to be administered by 
the two countries would be an appropriate solution to the problem. 
However the United States cannot support any arrangement which would 
purport to authorize the establishment of Israeli or Trans-Jordanian 
sovereignty over parts of the Jerusalem area in view of the United 
Nations resolutions and our support thereof. The Israelis and Trans-, 
Jordanians should be supervised in their administration of the City by a 
United Nations Commissioner, the principle of the ifiternationalization 
of Jerusalem, in favour of which the world community has votedt thus 
being maintained. "" 
In January 19,1969 the Nixon administration replaced the Johnston 
administration. Later that year, when the issue of the status of 
Jerusalem arose before the Security Council as a result of a Jordanian 
complaint about Israeli action in the city, the new U. S. Ambassador to 
the U. N., Charles Yosto had occasion to deliver a major policy 
statement to the Security Council, upon-the US voting for Resolution 267 
of July 3,1969 which sharply criticized Israel for its policy in 
Jerusalem. 100 In addressing the Council on July 1, Yost defined his 
country's Jerusalem policy. The relevant and most important paragraph 
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of his speech described Israel as a military occupier- of East 
Jerusalem: 
"The United States considers that the part of Jerusalem that came under 
the control of Israel in the June war, like other areas occupied by 
Israel, is occupied territory and hence subject to the provisions of 
international law governing -the rights and obligations of an occupying 
power. 11101 
A careful study of the other parts of the Yost speech suggests that, 
with the exception of the above paragraph, it was in line with the views 
expressed by Goldberg in 1967. 
An important question arises here in respect of the above-mentioned 
statements, namely, whether there is a difference between the U. S. 
Jerusalem policy under Goldberg and that under Yost. According to a 
reasonable viewl the U. S. policy expressed by Yost represented a radical 
departure from the previous U. S. position indicated by Goldberg-102 The 
extent to which the Yost statement diverged from the views expressed by 
his predecessor at the U. N. is best revealed in a letter which appeared 
in the New York Times in March 1989, written by Goldberg himself: 
"The facts are that I never described Jerusalem as occupied territory. 
Ambassador Yost did, in his speech of July 1 1969, under instructions 
from President Nixon, and his statement represented a departure from the 
policy I, President Johnston and the Department of State pursued with 
respect to Jerusalem during the period of my tenure . In a number of 
speeches at the U. N. in 1967,1 repeatedly stated that the armistice 
lines fixed after 1948 were intended to be temporary. This, of coursep 
was particularly true of Jerusalem. At no time in these many speeches 
did I refer to East Jerusalem as occupied territory. I made it clear 
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that the status of Jerusalem should be negotiable and that the armistice 
lines dividing Jerusalem -were no longer viable. In other words, 
Jerusalem was not to be divided again. " 
This is a far cry from Ambassador Yost's statement that we conceived 
East Jerusalem to be occupied territory, to be returned to Jordanian 
sovereignty ... "101 
On the other hand# the Carter administration held the view 
that the Yost approach did not represent a departure from the preceding 
policy as expressed by Goldberg. ` According to this view, the concept 
of Jerusalem as occupied territory was inaugurated by Goldberg and 
continued by Yost. 106 
The weakness of this view lies in the fact that there is no reasonable 
explanation as to why, in his letter to Sadat, President Carter found 
it necessary to refer to both U. N. statements when the Yost statement 
included everything in the Goldberg statement and even went beyond it. 
In considering the legal aspect of the U. S position, particularly the 
reference to East Jerusalem as occupied territory subject to the law of 
military occupation$ some comments must be made. 
Clearly, the Americans did not accept Israel's argument that it had a 
better title to East Jerusalem than Jordan. Nor did they accept Israel's 
argument that the'law of military occupation was not applicable to the 
Vest Bank and Gaza because Israel replaced a military occupier in East 
Jerusalem, i. e. Jordan. The argument that the law of military 
occupationlor- cannot be applied unless the ousted sovereign was 
legitimate has been discussed earlier. 107 
The American position regarding East Jerusalem was consistent 
with the prevailing view that Resolution 242 required Israel to withdraw 
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from all the territories occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem. It 
was also consistent 'with several other U. N. resolutions, particularly 
Security Council Resolution 465 of March 1,1980, which criticized 
Israel for its settlement- policy in the Vest Bank on the ground that it 
consituted a "flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention" and 
called on Israel to rescind the measures taken and "to dismantle the 
existing settlements and in particular to cease, on an urgent basis, 
the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab 
territories occupied since 1967l including Jerusalem. "100 
The precise meaning of the term "occupied territory" had not been 
clarifiedt i. e. whether the term is taken to refer to territories 
occupied from Jordan or territories occupied f rom the United Nations. 
It might be argued that the U. N. retained a residual right of 
sovereignty in Jerusalem from 1948 to 1967 and Israel's entry into East 
Jerusalem constituted occupation of territory appertaining to the United 
Nations'09. At this point, it is worth mentioning that the U. N. 
Committee on the Exercise of Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian 
People, in a paper issued in 1979 an the status of Jerusalem, contended 
that General Assembly and Security Council resolutions after 1967, which 
declared that Israeli actions tending to change the legal status of 
Jerusalem were invalid, must be taken to refer to the legal status of 
nnrpus separatum of the original Partition Resolution. 110 Thus a 
distinguished writer suggested that Israel withdraw from East Jerusalem 
to be replaced by a U. N. administration. "I 
The term "occupied territory" could also be understood as referring to 
territory occupied from Jordan. In the years immediately after the 1967 
war, there was an international understanding that Jordan possessed a 
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reversionary interest in the Vest Bank and was the legitimate 
negotiating party for the conclusion of a treaty of peace with Israel 
whereby the Vest Bank, including East Jerusalem, with allowances for 
minor territorial adjustment, would finally become de jure a recognized 
part of Jordan's territory. 112 The legal argument advanced to Justify 
Jordanian rights to the Vest Bank was that the 1949 Armistice Agreement 
between Israel and Jordan, coupled with the 1950 Jericho petition'13 of 
Arab 'notables for Arab Palestine to be joined to Transjordan brought 
about a situation whereby Jordan became not only the de facto but the 
legitimate sovereign authority -in the Vest Bank and East Jerusalem. 
These acts, it was said, constituted a form of self-determination. 
According to. this argument, U. N. resolutions since 1967 calling for the 
return of the status quo ante in East Jerusalem refer to the restoration 
of Jordanian authority. 114 
The view that the term "Occupied territory" should be understood to 
describe territories occupied from Jordan can be supported by the terms 
of the Rogers Peace Plan, announced by the American Secretary of State 
on December 9,1967-111 He referred to a Jordanian authority in East 
Jerusalem In the following terms: 
"Arrangements for the administration of the unified city should take 
into account the interests of all its inhabitants and of the Jewish 
Islamic and Christian communities. And there should be roles for both 
Israel and Jordan in the civic, economic and religious life of the 
city. "Is 
Clearly, the formulation of this last sentence implied that the 
administration of the city would be shared, with the authority of both 
Jordan and Israel extending to the political and economic spheres, as 
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well as the religious. In other words, it can be argued, Jordanian 
sovereignty was to be restored. 
Such an approach, which implied a recognition of the legality of 
Jordanian sovereignty in East Jerusalem, was inconsistent with the 
previous U. S. policy Since 1948, the U. S. had considered the Jordanian 
entry into East Jerusalem to be illegal. In 1948 the U. S. representative 
in Security Council referred to the Ruler of Jordan as "a ruler who is 
occupying land outside his domain. The illegal purposes of this 
government invading Palestine with armed forces ... is against the peace 
... It is an invasion with a definite purpose ... Therefore we have the 
highest type of the international violation of law. "' 17 
Subsequently, the US refused to recognise Jordan's annexation of the 
Vest Bank, including East Jerusalem. lie 
The position of the U. S. concerning the final status of Jerusalem is not 
clear. Vhile the paragraph agreed on Jerusalem, as well as the 
Goldberg statement, referred to a united city and functional 
internationalizationt the Carter letter, by reference to the Yost 
statement, endorsed a separate status for East Jerusalem, and hence 
implicitly a commitment by the U. S. to support two legal regimes in the 
city. These two lines of policy, as has been rightly observed, were 
divergent and could not readily be reconciled. 119 
Subsequently, the Carter administration provided more clarification on 
that point. In Carter's reply to questions submitted to him by King 
Hussein of Jordan in respect of the final status of Jerusalem, the U. S. 
President stated: 
"The final status of Jerusalem should not be prejudged by the unilateral 
actions undertaken in Jerusalem since the 1967 war. Vhatever solution 
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is agreed upon should preserve Jerusalem as a physically undivided city. 
It should provide for free access to the Jewish, Muslim and Christian 
Holy Places without distinction or discrimination for the free exercise 
of worship. It should assure the basic rights of all the City's 
residents. The Holy Places of each faith should be under the full 
authority of their representatives. 0120 
It is noteworthy that the word "physically" was deliberately inserted 
b, efore the word "undivided". Taking into consideration the fact that 
previous U. S. statements used the word "undivided" without being 
preceded by the term "physically", one may wonder as to the precise 
meaning of this term. FortunatelYj Secretary Vance interpreted its 
meaning in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
on March 21,1980. He stated: 
@'What is meantj very simply, was that it should be physically undivided; 
that never again should there be barbed wire between the various parts. 
It did not purport to say what the final political solution should be. 
It did not speak to of the ultimate question of sovereignty. It talked 
of the question of what the City would be in terms of its physical 
characteristics. " 121 
He concluded his testimony by stating that "Our policy on this city has 
remained consistent under the past four Presidents. "122 
The Begin letter appended to the Agreements defined Israel's position 
in the following terms: 
on 28 June 1967l Israel's Parliament (the Knesset) promulgated and 
adopted a law to the effect : "The Government is empowered by a decree 
to apply the law, the Jurisdiction and administration of the state to 
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any part of Eretz Israel (Land of Israel-Palestine)" , as stated in that 
decree. 
On the basis of this law, the Government of Israel decreed in. July 1967 
that Jerusalem is one city indivisible, the capital of the State of 
Israel. " 123 
The wording of this letter indicates clearly that there is no change in 
Israel's position vis-a-vis East Jerusalem since its occupation in 
1967, particularly the administrative and legislative measures taken on 
June 20,1967. The argument for and against these Israeli measures is 
well known. It does not seem necessary to repeat what has been said in 
this respect, 124 and it may be sufficient to refer in brief to such 
measures and their legality under international law. 
Immediately after its occupation of East Jerusalem during the 1967 war, 
Israel removed the barriers of brick and barbed wire separating the two 
parts of Jerusalem and proceeded to treat the city as one united 
municipal entity. 
126 
This situation was formalized by the Knesset in the enactment of three 
laws on June 27,1907. The first was the Law and Administration 
Ordinance Amendment Act which provided that Israeli "law, jurisdiction 
and administration shall extend to any area of Eretz Israel designated 
by the Government by order". 126 The second effected an amendment to the 
1934 Municipalities Ordinance Act to enable the Minister of the Interior 
to expand by proclamation the area of the municipal corporation to 
include any area designated under the Law and Administration Ordinance 
Act'27- And finally, the third law provided for the protection of the 
Holy Places and for untrammeled freedom of access to then120 The next 
day, June 28,1967, the Minister of the Interiorl on the basis of the 
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revised Law and Administration Ordinance Act, designated an area 
embracing East Jerusalem and outlying areas as part of the municipal 
City of Jerusalem. The administrative unification of the City was 
thereby formally completed. 129 
Israel's announcement that the law, jurisdiction and administration of 
the State of Israel were being applied to East Jerusalem provoked bitter 
protest from Jordan and other statest including the U. S. 130 
The United Nations General Assembly adopted two Resolutions without 
opposition on July 4 and 14l 1967, declaring Israel's actions "invalid" 
and calling upon Israel "to rescind all measures already taken and 
desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of 
Jerusalem. " 131 Israel refused to comply, contending that no 
international or other interest would be served by the institution of 
divisions and barriers which would only sharpen tension and generate 
discrimination. 111: 22 The claim was made that Israel was responding to 
"the intrinsic necessity of ensuring equal rights and opportunities to 
all the city's residents. 11133 This answer was not accepted by the 
General Assembly. 134 
These measures were the subject of sharp criticism at the Security 
Council in several resolutions adopted in 1968,36,1969'3r- and 1971 1 37. 
For instance, Security Council Resolution 29a adopted on September 25, 
1971 confirmed that "legislative and administrative actions taken by 
Israel to change the status of the City of Jerusalem, including 
expropriation of land and properties, transfer of populations and 
legislation aimed at the incorporation of the occupied section are 
totally invalid and cannot change that status". 
391 
"Urgently calls upon Israel to rescind all previous measures and 
actions and to take no further steps in the occupied section of 
Jerusalem which may purport to change the status of the City, or which 
would prejudice the rights of the inhabitants and the interests of the 
international community# or a just and lasting peace. "138 
Reacting to this Resolution, the Israeli government issued a statement 
in which it declared its rejection in the following terms: 
"The - Government of Israel considers that there was no justification 
whatever for raising the issue of Jerusalem in the Security Council, nor 
for the Resolution adopted. The Government of Israel will not enter 
into any discussion with any political organ on the basis of this 
Resolution. Israel's policy on Jerusalem will remain unchanged. 11139 
In the period following the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, it is not 
surprising that Israeli practice has gone a long way in tying East 
Jerusalem to it through a variety of measures, including the extension 
of public services and the establishment of settlements in the area. 140 
On March 1,1980, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 
465 which criticized Israel for its settlement policy on the West Bank 
whichq it charged, was "a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention .. and .. a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, 
just and lasting peace in the Middle East. "141 The resolution called on 
Israel to rescind the measures taken and "to dismantle the existing 
settlements and in particular to cease on an urgent basis, the 
establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab 
territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem. 14142 
The Israelis' reaction an the above Resolution came very soon. Again 
they challenged the will of the U. N. On July 31,1980, the Knesset 
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passed a law which proclaimed Jerusalem the eternal capital of Israel. 
The relevant text of this law reads: 
111. Jerusalem united in its entirity is the capital of Israel. 
2. Jerusalem is the seat of the President of the State, the Knesset, and 
the Government, and the Supreme Court. 
3. The Holy Places shall be protected from desecration and any other 
violation and from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of 
the members of the different religions to the places sacred to them or 
their feelings with regard to those places. " 143 
This law was not accepted by the Egyptians who considered it to be a 
flagrant violation of what had been agreed at Camp David, and 
immediately decided to stop the autonomy negotiations with Israel. 144 
- In turno the Security Council, on August 209 1980, adopted Resolution 
478 which censured Israel for its enactment of the "basic law" an 
Jerusalem and called upon all member states maintaining diplomatic 
missions in Jerusalem to withdraw them from the City. 14S 
A final and important question arises in respect of Israel's final 
position vis-a-vis East Jerusalem, namely, whether or not the Israeli 
administrative and legislative measures taken in Jerusalem before and 
after the conclusion of the Camp David Accords were permissible under 
international law? On- the one hand, the prevailing view is that these 
measures are a flagrant violation of international law. 14r- Opposing 
this trend, on the other hand, is the views held by Israel and some 
writers supporting it, that these measures are not illegal. 
Several arguments can be advanced, in support of the view held by an 
overwhelming majority of U. N. members that the Israeli measures, were 
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illegal. Firstf it was argued that the Israeli action is in violation 
of its obligation under the Camp David Accords. 
The Egyptians argued that Israel's law, enacted on July 31,19800 
proclaiming Jerusalem the eternal capital of Israel, constituted a 
flagrant violation of the Camp David Accords. At Camp David, according 
to the Egyptians, the parties agreed that the final status of Jerusalem 
should be left to future negotiations. 147 Any review of the records of 
the negotiations confirm this agreement. It follows that Israel was 
obliged not to decide unilaterally on the final status of Jerusalem as 
it had done in 1980.148 
Perhaps, the weakness of this argument lies in the fact that there was 
no provision in the Camp David Accords or in the 1979 Peace Treaty under 
which Israel was obliged to negotiate on the future status of East 
Jerusalem. Even the Carter letter an the U. S. position concerning East 
Jerusalem was addressed to Sadat, but not to Begin. The Israelis, 
therefore, declared themselves in no way bound by what Carter had 
written to Sadat. 
it was also argued that the Israeli measures constituted annexation of 
the Arab Sectort rather than the administrative unification of the 
city. 149 If this were true, it followed that this annexation must be 
invalid under the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of 
territory by force. This is a well established and recognized-principle 
of international law. According to Quincy Wight, the application of 
this principle to the Arab-Israeli conflict "clearly required that 
Israel gained no political advantage by its occupation. "160 In 
practicet this would mean that Israel had no right to annex any part of 
the territories it occupied by military force in the Six-Day War. 161 
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The argument that these measures constituted annexation is complicated 
by the fact that Israel had not expressly claimed "sovereignty" over the 
Old City. Instead it spoke of re-unification, and of reuniting the 
administration of the two parts of the City. 162 
However, the assumption was that Israel had in law formally annexed 
East Jerusalem. A review of the views expressed by the U. N. members 
during the discussion of Resolutions 2254 adopted by the General 
Assembly on Ju ly 17# 1967 and 252 adopted by the Security Council on May 
21,1968, confirms this assumption. Ic-3 In the Ruwaydi and Maches--v. - 
Ho. 'hron Military Court Case two Judges of the Israeli Supreme Court 
accepted that East Jerusalem was formally annexed by Israel. 164 
To sum up, the argument here is based on the distinction made by 
traditional international law between occupation and annexation of enemy 
territory. Occupation is mere control of enemy territory by force of 
arms for so long as the belligerent is able to maintain his position or 
until he voluntarily gives it up. It involves no termination of the de- 
J. um rights of the regular sovereign, only a temporary, though possibly 
prolonged, de facto 
. 
suspension of the exercise of those rights. Under 
certain circumstancess occupation may be legally permitted-"' 
Annexation involves an attempt by the occupier to convert his physical 
right of occupation into a legal title to the territory. In other 
wordso he seeks to change sovereignty over the territory from his enemy 
to himself. Such annexation is prohibited. "' 
It has been contended the Isreali measures in East Jerusalem are in 
violation of the law of military occupation. The international law of 
military occupation determines the extent of the occupier's jurisdiction 
and its power to make and enforce law in the occupied territory. The 
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degree of erosion of the internal law of the territory so occupied is 
controlled in Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, as modified 
by the Fourth Geneva Convention. Article 43 of the former reads: 
"The authority of the power of the State, having passed de facto into 
the hands of the Occupant, the latter shall do all in his power to 
restore and ensure as far as possible, public order and safety, 
respecting at the same time, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in 
force in the country. " IS7 
In the course of the U. N. debates on the Israeli measures in Jerusalem, 
Lord Caradon said on behalf of the United Kingdom that the Israeli 
measures in Jerusalem were invalid because they went beyond the 
competence of the occupying power as defined by international law. 158 A 
similar view was expressed by Ambassador Yost in the course of the 
Security Council debates: 
"Among the provisions of international law which bind Israel, as they 
would bind any occupier, are the provisions that the occupier has no 
right to make changes in law or in administration other than those which 
are temporarily necessitated by his security interest, and that an 
occupier may not confiscate or destroy private property. The pattern of 
behaviour authorized under the Geneva Convention and international law 
is clear: the occupier must maintain the occupied areas as intact and 
unaltered as possiblet without interfering with the customary life of 
the area, and any changes must be necessitated by immediate needs of the 
occupation. I regret to say that the actions of Israel in the occupied 
portion of Jerusalem present a different picture, one which gives rise 
to understandable concerns that the eventual disposition of East 
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Jerusalem may be prejudiced and the rights and activities of the 
population are already being affected and altered. 1116v 
Israel's measures have been said to be a "trespass upon"t and a 
"usurpation of a territory" to be administered by the U. N. 11611 
As is wellknown, the General Assembly of the United Nations recomm nded 
the internationalization of Jerusalem by its Resolutions 181 of 
November 19,19471 194 of December 11,1948, and 303 of December 9 
1949.161 
Israel undertook at the time of her application for admission to 
U. N. membership to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly 
concerning the internationalization of Jerusalem. During the prolonged 
debate that preceded Israel's application for admission, it specifically 
undertook to respect the status and the internationalization of 
Jerusalem. I r-2 The Resolution of the General Assembly of 11 May 1949, 
which recommended Israel's admission to U. N. membership, expressly 
referred'to Israel's "declarations and explanations" with respect to the 
resolutions on Jerusalem. 'r-3 Israel was bound by her "declarations and 
explanations" and could not rely an a breach of its own formal 
assurances to the U. N. to claim title over Jerusalem. 
Cattan maintained that these resolutions on the international regime 
for the City of Jerusalem are still valid and operative. To pro, ýe thist 
he referred to the U. N. resolutions deploring the Israeli measures in 
Jerusalem and to the refusal of most states to establish their 
diplomatic missions in Jerusalem. 164 
The Israeli measures were also condemned by several U. N. resolutions 
calling on Israel to rescind them and to withdraw from East Jerusalem. 
The argument here refers to U. I. resolutions adopted by the General 
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Assembly and the Security Council in reaction to the Israeli 
administrative and legislative measures taken since June 1907. We may 
refer specifically to General Assembly Resolution 2253 adopted an July 
4.1967, which was the first U. N. resolution condemning these measures: 
"The General Assembly .. 
1. Considers that these measures are invalid; 
2. Calls upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist 
forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of 
Jerusalem. 11 1 11 
Again, on July 14,1967, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2254 
wherein it expressed the deepest regret and concern at the 
noncompliance by Israel with Resolution 2253 and: " 
2. Reiterates its call to Israel in that Resolution to rescind all 
measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action 
which would alter the status of Jerusalem. ""', 
Similar resolutions were adopted by the Security Council in May 
19681671 July 1969, September 1969160 and September 1971.169 
. C)n March 11 1980 a strong resolution was adopted by the Security 
Council in which it confirmed its previous position in respect of the 
Israeli measures. The U. S. voted for this resolution, which reads in 
part: 
"The Security Council,,,, 
affirming once more that the Geneva Convention relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of Var, of 12 August 1949 is 
applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, 
including Jerusalem.... 
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Deploring the decision of the government of Israel officially to 
support Israeli settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab 
territories occupied since 1967, 
Deeply concerned by the practices of the Israeli authorities in 
implementing that settlement policy in the occupied Arab 
territories, including Jerusalem, and its consequences for the local 
Arab and Palestinian population.... 
Determines that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical 
character, demographic composition, institutional structure or 
status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 
1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof have no legal 
validity and that Israel's policy and practices of settling parts of 
its population and new immigrants in those territories constitute a 
flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of Var and also constitute a 
serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, Just and lasting 
peace in the Middle East; 
Strongly deplores the continuation and persistence of Israel in 
pursuing those policies and practices and calls upon the Government 
and people of Israel to rescind those measuresl to dismantle the 
existing settlements and in particular to cease, on an urgent basis$ 
the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the 
Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem.. . 11170 
In reaction to the Israeli law of July 1980 declaring Jerusalem in its 
entirety the capital of Israel, the Security Council on August 20,1980 
adopted Resolution 478 censuring Israel for its enactment of the "basic 
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law" on Jerusalem and calling upon all member states maintaining 
diplomatic missions in Jerusalem to withdraw them from the City. 171 
There Is also another view to the effect that Israeli administrative 
and legislative measures in East Jerusalem were not illegal. Several 
writers have attempted to find legal bases for Israel's measures in East 
Jerusalem. Three main arguments have been advanced in this respect. 
Israel, it is alleged, has acquired a legal title to East Jerusalem, 
based on the assumption either that it filled the sovereignty vacuum 
arising in East Jerusalem after the end of the Mandate (which was not 
filled by Jordan's occupation of East Jerusalem in 1948) 172, or that 
Israel acquired such title under the theory of "relative title" .1 73 
A holder of the view that Israel filled the sovereignty vacuum is E. 
Lauterpacht who stated 
"The sovereignty vacuum arising in the Old City at the end of the 
Mandate was not filled by Jordan, whose status there was one of de factG 
occupation protected by the Armistice Agreement. Once Jordan was 
physically removed for the Old City? legitimate measures - as the Israeli 
reactions to the Jordanian attack on 5th June 1967 - undoubtedly 1. 
the way was open for a lawful occupant to fill the still subsisting 
vacaricy. IfI74 
So far as the argument for Israel's relative title to East Jerusalem is 
concerned, some held that title to territory is normally based not an A 
00-/ 
claim of absolute validity but rather an one of relative validity Thust 
e. g. j in the Minquers and'Crehns case the International Court of Justice 
decided to "appraise the 
Lý 
relative strength Oýthe opposing claims to 
sovereignty. 
11176 A supporter of this view is S. Schwebel who wrote: 
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"Having regard to the consideration that Israel .. Eacted] defensively 
in 1948 and 1967.. and her Arab neighbours.. Eacted] aggressively in 1948 
and 1967 .. Israel has better title in the territory of what was 
Palestine, including the whole of Jerusalem, than do Jordan and 
Egypt-* W176 
Clearly, the argument for Israel's territorial title to East Jerusalem 
is based on the two-fold assumption: that Israel was exercising 
self-defence against Jordan whose previous territorial sovereignty over 
East Jerusalem was doubtful; 176 that the U. N resolutions on the 
internationalization of Jerusalem were no longer valid or effective 
since they contain no reference to such a concept after 1949.177 
It has been argued that the law of military occupation, under which 
these Israeli measures could be valid, is not applicable to East 
Jerusalem. According to Blum: 
"The traditional rules of international law governing belligerant 
occupation are based on a two-fold assumption, namely, (a) that it was 
the legitimate sovereign which was ousted from the territory under 
occupation, and (b) that the ousting side qualifies as a belligerent 
occupant with respect to the territary. "176 
Thusl since the Kingdom of Jordan never had the status of a legitimate 
sovereign over East Jerusalem, the rules of international law limiting 
the occupant's duty to safeguard the reversionary rights of the 
legitimate sovereign have no application as against Israel. 179 
Also, it has been argued that even if it were assumed that Israel was 
merely a "belligerent occupant" and the law of military occupation was 
applicable to the Israeli position in Jerusalem, the measures adopted 
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by Israel are largely "consistent with the technical maintenance of a 
condition of belligerent occupation". 18' 
Lauterpacht asserted that the texts of the three Israeli laws of June 
289 1967 did not include any explicit or implicit reference to a formal 
annexation of East Jerusalem. 101 Along the same lines, Israeli 
officials maintained that its moves in Jerusalem were administrative 
and not political. An example is Israel's reply, dated July 15 1967 to a 
OIL-, 
letter to UN Secretary General coaceping Resolution 2253 of the General 
N 
Assembly on East Jearusalem, wherein Foreign Minister Abba Eban, stated 
that, the term "annexation" used by supporters of the Resolution is out 
of place, and that the measures adopted relate to the integration of 
Jerusalem in the administrative and municipal spheres, and furnish a 
legal basis for the protection of the Holy Places In Jerusalem. 182 
Similarlyt the text of the Israeli law of July 31,1980 declaring 
Jerusalem the capital of Israel contained no mention of a formal 
annexation. 193 
In considering the Israeli position regarding East Jerusalem in the 
light of the above arguments against and in favour of the legitimacy of 
Israeli measures in the Old City, this writer, influenced by scores of 
relevant United Nations resolutionso inclines to support the first view. 
Certainly/, 'Lt is a matter of justied that Israel must rescind all these 
measures aiming to change the legal status of the Old City. Israel has 
to withdraw and the Palestinians should be entitled to decide their own 
future. It is equally true that it is difficult, If not impossible, for 
reasons relating to principles of international law and relevant UK 
resolutions, to accept the continuing Israeli occupation of that part of 
Jerusalem seized in 1967. However, one must admit that politicalp 
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historic, religious and strategic considerations, e4 rather than legal 
ones were and still are playing an important role in shaping Israeli 
decisions regarding East Jerusalem. This has to be taken into account 
in understanding the Israeli present and future position on this crucial 
issue. 
In the light of the preceding discussion on the final position of 
Egypt, the US, and Israel, it would be correct to assert that it is more 
likely that the resolution of the Jerusalem question would constitute 
the main obstacle in any future settlement of the Palestinian problem. 
Indeed, It is a difficult problem to solve satisfactorily. Several 
pertinent difficulties may arise in this connection. Three may be cited 
because of their importance. First, for a number of reasons, there is a 
consensus of opinion amongst all the Arab statesl as reflected in 
relevant Arab League Summit resolutions, that Arab suvereignty over 
East Jerusalem (Al Qods) must be completely restored. Secondly, 
howeverl for reasons discussed earlier, particularly in the light of the 
fact that no access to the Holy places in East Jerusalem was given to 
the Israelis when the Old City was under Arab sovereignty between 1948 
and 1907 , it is unlikely that the Israelis would accept the restoration 
of a complete Arab sovereignty over East Jerusalem. Thirdly, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, for reasons relating to principles of 
international law and relevant UN resolutionsp 
. 
to accept Israel as a 
sovereign over the Old City which it seized in the 1967 War. 
To say this is not to argue that the problem of the status of Jerusalem 
is absolutely psoluble. Indeed, three solutions have been suggested 
and the future of the Holy City ought to be based upon one of them. The 
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first solution, as put forward by the majority proposal of the UNSCOP in 
1947l is the internationalization of Jerusalem. Resolution 194 of the 
UK General Assembly provided that the city should "be accorded 
special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be 
placed under effective United Nations Control with the maximum feasible 
local autonomy for the Arab and Jewish communities"' 06. A new scheme 
for the internationalization of the city to the degree necessary to 
achieve agreement among the main parties in interest may be derived. A 
second solution, as put forward by others such as Cont Bernadotte, is 
based on three main points: no integral annexation, maximum local 
autonomy for Arab and Jewish communities, and some form of international 
guarantees of legitimate international interests. 106 A third solution is 
to return to pre-June war situation: to divide the city between two 
sovereigns. 
In the view of this writert a settlement which based generally on the 
second solution may, in the light of the present circumstances, have the 
best chances of being accepted by the parties. Perhaps, the maim 
outlines of the Brooking Institution Report of 1975 with regard to 
Jerusalem, which was adopted by the Carter administration at Camp David, 
are the most optimistic basis for a SolUtion. 187 
100 
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Certainly, the Camp David Accords and the 1979 Treaty were intended, as a 
first step, towards realizing a comprehensive peace settlement of the Arab 
Israeli conflict. It was planned that the 1979 Treaty should provide a model 
for subsequent peace treaties between Israel and other Arab states. 
The 1979 Treaty can be reduced to two broad elements, territory and the 
Palestinians. The territorial i9stips tjnder the Treaty are certainly proved te 
be a success if measured against the Palestinian clause. Clearly, the authors 
of the Treaty were aware of the fact that territorial issues were not just a 
question of lines and colours on the map; rather they touch deeply-rooted 
sentiments of individuals and groups and involve "all the complexities of 
civilization". However, when it came to disputes between the Israelis and 
Palestinians the problem was admittedly more difficult for political and legal 
reasons. 
Notwithstanding, these two elements, with some minor differences and additions, 
would form the basis for other Arab treaties with Israel, e. g., with Syria. What 
is important now is to consider the critical lessons we can learn from the 
Treaty. 
I. Tbom Terrltorlal Issues. - 
A judgement on the territorial issues under the 1979 Treaty must begin with 
its benefits. One of the critical problems of the Arab-Israeli conflict was the 
extent of the Israeli withdrawal, under Resolution 242, from the Arab 
territories occupied in 1967. The meaning attributed to the Resolution in the 
41 
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standard pro-Israel argument is that it does not require Israeli withdrawal 
from all Arab occupied territories, but requires withdrawal to such lines as 
would constitute "secure boundaries" for Israel, while the Arab states argue 
that the Resolution requires a total Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied 
territories. Correct as that latter view may be, the ambiguity regarding thý 
extent of the withdrawal has been decisively settled in the Peace Treaty which 
endorsed the concept of full withdrawal. This would no doubt affect the extent 
of the Israeli withdrawal from the rest of the Arab occupied territories. 
One component of the Egyptian- Israeli conflict was the Israeli settlement 
policy in Sinai. As Sadat admitted, one of the Israeli settlements in Sinai, 
Yamitt was among the main reasons behind the October War of 1973. So far as 
these settlements are concerned, the Israelis held the view that the settlements 
were not illegal and that such settlements were an inalienable Jewish right 
and an integral part of Israel's national security. However, regardless of 
Israel's numerous attempts to justify its settlement policy, the international 
community without any exception has consistently condemned this policy as an 
illegal measure and a, clear violation of binding international conventions. By 
endorsing the Egyptian proposal for dismantling all the Israeli settlements in 
Sinai, the authors of the Treaty adopted a reasonable attitude which 
w+rtainly in line with the general trend of international practice. Had the 
Treaty adopted the Israeli view, it would have run counter to the norms of 
international law as well as the relevant UK resolutions in this respect. In 
fact, the attitudes of the Treaty towards the Israeli settlement in Sinai were 
implicitly praised and adopted by the UK Security Council in its resolution 465 
of 1980 which calls upon Israel, for the first time, in clear and explicit 
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language, to "dismantle and cease the establishment of settlements in the 
occupied territories". ' In spite of the fact that several Israeli officials 
declared that the removal of the Sinai settlements should not be regarded as a 
precedent applicable to other Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, it 
is reasonable to suppose that the attitude of the Peace Treaty towards the 
settlements in Sinai may be looked upon as a legal precedent applicable to all 
the settlements In the occupied territories, or at least to the Golan Heights in 
Syria. 
The dispute over Israeli navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits 
of Tiran has been the occasion of the outbreak of two wars between Egypt and 
Israel in 1956 and 1967. As far as the legal regime of the Gulf of Aqaba is 
concerned, it seems clear that until the conclusion of the 1979 Treaty writers 
differed in their opinions as to the regime applicable. A number of them 
held that the waters of the Gulf of Aqaba possess the character of historic 
waters as the Gulf was an Arab mare claus= for over thirteen centuries and 
therefore should be treated as internal waters; others oppose this view, 
arguing that the Gulf and the Straits must be subject to the regime of 
territorial seas in accordance with Article 16 (4) of the 1958 Geneva 
Convention an the Territorial Sea of 1958 i. e., to a regime of non-suspendable 
innocent passage; and still others believed that the Gulf and the Straits 
constitute international waters and must be, therefore, opened for non- 
suspendable freedom of navigation similar to navigation on the high seas. 
After analysing the various claims and examining international evidence 
(treatiest uniliteral acts, etc. ), one can only conclude that the legal system 
governing the Gulf and the Straits prior to the 1979 Treaty was uncertain. No 
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better evidence may be f ound to support this suggestion than what has been 
concluded by the International Law Commission in its 1956 Special Report that 
the situation of the Gulf of Aqaba is "exceptional - possible unique"'. 
As noted earliert Article V(2) of the 1979 Treaty provides that the Gulf and 
the Straits are international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and 
non-suspendable freedom of navigation. Vhile the new regime established under 
this Article does not cause problems of practical importance in relation to 
Israeli navigation, certain difficulties have been raised as to the legal nature 
of the new regime. Some held that the authors intended to establish a regime 
that goes beyond the regime of innocent passage but that falls short of the 
freedom of navigation and overflight applicable in the high seas, i. e., to 
establish a regime analogous in the content to the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea regime of transit passage, which assures the rights of international 
community while preserving coastal stateso rights of protection and self- 
preservation. Howeverg after examining the language used and Egypt's practice 
after the 1979 Treaty, we have concluded that the new regime should be governed 
by the rules governing navigation on the high seas. No better evidence may be 
found to support this conclusion than that concluded by Reisman who indicated 
that lointerpretated logically or teleogically Camp David produces freedom of 
navigation". 3 
Concerning the state of war between Egypt and Israel which was dealt in 
Article 1(1) of the Treaty, it is important to emphasize that, by the exchange 
of instruments of ratification at the US Surveillance Post at UK-Khashiba in 
Sinai on April 25,1979, the 31-year-old state of war between Egypt and Israel 
was officially terminated. It is obvious that the termination of the state of 
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war was part of Egypt's obligation stipulated in return of recovering its 
territories occupied by Israel. Indeedt this is in line with Security Council 
Resolution 242 upon which the Camp David Accords and the Peace Treaty were 
based. Under the Resolution the formula to resolve the conflict contained two 
sets of corresponding obligations whose fulfillment would lead to the 
achievement of peace. As mentioned earlier, Article WI) of Resolution 242 
stipulates the "termination of all claims or states of belligerency". Despite 
the reference to the termination of the state of war in the text of the Treaty 
as from the date of ratification, some writers argued that the state of war had 
been legally terminated by the cessation of hostilities in 1973. The wars 
between Sweden and Poland in 1716 and between Russia and Persia in 1867 may be 
mentioned as examples where the status of war had been terkinated by simple 
cessation of hostilities. In 1950 the Security Council in its resolution 
adopted on September 25,1951 considered the state of war between Egypt and 
Israel as terminated after the cessation of hostilities under the 1949 Armistice 
Agreement. However, the prevailing view was that the state of war between 
Egypt and Israel was not terminated by the simple cessation of hostilities. In 
the-Ely. ing Tradert the Alexandria Prize Court. rejected the claimant, argumentg 
that no state of war existed between Egypt and Israel. 4 Similarly, state 
practice suggests that many states refused to regard termination of hostilities 
as analagous to the termination of the status of war, e. g., despite the 
unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan after the Second World War, the 
US, including its national courts and authoritiesl considered themselves at a 
state of war with Japan until it signed the 1950 Peace Treaty, and at a state 
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of war with Germany until it adopted the 1951 Act which ended the state of war 
between them. 
From the aboveg we may conclude that the authors of the Treaty adopted the 
reasonable view that the simple cessation of hostilities could not be regarded 
as an alternative to the formal termination of the state of war between Egypt 
and Israel which was one of the main legal features of the conf lict between 
1948 and 1979. 
The recognition of the state of Israel and the establishment of diplomatic and 
economic relations were part of the package- deal which was based on the 
formula of Resolution 242. Howevert the establishment of full diplomatic 
relationsq as well as economic relationso went far beyond Resolution 242. Under 
the Resolution, Egypt was only obliged to terminate the state of war and to 
recognize Israel's right live in secure boundariest but no economic and 
diplomatic relations were envisaged. If the 1979 Treaty is to be considered as 
a madell then, any future peace treaty between Israel and other Arab states 
would necessarily include the establishment of such relationships. 
A final benefit which deserves mentioning is that, under the 1979 Peace Treaty, 
and after the Taba Award, of September 29,1988, the permanent international 
boundary between Egypt and Israel was finally established. It is the same 
boundary as existed between Egypt and mandated Palestine as governed by the 
1906 Agreement between Anglo-Egyptian and Turkish representatives. In 
implementation of the 1979 Treaty and the Ma, Awqrdo Egypt and Israel signed 
an agreement in September 1989 whereby the final and permanent border-line 
between the two states was fixed. In fact, the eventual resolution of the 
v 
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dispute over Taba by arbitration represents an important addition to the list 
of successes of the 1979 Treaty. 
The above conclusions an the benefits of the Agreenent are in line with the 
conclusions reached by William Quandt when he referred to the political gains 
for Egypt and Israel in the following terms: 
"By these standards the Egyptian- Israeli peace treaty looks very good. 
Egypt recovered its territory and oil f ields, and was able to turn some of 
its energies from the planning of war to the challenge of development ... For 
Israel, too, the Treaty has been valuable. On the strategic level, Egypt 
today poses no military danger. This means that most of Israel's 
formidable arsenal can be aimed at deterring Syrian threats. A one-front 
war is a much less alarming prospect for Israel than a two-front war. 
Israel has also been able to meet its oil needs by purchasing Egyptian 
oil. ", 
As well as its benefits, the territorial settlement of the Egyptian- Israeli 
conflict has its defects. It would, of course, be f oolish to underestimate the 
effect of these defects upon the future of peace between Egypt and Israel and 
upon the peace process in the Middle East as a whole. 
Turning first' to the issue of compensation for the war damage and the oil 
taken 'by Israel during its occupation of Sinai, it is important to emphasize 
that the critics of the 1979 Treaty have pointed out thaýbne of its 
shortcomings is the failure to lay down definite rules of compensation and 
guidelines concerning the many problems which may arise in this respect. As 
indicated 'earlierl Article VIII of the 1979 Peace Treaty which speaks of "a 
claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims" includes a 
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f ormula which was designed to glass over the issue rather than resolve it. In 
fact, it reflects a policy of postponement, perhaps permanently, of the. 
compensation issue. 
Two difficulties have arisen concerning compensation. The f irst concerns 
cases whereq as a result of military operations and/or Israeli occupation, an 
Egyptian or foreign national has suffered a loss by reason of injury or damage 
to his property in Sinai. Ve have suggested earlier that any Egyptian citizen 
-d whose property was requisiti6n4by the Israeli settlements is entitled under 
international law to be compensated. Article 52 of the Hague Regulations 
provides "contributions in kind shall be given and the payment of the amount 
due shall be made as soon as possiblell. r- In the Kanjatzucas v. Germany Case, 
the German-Greek Mixed Arbitral Tribunal held that requisitions without 
compensation were contrary to international law: 
"Such requisitions were lawful as complied with the provisions of Article 521 
namelyl that the payment of the amount due should be made as soon as possible 
after the requisition; and that as nearly nine years had elapsed since the 
requisition and full payment had not been made, the requisition was contrary to 
International Law and afforded a good ground for the recognition of the 
competence of the Tribunal and an award of compensation". 7 
Neverthelesso under the 1979 Treaty no owner of damaged property is entitled 
to receive compensation. In other words, the 1979 Treaty, due to Israel's 
rejectiont produced nothing like Article 78 of the 1947 Peace Treaty between 
Italy and the Allied and Associated PowersO which has several provisions 
concerning compensation, in particular how a person whose property had been 
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requisited or damaged during the occupation can claim f or compensation. An 
example is Article 78 (4) which reads as follows: 
"In cases where property cannot be returned or where as a result of the war a 
United Nations national has suffered a loss by reason of injury or damage to 
property in Italy, he shall receive f rom the Italian Government compensation in 
lire to the extent of two-thirds of the sum necessary, at the date of payment, 
to purchase similar property or to make good the loss suffered". 9 
A more important problem concerning compensation is that of Israeli 
exploitation of oil fields in Sinai since the Israeli occupation began in 1967. 
Vhilst Egypt has consistently taken the Position that such exploitation violated 
international law, Israel held the view that its exploitation of the oil f ields 
was within its authority as an occupying power and thus not in violation of the 
law of military occupation. - The reasons in support of these two conflicting 
views are not our concern, nor is it intended here to repeat all that has been 
said in this respect. However, one may be entitled to assume that Egypt's 
precious oil resources could not be legally taken by a temporary belligerent 
occupant but must be safeguarded as Article 55 of the Hague Regulations 
expressly requires. No better evidence may be found to support this suggestion 
than what was concluded by the -International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 
The_Earhen. and Krupp cases that: "at the outermost limit an occupant may take 
no more property from the occupied territory - public or private, movable or 
immovable, in aggregate than is necessary to - meet the costs of the 
accupation" '"- 
It is well known that the Sinai oil f ields were producing 55% of Israel's oil 
needs, and it may be correct to say that omission of any explicit reference to 
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the issue leaves the way open for invoking all kinds of allegations which 
could no doubt affect the peace between Egypt and Israel. 
It may be added that Egypt has explicitly maintained that it is entitled under 
the provisions of the Peace Treaty to get compensation for the oil taken by 
Israel. In 1989 President Xubarak of Egypt restated this position, which was 
rejected by Israel. " 
Another important shortcoming in the territorial settlement under the 1979 
Peace Treaty is the absence of reciprocity in the provisions an the security 
requirements. Several qualified observers have maintained that Israel enjoys a 
privileged position under the provisions of the Treaty stipulating the permanent 
demilitarization of Sinai. We have indicated earlier that under Article IV of 
the 1979 Treaty and other relevant provisions, whilst a very small I-'.. - border 
area of Israeli territory was to be a limited force zone, one third of Egypt's 
territory was to be a limited force and demilitarized zone. Moreover, while 
the provisions -provided for the stationing of UK or international forces in 
Egypt's territory, only UK observers ( but not forces) will be allowed to stay 
in Israeli territory. Furthermore, Egypt would not be allowed by its own 
decision to evacuate the international forces from its territory. In ' this 
respecto Egypt needs either Israeli approval or a Security Council resolution in 
order to evacuate such foreign f orces from its own territory. Surely such 
conditions are undesirable, since they could be interpreted as denying Egypt's 
complete sovereignty over part- of its own territory. Also, these condictions 
went beyond what had been envisaged by Resolution 242 and the Camp David 
Framework Agreement. As is well-knownj both the Resolution and the Agreement 
refer to the security concerns "of all parties" and to the security of "Israel 
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and its neighbours". In the negotiations all the parties, including the US 
Government, endorsed the principle of reciprocity on the security requirements. 
No party has accepted that these requirements are to be one-sided only. There 
is no better quotation in this regard than a passage from Mahmoud Riad In 
which he indicated that: 
"if circumstances had f orced Egypt to sign on its own an agreement which 
denied it complete sovereignty over part of its own territories, then every 
Egyptian would feel that the security of Egypt was in danger and that Israel 
that attacked Egypt twice, in 1956 and 19670 might be more tempted to do so 
again in the future". 1: 2 
Bearing in mind that Article IV (4) permits that these security arrangements 
may, - at the request of either party, be reviewed and amended by mutual 
agreement of the Parties, we suggest that a revision of the conditions would 
be useful in order to lessen their shortcomings. Looked upon as a model for 
other peace treaties with Israel, such a revision of the 1979 Peace Treatyl 
which would enhance the chances for a permanent peace in the area, cannot be 
avoided. 
0 
Another type of difficulty appears to be in cases where Israel, under the 
pretext of exercising the right of self-defence, could attack an Arab state. In 
such a situation$ it is possible to anticipate a contradiction between Egypt's 
obligations under the Arab Joint Defence Pact of 1951 on one hand and its 
obligations under the 1979 Peace Treaty an the other. Article 2 of the Arab 
Defence Pact stipulates that armed aggression against any one or more member 
would be considered as an attack against all. Article 6 of that Pact provides 
for the establishment of a Joint Defence Council, which would be competent to 
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decide (by a two-third majority) whether an act of aggression had occurred. 
Thus, even if Egypt was to vote that Israel was not the aggressor in the case 
of an act of anticipatory self-defence, it would be obliged to intervene against 
Israel if two-thirds of the parties to the Defence Pact condemned Israel, whilst 
in the meantime it is obliged under Article VI (5) of the Peace Treaty not to 
intervene militarily against Israel because of its obligation under any other 
treaty. As indicated earlier Article VI of the 1979 Treaty stipulates the 
rationale of the Egyptian- Israeli Peace Treaty over other obligations which 
either State has entered. So far as this problem is concerned, Israel insisted 
that the target of Article VI is the Arab Defence Pact and therefore demands 
that Egypt must withdraw from the De fence Pact so as to avoid such a possible 
contradiction. Vhile Egypt has explicitly maintained that its obligations under 
the Defence Pact are part of its obligations under Article 51 and 52 of the UK 
Charter and therefore that it cannot renounce the Defence Pact. 
Bearing in mind that the 1979 Treaty does not provide a mechanism to deal 
with controversies concerning the interpretation and execution of the Treaty, 
the foregoing conflicting interpretations could lead in certain circumstances to 
a serious consequence which might threaten the peace between Egypt and Israel. 
Undoubtedly, the absence of any specific provision for a mechanism to deal 
with disputes concerning the interpretation and execution of the Treaty which 
are not settled by diplomatic negotiations represents an important shortcoming 
in the Treaty. A review of the Treaties of Peace of 1949 between the Allied and 
Associated Powers on the one hand and Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy and 
Romania - an the other reveals that they all included provisions for the 
settlement of disputes which may arise out of their operation; the provisions 
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are almost identical in terms. Part XI of the Treaty with Italy, for example, 
provides in Article 87 that such controversies are to be submitted to the 
Ambassadors in Rome of Great Britainj the United States, the Soviet Union and 
of France. If this dispute has not been resolved by them within a period of 
two months, 
"it shall, unless the parties to the dispute mutually agree upon another means 
of settlementl be referred at the request of either party to a Commission 
composed of one representative of each party and a third member selected by 
mutual agreement of the two parties from nationals of a third country. Should 
the two parties fail to agree within a period of one month upon the appointment 
of the third member, the Secretary-General of the United Nations may be 
requested by either party to make the appointement". 1: 3 
Likewiset the Peace Treaty with Japan which was signed in San Francisco on 
September 8,1951 provides that disputes concerning the interpretation or 
execution of the peace treaty which were not resolved by a special claims 
tribunal or by other agreed means were to be referred at the request of any 
party to the International Court of Justice for settlement. 14 
Having in their mind the importance of such a mechanism for the interpretation 
of the Treaty between Egypt and Israel, both the Egyptians and Americans in 
their proposals at Camp David in 1978 suggested in Article 2(5) and Para. A. 1. 
respectively that the parties would "accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
International -Court of Justice with respect to all disputes emanating from the 
application or the interpretation of their contractual arrangements". 
Neverthelessl Israel rejected these proposals. Instead, the parties agreed in 
Article VII that, if disputes concerning interpretation cannot be settled by 
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negotiations, they shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration. 
It is not intended here to appraise the foregoing Article. For present 
purposes, it is enough to suppose that the methods laid down by Article VII to 
deal with disputes arising out of the Treaty's interpretation are not entirely 
satisfactory. No better evidence may be found to support this suggestion than 
the failure of these methods to settle the disputes over the meaning of certain 
provisions concerning the Palestinians raised by conflicting interpretations 
submitted by the parties. This failure prevented the implementation of the 
Agreement an the West Bank. If the 1979 Treaty had established an effective 
mechanism, similar to those of the post World War II peace treaties, the 
Palestinian clause might have been implemented. 
At this point it should be added that, despite the strong argument that the 
eventual resolution of the Taba problem by arbitration represented a success of 
the methods defined in Article VII of the Treaty, nevertheless one may be 
entitled to suggest that such a success was an exception. A careful study of 
the Taba Case reveals that, whilst Israel rejected any form of arbitration over 
Taba after the failure of the negotiations to settle the problem in 1983, Egypt 
was not able to force Israel to accept arbitration for more than four years. 
Nevertheless, by reasons partly of US intensive political pressure on Israel and 
partly of Egypt's implicit threats to abrogate the Treaty, the Israeli Cabinet 
in January 1988 decided to accept binding international arbitration an the 
issue. In fact, the resolution of the dispute over Taba by means of arbitration 
was a success for American and Egyptian diplomatic efforts rather than a 
success for the vague mechanism established by Article VII of the 1979 Treaty. 
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Again, if the Treaty had provided for an effective mechanism, it would not have 
been taken more than seven years to settle the Taba dispute. 
II. Thp PalestInlanal Clamp: 
A judgement of the provisions dealing with the Palestinians under the 1979 
Peace Treaty and the Camp David Accords must begin with its defects. One of the 
essential defects of the Agreement concerning the Palestinians is that it was 
concluded in the absence of any Palestinian or any authorized person who could 
speak on behalf of the Palestinians. So far as this defect is concerned, 
attention will be paid only to a few points: 
Because the Palestinians were not legally represented at Camp David or at the 
negotiations that led to the 1979 Treaty, the provisions dealing with their 
issues are not binding on the Palestinian people. This being the case, the 
drafters, who realized that any agreement reached an the Palestinian problem 
could be rejected, were reluctant to give the problem more effort and time.; 
Moreover, because of the fact that Egypt could, not speak for the Palestinians 
or make binding commitments on their behalf, Egypt felt obliged to be a staunch 
advocate of general principles in a situation in which details were of more 
importance to the Israelis and to the Palestinians. 
Finallyl the absence of the Palestinians from the peace' negotiations led to the 
absurd conclusion that they were, in practice# represented mainly by the 
Egyptians and sometimes by the Americans. Both have been accused of being not 
sufficiently aware of the realities of the situation in the West Bank and Gaza. 
President Carter admitted that it was not until he visited the, Vest Bank as a 
private citizen in 1983 that he become aware of many of the realities of the 
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situation there. Also, Dayan criticized Egyptian officials' lack of 
comprehension of many of the realities of the situation in Gaza and the Vest 
Bank. 
So far as the scope of the Palestinian provisions is concerned, we have 
indicated earlier that several important aspects lof 
the Palestinian question 
were excluded. Among these is the question of East Jerusalem. It is important 
to emphasize that critics of the Camp David Accords and the 1979 Peace Treaty 
have pointed out one of its shortcomings as failing to produce any provisions 
on the problem of East Jerusalem. 
One component of the Jerusalem problem was the Israeli occupation of the Arab 
sector of the city in the Six-Day War of 1967. As indicated earlier, Israel 
maintained that the sovereignty vaccum arising in the Old City at the end of 
the mandate was not filled by Jordan, whose status there was one of the-AP. 
f. qnto occupation. It follows that, once Jordan was physically removed from 
East Jerusalem by legitimate measures, namely Israeli defensive action an June 
5,1967, the way was open for Israel, as a lawful occupant, to fill the still 
subsisting vacancy. However, it seems quite clear that the overwhelming 
majority of states are not prepared to agree to this Israeli view. It is not 
intended here to repeat what had been said in this respect. For present 
purposes it is enough to refer to the Security Council Resolution 465 of 1980 
(adopted by a majority including the US) whereby East Jerusalem was described 
as an occupied territory. 
Another aspect of the Jerusalem question is the Israeli administrative and 
legislative' measures taken in East Jerusalem. Among these measures are the 
Israeli administrative unification and/or annexation of the Arab city, the 
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establishment of Israeli settlements and attempts to change the demographic 
structure of the Arab city. As far as these measures are concerned whilst the 
Israelis considered that their settlement policy in East Jerusalem is within the 
limits of law of military occupation and that the administrative unification of 
the city does not constitute a formal annexation, the overwhelming majority of 
states oppose this view, arguing that it is in violation D: f the rules L.;. 
international law as well as the UK Charter. In fact, several UK resolutions 
call upon Israel to rescind these measures an the ground that they are in 
violation of the law of military occupation. 
From the foregoing, we may conclude that the omission of such an important 
question as Jerusalem was not only unreasonable but also undesirable. This 
omission was understood by some as an endorsement by Egypt and the US of 
Israel's annexation and unification of the Holy City as its capital. Others 
emphasized that the omission reflected the failure of the framers to meet the 
aspirations of the Palestinian people, thus failing to achieve a comprehensive 
peace as required by Resolution 242. 
The attitude towards the Palestinian refugees represents another shortcoming 
attributed to the provisions on the Palestinians. Several qualified observers 
criticized the solution provided by the Treaty for the refugee problem because 
it was not in conformity with the UK resolutions relating to the Palestinian 
refugees, Also, it was criticized for not laying down a workable solution for 
all the groups of Palestinian refugees. As notedý earlier, the framers made a 
distinction between the "old" refugees who fled in 1947-1948 and "new" refugees 
of 1967 war. Vhilst an agreed procedure would be established by Israel for the 
resolution of the former's problem, it has been agreed that the latter group 
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would only allowed to return subject to the consent of the Israeli authorities. 
However, the authors of the Camp David Accords made an uneasy distinction 
among the refugees of the latter group by providing that the right to return is 
not applicable to the 1967 refugees in general but only to those who have been 
forcibly transferred or expelled. In practice, suppose that two persons A and B 
left the West Bank after Israel's occupation in 1967, and that A was expelled by 
the Israelis while B fled because of his fears. Under the Camp David Accords 
only A could be allowed to return. To deprive B of the right to return to his 
homeland is clearly in violation of various UK resolutions in this respect, as, 
for example, the Security Council Resolution 237 adopted an June 14,1967 and 
reaffirmed by the General Assembly an July 4,1967 whereby the Security Council 
calls upon the Government of Israel to facilitate the return of those 
inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities. It is 
also inconsistent with Resolution 3236 adopted by the General Assembly in 1974 
whereby the Assembly affirmed the inalienable right of the Palestinians to 
return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and 
uprooted. 
It may be added that the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights 
of the Palestinian People, established in 1975 by the General Assembly to 
prepare a programme of implementation to enable the Palestinians to exercise 
the rights recognized in Resolution 3236, recommended a Palestinian return In 
two phases. The first phase would involve refugees of the Six Days' war of 
1967 who had f led areas of the Vest Bank and Gaza now occupied by Israel. In 
the second phase, Arab refugees would be permitted to return to areas in Israel 
from which they had fled during the original hostilities of 1947-48. 
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Turning to the provisions an the autonomy plan for the inhabitants of the Vest 
Bank and Gaza, it is important to emphasize that several qualified observers 
have criticized the authors, not only for their failure to work out a 
satisfactory-for-tila acceptable to all the parties, but also because the wording 
of these provisions was extremely vague and imprecise and might give rise to 
differencies of opinions on various words and expressions which had been used. 
The first imprecise term which does cause problems of practical importance is 
"full autonomy". As noted earlier, autonomy is not a term of legal art, nor has 
it an accepted precise meaning. Consequently, we were confronted with two 
sharply opposing points of view an the nature of Palestinian autonomy. The 
Egyptians understood the term as a reference to an extensive degree of autonomy 
similar to a de fanta government and as the precursor to Palestinian self- 
determination and Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. The Israelis held' 
that autonomy meant a limited form of administrative self-government under 
circumstances in which Israel retained control over both the West Bank and 
Gaza. Nevertheless, despite the , conclusion, demonstrated earlier, that a 
reasonable understanding of the language would support Egypt's view that the 
term "autonomy" was intended by the authors to refer to a wide and extensive 
degree of autonomy, however, one may be entitled to suppose that the term 
"autonomy" was acceptable to Egypt and Israel mainly because it would enable 
them to invoke all kinds of interpretations as to its meaning. Undoubtedlyt 
this is an undesirable suggestion but it is a possible understanding of the 
intention of the parties. 
Another type of difficulty appears to be in the exact meaning of the phrase 
"the representatives of the Palestinian people" used in paragraph (A) 1. The 
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parties concerned differed in their opinions as to the correct interpretation of 
this phrase. The US interprets it not in terms of any single group or 
organization as representing the Palestinian people, but as encompassing those 
elected or chosen for participation in negotiations provided that they would 
accept the purposes of the negotiations as defined in Resolution 242 and in the 
Camp David Agreement as well as being prepared to live in peace with Israel. 
The Israelis opposed this view, arguingthat the phrase does not encompass the 
PLO. Egypt held that there is nothing in the language of the Camp David Accords 
which prevents the PLO from representing the Palestinian people. However, the 
Camp David Accords neither permit nor prevent the PLO from taking part in the 
negotiations and, after the PLO's acceptance of Resolution 242 in November 1988, 
there is nothing from a legal view which prevents the PLO from assuming such a 
role. To support this conclusion, we may refer to the conclusion of Bernard 
Lewis thatt in negotiations to end a conflict, one does not choose the 
representatives of the other side. He went an f urther to say that "it is not 
for the Israelis or any other outside party to choose, or impose any veto on 
Palestinian representation". ' Ir, 
Similar difficulties have been raised concerning the meaning of other phrases 
in the Camp David Agreement as "self-governing authority", "the legitimate 
security concerns of the parties" and "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
people and their Just requirements". It is not intended here to repeat what has 
been said earlier in respect of conflicting interpretations submitted by the 
parties. For the present purpose it is enough to indicate that there has simply 
been no meeting of minds between Israel and Egypt on the meaning of these 
phrases. Greater precision in defining and redefining such terms is desirable. 
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Concerning the election of the self-governing authority, it is important to 
emphasize that critics of the Camp David Agreement have pointed out one of its 
shortcomings the omission of provisions to deal with questions which may 
arise out of the elections. As, for example, who will supervise the elections 7 
Who will be eligible to elect and to be elected ? Will Israel have the right 
to object to any candidate ? Whether the Israeli settlers will take part in 
these elections - While these questions do not raise problems of principle, 
they do cause problems of practical importance which are both difficult and of 
immediate concern to the parties involved. 
Among the main components of the Palestinian problem is the Israeli military 
occupation of the Vest Bank and Gaza. The Camp David Agreement, however, has 
no provision for Israeli withdrawal from the area. Instead, the Agreement 
speaks of redeployment of Israeli forces into specified security locations. 
Apart from the uncertainity relating to the definitions and the geographical 
position of these security locations and the number of forces which will remain 
in theml the absence of specific provisions on the final Israeli withdrawal has 
been considered as one of its main defects for several reasons. In the first 
place, it is inconsistent with Resolution 242 which undoubtedly called for a 
final Israeli withdrawal from the area, and Resolution 242 is the legal basis of 
the Camp David Accords and the 1979 Peace Treaty. Moreover, the failure to 
resolve the issue of the Israeli withdrawal represented a failure to achieve the 
comprehensive peace promised by the parties. Finally and most significantlyl 
this failure may be looked upon as a double-standard in dealing with different 
parts of the occupied territories, that is to sayl while the Security Council 
made no distinction whatsoever between the Arab territories occupied in 1967, 
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whether they belonged to Egypt, Syria or the Palestinians, as they all should be 
evacuated by the Israeli forces, the authors of the 1979 Treaty and the Camp 
David Accords laid down an uneasy and undesirable distinction between 
Palestinian and Egyptian territory. By providing for a total and final 
withdrawal from the Sinai and at the same time ignoring a similar withdrawal 
from the Vest Bank and Gaza, the authors left their Agreement open for sharp 
criticism. 
Another shortcoming is the absence of any provision an the Israeli settlements 
in Gaza and the West Bank. It is submitted that the Israeli settlement policy 
in Gaza and the West Bank is illegal under the rules of international law and 
according to the various UN resolutions condemning such policy and calling upon 
Israel to dismantle the settlements. In fact, there is a consensus of opinion 
among states as to the illegality of these settlements. There is no need to 
repeat here what was said in this respect. From the foregoing, one may be 
entitled to suggest that the attitude of the Accords and the Treaty towards the 
Israeli settlements in Gaza and the West Bank runs counter, not only to the 
general trend of international law in this respect, but also to the attitude of 
the Peace Treaty itself towards the Israeli settlements in Sinai which the 
authors agreed to dismantle. Again, we are confronted with a double-standard 
in dealing with Palestinian issues. 
As far as the f inal status of the West Bank and Gaza is concerned$ it is clear 
that the authors failed to settle these problems by including only a sentence to 
the effect that negotiations would deal with all outstanding issues after the 
transitional period. This approach towards the final status of the area has 
left the door open for the parties to submit two sharply opposing points of 
440 
view on that crucial issue. The Egyptians hold that the Palestinians will be 
entitled after the transitional period to exercise the right of self- 
determination, including the formation of the Palestinian state, if they choose 
to do so. The Israelis believe that the Camp David Accords exclude the choice 
of an independent Palestinian state; and therefore the area could remain under 
permanent ýIsraell sovereignty after the transitional period, The Americans 
believed that self-government by the Palestinians of the Vest Bank and Gaza, In 
association with Jordan, offers the best chance for a durable, just and lasting 
peace. 
It is suggested that the timing of the implementation of the Agreement on the 
Vest Bank and Gaza was badly phrased, as well as not binding on Israel. The 
language on the implementation of the Sinai Agreement referred to fixed and 
binding dates which were included in the text of the Treaty. Nevertheless, when 
it comes to implementing the Agreement an the Palestinians, the authors speak 
of target, rather than f ixed, dates. Moreover, such target dates were not 
included in the text of the Agreement; instead they were referred to in a 
separate letter attached to the Peace Treaty. Comparing the latter to the dates 
of the Sinai Agreement, one may be entitled to suppose that there does exist a 
double-standard in dealing with the Palestinians. Indeed, this may cast doubts 
an the real intention of the parties, or at least on the Israeli intention as to 
the implementation of the Palestinian clause. President Carter admitted in 
1983 that he miscalculated Israeli Intention as to implementing the Agreement 
on the West Bank: 
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"From Begin's point of view, the peace agreement with Egypt was the significant 
act for Israel; the references to the Vest Bank and Palestinians were to be 
f inessed. " I '- 
From a political viewpoint, several qualified observers have maintained that 
the authors of the Accords and the Treaty overestimated the role that Egypt 
could play in laying the groundwork for a negotiated settlement of the 
Palestinian issue. In fact, during the post-Camp David autonomy negotiations, 
the Egyptians tried to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians, but realized 
that their ability to make arrangement for others was limited. Similarly, they 
misjudged the attitude of King Hussein and the Palestinian leaders by assuming 
that they might be willing to take part in negotiations. 
Despite all the foregoing defects which have been presented by a number of 
leading writers for holding that the Accords and the Treaty failed to achieve, 
or to lay down, bases for a comprehensive peace, nevertheless one may be 
entitled to suggest that there may be a number of benefits for the Agreement on 
the Palestinians which perhaps could open the way for a final and comprehensive 
solution. It is submitted that Para. A. 1. (c) of the Agreement pointed out that 
the solution must recognize "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and 
their just requirements. " Undoubtedly, this is the first document in which 
Israel recognized in writing that the Palestinians had legitimate rights. 
Moreover, it was agreed that the negotiations to determine the final status of 
the West Bank and Gaza are to be "based an the provisions and principles of UK 
Security Council Resolution 242.11 Surely, there are ample reasons to argue that 
these words on Resolution 242 had been phrased in such a manner as to show 
442 
that the resolution must be applied to the West Bank and Gaza. Logically, this 
would lead tol or at least keep the door open for, a final and total Israeli 
withdrawal from the area. 
Further, although the proposed autonomy does not meet the aspirations of the 
Palestiniansl nor their just requirements under international law, Israel's 
commitment in an international agreement that the Palestinians would be given 
"full autonomy". should not be underestimated. In fact, Israel did commit itself 
Wj". &. 4- 
to a proces if faithfully implemented, would have led to the withdrawal of the 
military government and the establishment of an elected Palestinian self- 
governing body. This autonomy process, for political and legal reasons, would 
become irreversible. Surely, if the "Palestinian elected body" acted 
responsibly, then Israelp after the transitional period, could be politically, if 
not legally, obliged to abandon sovereignty over the area. 
For all the defects presented earlier, it is not surprising that the Agreement 
on the Palestinians was not implemented. Perhaps, because of these defects, it 
appears that both Egypt and Israel no longer adhere to the Camp David formula. 
For example, a review of the Shamir Plan of May 1989 whereby he speaks of 
"transitional" self-rule leading to "permanent" self-rule reveals how far Israel 
has denounced its commitments under the Camp David Agreement. On the other 
hand, Egypt made it clear that, because the circumstances have changed# the 
Camp David formula is no longer an appropriate framework for the solution of 
the Palestinian problem. This is due partly to the Palestinian uprising, and 
partly to the fact that the Palestinians have accepted Resolution 242 and 
declared their own state in 1988. 
443 
III rqlnp 'naVid me a imndfll 
We have to distinguish between Camp David as a model f or negotiations (a 
process) and -Camp David as a model for other peace treaties. 
So' far as the former is concerned, some believe that it could be a model for 
future negotiations between Israel and its other Arab neighbours. Under 
American auspices an agreement based on the "territory for peace" formula could 
be produced. In other words, Camp David could be seen as something of a model 
for Arab-Israeli peace negotiations as an alternative to the idea of an 
international conference. From a legal view, this could be accepted since the 
Security Council Resolution 338* speaks of negotiations under "appropriate 
auspices". Such auspices could be the UNj the US or an international conference. 
Howevert this view was criticized an the ground that, for several political 
reasonso the Camp David Accords do not provide a model that can be easily 
copied in future negotiations. Among these reasons is the fact that by 
removing Egypt's considerable strength from the military equation vis-a vis 
Jordanj Syria and the Palestinians, Israel was greatly strengthed. According 
to some# this weakness of the Arab positions could make negotiations with 
Israel impossible or at least the Arab leaders cannot expect to gain as much 
from negotiations as Sadat did. 
Perhaps for this reason, the Camp David model for negotiations, in which the 
US would play an active role to help the parties concerned in achieving an 
agreements is no longer supported by Egypt. Instead, the idea of having an 
international conference to discuss all the remaining problems of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, including the Palestinian issue, is nowadays widely accepted by 
international society. Nevertheless, Israel opposes the idea an the ground that 
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such an international conference would put much pressure on Israel and thus 
weaken its bargaining poSition. 17 
This writer, however, believes that the Camp David process provides a rare 
opportunity to understand how a powerful mediator can play an important role in 
solving the complicated issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Having in mind the 
fact that there was nothing new at Camp David, the situation was not more than 
heads of states at a summit deciding grave issues of war and peace, one may 
conclude that, theoretically, Camp David as a model and pattern f or 
negotiations can be copied. In a recent study published in January 1991, Tom 
Princen reached a similar conclusion: lr- 
Concerning Camp David as a model for other peace treaties with Arab States a 
distinction should be made between the agreement on Sinai and that on the 
Palestinians". 
Apart from the Palestinian clause, the Egyptian- Israeli Peace Treaty, though 
far short of an ideal model, did establish the important precedents of trading 
territory and the dismantling of settlements for a binding peace treaty and 
elaborate security arrangements. Surely, such precedents would be useful in any 
future agreements between Israel and Arab states. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the basic approach to the question of the 
Palestinian people at the Camp David Accords was not the right one, this 
writer believes that the Camp David formula provided a unique opportunityl at 
least as a starting point, for working out a formula accepted by all the parties 
concerned provided that the Palestinians and the Israelis have to give up any 
preconditions which are not accepted by the other party, that is to say# the 
Israelis have to abandon the precondition that they would have a right to veto 
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the choice of Palestinian spokesmen. On the Palestinian side, there has 
hitherto been a precondition that they will not enter into any negotiations 
unless the result, a Palestinian state, is determined in advance. 
IV. ReGam"fIndatiOns 
It is pertinent to end these conclusions with the suggestion that, instead of 
the separate negotiations resulting sometimes in agreements binding only 
between the nations concerned, sometimes in failure to agree, and sometimes even 
in failure after the agreement was concluded (e. g. the Peace Agreement of 1983 
between Lebanon and Israel which was abrogated in 1984)0 there should be a 
multilateral conference including all the states concerned as well as the 
permanent members of the UN Security Council, or alternatively only of Israel 
and Arab States still in conflict with it, at which peace agreements would be 
simultaneously negotiated. The propo4 agreement should: 
1. Def ine precisely and exactly the border between Israel and each of the Arab 
neighbouring states. Otherwise, in the absence of such a precise definition of 
the boundaries with Israel, there could afterwards arise disputesp like the 
Egyptian- Israeli dispute over Tabal which might have been avoided by more 
careful drafting of the agreement, 
2. There should be some mechanism for compulsory settlement of any dispute in 
the future. 
3. The principle of reciprocity should be regarded as the basis an which the 
parties can agree to special security arrangements. It would be a mistake to 
apply these requirements only to one side. 
446 
4. Some provision ought to be made with respect to the water resources 
problems which already exist between Israel on the one hand and Syria, Lebanon 
and the Palestinians in the West Bank on the other. 
5. There should be provisions to deal precisely with all the financial claims 
which might arise. 
6. Finally, the suggested agreement should be based on the "territory f or 
peace" formula upon which the Security Council Resolution 242 was based. This 
would mean that Israel has to give up all the occupied Arab territories in 
return for a genuine and permanent peace. 
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APPIEEND IXI 
Prime Minister Begin's Autonomy Plan 
28 December. 1977 
1. The administration of the Military Government in Judea, Samaria and the 
Gaza district will be abolished. 
2. In Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, administrative autonomy of the 
residentsl by and for them, will be established. 
3. The residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, will elect an 
Administrative Council composed of 11 members. The Administrative Council will 
operate in accordance with the principles laid down in this paprer. 
4. Any resident, 18 years old and above, without distinction of citizenship, 
or if stateless, will be entitled to vote in the elections to the Administrative 
Council. 
5. Any resident whose name is included in the list of candidates for the 
Administrative Council and who, on the day the list is submitted, is 25 years 
old or abovet will be entitled to be elected to the Council. 
6. The Administrative Council will be elected by general, direct, personall 
equal and secret ballot. 
7. The period of office of the Administrative Council will be four years from 
the day of its election. 
8. The Administrative Council will sit in Bethlehem. 
9. All the administative affairs relating to the Arab residents of the areas 
of Judea# Samaria and Gaza district will be under the direction and within the 
competence of the Administrative Council. ý 
10. The Administrative Council will operate the following Departments: 
education; religious affairs; finance; transportation; construction and housing; 
industry; commerce and tourism; agriculture; health; labour and social welfare; 
rehabilitation of refugees; and the administration of Justice and supervision of 
local police forces; and promulgate regulations relating to the operation of 
these Departments. 
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11. Security and public order in the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza 
district will be the responsibility of the Israeli authorities. 
12. The Administrative Council will elect its own chairman. 
13. The first session of the Administrative Council will be convened 30 days 
after the publication of the election results. 
14. Residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, without distinction of 
citizenshipp or if stateless, will be granted free choice (option) of either 
Israeli or Jordanian citizenship. 
15. A resident of the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who 
requests Israeli citizenship will be granted such citizenship in accordance with 
the citizenship law of the state. 
16. Residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who, in accordance with 
the right of free option, choose Israeli citizenship, will be entitled to vote 
for, and be elected to, the Knesset in accordance with the election law. 
17. Residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who are citizens of 
Jordan or who, in accordance with the right of free option will become citizens 
of Jordan, will- elect and be eligible for election to the Parlinent of the 
Hashemit Kingdom of Jordan in accordance with the election law of that 
countary. 
18. Questions arising from the vote to the Jordanian- Parliament by residents 
of Judeat Samaria and the Gaza district will be clarified in negotiations 
between Israel and Jordan. 
19. A committee will be established of representatives of Israel, Jordan and 
the Administrative Council to examine existing legislation in Judea, Samaria and 
the Gaza district, and to determine which legislation will continue in force 
which will be abolished, and what will be the competence of the Administrative 
Council to promulgate regulations. The rulings of the committee will be adopted 
by unanimous decision. 
20. Residents of Israel will be entitled to acquire land and settle in the 
area of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. Arabs, residents of Judea, 
Samaria and the Gaza district, who, in accordance with the free option granted 
themp will become Israeli citizens, will be entitled to acquire land and settle 
in Israel. 
21. A committee will be established of representatives of Israel, Jordan and 
the Administrative Council to determine norms of immigration to the areas of 
Judeat Samaria and the Gaza district. The committee will determine the norms 
whereby Arab refugees residing outside Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will 
be permitted to immigrate to these areas in reasonable numbers. The rulings of 
the committee will be adopted by unanimous decision. 
22. Residents of Israel and residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district 
will be assured freedom of movement and freedom of economic activity in Israel 
Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. 
23. - The Administrative Council will appoint one of its members to represent 
the Council before the Government of Israel for deliberation an matters of 
common interest, and one of its members to represent the Council before the 
Government of Jordan for deliberation on matters of common interest. 
24. Israel stands by its right and its claim of sovereignty to Judea, Samaria 
and the Gaza district. In the knowledge that other claims exist, it proposes, 
for the sake of the agreement and the peace, that the question of sovereignty in 
the areas be left open. 
25. Vith regard to the administration of the holy places of the three 
religions in Jerusalent a special proposal will be drawn up and submitted that 
will include the guarantee of freedom of access to members of all the faiths to 
the shrines holy to them. 
26'. These principles will be subject to review after a five-year period. 
APPIENDIX 11 
Egyptian Proposal at Camp David 
September So 1978 
Framework For The Unsprehensive Peace Settlement 
Of The Xiddle East 
Following: The historic initiative of President Sadat which rekindled the hopes 
of all nations a better future for mankind. 
In view of the firm determination of the peoples of the Middle East, together 
with all peace-loving nations, to put an end to the unhappy past# spare this 
generation and the generations to come the scourge of war and open a new 
chapter in their history ushering in an era of mutual respect and 
understanding. 
Desirous to make the Middle East, the cradle of civilization and the birthplace 
of all Divine missionso a shining model for coexistence and cooperation among 
nations. 
Determined to revive the great tradition of tolerance and mutual acceptance 
free from prejudice and discrimination. 
Determined to conduct their relations in accordance with the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations and the accepted norms of international law and 
legitimacy. 
Committed to adhere to the letter and spirit of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
Desirous to develop between them good-neighborly relations in accordance with 
the Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
Bearing in mind that the establishment of peace and good- neighborly relations 
should be founded upon legitimacy, justice, equality and respect for fundamental 
rights and that good neighbors should demonstrate, in their acts and claims, a 
strict adherence to the rule of law and a genuine willingness to assume their 
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mutual obligation to refrain from any infringement upon each other's sovereignty 
or territorial integrity. 
Convinced that military occupation and/or the denial of other peoples' rights 
and legitimate aspirations to live and develop freely are incompatible with the 
spirit of peace. 
Considering the vital interests of all peoples of the Xiddle East as well as 
the universal interest that exists in strengthening Vorld Peace and security. 
Article 1 
The -Parties express their determination to reach a comprehensive settlement of 
the Middle East problem through the conclusion of peace treaties on the basis 
of the full implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all 
their parts. 
Article 2 
The Parties agree that the establishment of a just and lasting peace among them 
requires the fulfillment of the following: 
First: Withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories in accordance with 
the principle of inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by War. 
In Sinai and the Golan, withdrawal shall take place to the international 
boundaries between mandated Palestine and Egypt and Syria respectively. 
In the Vest Banki Israel shall withdraw to the demarcation lines of the 1949 
Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan with such insubstantial 
alterations as might be mutually accepted by the Parties concerned. It is to be 
understood that such alterations should not reflect the weight of conquest. 
Security measures shall be introduced in accordance with the provisions below 
mentioned with a view to meeting the Parties' legitimate concern for security 
and safeguarding the rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people. 
Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip shall take place to the demarcation lines of 
the 1949 Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel. 
Israeli withdrawal shall commence immediately after the signing of the peace 
treaties and shall be completed according to a time-table to be agreed upon 
within the period referred to in Article 6. 
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Second: Removal of the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories 
according to a time-table to be agreed upon within the period referred to in 
Article 6. 
Third: Guaranteeing the security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
inviolability and the political independence of every State through the 
f ollowing measures: 
(a) The establishment of demilitarized zones astride the borders. 
(b) The establishment of limited armament zones astride the borders. 
(c) the stationing of United Nations forces astride the borders. 
(d) The stationing of early warning systems an the basis of reciprocity. 
(e) Regulating the acquisition of arms by the Parties and the type of their 
armament and weapons system. 
(f) The adherence by all the Parties to the Treaty an the Ron-Proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. The Parties undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
(g) Applying the principle of innocent passage to transit through the Straits 
of Tiran. 
(h) The establishment of relations of peace and good-neighborly cooperation 
among the Parties. 
Fourth: An undertaking by all' the Parties not to resort to the threat or the 
use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means 
in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
The Parties also undertake to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice with respect to all disputes emanating from the 
application or the intprpretation of their contractual arrangements. 
Fifth: Upon the signing of the peace treaties, the Israeli military Government 
in the 'West Bank and Gaza shall be abolished and authority shall be transferred 
to the Arab side in an orderly and peaceful manner. There shall be a 
transitional period not to exceed five years from the date of the signing of 
the "Framework" during which Jordan shall supervise the administration of the 
Gaza Strip. 
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Egypt - and Jordan shall carry out their responsibility in cooperation with 
freely elected representatives of the Palestinian people who shall exercise 
direct authority over the administration of the Vest Bank and Gaza 
simultaneously with the abolition of the Israeli military government. 
Six months before the end of the transitional period, the Palestinian people 
shall exercise their fundamental right to self-detedrmination and shall be 
enabled to establish their responsibility in the Gaza Strip and the Vest Bank, 
shall recommend that the entity be linked with Jordan as decided by their 
peoples. 
Palestinian refugees and displaced persons shall be enabled to exercise the 
right to return or receive compensation in accordance with relevant United 
Nations resolutions. 
Sixth: Israel shall withdraw from Jerusalem to the demarcation lines of the 
Armistice Agreement of 1949 in conformity with the principle of the 
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. Arab sovereignty and 
administration shall be restored to the Arab sector. 
A joint municipal council composed of an equal number of Palestinian and 
Israeli members shall be entrusted with regulating and supervising the 
f ollowing matters: 
(a) Public utilities throughout the City. 
(b) Public transportation and traffic. 
(c) Postal and telephone services. 
(d) Tourism. 
The Parties undertake to ensure the free exercise of worship, the freedom of 
accesso visit and transit to the holy places without distinction or 
discrimination. 
Seventh: Synchronized with the implementation of the provisions related to 
withdrawal, the Parties shall proceed to establish among them relationships 
normal to States at peace with one another. To this end, they undertake to abide 
by all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Steps taken in this 
respect include: 
(a) Full recognition. 
(b) Abolishing economic boycott. 
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(c) Ensuring the freedom of passage through the Suez Canal in accordance with 
the provisions of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and the Declaration of 
the Egyptian Government of April 24,1957. 
(d) Guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other 
Parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law. 
Eighth: Israel undertakes to pay full and prompt compensation f or the damage 
which resulted from the operations of its armed f orces against the civilian 
population and installations, as well as its exploitation of natural resouices 
in occupied territories. 
Article 3 
Upon the signing of this "Framework"q which represents a comprehensive and 
balanced package embodying all the rights and obligations of the Parties, other 
Parties concerned shall be invited to adhere to it under the Middle East Peace 
Conference in Geneva. 
Article 4 
The representatives of the Palestinian people shall take part in the peace talks 
to be held after the signing of the "Framework". 
Article 5 
The United States shall participate in the talks on matters related to the 
modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the time- 
table for the carrying out of the obligations of the Parties. 
Article 6 
Peace treaties shall be concluded within three months from the signing of this 
"Framework" by the Parties concerned, thus signalling the beginning of the peace 




The Security Council shall be requested to endorse the Peace Treaties and ensure 
that their provisions shall not be violated. The Council shall also be requested 
to guarantee the boundaries between the Parties. 
Article 8 
The Permanent Members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite 
the Peace Treaties and ensure respect f or their provisions. They shall also be 
requested to conf or= their policies and actions with the undertakings contained 
in this Framework. 
Article 9 
The United States shall guarantee the implementation of this "Framework" and 
the peace treaties in full and in good faith. 
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APPENDIX III 
First Draft of the American Proposal 
At Camp David. September 10,1978 
A Framework For Peace In The Xiddle Rm Agreed 
At Camp David 
Muhammad Anwar Al-Sadatj President of Arab Republic of Egypt, and Xenachem 
Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the Jjnited 
States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to- , 1978, and have agreed 
on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other 
parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it. 
Preamble 
The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following: 
- After four wars during thirty years, despite intensive human efforts, the 
Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three 
great religions, does not yet enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the 
Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the 
region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become 
a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations. 
- The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the 
reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the constructive peace 
proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions 
by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for 
peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to 
be spared the tragedies of war. 
- The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted 
norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for 
the conduct of relations among all states. 
- The only agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, supplemented by Resolution 
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338. Resolution 242 in its preamble emphasizes the obligation of Member States 
in the United Nations to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter. 
Article 2, among other points, calls for the settlement of disputes by peaceful 
means and for Members to refrain from the threat or use of force. Egypt and 
Israel in their agreement signed September 4,1975l agreed: "The Parties hereby 
undertake not to resort to the threat or used of force or military blockade 
against each other. " They have both also stated that there shall be no more war 
between them. In a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2, 
negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and 
security with it should be based on all the provi sions and principles of 
Resolution 242# including the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by 
war and the need to work f or a just and lasting peace in which every state in 
the area can live in security within secure and recognized borders. Negotiations 
based on these principles are necessary with respect to all f ronts of the 
conf lict-the Sinai, the Golan Heights, the Vest Bank and Gaza, and Lebanon. 
- Peace is more than the juridical end of the state of belligerency. It should 
encompass the full range of normal relations between nations. Progress toward 
that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the 
Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in 
maintaining stability, and in assuring security. 
- Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between 
nations which enjoy normal. relations. In addition, under the terms of peace 
treaties, the sovereign parties can agree to special security arrangements such 
as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, special 
security forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements 
that they agree are useful. 
Agreement 
Taking these -factors into account, Egypt and Israel are determined to reach a 
just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through 
the conclusion of peace treaties on the basis of the full implementation of 
Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to 
achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that, for peace to 
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endure, it must involve all those who have been principal parties to the Arab- 
Israeli conflict; it must provide security; and it must give the peoples who 
have been most deeply affected by the conflict, including the Palestinians, a 
sense that they have been dealt with fairly in the peace agreement. They 
therefore agree that this Framework as appropriate is intended by them to 
constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israelt but also 
between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate 
peace with Israel on this basis. Vith that objective in mind, they have agreed 
to proceed as follows: 
A. Egypt-Israel 
1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of 
force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United 
Nations., In the event of disputes arising from the application or interpretation 
of their contractual agreements, the two parties will seek to reach a settlement 
by direct negotiations. Failing agreement, the parties accept the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with respect to all disputes 
emanating from the application or the interpretation of their contractual 
arrangements. 
2. In order to achieve peace between them, they have agreed to negotiate 
without interruption with 'a goal of concluding within three months from the 
signing of this Framework a peace treaty between them, while inviting the other 
parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude 
similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the 
area. Israel has agreed to the restoration of the exercise of full Egyptian 
sovereignty in the Sinai up to the internationally recognized border between 
Egypt and Israelq and Egypt has agreed to establish full peace and normal 
relations with Israel. Security arrangements, the timing of withdrawal of all 
Israeli forces from the Sinai, and the elements of a normal, peaceful 
relationship between them have been discussed and will be defined in the peace 
treaty. 
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3. Egypt and Israel agree that freedom of passage through the Suez Canalq the 
Strait of Tiran, and the Gulf of Suez should be assured for ships of all flags, 
including Israel. 
B. West Bank and Gaza 
1. Egypt and Israel will participate in negotiations an resolution of the 
Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The solution must recognize the 
legitimate rights of - the Palestinian people and enable the Palestinians to 
participate in the determination of their own future. 
2. To this endo negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should 
provide for links between these areas and Jordan and should proceed in three 
stages: 
(a) Egypt and Israel hereby agree that the following should be the main 
elements of a settlement in the West Bank and Gaza: In order to ensure a 
peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, there should be transitional 
arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years, 
In order to provide full autonomy to the Inhabitants; under these arrangements 
the Israeli military government and administration will be abolished and 
withdrawn as, soon as a self-governing authority can be freely elected by the 
inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. This 
transitional arrangement should derive its authority for self-government from 
Egypt and Israelt, and Jordan, when Jordan joins the negotiations. To negotiate 
the details of a transitional arrangement, the Government of Jordan will be 
invited to Join the negotiations an the basis of this Framework. These new 
arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self- 
government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate 
security concerns of Egypt, Israel$ Jordan and the inhabitants of the Vest Bank 
and Gaza. 
(b) Egypt, Israell and Jordan will determine the modalities for establishing 
the elected self-governing authority in the Vest Bank and Gaza. The delegations 
nay include Palestinians from , the Vest Bank and Gaza. The parties will 
negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the 
self-governing authority. The Agreement will provide for the withdrawal of 
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Israeli armed forces and the redeployment of some of then to limited and 
specified security points. It will also include arrangements for assuring 
internal and external security and public order, Including the respective roles 
of Israeli armed forces and local police. 
(c) When the self-governing authority in the Vest Bank and Gaza is 
inauguratedt the transitional period will begin. Within three years after the 
beginning of the transitional period, Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the self- 
governing authority in the Vest Bank and Gaza will undertake negotiations for a 
peace treaty which will settle the final status of the West Bank and Gaza after 
the transitional period and its relationship with its neighbors an the basis of 
all of the principles of UK Security Council Resolution 242, including the 
mutual obligations of peace, the necessity for security arrangements for all 
parties concerned folloeing the transitional period, the withdrawal of Israeli 
forces, a just settlement of the refugee problem, and the establishment of 
secure and recognized boundaries. The boundaries and security arrangements must 
both satisfy the aspirations of the Palestinians and meet Israel's security 
needs. They may incorporate agreed minor modifications in the temporary 
armistice lines which existed beyween 1949 and 1967. The peace treaty will 
define the rights of the citizens of each of the parties to do busines, to work, 
to live, and to carry an other transactions in each other's territory on a 
reciprocal basis. 
3. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure 
Israel's security during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in 
providing security during and beyond the transitional period: 
(a) Egypt and Israel propose that Jordan and Egypt assign personnel to the 
police forces of the self-governing autholrity in the Vest Bank and Gaza, 
respectively. They will also maintain continuing liaison an internal security 
matters with the designated Israeli authorities to ensure that no hostile 
threats or acts against Israel or its citizens originate from the West Bank or 
Gaza. The numbers, equipment, and responsibilities of such Egyptian and 
Jordanian personnel will be defined by the agreement. By mutual agreement, 
United Nations forces or observers may also be introduced during the 
transitional period. 
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(b) The nature of the Israeli security presence during the transitional period 
and beyond will be agreed in the negotiations described in paragraphs B2 (b) 
and (c) above. 
4. During the transitional period, the negotiating parties (Egypt, Israeli 
Jordan, the self-governing authority) will constitute a continuing committee to 
reach mutual agreements applicable during that period on: 
(a) Issues involving interpretation of the agreement or issues unforeseen 
during the negotiation of the agreement, if not resolvable by the self- 
governing authority; 
(b) the return of agreed numbers of persons displaced from the Vest Bank in 
1967 and of Palestinian refugees together with necessary measures in connection 
with their return to prevent disruption and disorder. 
5. Jerusalem# the city of peace, shall not be divided. It is a city holy to Jew, 
Xuslimo and Christian and all peoples must have free access to it and enjoy the 
free exercise of worship and the right to visit and transit to the holy places 
without distinction or discrimination. The holy places of each faith will be 
under the administration of their representatives. For peace to endure, each 
community in Jerusalem must be able to express freely its cultural and 
religious values in an acceptable political framework. A representative 
municipal council shall supervise essential functions In the city. An agreement 
an relationships In Jerusalem should be reached in the negotiations dealing 
with the final status of the Vest Bank and Gaza. 
6. Egypt and Israel agree to work with each other and with other interested 
parties to achieve a Just and permanent solution of the problems of Palestinian 
and Jewish refugees. 
7. If Jordan is unable to join these negoltiations, Egypt, Israel, and the 
Inhabitants of the Vest Bank and Gaza will proceed to establish and administer 
the self-governing authority. 
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C. Settlements 
(Language to be Inserted) 
D. Associated Principles 
1. Egypt and Israel believe that the principles and provisions described 
below should apply to peace treaties on all fronts. 
2. Synchronized with the implementation of the provisions related to 
withdrawal, signatories shall proceed to establish among themselves 
relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they 
should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations. Steps to be taken in this respect include: 
(a) full recognition, Including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; 
(b) abolishing economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods 
and people; 
(c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other 
parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law. 
3. Signatories should agree to provide for - the security and respect tbed 
sovereignty. territorial integrityand inviolability and the political 
independence of each state pegotiating peace through measures such as the 
following: 
(a) the establishment of demilitarized zones; 
(b) the establishment of limited armament zones; 
(c) the stationing of United Nations forces or observer groups as agreed; 
W the stationing of early warning systems on the basis of reciprocity; 
(e) regulating the size of their armed forces and the types of their armament 
and weapons systems. 
4. Signatories should explore possibilities for regional economic development 
In the context of both traditional arrangements and final peace treaties, with 
the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and 
friendship which is their common goal. 
5. Claims Commisions may be established for the mutual settlement of all 
f Inancial claims. 
6. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters 
related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working 
out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties. 
7. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace 
treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent 
members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace 
treaties and ensure respect for their provisions. They shall also be requested 
to conform their policies and actions with the undertakings contained in this 
Framework. 
AF'IP33NIDIX IV 
THE Camp David Accords, September 17,1978 
A Framework For Peace in the Middle East Agreed 
At Camp David 
Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and 
Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of 
the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 
17,1978, and have agreed an the following framework for peace in the Middle 
East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it. 
Preamble 
The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following: 
-The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel 
and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its 
parts. 
-After four wars during thirty years, despite intensive human efforts, the 
Middle East, which is the cradle of civilazation and the birthplace of three 
great religions, does not yet enjoy the blessing of peace. The people of the 
Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the 
region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become 
a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations. 
-The historic initative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the 
reception accorded to him by the Parliament, government and people of Israel, 
and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace 
proposals made by both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for 
peace which must not be lost If this generation and future generations are to 
be spared the tragedies of war. 
-The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted 
norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for 
the conduct of relations among all states. 
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-To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United 
Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to 
negotiate peace and security with it, are necessary for the purpose of carrying 
out all provisions and principles of Resolution 242 and 338. 
-Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in 
peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of 
force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of 
reconciliation in the Xiddle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic 
development, in maintaining stability, and in assuring security. 
-Security Is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between 
nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace 
treatiest the parties can, an the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security 
arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early 
warning stations, the presence of international forces, liason, agreed measures 
for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful. 
Framework 
Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, 
comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Xiddle East conflict through the 
conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 
in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly 
relations. They recognize that, for peace to endure, it must involve all those 
who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that 
this framework as appropriate is intended by them to constitute a basis for 
peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of 
its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this 
basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows: 
A. West Bank and Gaza 
1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people 
should participate in negotiations on the resolution of Palestinian problem in 
all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West 
Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages: 
468 
(a) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly 
transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the 
parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the Vest Bank and Gaza 
for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the 
inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its 
civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority 
has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the 
existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional 
arrangement, the Government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations 
an the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due 
consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of 
these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties 
involved. 
(b) Egypt, Israel and Jordan will agree an the modalities for establishing the 
elected self-governing authority In the Vest-Bank and Gaza. The delegations of 
Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other 
Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which 
will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to 
be exercised In the Vest Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces 
will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces 
into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements 
for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local 
police force will be established, which may include Jordanian Citizens. In 
addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in 
the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders. 
(c) When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the Vest 
Bank and Gaza Is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five 
years will begin. As soon as possible. but not later than the third year after 
the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to 
determine the final status of the Vest Bank and Gaza and its relationship with 
its neighbors, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the 
end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the 
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Vest Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one 
committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will 
negotiate and agree an the f Inal status of the Vest Bank and Gaza, and its 
relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of 
representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be Joined by the 
elected representatives of the Inhabitants of the Vest Bank and Gaza, to 
negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the 
agreement reached an the f inal status of the Vest Bank and Gaza. The 
negotiations shall be based an all provisions and principles of UK Security 
Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the 
location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The 
solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians 
will participate in the determination of their own future through: 
(1) The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of 
the inhabitants of the Vest Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the 
end of the transitional period. 
(2) Submitting their agreement to a vote by the elected representatives of 
the inhabitants of the Vest Bank and Gaza. 
(3) Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the Vest 
Bank and Gaza to decide bow they shall govern themselves consistent with the 
provisions of their agreement. 
(4) Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating 
the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. 
2. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made t9 assure the 
security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. 
To assist In providing such security, a strong local police force will be 
constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of Inhabitants 
of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing liaison an 
internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian 
officers. 
3. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and 
the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by 
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agreement an the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West 
Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption 
and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this 
committee. 
4. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested 
parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, Just and permanent 
implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem. 
B. Egypt-Israel 
1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of 
force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agreed to negotiate in 
good faith with a good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from 
the signing of this Framework a peace treaty between them, while inviting the 
other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and 
conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace 
in the area. The Framework for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt 
and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will 
agree an the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their 
obligations under the treaty. 
C. Associated Principles 
1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below 
should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors-Egypt, 
Jordant Syria and Lebanon. 
2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to 
states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide 
by all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Steps to be taken 
in this respect include: 
(a) full recognition; 
(b) abolishing economic boycotts; 
(c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other 
parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law. 
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3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the 
context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the 
atmosphere of peace# cooperation and friendship which is their common goal. 
4. Claims Commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all 
financial claims. 
5. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks an matters 
related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working 
out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties. 
6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace 
treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent 
members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace 
treaties and ensure respect for their provisions. They shall also be requested 
to conform their policies and actions with the undertakings contained in this 
Framework. 
Framework For The Conclusion Of A Peace Treaty 
Between Egypt And Israel 
In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in 
good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this 
framework a peace treaty between them. 
It is agreed that: 
The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location 
or locations to be mutually agreed. 
All of the principles of UK Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of 
the dispute between Israel and Egypt. 
Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be 
implemented between two and three years after the peace'treaty is signed. 
The following matters are agreed between the parties: 
(a) the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally 
recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine; 
(b) the 'withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai; 
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(c) the use of airfields left by the Israelis near El Arish, Rafah, Ras en 
Yaqb, and Sharm el Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible 
commercial use by all nations; 
(d) the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and 
the Suez Canal an the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying 
to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international 
waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom 
of navigation and overflight; 
(e) the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Elat with 
guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and 
(f) the stationing of military forces listed below. 
Stationing of Forces 
A. No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed 
forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 kilometers (km) 
east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal. 
B. Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to 
perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of 
the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying In width from 20 km to 
40 km. 
C. In the area within 3 km east of the international border there will be 
Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and 
United Nations observers. 
D. Border patrol units, not to exceed three battalions, will supplement the 
civil police In maintaining order in the area not included above. 
The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace 
negotiations. 
Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the 
agreement. 
United Nations forces will be stationed: (a) in part of the area in the Sinai 
lying within about 20 km of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the 
international border, and (b) In the Sharm el Sheikh area to ensure freedom of 
passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed 
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unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United NatiOnS 
with a unanimous vote of the live permanent members. 
After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, 
normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, includ#g: full 
recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination 
of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and 
mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law. 
Interim Vithdrawal 
Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all 
Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El 
Arish to Ras Xuhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by 
mutual agreement. 
Letter From Israel Prime Minister Menachem Begin 
To President Jimmy Carter, September 171 1978 
Dear Mr. President: 
I have the honor to inform you that during two weeks af ter my return home I 
will submit a motion before Israel's Parliament (the Knesset) to decide on the 
following question: 
If during the negotiations to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and 
Egypt all outstanding issues are agreed upon, "are you In favor of the removal 
of the Israeli settlers from the northern and southern Sinai areas or are you 
In favor of keeping the aforementioned settlers in those areas? " 
The vote, Mr. President, on this Issue will. be completely free from the usual 
Parliamentary Party discipline to the effect that, although the coalition is 
being now supported by 70 members out of 120, every member of the Knesset, as 
I believe, both on the Government and the Opposition benches will be enabled to 
vote in accordance with his own conscience. 
Letter From President Jimmy Carter To Egyptian 
President Anwar El Sadat, September 22,1978 
Dear Xr. President: 
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I transmit herewith a copy of a letter to me from Prime Minister Begin setting 
forth how he proposes to present the issue of the Sinai settlements to the 
Knesset for the latter's decision. 
In this connection, I understand from your letter that Knesset approval to 
withdraw all Israeli settlers from Sinai according to a timetable within the 
period specified for the implementation of the peace treaty is a prerequisite to 
any negotiations an a peace treaty between Egypt and Isrfael. 
Letter From Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat To 
President Jimmy Carter, September 17,1978 
Dear Xr. President: 
In connection with the "Framework for a Settlement in Sinai" to be signed 
tonight, I would like to reaffirm the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt 
with respect to the settlements: 
1. All Israeli settlers must be withdrawn from Sinai according to a timetable 
within the period specified for the implementation of the peace treaty. 
2. Agreement by the Israeli Government and its constitutional institutions to 
this basic principle is therefore a prerequisite to starting peace negotiations 
for concluding a peace treaty. 
3. If Israel fails to meet this commitment, the "Framework" shall be void and 
Invalid. 
Letter From President Jimmy Carter To Israeli Prime 
Xinister Menachem Begin, September 22,1978 
Dear Mr. Prime Minister: 
I have received your letter of September- 17,1978, describing how you intend to 
place the question of the future of Israeli settlements in Sinai before the 
Knesset for Its decision. 
Enclosed Is a copy of President Sadat's letter to me on this subject. 
Letter From Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat To 
President Jimmy Carter, September 17,1978 
Dear Xr. President: 
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I an writing to you to reaffirm the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt with 
respect to Jerusalem: 
1. Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank. Legal and historical 
Arab rights in the City must be respected and restored. 
2. Arab Jerusalem should be under Arab sovereignty. 
3. The Palestinian inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem are entitled to exercise 
their legitimate national rights, being part of the palestinian People In the 
Vest Bank. 
4. Relevant Security Council Resolutions, particularly Resolutions 242 and 267, 
must be applied with regard to Jerusalem. All the measures taken by Israel to 
alter the status of the city are null and void and should be rescinded. 
5. All peoples must have free access to the City and enjoy the free exercise of 
worship and the right to visit and transit to the holy places without 
distinction or discrimination. 
6. The holy places of each faith may be placed under the administration and 
control of their representatives. 
7. Essential functions in the City should be undivided and a joint municipal 
council composed of an equal number of Arab and Israeli members can supervise 
the carrying out of these functions. In this way, the City shall be undivided. - 
Letter From Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin 
To President Jimmy Carter, September 17,1978 
Dear Mr. President: 
I have the honor to inform you, Mr. President, that on 28 June 1967 Israel's 
Parliament (The Knesset) promulgated and adopted a law to the effect: "the 
Government Is empowered by a decree to apply the law, the jurisdiction and 
administration of the State to any part of Eretz Israel (land of Israel- 
Palestine)# as stated in that decree". 
On the basis of this law, the Government of Israel decreed in July 1967 that 
Jerusalem is one city Indivisible, the Capital of the State of Israel. 
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Letter From President Jimmy Carter To Egyptian 
President Anwar El Sadat, September 22,1978 
Dear Mr. President: 
I have received your -letter of September 17,1978, setting forth the Egyptian 
position an Jerusalem. I am transmitting a copy of that letter to Prime Minister 
Begin for his information. 
The position of the United States on Jerusalem remains as stated by 
Ambassador Goldberg In the United Nations General Assembly on July 14,1967, 
and subsequently by Ambassador Yost in the United Nations Security Council on 
July 1.1989. 
Letter From Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat To 
President Jimmy Carter, September 17l 1978 
Dear Mr. President: 
In connection with the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East, " I am writing 
you this letter to inform you of the position of the Arab Republic of Egyptq 
with respect to the implementation of the comprehensive settlement. 
To ensure the implementation of the provisions related to the Vest Bank and 
Gaza and in order to safeguard the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, 
Egypt will be prepared to assume the Arab role emanating from these provisions, 
following consultations with Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian 
people. 
Letter From President Jimmy Carter To Israeli Prime 
Minister Menachem Begin, September 22,1978 
Dear Mr. Prime Minister: 
I hereby acknowledge that you have informed me as follows: 
A) In each paragraph of the Agreed Framework Document the expressions 
"Palestinians" or "Palestinian People" are being and will be construed and 
understood by you as "Palestinian Arabs. " 
B) In each paragraph in which the expression "West Bank" appears, it is 
being, and will be, understood by the Government of Israel as Judea and Samaria. 
Letter From Secretary Of Def ense Harold Brown To 
Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Veizman, 
Accompanying The Documents Agreed To At Camp 
David, Released September 29,1978 
Dear Mr. Minister: 
The U. S. understands that, in connection with carrying out the agreements 
reached at Camp David$ Israel intends to build two military airbases at 
appropriate sites in the Negev to replace the airbases at Eitam and Etzion 
which will be evacuated by Israel in accordance with the peace treaty to be 
concluded between Egypt and Israel. We also understand the special urgency and 
priority which Israel attaches to preparing the new bases in light of its 
conviction that it cannot safely leave the Sinai alrbases until the new ones are 
operatioinal. 
I suggest that our two governments consult an the scope of the two new 
airbases as well as on related forms of assistance which the United States 
might appropriately provide in light of the special problems which may be 
presented by carrying out such a project on an urgent basis. The President is 
prepared to seek the necessary Congressional approvals for such assistance as 
may be agreed upon by the U. S. side as a result of such consultations. 
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APIPUND IXV 
The Treaty Of Peace Between Egypt And Israel 
Washington, March 17,1979. 
The Government Of the Arab Republic of Egypt 
and the Government of the State of Israel 
Preamble 
Convinced of the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just 
comperrhensive and lasting peace in the Middle East In accordance with 
Security Council Resolution 242 and 338. 
Reaffirming their adherence to the Framework for Peace in the Middle 
East Agreed at Camp David dated September 17,1978; 
Noting that the aforementioned Framework as appropriate is intended to 
constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also 
between Israel and eacn-of its other Arab neighbors which is prepared to 
negotiate peace with it on this basis. 
Desiring to bring to an end the state of war between them and to 
establish a peace In which every state in the area can live in security; 
Convinced that the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between Egypt and 
Israel Is an important step in the search for comprehensive peace in the 
area and for the attaintment of the settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict In all its aspects. 
Inviting the other Arab parties to this dispute to join the peace 
process with Israel vuided bv and based an the principles of the 
aforementioned Framework ; Desiring as well TO deveLop friendly 
relations and cooperation between themselves in accordance with the 
United Nations Charter and the principles of international law governing 
international relations in times of peace; Agree to the following 
provisions in the free exercise of their sovereignty, in order to 
implement the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between 
Egypt and Israel" 
479 
Article 1 
1 The state of war between the parties will be terminated and peace 
will be established between them upon the exchange of instruments of 
ratification of this Treaty. 2-Israel will withdraw all its armed forces 
and civilians from the Sinai behind the international boundary between 
Egypt and mandated Palestine, as provided in the annexed protocol (Annex 
1), and Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the 
Sinai. 3-Upon completion of the interim withdrawal provided for in Annex 
1, the Parties will establish normal and friendly relations, in 
accordance with Article 111 (3). 
Article II 
The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized 
international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory 
of Palestine, as shown an the map at Annex II without prejudice to the 
issue of the status of the Gaza Strip. The Parties recognize this 
boundary as inviolable. Each will respect the territorial integrity of 
the other, including their territorial waters and air space. 
Article III 
1-The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of 
the United Nations and the principles of international law governing 
relations among states In times of peace. In particular a-They recognize 
and will respect each other's sovereigntyl territorial integrity and 
political independdence; 
b-They recognize and will respect each other s right to live in peace 
within their secure and reecognized boundaries; 
c-They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or 
indirectly, against each other and will settle all disputes betweenn 
then by peaceful means. 
2-Each party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, 
hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from 
within its territory, or any forces subject to its control or by any 
other forces stationed an its territory, against the population, 
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citizens or property of the other Party. Each Party also undertakes to 
refrain iron organizing, Instigating, inciting, assisting or 
participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion 
or violence against the other Party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure 
that perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice. 
3-The Parties agree that the normal relationship established between 
them will include full recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural 
relations, ternination of economic boycotts and discriminatory barries 
to the free movement of people and goods, and will guarantee the mutual 
enjoyment by citizens of the due process of law. Thy process by which 
they undertake to achieve such a relationship parallel to the 
implementation of other provisions of this Treeaty is set out in the 
annexed protocol EAnnex 111 3. 
Article IV 
1-In order to provide maximum security for both Parties on the basis of 
reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be established including 
limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, and United 
Nations forces and observers, described in detail as to nature and 
timing in Annex 1, and other security arrangements the Parties nay agree 
upon. 
2-The Parties agree to the stationing of United Nations personnel in 
areas described in Annex 1. The Parties agree not to request withdrawal 
of the United Nations personnel will not be removed unless such removal 
is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the 
affirmative vote of the five Permanent Members, unless the Parties 
otherwise agree. 
3-A Joint Commision will be established to facilitate the implementation 
of the Treaty, as provided for in Annex 1. 
4-The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this 
Article may at the request of either party be reviewed and amended by 
mutual agreement of the Parties. 
krticle V 
1-Ships of Israel, and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall 
enjoy the right of free passage through the Suez Canal and its 
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approaches through the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea on the 
basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, applying to all nations. 
Israeli nationalsg vessels and cargoes, as well as persons, vessels and 
cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall be accorded 
non-discriminatory treatment in all matters connected with usage of the 
canal. 
2-The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be 
international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and 
non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The Parties will 
respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to 
either country through the Strait of Tiran. and the Gulf of Aqaba. 
Article VI 
1-This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting 
in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter 
of the United Nations. 2-The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith 
their obligations under this Treaty; without regard to action or 
inaction of any other party and Independently of any instrument external 
to this Treaty. 
3-They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the 
application in their relations of the multilateral conventions to which 
they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notifaction to 
the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositaries of 
such conventions. 
4-The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict 
with this Treaty. 
5-Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of 
a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present 
Treaty and any of their obligations, the obligations under this Treaty 
will be binding and implemented. 
krtIcle VII 
1-Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this 
Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations. 
2-Any such disputer. which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be 
resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration. 
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Irticle VIII 
The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual 
settlement of all financial claims. 
Article II 
1-This Treaty shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of 
ratifaction. 
2-This Treatysupersedes the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 
September, 1975- 
; -3-All protocolst annexes, and maps attached to this Treaty shall be 
regarded as an integral part hereof. 
4-The Treaty shall be communited to the Secretary General of the United 
Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 
102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Annex I 
Protocol Concerning Israeli Vithdrawal And Security Arrangements 
Article I 
Concept of Vithdrawal 
Urael will complete withdrawal of all its armed forces and civilians 
from the Sinai not later than three years from the date of exchange of 
Instruments of ratifaction of this Treaty. 
2-To ensure the mutual security of the Parties, theimplementation of 
phased withdrawal will be accompanied by the military measures and 
establishment of zones set out in this Annex and In Map 1, hereinafter 
referred to as %the Zones'. 
3-The withdrawal from the Sinai will be accomplished In two phases; 
a. The Interim withdrawal behind the line from east of ElArish to Ras 
Xuhammed as delineated on Nap 2 within nine months from the date of 
exchange of instruments of ratifaction of this Treaty. 
b. The final withdrawal from the Sinai behind the international 
boundary not later than three years from the date of exchange of 
instruments of ratifaction of this Treaty. 
4-A Joint Commission will be formed immediately after the exchange of 
Instruments of ratifaction of this Treaty in order to supervise and 
coordinate movements and schedules during the withdrawal, and to adjust 
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plans and timetables as necessary within the limits established by 
paragraph 3, above. Details relating to the Joint Commision are set out 
in Article IV of the attached Appendix. The Joint Commission will be 
dissolved upon completion of final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. 
krticle II 
Determination of Final Lines and Zones 
1-In-order to provide maximum security for both Parties after the final 
withdrawal@ the lines and the Zones delineated an Mapl are to be 
established and organized as follows: 
a. Zone A 
(1) Zone A is bounded an the east by line A( red line ) and on 
the west by the Suez Canal and the east coast of the Gulf of 
Suez, as shown an -Map 1. 
(2) An Egyptian armed force of one mechanized infantry division 
and its military installations and field fortifactions, will be 
in this Zone. 
MThe main elements of that Division will consist of: (a) Three 
mechanized infantry brigades. 
(b) one armed brigade. 
(c) Seven field artillery battalions including up to 126 artillery 
pieces. 
(d) Seven anti-aircraft artillery battalions including individual's 
urface-to-air missiles and up to 126 anti-aircraft guns of 37 mm and 
above. 
(e) Up to 230 tanks. 
(f) Up, to 480 armored personnel vehicles of all types. 
(g) Up to a total of twenty-two thousand personnel. 
b; Zone. B 
(1) Zone B is bounded by line B (green-line) an the east and by 
line A (red line) an the west, as shown on Map 1. 
(2) Egyptian border units of four battalions equipped with light 
weapons and wheeled vehicles will provide security and supplement 
the civil- police in maintaining order in Zone B. The main elements 
of the four Border Battalions will consist of up to a total of four 
thousand personnel. 
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(3) Land based# short range, low powerg coastal warning points of 
the border patrol units may be established an the coast of this 
Zone. 
WThere will be in Zone B field fortifactions and military 
installations for the four border battalions. 
c. Zone C 
(1) Zone C is boundered by line B(green line) an the west and the 
International Boundary and the Gulf of Aqaba on the east, as shown on 
Map 1. 
(2) only United Nations forces and Egyptian civil police will be 
stationed in Zone C. 
(3) The Egyptian civil police armed with light weapons will perform 
normal police functions within this Zone. 
(4) The United Nations Force will be deplored within Zone C and perform 
its functions as defined in Article VI of this Annex. 
(5) The United Nations Force will be stationed mainly in camps located 
within the following stationing areas shown on Mapl, and will establish 
its precise locations after consultations with Egypt : (a) In that part 
of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 Km. of the Xediterranean 
Sea and adjacent to the International Boundary. 
W In the Sharm el Sheikh area. 
d. Zone D 
(1) Zone D is bounded by line D (blue line) on the east and the 
international boundary on the west, as shown an Mapl. 
(2) In this Zone there will be an Israeli limited force of four 
infantry battalionso their, military installations, and field 
fortifactionst the United Nations observers. 
(3) The Israeli forces in Zone D will not include tanks, artillery and 
anti-aircraft missiles except individual surface-to-air missiles. 
(4) The main elements of the four Israeli infantry battalions will 
consist of up to 180 armored personnel vehicles of all types and up to a 
total of four thousand personnel. 
2. Access across the international boundary shall only be permitted 
through entry check points designated by each Party and under its 
control. Such access shall be in accordance with laws and regulations of 
each country. 
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3. Only those field fortificationst military installationa, forcest and 
weapons specifically permitted by this Annex shall be in the Zones. 
Article III 
Aerial Xilitary Regine 
1. Flights of combat aircraft and reconnaisance flights of Egypt and 
Israel shall take place only over Zones Aand D, respectively. 
2. Only unarmed, non-combat aircraft of Egypt and Israel will be 
stationed in Zones A and D, respectively. 
3. only Egyptian unarmed transport aircraft will take off and land in 
Zone B and up to eight such aircraft may maintained in Zone B. The 
Egyptian border units may be equipped with unarmed helicopters to 
perform their functions in Zone B. 
4. The Egyptian civil police may be equipped with unarmed police 
helicopters to perform normal police functions in Zone C. 
5. Only civilian airfields may be built in the Zones. 
6. 'Without prejudice to the provisions of this Treaty, only those 
military aerial activities specifically permitted by this Annex shall be 
allowed in the Zones and the airspace above their territorial waters. 
Article IV 
Naval Regime 
1. Egypt and Israel may base and operate naval vessels along the coasts 
of Zones A and D, respectively. 
2. Egyptian coast guard boats, lightly armed, may be stationed and 
operate in the territorial waters of Zone B to assist the border units 
in performing their functions in this Zone. 
3. Egyptian civil police equipped with light boats, lightly armedo 
shall perform normal police functions within the territorial waters of 
Zone C. 
4. Nothing in this Annex shall be considered as derogating from the 
right of innocent passage of the naval vessels of either party. 
5. only civilian maritime ports and installations may be built in the 
Zones. 
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6. Without prejudice to the provisions of this Treaty, only those naval 
activities specifically permitted by this Annex shall be allowed in the 
Zones and in their territorial waters. 
Article V 
Early Varning Syste=B 
Egypt and Israel may establish and operate early warning systems only in 
Zones A and D respectively. 
Article VI 
United Nations Operations 
1. The Parties will requst the United Nations to provide forces and 
observers to supervise the implementation of this Annex and employ their 
best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms. 
2 Vith respect to these United Nations forces and observers, as 
appropriate# the Parties agree to request the following arrangements: 
a. operation of check pointsl reconnaissance patrols# and observation 
posts along the international boundary and line B, and within Zone C. 
b. Periodic verification of the implementation of the provisions of 
this Annex will be carried out not less than twice a month unless 
otherwise agreed by the Parties. 
c. Additional verifications within 48 hours after the receipt of a 
request from either Party. 
d. Ensuring the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran in 
accordance with Article V of the Treaty of Peace. 
3. The arrangements described in this article for each zone will be 
implemented in Zones At B, and C by the United Nations Force and in Zone 
D by the United Nations Observers. 
4. United Nations verification teams shall be accompanied by liaison 
officers of the respective Party. 
5. The United Nations Force and observers will report their findings to 
both Parties. 
6. The United Nations Force and Observers operationg in the Zones will 
enjoy freedom of movement and other facilities necessary for the 
performance of their tasks. 
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7. The United Nations Force and Observers are not empowered to 
authorize the crossing of the international boundary. - 
13. The Parties 
shall agree on the nations from which the United Nations Force and 
Observers will be drawn. They will be drawn from nations other than 
those which are permanent members of the United Nations Security 
council. 
9. The Parties agree that the United Nations should make those command 




Upon dissolution of the Joint Commision, aliaison system between the 
Parties will be established. This liaison system is intended to provide 
an effective method to asses progress in the implementation of 
obligations under the present Annex and to resolve any problem that may 
arise in the course of implementation, and refer other unresolved 
matters to the higher military authorities of the two countries 
respectively for consideration. It is also intended to prevent 
situations resulting from errors or misinterpretation on the part of 
either Party. 
2. An Egyptian liaison office will be established in the city of 
El-Arish and an Israeli liaison office will be established in the city 
of Beer-Sheba. Each office will be headed by an officer of the 
respective country, and assisted by a number of officers. 
3. A direct telephone link between the two offices will be set up and 
also direct telophone lines with the United Nations command will be 
maintained by both offices. 
Irticle VIII 
Respect For Var Menorials 
Each Party undertakes to preserve in good condition the War Memorials 
erected in the memory of soldiers of the other Party, namely those 
erected by Israel in the Sinai and those erected by Egypt in Israel, and 




The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and Civilians behind the interim 
withdrawal line, and the conduct of the forces of the Parties and the 
United Nations prior to the final withdrawal, will be governed by the 
attached Appendix and Maps 2 and 3. 
Appendix To Annex I 
Organization of Novenents in the Sinai 
Article I 
Principles of Vithdrawal 
1. The withdrawal of Israeli forces and civilians from the Sinai will be 
accomplished in two phases as described in Article 1 of Annex 1. The 
description and timing of the withdrawal are included in this Appendix. 
The joint Commision will develop and present to the Chief Coordinator of 
the United Nations forces in the Middle East the details of these phases 
not later than one month before the initation of each phase of 
withdrawal. 
2. Both Parties agree on the following principles for the sequence of 
military movements. 
a. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1X, paragraph 2j of 
this Treaty, until Israeli armed forces complete withdrawal from the 
current J and M Lines established by the Egyptian- Israeli Agreement 
of September 1975, hereinafter reffered to as the 1975 Agreement, up 
to the interim withdrawal line, all military arrangements existing 
under that Agreement will remain in effect, except those military 
arrangements otherwise provided for in this Appendix. 
b. As Israeli armed forces withdraw. United Natians foreas will 
immediately enter the evacuated areas to establish interim and 
temporary buffer zones as shown on Maps 2 and 3, respectively, for 
the purpose of maintaining a seperation of forces. United Nations 
forces deployment will precede the movement of any other personnel 
into these areas. 
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c. Within a period of seven days after Israeli armed forces have. 
evacuated any area located in Zone A, units of Egyptian armed forces 
shall deploy in accordance with the provisions of Artivle II of this 
Appendix. ' 
d. Within a period of seven days after Israeli armed forces have 
evacuated any area located in Zone A or B, Egyptian border units 
shall deploy in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this 
Appendix, and will function in accordance with the provisions of 
Article II of Annex I. e. Egyptian civil police will enter evacuated 
areas immediately after the United Nations forces to perform normal 
police functions. 
f. Egyptian naval units shall deploy in the Gulf of Suez in 
accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix. 
g. Except those movements mentioned abovet deployments of Egyptian 
armed forces and the activities covered in Annex I will be effected 
In the evacuated areas when Israeli armed forces have completed 
their withdrawal behind the interim withdrawal line. 
Article II 
Subphases of the Withdrawal to the Interfis Withdrawal Line 
1. The withdrawal to the interim withdrawal line will be accomplished 
in subphases as described in this Article and as shown an Map 3. Each 
subphase will be completed within the indicated number of months from 
the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty. 
a. First subphase: within two months, Israeli armed forces will 
withdraw from the area of El Arish, including the town of El Arish 
and its airfieldo shown as Area 1 on Map 3. 
b. Second subphase: within three monthsl Israeli armed forces will 
withdraw from the area between line M of the 1975 Agreement and line 
A, shown as Area II an Map 3. 
c. Third subphase. - within five months, Israeli armed forces will 
withdraw from the areas east and south of Area III shown as Area III 
on Map 3. 
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d. Fourth subphase: within seven monthei Israeli armed forces will 
withdraw from the area of El Tor-Ras El Kenisa, shown as Area IV on 
Map 3. 
e. Fifth subphase: within nine months, Israeli armed forces will 
withdraw from the remaining areas west of the interim withdrawal 
line, including the areas of Santa Katrina and the areas east of the 
Giddi and Mitla passes, shown as Area V an Map 3, thereby completing 
Israeli withdrawal behind the interim withdrawal line. 
2. Egyptian forces will deploy in the areas evacuated by Israeli armed 
forces as follows: 
a. Up to one-third of the Egyptian armed forces in the Sinai in 
accordance with the 1975 Agreement will deploy in the portions of 
Zone A lying within Area I, untill the completion of interim 
withdrawal. Thereafter, Egyptian armed forces as described in 
Article II of Annex I will be deployed in Zone A up to the limits of 
the interim buffer zone. 
b. The Egyptian naval activity in accordance with Article IV of 
Annex I will commence along the coasts of Areas II, III, and IV, 
upon completion of the second, third, and fourth subphases, 
respectively. 
c. Of the Egyptian border units described in Article II of Annex I, 
upon completion of the first subpbase one battalion will be deployed 
in Area I. A second battalion will be deployed in Area II upon 
completion of the second subphase. A third battalion will be 
deployed in Area III upon completion of the third subphase. The 
second and third battalions mentioned above may also be deployed in 
any of the subsequently evacuated areas of the southern Sinai. 
3. United Nations forces in Buffer Zone I of the 1975 Agreement will 
redoplay to enable the deployment of Egyptian forces described above 
upon the completion of the first subphaseo but will otherwise continue 
to function in accordance with the provisions of that Agreement in the 
remainder of that zone until the completion of interim withdrawal, as 
indicated in Article I of this Appendix. 
4. Israeli convoys may use the roads south and east of the main road 
junction east of El Arish to evacuate Israeli forces and equipment up to 
the completion of interim withdrawal. These convoys will proceed in 
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daylight upon four hours notice to the Egyptian liaison group and United 
Nations forces, will be escorted by United Nations forces, and will be 
in accordance with schedules coordinated by the Joint Commision. An 
Egyptian liaison officer will accompany convoys to assure un interrupted 
movement. The Joint Commision may approve other arrangements for 
convoys. 
Article III 
United Nations Forces 
1. The Parties shall request that United Nations forces be deployed as 
necessary to perform the functions described In this Appendix up to the 
time of, completion of final Israeli withdrawal. For that purpose, the 
Parties agree to the redoployment of the United Nations Emergency Force. 
2. United Nations forces will supervise the implementation of this 
Appendix and will employ their best efforts to prevent any violation of 
its terms. 
3. Vhen United Nations forces deploy in accordance with the provisions 
of Articles I and II of this Appendix, they will perform the functions 
of verification in limited force zones in accordance with Article VI of 
Annex I, and will establish check points, reconnaissance patrols, and 
observation posts in the temporary buffer zones described in Article II 
above. Other functions of the United Nations forces which concern the 
interim buffer zone are described in Article V of this Appendix. 
Article IV 
Joint Commision and Liaison 
1. The Joint Commision referred to in Article IV of this Treaty will 
function from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of 
this Treaty up to the date of completion of final Israeli withdrawal 
from the Sinaai. 
2. The Joint Commision will be composed of representatives of each 
Party headed by senior officers. This Commision shall invite a 
representative of the United Nations when discussing subjects concerning 
the United Nations, or when either Party requests United Nations 
presence. Decisions of the Joint Commision will be reached by agreement 
of Egypt and Israel. 
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3. The Joint Commision will supervise the implementation of the 
arrangements described in Annex II and this Appendix. To this end, and 
by agreement of both Parties, it will: 
a. coordinate military movements described in this Appendix and 
supervise their implementation; 
b. address and seek to resolve any problem arising out of the 
implementation of Annex I and this Appendix, and discuss any 
violations reported by the United Nations Force and Observers and 
refer to the Governments of Egypt and Israel any unresolved 
problems; 
c. assist the United Nations Force and Observers in the execution 
of their mandates, and deal with the timetable of the periodic 
verifications when referred to it by the Parties as provided for in 
Annex I and in this Appendix; 
d. organize the demarcation of the international boundary and all 
'lines and zones described in Annex I and this Appendix; 
e. supervise the handing over of the main installation in the Sinai 
from Israel to Egypt; 
f. agree on necessary arrangements for finding and returning 
missing bodies of Egyptian and Israeli soldiers; 
g. organize the setting up and operation of entry check points 
along the El Arish-Ras Muhammed line in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 4 of Annex III; 
h. conduct its operations through the use of Joint liaison teams 
consisting of one Israeli representative and one Egyptian 
representative, provided from a standing Liaison Groupt which will 
conduct activities as directed by the Joint Commision; 
i. provide liaison and coordination to the United Nations command 
implementing provisions of the Treatyl and, through the joint 
liaison teams, maintain local coordination with the United Nations 
Force stationed in specific areas or United Nations Observers 
monitoring specific areas for any assistance as needed; 
J. discuss any other matters which the Parties by agreement may 
place before it. 
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4. Meeting of the Joint Commission shall be held at least once a month. 
In the event that either Party or the Command of the United Nations 
Force requests a special meeting, it will be convened within 24 hours. 
5. The Joint Commision will meet in the buffer zone until the completion 
of the Interim withdrawal and in El Arish and Beer-Sheba alternately 
afterwards. The first meeting will be held not later than two weeis 
after the entry into force of this Treaty. 
Article V 
Definition of the Interim Buffer Zone and Its 
Activities 
1. An interim buffer zone, by which the United Nations Force will 
effect a separation of Egyptian and Israeli elements, will be 
established west of and adjacent to the interim withdrawal line as shown 
on Map 2 after implementation of Israeli withdrawal and deployment 
behind the interim withdrawal line. Egyptian civil police equipped with 
light weapons will perform normal police functions within this zone. 
2. The United Nations Force will operate check points, reconnaissance 
patrols, and observation posts within the Interim buffer zone in order 
to ensure compliance with the terms of this Article. 
3. In accordance with arrangements agreed upon by both Parties and to 
be coordinated by the Joint Commision, Israeli personnel will operate 
military technical installations at four specific locations shown an Map 
2 and designated as Mmap central coordinate 57163940), T2 (map central 
coordinate 59351541)l T3 (map central coordinate 59331527)l and T4 (map 
central cordinate 61130979) under the following principles: 
a. The technical installatias shall be manned by technical and 
administrative personnel equipped with small arms required for their 
protection (revolvers, rifles, sub-machine gunst light machine guns 
hand grenades, and ammunition), as follows: 
T1-up to 150 personnel 
T2and T3-up to 350 personnel 
T4-up to 200 personnel 
b. Israeli personnel will not carry weapons outside the sites, 
except officers who may carry personnel weapons. 
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c. Only a third party agreed to by Egypt and Israel will enter and 
conduct inspections within the perimeters of technical installations 
in the buffer zone. The third party will conduct inspections in a 
random manner at least once a month. The inspections will verify the 
nature of the operation of the installatias and the weapons and 
personnel therein. The third party will in diately report to the 
Parties any divergence from an installations visual and electronic 
surveillance or communicatkons role. d. Supply 6f the installations, 
visits for technical and administrative purposes, and replacement of 
personnel and equipment situated in the sites, may occur 
uninterrruptedly from the United Nations check points to the 
perimeter of the technical installations, after checking and being 
escorted by only the United Nations forces. 
e. Israel will be permitted to introduce into its technical 
installations items required for the proper functioning of the 
installations and personnel. 
f. As detrmined by the Joint Commision, Israel will be permitted to: 
(1) Maintain in its installations fire-fighting and general 
maintenance equipment as well as wheeled administrative vehicles 
and mobile engineering equipment necessary for the maintenance 
of the sites. All vehicles shall be unarmed. 
(2) Within the sites and in the buffer zone, maintain roads, 
water lines, and communications cables which serve the sites. At 
each of the three installation locations (Tl, T2 and T3, and 
T4), this maintenance may be performed with up to two unarmed 
wheeled vehicles and by up to twelve unarmed personnel with only 
necessary equipment, including heavy engineering equipment if 
needed. This maintenance may be performed three times a weeko 
except for special problems, and only after giving the United 
Nations four hours notice. The teams will be escorted by the 
United Nations. 
g. Movement to and from the technical installations will take place 
only during daylight hours. Access to, and exit from, the technical 
installations shall be as follows: 
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(1) T1: through a United Nations check point, and ViB the road 
between Abu Aweigila road and the Gebel Libni road (at Km. 161), 
as shown on Map 2. 
(2) T2 and T3., through a United Nations checkpoint and via the 
road constructed across the buffer zone to Gebel Katrina, as 
shown an Map 2. 
(3) T2, T3, and-T4: via helicopters flying within a corridor at 
the times, and according to a flight profilej agreed to by the 
Joint Commision. The helicopters will be checked by the United 
Nations Force at landing sites outside the perimeter of the 
installations. 
h. Israel will inform the United Nations Force at least one hour in 
advance of each intended movement to and from the installations. 
i. Israel shall be entitled to evacuate sick and wounded and summon 
medical experts and medical teams at'any time after giving immediate 
notice to the United Nations Force. 
4. The details of the above principles and all other matters in this 
Article requiring coordination by the Parties will be handled by the 
Joint Commision. 
5. These technical installations will be withdrawn when Israeli forces 




Dispcoition, of Installations and Xilitary Barriers 
Dispositions of installations and military barriers will be determined 
by the Parties in accordance the following guidelines: 
1. Up to three weeks before Israeli withdrawal from any area, the Joint 
Commision will arrange for Israeli and Egyptian liaison and technical 
teams to conduct a Joint inspection of all appropriate installations to 
agree upon condition of structures and ariicles which will be 
transferred to Egyptian control and to arrange for such transfer. Israel 
will declarel at that time, its plans for disposition of installations 
and articles within the installations. 
2. Israel undertakes to transfer to Egypt all agreed infrastructure, 
utilities, and installations intact, inter alia, airfields, roads, 
pumping stations# and ports. Israel will present to Egypt the 
information necessary for the maintenance and operation of these 
facilities. Egyptian technical teams will be permitted to observe and 
familiarize themselves with the operation of these facilities for a 
period of up to two weeks prior to transfer. 
3. Vhen Israel relinquishes Israeli military water points near El Arish 
and El Tor, Egyptian technical teams will assume control of those 
installations and- ancillary equipment in accordance with an orderly 
transfer process arranged beforehand by the Joint Commision. Egypt 
undertakesýto continue to make available at all water supply points the 
normal quantity of currently available water up to the time Israel 
withdraws behind the international boundary, unless otherwise agreed in 
the Joint Commision. 
4. Israel will make its best effort to remove or destroy all military 
barriers, including obstacles and minefieldst in the araes and adjacent 
waters from which it withdraws, according to the following concept: 
a. Military barriers will be cleared first from areas near 
populations, roads, and major installations and utilities. 
b. For these obstacles and minefields which cannot be removed or 
destroyed prior to Israeli withdrawal, Israel will provide detailed 
naps to Egypt and the United Nations through the Joint Commision not 
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later than 15 days before entry of United Nations forces into the 
affected areas. 
c. Egyptian military engineers will enter those areas after United 
Nations forces enter to conduct barrier clearance operations in 




1, Aerial surveillance activities during the withdrawal will be carried 
out as follows: 
a. Both Parties request the United States to continue airborne 
surveillance flights in accordance with previous agreements untill 
the completion of final Israeli withdrawal. 
b. 'Flight profiles will cover the Limited Farces Zones to monitor 
the limi tations on forces and armaments, and to detrimine that 
Israeli armed forces have withdrawn from the areas described in 
Article II of Annex I, Article II of this Appendixt and Maps 2 and 
3, and that these forces thereafter remain behind their lines. 
Special inspection flights may be flown at the request of either 
Party or of the United Nations. 
c. Only the main elements in the military organizations of each 
Party, as described in Annex I and in this Appendixt will be 
reported. 
2. Both Parties request the United States operated Sinai Field Mission 
to continue its operations in accordance with previos agreements until 
completion of the Israeli withdrawal from the area east of the Giddi and 
Mitla Passes. Thereafter, the Mission will be terminated. 
Article VIII 
Exercise of Egyptian Sovereignty 
Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over evacuated 
parts of the Sinai upon Israeli withdrawal as provided for in Article I 
of this Treaty. 
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JOINT LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM PRESIDENT SADAT AND 
PRIME MINISTER BEGINXrch 26,1979 
Dear Mr. President: 
This letter confirms that Egypt and Israel have agreed as follows: 
The Goverments of Egypt and Israel recall that they concluded at Camp 
David and signed at the Vhite House on September 17,1978, the annexed 
documents entitled "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at 
Camp David* and "Framework for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between 
Egypt and Israel. " 
For the purpose of achieving a comprehensive peace settlement in 
accordance with the above mentioned Frameworks, Egypt and Israel will 
proceed with the implementation of those provisions relating to the Vest 
Bank and the Gaza Strip. They have agreed to start negotiations within a 
month after the exchange of the instruments of ratifaction of the Peace 
Treaty. In accordance with the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East, " 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is invited to join the negotiations. The 
Delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The 
purpose of the negotiation shall be to agree, prior to the elections, an 
the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority 
(administrative council), define its powers and responsibilities, and 
agree upon other related issues. In the event Jordan decides not to take 
part in the negotiations, the negotiations will be held by Egypt and 
Israel. 
The two Governments agree to negotiate continuously and in good faith 
to conclude these negotiations at the earliest possible date. They also 
agree that the objective of the negotiations is the establishment of the 
self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza in order to provide 
full autonomy to the inhabitants. 
Egypt and Israel set for themselves the goal of completing the 
negotiations within one year so that elections will be held as 
expeditiously as possible after agreement has been reached between the 
parties. The self-governing authority referred to in the "Framework for 
Peace in the Middle East" will be established and inagurated within one 
month after it has been elected, at which time the transitional period 
of five years will begin. The Israeli military government and Its 
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civilian administration will be withdrawn, to be replaced by the 
self-governing authority, as specified in the "Framework for Peace in 
the Middle East. " A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will then take 
place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces 
into specified security locations. 
This letter also confirms our understanding that the United States 
Government will participate fully in all stages of negotiations. 
Explanatory Note 
President Carter, upon receipt of the Joint Letter to him from President 
Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, has added to the American and Israeli 
copies the notion: "I-have been informed that the expression "West Bank" 
is understood by the Government of Israel to mean "Judea and Samaria". 
This notation is in accordance with similar procedures established at 
Camp David. 
LETTERS REGARDING EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS 
Karch 26,1979 
Dear Xr. President: 
In response to- your request, I can confirm that, within one month 
after the completion of Israel s withdrawal to the interim line as 
provided for in the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, Egypt will 
send a resident ambassador to Israel and will recieve a resident Israeli 




Dear Mr. Prime Minister: 
I have received a letter from President Sadat that, within one month 
after Israel completes its withdrawal to the interim line In Sinai, as 
provided for in the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, Egypt will 
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send a resident ambassador to Israel and will receive in Egypt a 
resident Israeli ambassador. 
I would be grateful if you will confirm that this procedure will be 
agreeable to the Government of Israel. 
Sincerely 
JIXXY CARTER 
APP: ENDIX VI 
Government of Egypt Proposed Model of Full 
Autonomy For the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
28 January, 1980 
1-Introduction 
(a) The Camp David Framework stipulates the withdrawal of the military 
government and its civilian administration, and the transfer of its authority to 
the self-governing authority which will replace it. 
(b) In reviewing the powers and responsibilities of the military government 
and its civilian administration, the working group was seeking to envisage, 
through a practical approach, the powers and responsibilities to be exercised 
by the SGA in the context of its replacement of the military government and its 
civilian administration as stated in the Camp David Framework. That was the 
purpose of the survey of the current situation, it was a way out of the deadlock 
caused by the conceptual discussion of the comprehensive approachl and a step 
to provide the parties with basic information for discussing the transfer of 
authority. Indeedt the presentations of the powers and responsibilities of the 
military government and its civilian administration were meant to lead the 
working group, in the light of these presentations, and in the context of the 
transfer of authority, to prepare a model for the powers and responsibilities to 
be exercised by the SGA. 
This method was endorsed by the decision taken at the London meeting of the 
heads of delegation an October 26,1979: 
"... Presentations an the current situation will provide the parties with basic 
information for discussing transfer of authority as stated in the Camp David 
Framework. " 
This led subsequently to the call of the plenary on December 19,1979 to the 
working group: 
"To proceed to prepare for the plenary's future consideration a proposed model 
for the powers and responsibilities to be exercised by the SGA". 
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(c) Vhen the method is thus set in perspective, it becomes clear that when a 
model of the powers and responsibilities of the SGA is to be prepared$ the 
guiding frame should be the powers and responsibilities of the military 
government and its civilian administration and that the focal points in 
discussing such a model should be: ý 
1- Vithdrawal of the Israeli military government and its civilian 
administration. 
2- The transfer of authority. 
3-Organs of the SGA which will take over from, and replace, the military 
government and its civilian administration. 
II-The Xilitary Government and its Civilian Administration 
(a) On June 7,1967, the Israeli military command published proclamation No. 2 
entitled "Laws and administration proclamation". A section of which is 
concerned with the assumption of government by the Israeli defence forces, and 
under the title "Assumption of powers" it reads: 
"Any power of government, legislation, appointment, or administration with 
respect to the region or its inhabitants shall henceforth vest in me alone and 
shall be exercised only by me or a person appointed by me to that end or 
acting on my behalf. " 
(b) The Israeli military government currently exisiting in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip has full comprehensive authority. It assumes the power of 
formulating all policies and coordinating all activities. Its decision making 
emanates from different and interconnected channels of Israeli cabinet and 
interministerial levels as well as a chain of military command leading to the 
area or regional commander (one for the West Bank and one for Gaza) who was 
vested with full legislative and executive authority in the area as shown in the 
aforementioned proclamation. Mandatory orders issued by the military commander 
presented legislative enactment and revisions. Policy is determined according 
to considerations adopted by the office of the coordinator of activities, the 
Israeli ministry concerned and the regional command. 
(c) Administrative authority is delegated to regional and district commanders. 
Routine administrative duties and conduct of ordinary activities are left to the 
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relevant institutions that were already operating in the Vest Bank and Gaza or 
to newly organized units of administrative service. 
The civil administration of the military government is carried out by 
branches, each branch supervising a number of units. The units carry out the 
conduct of every day life. Heads of units who operate in the areas are directly 
subordinated through the chief of branch to the military commander while they 
come, at the same time, under the corresponding ministries in Israel an 
professional matters. From the ministry they get instructions on professional 
matters, how to act, how to deal with the problems arising out of thed daily 
life. From the commander, through the chief of branch, they get the policy, the 
command. 
(d) The military government and its civilian administration is therefore 
composed of different levels manifesting different layers of authority. One 
layer legislates and formulates policies while another layer executes and 
carries out the policies. I 
The Camp David Framework stipulates the transfer of both. It is not a matter 
of transferring the administrative set-up which implements the orders but first 
and foremost transferring the strata of authority which holds the power to 
issue the orders. 
(e) It may be recalled that the civil administration of the military 
government is mainly composed, even now, of local inhabitants. According to 
the figures of December 1978 there were in the Vest Bank 11,165 local employees 
in the civil administration (and only 980 Israelis) while in Gaza there are 
local director-generals heading 14 of the main units. 
Sol it may be said, that even now the Palestinian people in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip are bearing most of the responsibility for running the affairs of 
their daily life but only carrying out decisions which were made for them and 
implementing policies which were formulated over their heads. 
When the Camp David Framework promises them full autonomy, it can only mean 
that under the SGA they will be able to take their own decisions and formulate 
their own policies. 
The full autonomy which the Camp David Framework provides for cannot amount 
to a reorganization of what the Palestinians in the Vest Bank and Gaza Strip 
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already have, but rather the transformation of that set-up in an authority 
which is self-governing. Hence, the withdrawal of the military government and 
the transfer of its manifold authority to the inhabitants. 
III- Vithdrawal of the Xilltary Governzent and the Transfer of Authority 
(a) The first step in establishing the SGA should be the withdrawal of the 
military government, the Camp David Framework for peace states clearly that: 
"The Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be 
withdrawn as soon as self-governing authority has been freely elected by the 
inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. " 
The joint letter of March 26,1979 states that: "The Military Government and 
its civilian administration will be withdrawn, to be replaced by the SGA. " 
(b) Distinction is made in both the Camp David Framework and the Joint letter 
between two kinds of withdrawals: 
1- The withdrawal of the military government and its civilian administration 
which is total and absolute. It is an unqualified withdrawal; and 
. 2- A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces which is going to be partial and 
there will be a' redeployment of the remaining forces into specified security 
locations. 
(c) The withdrawal of the military government and its civilian 
administration, which occurs as soon as the SGA is elected, is the first step 
towards the assumption by the SGA of its powers and responsibilities. The 
transfer of authority takes place by handing over the powers and 
responsibilities of the military government and its civilian administration to 
the newly elected SGA. The SGA replaces the outgoing regime. 
(d) In this respect, the following elements should be stressed: 
(1) The transfer of authority implies the handing over of all powers and 
responsibilities presently exercised by the military government and its civilian 
administration. 
(2) The transfer of authority should be carried out in a peaceful and orderly 
manner. 
(3) Whenever Palestinian Institutions already exist in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, as part of the prevailing system of civil service, they will, in the 
course of such transfer of authority, take over the functions of, and replace, 
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the military government and its civilian administration. It is only when new 
functions, or new powers, are transferred to the SGA which were not exercised 
before under the military regime by the Palestinian people that new organs 
should be sought. 
(e) Stress should be focused more on the powers and functions that are not 
exercised by the Palestinian people under the military regime so that the 
necessary relevant organs would be suggested. The Palestinian people already 
played the major role in the civil service which obeyed the commands and 
implemented the policies of the military regime. Under the autonomy there will 
be need for an organ to fulfill their newly acquired powerf to make their own 
decisions and formulate their own policies. The elected body of the SGA is 
obviously that organ. 
IV- Powers and Responsibilities to be Exercised by the Self-Governing Authority 
For a model of powers and responsibilities to be exercised by the SGA, some 
keywords and guidelines from the Camp David Framework for peace should be 
stressed at the outset. 
(a) It is a self-governing authority, which means that it governs itself by 
itself. It is a self-generating authority. No outside source vests it with its 
authority. 
(b) It provides full autonomy, and not an impaired or partial autonomy. 
(c) This self-governing authority with full autonomy comes through free 
elections. It is a democratic structure of a government by the people and for 
the people. As an elected body it has a representative character and its 
membership fulfill the functions and exercise the powers that an elected 
representative body usually does. 
1- Nature of the SGA 
The SGA is an interim arrangement for a period not exceeding 5 years. This 
transitional process, at the outset of which the Israeli military government and 
its civilian administration will be withdrawn and the SGA established, can 
demonstrate that the practical problems arising from a transition to peace can 
be, satisfactorily resolved. The transitional period is aimed at bringing about 
the changes in attitudes that can assure a final settlement which realizes the 
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legitimate rights of the Palestinian people while assuring the security of all. 
the parties. The purpose of this transitional arrangement is: 
(a) To ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority to the Palestinian 
people in the Vest Bank and Gaza Strip. 
(b) To help the Palestinian people to develop their own political, economic 
and social institutioins in the Vest Bank and Gaza Strip so as to give 
expression to the principle of full autonomy which the SGA provides. 
(c) To provide the proper conditions for the Palestinian people to participate 
in negotiations leading to the solution of the Palestinian problem in all its 
aspects and the realization of their legitimate rights including their right to 
self-determination. 
2- Scope of the SGA: 
(a) The jurisdiction of the SGA will encompass all of the Palestinian 
territories occupied after 5 June 1967 and which are delineated in the relevant 
armistice agreements of 1949 (Egyptian- Israeli armistice agreement of 2 April, 
1949 regarding the Gaza Strip and Jordanian- Israeli armistice agreement of 24 
February, 1949 regarding the West Bank including Arab Jerusalem). 
(b) Authority of the SGA extends to the inhabitants as well as the land in 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
(c) All powers and responsibilities of the SGA apply to the Vest Bank and 
Gaza Strip which shall be regarded under the autonomy as one territory and 
integral whole. 
(d) All changes in the geographic character, the demographic composition and 
the legal status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip or any part thereof are null 
and void and must be rescinded as they Jeopardize the attainment of the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people as provided for in the Camp David 
Framework. 
This applies in particular to 
1- East Jerusalem, the annexation of which by Israel is null and void and must 
be rescinded. Relevant Security Council Resolutions, particularly Resolutions 
242 and 267 must be applied to Jerusalem which Is an integral part of the Vest 
Bank. Legal and historical Arab rights in the City must be respected and 
restored. 
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2- Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are illegal and, in the 
course of a final settlement should be withdrawn. 
During the transitional period there should be a ban on the establishment of 
new settlements or enlarging the existing ones. After the inauguration of the 
SGA all settlers in the Vest Bank and Gaza will come under the authority of the 
SGA. 
3- General Powers and Responsibilities of the SGA 
1- Promulgation of laws and regulations 
2-Policy formulation and supervision 
3-Budgetary provisions 
4- Taxation 
5- Employment of staff 
6- Issuance of identity and travel documents 
7- Control of in and out movement of persons and goods 
a- Power to assume obligations and own property 
9- Power to bold title to public land 
10- Power to sue and to be sued 
11- Power to enter into contracts 
12-Power to participate in negotiations on the final status of the Vest Bank 
and Gaza Strip and to ascertain in the views of the Palestinians 
13- Assuming responsibility for; 
(a) Public administration; 
(b) Public services; 
(c) Public order and internal security and police; 
(d) Public domain and natural resources; 
(e) Economic and financial fields; 
(f ) Social and cultural f ields; 
(g) Human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
14- Administration of Justice. 
4- Structure of the SGA 
(a) The SGA will be composed of 80-100 members freely elected from the 
Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
(b) The structure of the SGA contains two main organs: 
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- An assembly of the SGA composed of all freely elected representatives from 
the Vest Bank and Gaza. 
-A council composed of 10-15 members to be elected from among the 
membership of the assembly. 
(c) The Assembly: 
(1) It will take over, and replace, the authority of the military government in 
enacting laws and regulations, formulating and supervising policies, adopting 
the budget, levying taxes, etc... 
(2) Its internal organization of a chairman with one or more vice-chairmen, 
its rules of procedure and the number and composition of its committees will be 
determined by the Assembly itself. 
(d) The Council: 
(1) It assumes the actual administration of the West Bank and Gaza and 
implements the policies formulated by the assembly in the different domains. 
(2) It covers the whole range of activities and has full power in organizing, 
operating, employing staff and supervising the following executive branches; 
Education- Information and Culture- Transportation and Communications- Health- 
Social Velfare- Labour- Tourism- Internal Security- Housing- Religious Affairs- 
Agriculture- Economy and Finance- Commerce- Industry- Administration of 
Justice. 
(3) The Council will constitute its divisions as it deems necessary for the 
proper conduct of its functions and will determine the number of divisions, the 
internal organization of divisions and the machinery for coordination as befits 
the best and the most effective conduct of its activities. It may get in this 
respect, and if requested, expert help from the parties. 
(e) The Judicial authority will be manifested in a system of courts of law, 
courts of appeal and supreme court enjoying full guarantees for independence 
and efficiency in their administration of justice. 
M The SGA will have a representative, alongside with the representatives of 
Israels Egypt (and Jordan), on the continuing committee in accordance with 
Article 3 of the Camp David Framework. Katters of common concern to Israel 
and the SGA which need mutual arrangements could be dealt with through the 
committee. 
- lfthý 
5- Seat of the SGA 
The seat of the SGA will be East Jerusalem, 
6- Additional Arrangements 
(a) As soon as the SGA is established and inaugurated in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, a withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will 
be a redeploymedntg of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security 
locations. Permission will be required for any movement of military troops 
into or through the territory. 
(b) The Camp David Framework requires the parties to negotiate an agreement 
which includes, inter alia, arrangements for assuring internal security and 
public order. Responsibilities for security and public order will be decided 
jointly by the parties including the Palestinians, the Israelis, the Egyptians 
(and the Jordanians). 
(c) A strong police force will be established in the Vest Bank and Gaza Strip. 
It will be constituted by the SGA and composed of the people of the Vest Bank 
and Gaza Strip. 
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APP: ENDIX VII 
Israel Autonomy Proposal, January 1982 
In the Camp David Agreement signed on 17 September 1978 between Egypt 
and Israel, with the United States signing as a witness, agreement was 
reached on a plan for the solution of the problem of the Palestinian 
Arabs, that includes a proposal for full autonomy for the Palestinian 
Arabs living in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. The manner of establishing 
this autonomy, as well as its powers, were to be determined in 
negotiations between the signatories (Jordan was invited to participate, 
but did not respond). It was Israel that f irst raised the idea of 
autonomy that was later to serve as the basis of the Camp David 
agreement. For the first time in the history of the Palestinian Arab 
inhabitants of Judea-Samaria and the Gaza district, they were offered an 
opportunity of this kind to conduct their own affairs by themselves. 
Since 1979, talks have been held for the implementation of this 
agreement; there were intermissions in the negotiations, but talks were 
resumed intensively in the summer of 1981, leading to a thorough-going 
clarification of the positions of the parties. At these talks Israel 
put forward its proposals with regard to the self-governing authority 
(administrative council), its powers, responsibilities and structure as 
well as other related issues. The main points of Israel's proposals, as 
submitted in the course of the negotiations were as follows: 
Scope, Jurisdiction and Structure of the Self-Governing Authority 
(Adninistrative Council) : 
1. The Camp David accords set forth the establishment of a self- 
governing authority (administrative council) that will comprise one body 
representing the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza 
district, who will choose this body in free elections, and it will 
assume those functional powers that will be transferred to it. Thus the 
Palestinian Arabs will for the first time have an elected and 
representative body, in accordance with their own wishes and free' 
choicep that will be able to carry opt the functions assigned to it as 
an administrative council. 
2. The members of the administrative council will be able, as a groups 
to discuss all subjects within the councills competencet apportioning 
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among themselves the spheres of responsibility for the various 
functions. Within the domain of its assigned powers and 
responsibilities, the council will be responsible for planning and 
carrying out its activities. 
Powers of the Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council): 
La. Under the terms of the Camp David agreement, the parties have to 
reach an agreement on the powers and responsibilities of the authority. 
Israel's detailed proposals include a list of powers that will be given 
to the authority and that, by any reasonable and objective criterion, 
represent a wide and comprehensive range of fields of operation. 
Without any doubt, the transferring of these powers constitutes the 
bestowal of full autonomy- in the full meaning of that tern. 
b. The powers to be granted the authority, under these proposals, are 
in the following domains: 
1. Administration of Justice: Supervision of the administrative system 
of the courts in the areas; dealing with matters concerned with the 
prosecution system and with the registration of companiest partnership, 
patents, trademarks, etc. 
2. Agriculture: All branches of agriculture and fisheries, nature 
reserves and parks. 
3. Finance: Budget of the administrative council and allocations among 
its various divisions; taxation. 
4. Civil Service: Appointment and working conditions of the Council's 
employees. (Today, the civil service of the inhabitants of Judea-Samaria 
and Gaza, wit1lin the framework of the Military Government's Civilian 
Administrationj numbers about 12,000 persons. ) 
5. Education and Culture., Operation of the network of schools in the 
areas, from kindergarten to higher education; supervision of cultural, 
artistic and sporting activities. 
6. Health: Supervision of hospitals and clinics; operation of sanitary 
and other services related to Public health. 
7. Housing and Public Works: Construction, housing for the inhabitants 
and public works projects. 
8. Transportation and Communications: Maintenance and coordinations 
services. 
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9. Labour and Social Welfare: Welfare, labour and employment services, 
including the operation of labour exchanges. 
10. Municipal Affairs: Matters concerning municipalities and their 
effectived operation. 
11. Local Police: Operation of a strong local police force, as provided 
for in the Camp David agreement, and maintenance of prisons for criminal 
offenders sentenced by the courts in the areas. 
12. Religious Affairs: Provision and maintenance of religious 
facilities for all religious communities among the Arab inhabitants of 
Judea-Samaria and the Gaza district. 
13. Industry, Commerce and Tourism: Development of industry, commerce, 
workshops and tourist services. 
2. The council will have full powers in its spheres of competence to 
determine its budget, to enter into contractual obligations, to sue and 
be sued and to engage manpower. It will, moreover, have wide powers to 
promulgate regulations, as required by a body of this kind. In the 
nature of things, in view of the free movement that will prevail between 
Judea-Samaria and the Gaza district and Israel and for the general 
welfare of the inhabitants, arrangements will be agreed upon in the 
negotiations, in a number of domains, for cooperation and coordination 
with Israel. The administrative council will, hence, have full scope to 
exercise its wide-ranging powers under the terms of the autonomy 
agreement. These powers embrace all walks of life, and will enable the 
inhabitants of thq areas concerned to enjoy full autonomy. 
3. Size: The size of thý administrative council, whose representative 
character finds expression in its establishment through free elections, 
by the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Clearly, the 
criterion for determining the number of its members must be the 
functions that the council is empowered to perform. We propose, 
therefore, that the number of members will conform with the functions 
listed above'. 
4. Free elections: Elections to the administrative council, under 
Israel's proposals, will be absolutely free, as stipulated in the Camp 
David agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, the parties will 
agree upon the modalities of the elections; as a matter of fact, in past 
negotiations a long list of principles and guidelines has already been 
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prepared in this matter. In these free elections, all the rights 
pertaining to a peaceful assembly, freedom of expression and' secret 
balloting will be preserved and assured, and all necessary steps will be 
taken to prevent any interference with the election process. The 
holding of an absolutely free and unhampered election process will thus 
be assured in full, under the law, and in keeping with the tradition of 
free elections practiced in democratic societies. These elections will, 
in many respects, constitute a new departure in the region around us 
which in most of its parts is not too close to the ways of democracy, 
and in which free elections are a rare phenomenon. It is of some 
interest, thereforet to note that Judea-Samaria and Gaza under Israel's 
Military Government since 1967, have exemplified the practical 
possibility of totally free elections in these areas. In 1972, and 
again in 1976, Israel organized free elections in these areas based on 
the tradition and model of its own democratic and liberal tradition and 
custom; voters and elected officials alike concede that these were free 
elections in the fullest sense. The elections in the administrative 
council will be organized and supervised by a central elections 
committee whose composition has been agreed upon by the parties. 
5. Time of elections and establishment of the self-governing authority 
(Administrative council); The elections will be held as expeditiously as 
possible after agreement will have been reached on the autonomy. This 
was set forth in the Joint letter of the late President Sadat and of 
Prime Minister Begin to President Carter, dated 26 March 1979, setting 
for the manner in which the self-governing authority (administrative 
council) is to be established, under the terms of the Camp David 
agreement. 
6. Within one month following the electionsl the self-governing 
authority (administrative council) is to be established and inaugurated, 
and at that time the transitional period of five years will begin- 
again, in conformity with the Camp David agreement and the joint letter. 
7. Hence, every effort will be made to hold elections without delay 
once an agreement is reached, to be'followed by the establishment of the 
self-governing authority (administrative council). 
8. Following the elections and the establishment of the self-governing 
authority (administrative council) the military government and its 
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civilian administration will be withdrawnj a withdrawal of Israeli armed 
forces will take place, and there will be a redeployment of the 
remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations, in full- 
conformity with the Camp David agreement. Israel will present to the 
other parties in the negotiations the map of the specified security 
locations of the redeployment. It goes without saying that all this 
will be done for the purpose of safeguarding the security of Israel as 
well as of the Arab inhabitants of Judea-Samaria and Gaza and of the 
Israeli citizens residing in these areas. 
9. All of the above indicates Israel's readiness to observe the Camp 
David agreement fully and in every detail, in letter and spirit, while 
safeguarding the interests of all concerned. 
APPIEND IXVIII 
Agreement Regarding The Permanent Boundary 
Between Egypt And Israel, 26 February, 1989 
The Governments of Egypt and Israel, 
Reaffirming their adherence to the provisions of the Treaty of Peace of 26 
March 1979, and their respect for the inviolability and sanctity of the 
permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel, which is the recognized 
international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of 
Palestine, 
Recognizing as final and binding upon them the Award of 29 September 1988 
of the Arbitral Tribunal established by the Compromis of 10 September 1986, 
Having mutually located the recognized international boundary between 
boundary Pillar 91 and the Gulf of Aqaba, 
Have agreed as follows: 
1. The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel, as defined in Article 11 
of the Treaty of Peace$ meets the Gulf of Aqaba at the point marked by the two 
governments on the ground, as recorded in Annex A. 
2. On or before noon, March 15,1989, Israel will withdraw behind the 
recognized international boundary. 
Innex A 
The surveyors of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, meeting 
on February 24,1989, determined that the permanent boundary between Egypt and 
Israel, as defined in Article II of the Treaty of Peace, follows a straight line 
between agreed Boundary Pillar 91 and the Gulf of Aqaba. The surveyors of the 
two countries marked that line on the ground with two markers, one on the 
northern side of the road (as shown on the attached sketch) and one an the 
ridge immediately above the road. The surveyors agreed that tomorrow, February 
27, the latter marker will be replaced by a more permanent marker and an 
additional, similar marker will be erected on the same line where the line meets 
the share. 
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Addendum To Annex A 
On 7 March 1989 the surveyors of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of 
Israel augmented the local description of the two permanent markers established 
on 27 February 1989 Pursuant to Annex A of the document signed an 26 February 
1989 by recording the distances from these two markers to BP91 and by tying, 
through surveying measurements, to two agreed points an the Hotel and an agreed 
point an the top of the "granite knob". 
The above were recorded on the attached description card which, together with 
this Addendum are an integral part of Annex A. 
The parties agreed that a measurement of the angle between the prolongation of 
the line between B. P. 90 and B. P. 91 and the line connecting B. P. 91 and the two 
above noted markers will be carried out within the Framework of the 
documentation of the entire permanent boundary in the near future to be 
coordinated between the parties. 
Agreed Xinutes 
Concerning Tourism In South Sinai Through Checkpoint lumber 4 
Delegations from Egypt and Israel met during January and February 1989 in 
order to promote tourism between the two countries on a reciprocal basis and to 
their mutual benefit. At the end of these meetings the Egyptians delegation 
advised the Israeli delegation that the competent Egyptian authorities issued 
appropriate regulations necessary for the implementation of the following 
regulations and the following agreed arrangements regarding tourists of all 
nationalities. These regulations are to be communicated to all Egyptian 
consulates abroad. The Israeli delegation advised the Egyptian delegation'that 
Israel shall provide reciprocal arrangements on a proportional basis upon 
Egypt's request, 
Passports: 
In addition to the use of regular passports, the Egyptian authorities shall 
recognize Israeli regular passports valid for travel only to Egypt, provided 
such passports are valid for at least two months as of the date of entry. The 
Egyptian delegation requested to see and approve a sample In advance of use. 
Regular collective passports (for group. tours and large families) for around 25 
520 
persons would be valid for a single entry provided such passports are valid for 
at least two months as of the date of entry. 
Misas: 
All tourists entering South Sinai wifl be exempted from tourist visasl and entry 
and exit stamps will be stamped either on the passport upon the tourist's 
request or on the regular registration forms upon entry. Such stamps will be 
valid for a period of 14 days. 
Ecew 
No fee will be charged for persons traveling less than one kilometer from the 
checkpoint. 
rustoms: 
There will be only random spot checks and checks of suspicious persons. Anyone 
having anything to declare, such declaration will be noted by officials on the 
exit form. 
Currency: 
In accordance with agreed Technical Arrangements: (a) facilities will be 
provided in the Sonesta Hotel on a 24-hour basis for the exchange of Israeli 
currency for Egyptian currency and vice versa; and (b) Israeli currency obtained 
through this procedure will be convertible into U. S. dollars by the Bank of 
Israel. 
Vehicles 
Private passenger vehicles and rental cars: Customs authorities will register 
car license plate number, owner name, and driver name; they will affix a sticker 
valid for multiple entries for one kilometer for a period of stay of up to 14 
days. These rules will also apply to authorized service and supply vehicles 
attending to the needs of the hotel, authorized hotel shuttles and tour buses 
carrying passengers from Israel to the hotel and vice versa, and to emergency 
vehicles, the passage of which will be expedited by both sides. 
Vehicles crossing the border shall be covered by appropriate Egyptian insurance' 
valid for up to 14 days, or longer up to one year - if requested. 
Tprminal Hours: 
The delegations agreed to extend the working hours of their respective 
terminals to 0600-2400 hours. They further agreed to re-evaluate the need for 
and length of such extension after three months. 
'Fnod Regulations# 
Importation of food for personal consumption will be allowed subject to health 
and customs requirements. 
r, pneral: 
Appropriate liaison will be established between managers of the Israeli and 
Egyptian terminals. 
The Egyptian authorities will look into the possibility of designating a 
confined camping area that would be equipped with facilities. 
All rules and regulations with respect to tourism agreed to between Egypt and 
Israel shall continue, to apply unless otherwise stipulated in these matters. 
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